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The Digital Affect is an exploration of ways to improve the teaching of reading and writing using 
digital media and technology.  This requires a fundamental reexamination of digital narratives, 
building on and updating Espen Aarseth’s seminal work in Cybertext and N. Katherine Hayles’ 
recent work in Writing Machines.  It also requires a critical appraisal of the technology of the 
personal computer as an environment in which writers compose – an environment that introduces 
possibilities while imposing constraints that materially influence the writer’s efforts.  This 
exploration is best undertaken, I argue, from the perspective of literacy studies, not literary 
theory.  Rather than assuming the literary nature of digital narratives, my examination of the 
literacy requirements and effects of digital media and digital environments allows for the 
construction of a more nuanced and precise typology and genealogy of digital narrative.  
Focusing on the hermeneutical demands of digital media and environments reveals a narrative 
tradition that extends back to the earliest days of oral storytelling and that manifests itself not as 
a generic or historical formation, but rather as a poetical and rhetorical mode in which the 
narrative material is fragmented and distributed across media and throughout the virtual space of 
 v
the story.  Probing the hermeneutical act of interpreting digital narratives suggests the operation 
of what I term the “distributed mode” of composing narrative, an authorial mode I examine in  
works as varied as Stuart Moulthrop’s hypermedia story Reagan Library, Italo Calvino’s novel  
If on a winter’s night a traveler, Godfrey Reggio’s film Koyaanisqatsi, and Laurence Sterne’s 
novel Tristram Shandy.  This attention to the hermeneutical requirements of works composed in 
the distributed mode reveals two important features: first, the inadequacy of the widely-used 
term “digital literacy” to describe the range of activities undertaken by the interpreter of such 
works; and second, the inextricability and simultaneity of “reading” and “writing” during the 
interpretation of digital and non-digital works alike.  Throughout The Digital Affect, I argue that 
digital media disrupts and reconfigures our standard literacy practices, presenting an invaluable 
opportunity to make those practices visible and teachable in literature and composition 
classrooms. 
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PREFACE 
 
 
When I first began thinking about this project, in 1998, I had already noticed that something odd 
happened when I read hypertext fictions, such as Michael Joyce’s Afternoon, A Story or Stuart 
Moulthrop’s Victory Garden – I had to work a lot harder than usual to make it through them.  
The stories themselves weren’t especially difficult; I certainly had read more challenging prose.  
But these texts seemed to be working against me, preventing me from reading them.  The more I 
read, the more fiercely they seemed to resist my every effort to slip into my usual reading habits 
and patterns, because I could not rely on the conventions of reading a codex (book-form) text: 
reading from left to right across the lines of text on a page, following the lines from the top to the 
bottom of the page, turning the pages in sequential numerical order, progressing one chapter to 
the next.  Because they defied traditional reading conventions, hypertext fictions presented me 
with no clear guidance as to where I should go next.  I know when I am being “bad” with a 
traditional novel; reading the last chapter to find out what happens to the protagonist may be 
frowned upon by authors, but the technology of the codex allows these sorts of transgressions 
against the convention.  Hypertext fictions, on the other hand, give no indication of the “correct” 
way to proceed.  The narrative is distributed across a series of nodes, divided into fragments that 
are connected by hyperlinks, instead of arranged one after the other in a progression from the 
first page to the last, as in codex texts.  Because the hyperlinks establish a conceptual and 
associative geography for the prose, “forward” and “back” become meaningful only in the 
temporal sense when discussing hypertext fiction, not in the usual spatial sense. 
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 I eventually realized that part of what was frustrating me was the fact that I was having to 
work harder than usual to make sense of these stories.  When I read most fiction books, I am able 
to slip seamlessly into the author’s narrative world, interpreting the text of the book as I 
experience it in my mind’s eye.  In hypertext, however, I had to interpret not only the words on 
the page, but also my own reading process.  I was constantly having to ask myself, what have I 
learned, what did I know before this, what do I want to learn more about, and how do I think I 
can find that information?  All of these questions took me out of whatever immersive experience 
I might be having in the texts’ narratives.  Instead, I became preoccupied with the construction of 
the narrative that was being formed out of my efforts to read these texts.  I was the protagonist in 
my own narrative, competing against the many nefarious tricks of Joyce and Moulthrop, as I 
forged ahead in my quest to “finish” these hypertext fictions.   My narrative was episodic, filled 
with countless encounters as I read whatever prose passage was presented to me, attempted to fit 
it into the narrative framework that I was slowly constructing and revising in my head, and then 
attempted to find another prose passage that would answer the many questions I had.1  
Sometimes I prevailed, and sometimes I failed.  Most times, however, I did not realize whether I 
had failed or succeeded in my efforts until much later in my reading experience. 
 What these hypertext fictions – hyperfictions – were forcing me to do was to consciously 
work through the subconscious strategies for world-construction that I performed every time I 
read.  Usually, these procedures operated at a level of which I had not been aware since 
childhood, only rarely surfacing during particularly difficult codex passages.  At these “what 
the—?” moments, I have two options: I may ignore my confusion, hopeful that at a later point in 
                                                 
1   In Afternoon, a Story, for instance, there are “539 textual segments with 951 links among them,” while Victory Garden 
has “a total of 993 textual segments connected by 2,804 links” (Gaggi 123, 131).  Furthermore, each of these 539 or 993 
segments might lead me back to a segment I had already read, making the number of segments a patient reader could 
attempt to read infinite. 
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the text my questions will be answered, or I may stop reading and attempt to reconstruct the 
moment of my difficulty.  This second option might entail re-reading passages, or it might 
simply require me to devote a few moments to deciphering the many things going on in the text 
that have caused me such confusion.  In any case, “what the—?” moments are few and far 
between – except when reading hyperfiction or similar fragmented works. 
 This project has its genesis in computerized hyperfiction, but it extends into a 
bewildering array of other media and forms.  Reading contemporary literature, watching 
contemporary film, in fact, engaging with practically every form of contemporary art, 
demonstrates that digital media does not have an exclusive claim to fragmentation.  Every 
conceivable artistic field has countless examples of its practitioners moving away from linearity 
and embracing fragmentation, multiple perspectives, collage, pastiche, and the disorientation of 
the consumer of the work of art.  Labels such as “postmodern” have been deployed with 
alarming frequency to describe this pan-media movement, but this label in particular fails to take 
into account that these works were being produced long before postmodernity.  Lumping 
Lawrence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy, for instance, with Alain Robbe-Grillet’s In the Labyrinth, 
ignores the historical formation and context of each work. 
 Instead, many digital works share a formal, structural basis – which exists within various 
historical periods, and is not the product of any one – which persists across media and across 
time.  I advance the term “the distributed mode” to describe the structural and artistic 
conventions that connect these works.  The distributed mode, like narrative or drama, is 
capacious enough to encompass the array of texts that evince it, and is also broad enough to 
include both fiction and non-fiction works produced in this way.  This is an important 
consideration, as there is a great deal of criticism and theory concerning fragmentation in digital 
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works, most of which fails to differentiate adequately between fiction and non-fiction.  This is 
largely due to the creation of the Internet and the World Wide Web, with its network of 
connected “pages.”  The programming language used to create Web pages, hypertext markup 
language (HTML), is named for its defining feature – the ability to connect fragments of text on 
one page with fragments of text on other pages, thus “transporting” the Web user across the 
“hyperspace” of the Internet. 
 As “hypertext” became both the programming language used to create the linked web of 
pages and also the name for the linked pages themselves, early digital literary theorists rarely 
acknowledged or sought to maintain the very real distinction between non-fiction hypermedia, 
such as the Web, and hypermedia fiction such as Afternoon, a Story.  The cognitive demands of 
each type of work, though, are significantly different.  In the first three chapters of this 
dissertation, I will examine only fictional works in the distributed mode, leaving composition of 
both fiction and non-fiction in the distributed mode for the fourth chapter. 
 
- * - * - * - 
 
Chapter One, “The Distributed Mode and its Hermeneutical Problems,” challenges 
the concept of “digital literacy” as fundamentally flawed.  Examining the particular affordances 
of digital media, I argue that, although both multimodality and fragmentation are possible in 
many different media, digital technology is uniquely suited to facilitate and maximize the effects 
of each.  In this chapter, I examine Stuart Moulthrop’s hypermedia work, Reagan Library, using 
its integrated panoramic vistas and prose narration, as well as its fragmentation across a series of 
textual spaces, to illustrate the properties of the distributed mode.  This analysis also 
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demonstrates, importantly, that works in a variety of digital and non-digital media can be 
composed in the distributed mode.  I turn to Julio Cortázar’s novel, Hopscotch, as an illustration 
of the distributed mode realized in traditional codex form.  Focusing on these two works – one 
digital, one codex – I develop a series of hermeneutical problems arising from the attempted 
interpretation of works in the distributed mode, exploring the essentially digital nature of even 
print works composed in the distributed mode, and providing a more nuanced and intricate 
understanding of “digitality.”  From this hermeneutical investigation arises a more nuanced 
understanding of “literacy” which may be applied to composing or interpreting works in the 
distributed mode.  As I argue throughout “The Distributed Mode and its Hermeneutical 
Problems,” digital literacy comprises a far wider range of works than digital suggests, and entails 
a far wider range of activities than literacy is commonly believed to encompass.  Only by 
expanding our understanding of these two central terms can we reach a truly comprehensive and 
useful vision of digital media and chart a pedagogy for teaching it. 
Chapter Two, “Rhetorical Hermeneutics,” interrogates the use of rhetoric as a 
hermeneutical tool.  In this chapter, I argue – through an examination of early texts on rhetoric, 
poetics, and philosophy, as well as of contemporary theories of rhetoric and performativity – that 
rhetoric and poetics fuse into a single signifying practice in the interpretation of literary works.  
Thus, as I demonstrate in the second half of the chapter, all literary hermeneutics are essentially 
rhetorical in nature.  Building primarily on the hermeneutical theories of Hans-Georg Gadamer 
and Paul Ricoeur, and grounding my discussion in examinations of Marc Saporta’s aleatoric 
novel, Composition No. 1, and Godfrey Reggio’s film, Koyaanisqatsi, I construct a rhetorical 
hermeneutic specifically tailored to the interpretive demands of digital media and works 
composed in the distributed mode. 
 xvi
Chapter Three, “Master of the Maze: Reading as Godgame, Interpretation as 
Experience,” applies my rhetorical hermeneutic to the problem of reading and interpreting 
works composed in the distributed mode, exploring the reader’s complex process of enacting the 
narrative of the work – a process that combines traditional notions of reading and writing into a 
seamlessly unified interpretive practice.  The rhetorical hermeneutic outlined in chapter two is 
here applied to Italo Calvino’s notoriously difficult readerly novel, If on a winter’s night a 
traveler, and Michael Joyce’s no less challenging hypertext novel, Afternoon, A Story, 
illuminating the literary works as well as the reader’s role and actions while interpreting the 
works.  Revisiting the critical trope of the labyrinth frequently deployed by hypertext theorists, I 
explore the affective power of the labyrinth, arguing that, as in the labyrinth, the reader’s actions 
and experiences are provoked by the affective power of these works.  Understanding these works 
demands, therefore, that we pay full attention to the affective and aesthetic experience of the 
reader, in addition to critical analysis of the work’s narrative.  Throughout this chapter, I 
demonstrate the ways in which affective interpretation, coupled with critical analysis, can be 
applied to the teaching of literature and can improve the effectiveness of literature pedagogy. 
Chapter Four, “Digital Discourse: Composing in and with Technology,” describes 
the theoretical and pedagogical basis for the freshman composition seminar of the same name 
that I designed and have taught at the University of Pittsburgh.  The goal of this course is to 
integrate contemporary compositional forms with the digital-based self-reflexive and self-aware 
interpretation demonstrated in the previous three chapters.  The resulting pedagogy – based 
loosely on the work of the New London Group, and utilizing literary models such as Milorad 
Pavić’s novel, Dictionary of the Khazars – explores the ways digital technology has affected our 
modes of communication, and manifests that exploration in a variety of writing media, both 
 xvii
digital and non-digital.  This chapter describes the course’s pedagogy of code-switching from 
formal discursive modes, such as the traditional essay, to newer, more immediate and personal 
modes, such as the Web log (blog), and from the unimodal format of prose argumentation to 
multimodal rhetoric and argumentation.  As in the previous chapter, I demonstrate and apply a 
new pedagogy that allows digital textuality to inform the study and teaching of composition and 
thus improve the effectiveness of composition pedagogy. 
 
- * - * - * - 
 
 Throughout The Digital Affect, I consistently argue two points: first, that digital media is 
inseparable from communication practices and arts in the world today; and second, that our 
classroom practices have not managed to teach the critical awareness of these media and their 
communication styles, strengths, and weaknesses that is necessary for the student to function as 
an informed participant in contemporary discourse.  Though I may wax a bit rhapsodic about 
some of the digital works I discuss in this dissertation, I am no wild-eyed radical calling for the 
replacement of all books and paper with CD-ROMs and tablet computers.  For this project, I 
have deliberately chosen canonical works to examine and discuss, and I have paired each true 
digital work with a non-digital work to show the commonalities and traditions at work 
throughout the distributed mode.  Theorists of digital media, thrilled by the promise of the new, 
sometimes forget that productive approaches to current technology do not have to be, or to come 
from, new sources.  Literary and interpretive practices both come from traditions and have long, 
proud histories behind them.  Those histories and traditions are not so easily thrown off – they 
often can be found at the most surprising times and in the most unlikely places.  The Digital 
 xviii
Affect is a beginning, a set of approaches and questions that I see needing to be answered, given 
current trends and research in narrative, interpretation, and pedagogy.  I hope it will be seen as 
provocative without being dismissive of prior work, productive for the stimulation of further 
research on the many topics it raises, and an open invitation to all teachers and researchers 
interested in digital-age narratives and composition.  Come on in, the virtual water is just fine! 
 xix
  
 
 
 
 
1. THE DISTRIBUTED MODE AND ITS HERMENEUTICAL PROBLEMS 
 
If we want to begin to see ourselves where we are, we will have to 
find ways to say exactly what we are seeing.                           
(Joyce “New Stories” 170) 
 
Every evocation or exploration of a new discovery demands a new 
rhetoric, a new terminology.  If the newly discovered terrain is 
described in ‘old’ terms, they will colonize the new territory by 
imposing the beliefs they bring with them.                          
(Downing and Sosnoski 100) 
 
 
1.1. “DIGITAL LITERACY” IS NEITHER 
 
As far as general rubrics go, Digital Literacy is a pretty good one: it is short, it uses common 
language words that everyone knows; it includes a cultural hot-button word, “literacy”; it 
features the sexy computer signifier, “digital.”  And yet, as we use it the phrase has a meaning 
largely separate from the literal interpretation of its two words.  Digital Literacy does not refer to 
reading and writing digits – the word for that is numeracy.  Instead, we mean the reading and 
writing of materials rendered in the digital media of the computer processor.  The fact that we 
need to modify literacy with the qualifier digital, however, indicates either uneasiness with the 
ready application of literacy to the sphere of the computer, or suspicion that the computer 
modifies the ways we read and write, and hence modifies what we mean by literacy.  In either 
case, the relationship between digitality and literacy is far from stable. 
1 
 To explore why this is so, it will be helpful to isolate the two terms of the compound 
signifier Digital Literacy, examining each term as it is used in critical discourse and as it 
contributes a specific range of meanings and expectations to the set of skills required to 
demonstrate Digital Literacy.  As we shall see, neither digital nor literacy, as they are commonly 
used, is necessary or sufficient to describe the complex of cognitive and physical experiences 
and abilities required for someone to be considered digitally literate.  Each term conceals as 
much as it reveals about what actually happens when people engage with digital works, and it 
will be the project of this chapter to begin to bring to light the scope of what Digital Literacy is 
and what it requires. 
The process of uncovering the hidden mechanisms operating within the umbrella term 
Digital Literacy will lead quickly to questions of interpretation and understanding – what does it 
mean to interpret a digital work, what kind of works are to be interpreted, what is the relationship 
between the author, the reader, and the work, and what understandings of the digital environment 
are necessary to begin this work of interpretation, to name just a few – questions central to the 
hermeneutical tradition.  As Richard Palmer succinctly explains, “hermeneutics is the study of 
understanding, especially the task of understanding texts” (8).  There is a foundational 
impediment, however, to interpreting texts, referred to as the “hermeneutical problem”: how can 
one accurately interpret texts written by other people, potentially living in far distant lands and 
possibly in long ago times?  Hans Georg Gadamer, one of the towering figures in modern 
hermeneutical thought, notes that the hermeneutical problem is characterized by the fact that 
“something distant has to be brought close, a certain strangeness overcome, a bridge built 
between the once and the now.” (“Scope” 22).  Though Gadamer’s focus is on works from the 
past, Palmer clarifies that hermeneutics is the process by which “something foreign, strange, 
2 
 separated in time, space, or experience is made familiar, present, comprehensible” (14).  The act 
of building a bridge between Digital Literacy and our “familiar, present and comprehensible” 
understandings of computer technology and literacy must be performed very carefully, lest the 
“strangeness” of Digital Literacy be lost, buried under the connotations of traditional print 
literacy and the now-familiar instrument of the personal computer.  In his essay, “The 
Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem,” Gadamer proclaims that “the real power of 
hermeneutical consciousness is our ability to see what is questionable” (13).  This ability, 
though, remains itself hermeneutical, which means that “what is questionable” is not 
immediately apparent.  The passages from Michael Joyce and David Downing and James 
Sosnoski that head this chapter each identify in the context of computer technology and 
communication this hermeneutical tension between ostensible, stable-seeming meaning and the 
examination and discovery of a more accurate, but, in Frank Kermode’s words, “undetected 
latent sense” (Genesis 4). 
Joyce writes that “we will have to find ways to say exactly what we are seeing” when we 
look at digital textuality and our relationships with it (170, emphasis added).  We must “find 
ways” due to the limiting effect of our terminologies and habits of thought.  Downing and 
Sosnoski assert that the exploration of any new “territory” demands its own rhetoric and 
terminology.  At the beginning of any such exploration, the only terminologies available are the 
“old” ones, which Downing and Sosnoski warn “will colonize the new territory by imposing the 
beliefs they bring with them” (100).  When examining a hybrid form of textuality, which digital 
technology certainly is, considering the hybridization in terms of its constituent, “old” elements 
using the specialized language and ways of thought developed for them seems an appropriate 
initial course of action.  However, the hybrid is more than merely the sum of its parts.  The ways 
3 
 in which the elements are combined, and to what purpose and effect, contribute greatly to the 
new hybrid gestalt, demanding that not only the assemblage, but each of its constituent parts be 
reconsidered in its new, recontextualized aspect.  Thus, though the old familiar terms and 
analytics may seem apt, stable, and even comforting when considering a new hybrid form, they 
ultimately serve to hinder its accurate description and examination.   
The old terms and analytics remain instrumental for a brief period, as they indicate needs 
for new terms and analytics through the tension that arises from the dissonance between actual 
practice and experience with digital textuality and the inadequate tools at our disposal to describe 
and explain them.  This chapter arises from just such moments of tension and dissonance, and 
explores the range of activities – constructive and interpretive, cognitive and physiological – 
lumped together under the broad heading of Digital Literacy, as well as the works that evince 
and demand such activities.  The new terminologies and the new methodologies generated by 
this exploration will, in turn, point to new questions, which will demand their own terminologies 
and methodologies.  Raising and answering such questions, in other words, is never an end in 
itself, but always helps us to see ever more clearly what remains questionable. 
 
1.1.1. Digital Dilemmas: Reagan Library and Hopscotch 
 
Stuart Moulthrop’s Reagan Library was released for public access on the World Wide Web in 
1999, and presents an ambitious commingling of textual and visual narrative.2  Each lexia 
(plural: lexias)3 in Reagan Library occupies its own page, and consists of a colored banner on the 
left side of the screen identifying the lexia being displayed, a graphic representation of the 
                                                 
2   Reagan Library can be accessed on the WWW at the following address: http://iat.ubalt.edu/moulthrop/hypertexts/rl/ 
3   The term “lexia” describes a fragment of prose, usually presented as an independent section of narrative.  The term 
was adopted by most theorists of hypertext, hypertext fiction (referred to throughout this paper as hyperfiction) and other 
forms of distributed narrative, following Roland Barthes’ terminology from S/Z (13). 
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 location depicted by the current lexia, and a section of prose text.   As in most web pages, the 
reader has the option of clicking on text links within the prose portion of each page.  The reader 
also has the option of clicking on objects depicted within a panoramic vista (created with 
QuickTime VR) included at the top of each page.  Figure 1 shows one of the four opening lexias, 
the blue “Pavilion.”4   
 
 
Figure 1: The Blue-Blue Pavilion from Reagan Library. 
 
                                                 
4   Given the difficulty of citing to internal portions of hyperfiction works, I have adopted a standard that attempts to 
allow the reader to locate quotations quickly and easily.  As hyperfiction lexias rarely spread across more than one page, 
each hyperfictional citation will consist of the name of the lexia in quotation marks.  For works such as Reagan Library, 
which duplicate lexia names across zones, I will also include the name of the zone. 
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 In Reagan Library, Moulthrop establishes a set of “zones” and “states” that make up the work, 
and through which the reader navigates by selecting either prose hyperlinks or graphical objects 
in the panoramic window included in each lexia.  The work is distributed across four zones – 
blue, red, black with blue sky, and black with black sky – each of which contains prose told from 
a different narrative perspective.  Each zone presents not only a different narrator, but also seven 
different lexia locations.  Each of the four zones includes a central space, a “Pavilion,” that 
provides a textual introduction to the zone.  Some objects/spaces are duplicated across zones, as 
in the case of a mysterious cone-shaped object.  However, in two of the zones the cone is white, 
and in two it is black.  Similarly, some objects/spaces are unique to one zone.  This array of 
twenty-eight lexias – four zones consisting of seven object/spaces each – is further multiplied by 
a randomization of prose text that Moulthrop describes as the “state” of each lexia.  The first 
time a reader accesses a lexia, the prose text of that lexia is heavily randomized, largely 
consisting of phrases from other lexias.  As the reader returns repeatedly to that lexia, though, the 
prose text becomes more ordered, and the random text is replaced with prose that begins to form 
a coherent unit.  The state of the lexia, then, describes its counter-entropic progression from 
disorder to order, culminating at a fourth state, in which the prose settles into a fixed order.5  The 
reader, then, has not twenty-eight lexias to traverse, but rather 112 separate spaces through which 
she must progress via hyperlinkages if she wants to read the entire work. 
Critics have noted the difficulties peculiar to hyperfiction works, describing “the 
disorientation problem” (Conklin 38) of being “lost in hyperspace” or suffering from “the 
frustration of disorientation” (Charney 250) caused by hypertext.  Some have gone so far as to 
describe the state as one of “cognitive overload” (Schmundt 310), which may be so severe as to 
                                                 
5   All quotations from Reagan Library, except where noted, are from the fourth state of each lexia. 
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 represent “a disorientation that precludes meaningful freedom” (Gaggi 104-5).6  In traditional 
narrative modes, digression is understood to be the prerogative of the author, and the reader or 
viewer has the tacit assurance that sooner or later the narrative thread will resume, and that the 
digression was, however tenuously connected or seemingly unrelated, important to the overall 
work.  In works like Reagan Library, however, the reader’s responsibility for choosing the 
navigational method, and thus for calling up the next lexia, easily can result in the sense that 
somehow the reader has failed (i.e., gotten lost or turned around), and the resulting frustration 
can be significantly greater than that experienced by the consumer of a work in a more traditional 
narrative form. 
 The frustration and lack of information regarding the results of the choices to be made by 
the reader in the distributed mode cause these works to resemble, spatially and 
phenomenologically, a labyrinth in which the reader is trapped.  In his seminal book, Cybertext: 
Perspectives on Ergodic Literature, Espen Aarseth describes the reader’s experiences in the 
labyrinth of the distributed mode as being a series of aporias and epiphanies.  The lack of 
continuity in distributed narratives – as is provided by the sequential numbering of pages in 
traditional codex works, or as in the rapid sequential projection of static images in motion 
pictures – produces a blockage for the reader: after the reader finishes reading a particular lexia, 
there is no obvious, convention-bound successor to be read.  Instead, the reader faces a structural 
fissure in the text and must choose for herself a way to traverse the gap built into the work.  As 
Aarseth writes, “Aporia here becomes a trope, an absent pièce de résistance rather than the usual 
transcendental resistance of the (absent) meaning of a difficult passage” (Aarseth 91).  The 
resolution of the aporia produces epiphany – the replacement of a lack of text with another lexia.  
Even when the reader’s choice does not result in the resolution of the reader’s needs, the 
                                                 
6   For more on this, please see Johnson-Eilola 202, Utting and Yankelovich 58, and Schmundt 316. 
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 continuation of the work is itself a resolution of the premature ending represented by finishing a 
lexia.  Thus, in Aarseth’s terms, “The hypertext epiphany [. . .] is immanent: a planned construct 
rather than an unplanned contingency” (92).   
 In his classic essay, “Irony as a Principle of Structure,” Cleanth Brooks argues that this is 
precisely the way poetry operates.  According to Brooks, the multiple meanings of the poetic 
language create situations in which the reader is unable to determine the single, original meaning 
intended by the poet.  In Brooks’ words, “None of these meanings cancels out the other.  All are 
relevant, and each meaning contributes to the total meaning.  Indeed, there is not a facet of 
significance which does not receive illumination from the [ambiguous] figure” (765).  Just as the 
conscientious poetry reader cannot collapse the interpretive options presented by the poem’s 
irony into a single, stable meaning, and so the poem is enriched by the conflicting yet 
complimentary meanings arising from it, so too does the reader of hyperfiction face an 
irresolvable problem in attempting to select the next lexia.  All possible choices are correct, and 
so a work in the distributed mode accumulates meanings and interpretations, limited only by the 
amount of effort the reader is willing to expend in her navigation from lexia to lexia across the 
web of links. 
 This effort is different in both scope and amount from the effort expended by readers and 
viewers of works in more traditional narrative modes.  Though books do not read themselves and 
films do not watch themselves, the greater effort expended by consumers in the distributed mode 
includes the mechanical and cognitive processes inherent in traditional narratives and adds the 
need to consciously select the next lexia and to interpret the link itself.  Aarseth coins the 
neologism of “ergodic” reading to describe this new set of activities, “using a term appropriated 
from physics that derives from the Greek words ergon and hodos, meaning ‘work’ and ‘path.’  In 
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 ergodic literature, nontrivial effort is required to allow the reader to traverse the text” (1, italics 
in original).  The effort required by traditional narratives, especially in the codex platform,7 of 
turning pages, reading sequentially, and employing other codex conventions is, in Aarseth’s 
formulation, not ignored, but subordinated to the actively cognitive work of interpreting the 
narrative itself.  In hyperfiction works, on the other hand, the action of selecting hyperlinks is 
significant to both the experience of consuming the work and the formal properties of the work 
being consumed. 
 The material features of Reagan Library, its ergodicity, the mixture of prose text and 
movable, panoramic image, and the variability built into the prose by the decreasing randomness 
of each successive state, not to mention the fact that Reagan Library is a computer program, 
coded in hypertext markup language (HTML), QuickTime Virtual Reality, and javascript – that 
it, in other words, can be experienced only on a computer – all clearly mark the work as being 
one that requires its readers to possess Digital Literacy.  The work’s prose fragments, though, 
also require a more traditionally understood literacy; the work’s readers, after all, have to read 
Moulthrop’s prose. 
 Reagan Library is clearly a candidate target for investigating Digital Literacy, and hence, 
digital textuality and literariness – as we shall see, literacy, textuality and literariness are always 
inextricably linked – but it is the mingling of prose with panoramic, changeable images, as well 
as its weblike structure requiring readers to select their next segment of narrative, that must not 
be too quickly dismissed or taken for granted.  Reagan Library is clearly an example of hybrid 
                                                 
7   The different forms that distributed narrative may take – hypertext, codex novel, film, computer or video games – 
are uneasily described as “media.”  Each medium is actually – or potentially – comprised of several different media.  
Thus, each form would be more appropriately referred to as a multi-medium, but this is awkward and potentially 
misleading given the popular usage of the term “multi-media” to describe, among other things, personal computers 
with advanced graphics and sound capabilities.  Instead, I propose the alternate term platform to describe each multi-
medium.  Referring to the codex as a platform allows us to foreground the potential of the form to incorporate both 
print and illustration, and to make the print itself illustrative through the use of multiple fonts or different colors of 
ink. 
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 textuality, blending the media and conventions of print literature, illustration, landscape pictorial, 
computer science, and games of chance in varying amounts and with varying results and effects. 
 And yet, despite the plethora of media involved, print literature remains an integral part 
of Reagan Library, despite the fears of critics, such as Sven Birkerts, that digital textuality 
marked the end of print literature.  As Birkerts glumly notes, “The displacement of the page by 
the screen is not yet total (as evidenced by the book you are holding) – it may never be total – 
but the large-scale tendency in that direction has to be obvious to anyone who looks” (Gutenberg 
3).  Instead, as Marie-Laure Ryan notes, the hybrid forms of digital textuality allow for new 
avenues of investigation into even the most traditional print literature.  In the introduction to her 
edited collection, Cyberspace Textuality: Computer Technology and Literary Theory, she writes 
that “One of the most significant effects of the development of electronic textuality on literary 
theory in general is that it has led to a rediscovery and critical investigation of print and the 
Codex book” (10).  The notion that theorizing digital textuality may lead to productive new 
understandings of, in Ryan’s terms, “the material support of the text and its expressive potential” 
of non-digital print literature, is amply demonstrated within the body of critical work on digital 
textuality and Digital Literacy (10).  In their actual practice, the leading theorists of Digital 
Literacy have constructed, with notable unanimity, a canon of non-digital literary works whose 
many similarities to digital textuality require further inquiry.  The similarities between these 
paper-bound works and the emerging body of digital fictions are frequently presented as being so 
significant that they dissolve – or at least blur – the lines separating digital from print textuality.  
But if print literature is capable of assuming many of the distinguishing features of digital fiction, 
does that make these codex novels examples of digital textuality?  Clearly not, although the 
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 relationship between this new canon of sort-of-digital literature and actual digital works like 
Reagan Library is, in the critical literature, anything but clear. 
One of the most commonly discussed sort-of-digital works is Julio Cortázar’s novel, 
Rayuela.  Translated into English in 1966 as Hopscotch, Cortázar’s novel follows its protagonist, 
Horacio Oliveira, an Argentinean expatriate living in Paris, as he searches for meaning in his life.  
Oliveira’s travels, from Paris to Buenos Aires, and his occupations, bohemian ne’er-do-well, 
door-to-door cloth salesman, circus attendant, and orderly at a mental institution, comprise the 
bulk of the novel and present an existentialist interrogation of life, love and literature.  The 
novel’s reputation, however, is founded as much on its structure as on its virtuosity in 
composition and perception.  The novel is divided into many short chapters, which may be read 
in either of two approved ways, according to the novel’s “Table of Instructions”: 
In its own way, this book consists of many books, but two books 
above all. 
 The first can be read in a normal fashion and it ends with 
Chapter 56, at the close of which there are three garish little stars 
which stand for the words The End.  Consequently, the reader may 
ignore what follows with a clear conscience. 
 The second should be read by beginning with Chapter 73 
and then following the sequence indicated at the end of each 
chapter.  In case of confusion or forgetfulness, one need only 
consult the following list: 
73-1-2-116-3-84-4-71-5-81-74-6-7-8-93-68-9-104-10-65-11-136-
12-106-13-115-14-114-117-15-120-16-137-97-18-153-19-90-20-
126-21-79-22-62-23-124-128-24-134-25-141-60-26-109-27-28-
130-151-152-143-100-76-101-144-92-103-108-64-155-123-145-
122-112-154-85-150-95-146-29-107-113-30-57-70-147-31-32-
132-61-33-67-83-142-34-87-105-96-94-91-82-99-35-121-36-37-
98-38-39-86-78-40-59-41-148-42-75-43-125-44-102-45-80-46-47-
110-48-111-49-118-50-119-51-69-52-89-53-66-149-54-129-139-
133-140-138-127-56-135-63-88-72-77-131-58-131- 
 
Thus, the reader is allowed, if not encouraged, to play her own game of hopscotch – rayuela, in 
Spanish – through the text, leaping from one “square” to another.  Cortázar refers to the reader 
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 who follows his path as el lector cómplice, the complicit or accomplice reader.  If, on the other 
hand, the reader chooses to read the novel in the conventional way, she, too, is playing a sort of 
game, this time by thumbing her nose at Cortázar’s apparent dare for the reader to engage in a 
more whimsical consumption of his work.  Cortázar refers to this reader as el lector-hembra, the 
female-reader.8  In the novel, Cortázar positions Oliveira as the paradigmatic lector cómplice, 
and Oliveira’s love interest in Paris, La Maga, as the novel’s paradigmatic lector-hembra.  
Michael Hardin notes that perhaps “given the desire for binaries or the model readers within the 
novel, [el lector cómplice] has been termed by the majority of critics as the ‘male-reader’” (52). 
Though Cortázar’s work was written thirty years before the creation of the Internet and twenty 
years before Apple Computer began to popularize hypertext through its Macintosh program 
Hypercard, the “hopping” order established by Cortázar operates in a fashion similar to the 
hyperlink, sending the reader, for instance, from chapter 2 to chapter 116, forcing the reader to 
skip over 450 pages (in the paperback edition) to create the “work” as Cortázar invites.  This is 
not so different from the experience of the reader of Reagan Library, who has no idea how “far 
away” one lexia is from another, or to which lexia a particular hyperlink will lead.  All the reader 
of either text knows is that she is following one of the patterns for traversal established by the 
author. 
 The material form of Cortázar’s novel, a standard codex presentation with pages bound in 
numerical sequence, as well as the fact that it was written by an international novelist and writer 
of wide acclaim, clearly mark the work as being one that requires its readers to possess literacy.  
Furthermore, complex and allusive writing style demands that the novel’s readers possess not 
merely literacy, but a very high level of literate sophistication and skill.  Cortázar’s “Table of 
Instructions” further expands the scope of the reader’s activity; rather than merely reading the 
                                                 
8   Section 1.4.3 discusses the relevance and importance of Cortázar’s system of naming his readers.   
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 challenging and intricate prose, the reader also must make conscious decisions about how she 
will progress through the novel.  Regardless of whether she chooses the sequential path (reading 
chapters one through fifty-six), or the rayuela (hopping back and forth as indicated at the end of 
each chapter), the codex format allows her to change her mind at any time.  Thus, though she 
may read consecutively for several chapters, she may, for instance, decide to hop – either 
following Cortázar’s suggested path or choosing a different chapter altogether – at any time.  
Thinking through, and then acting on, the choices available to the reader for navigation through 
Hopscotch is a transgression against the accepted conventions of novel-reading, which Cortázar 
sardonically acknowledges by having one of his characters ask, “What good is a writer if he 
can’t destroy literature?” (442).  Though Hopscotch is clearly not a digital work, Cortázar’s 
“Table of Instructions” does provoke something like numeracy in its readers.  Cortázar 
encourages readers to ponder the lengthy string of numbers in an attempt to discover some 
meaning in the male-reader’s ordering. 
 
1.1.2. Codex and Digital: A Tangled Taxonomy 
 
For many theorists of digital textuality and literacy, Hopscotch heralds the coming of digital 
works.  Jane Yellowlees Douglas, whose work on Michael Joyce’s seminal hyperfiction 
Afternoon, A Story remains preeminent, calls Hopscotch and other fragmented codex works like 
it “print precursors” (55).  In her essay “How Do I Stop This Thing,” she explains that 
Hopscotch represents a clear predecessor to hyperfiction not only because of its fragmentation, 
but also because that fragmentation actively works against narrative closure through its “multiple 
and therefore highly indeterminate endings” (162).  George Landow, an early and highly 
influential advocate of examining poststructuralist and postmodern literary theory in light of 
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 hypertext, and vice versa, refers to Hopscotch in a discussion of works he calls “print proto-
hypertext” (HT 2.0 38).  Linking Hopscotch with theoretical works such as Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus and Roland Barthes’  S/Z, Landow describes print proto-
hypertexts as being works “whose printed versions already divide into sections analogous to 
lexias” (38, 56).  Janet Murray, whose book Hamlet on the Holodeck: The Future of Narrative in 
Cyberspace explored hyperfiction as one of the new and emerging forms of digital narrative, has 
also written about her experiences teaching courses in digital narrative.  In her essay “The 
Pedagogy of Cyberfiction: Teaching a Course on Reading and Writing Interactive Narrative,” 
she describes the codex and film works she uses as models for her students of digital narratives.  
She explains that she “turned to books and films that are clear predecessors of electronic 
interactive stories” (130).  Cortázar’s Hopscotch, she writes, is one of the “obvious alternate 
choices” for her reading list (160n3). 
 Stuart Moulthrop, influential both as the creator of hypertext and hypermedia fiction as 
well as a substantial body of criticism and theory concerning digital textuality, takes a different 
approach to the link between codex works and digital fiction.  In his article, “The Shadow of an 
Informand: A Rhetorical Experiment in Hypertext,” Moulthrop experiments with standard 
academic prose style, dividing his unilinearly-presented essay into numbered lexias, each with its 
own links to the other numbered lexias in the work.  As Moulthrop explains, he “worked from 
the assumption that some discourse about hypertext needs to originate in hypertextual form.”  
For Moulthrop, that meant duplicating, as closely as possible, the fragmented, multilinear 
structure of hypertext, while noting that although the hyperlinked form “cannot be duplicated in 
print, it may be approximated.  The structure of this paper reflects as fully as possible that of the 
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 electronic hypertext from which it was derived” (1).9  In translating his essay from the 
Storyspace environment in which it was composed to a linear, codex-friendly format for 
publication, Moulthrop resorted to a structure that had been employed thirty years earlier: “The 
linking scheme employed here was invented by the novelist Julio Cortázar for his fiction 
Hopscotch” (1).  Though Moulthrop takes pains to avoid associating Hopscotch with a form of 
textuality that Cortázar could not possibly have foreseen, his claim that Cortázar’s “Table of 
Instructions” approximates hypertextual structure “as fully as possible” within the codex form is 
striking.  Moulthrop here represents the similarity of form as being analogous, but not causal or 
identical. 
 Still other theorists combine digital works and non-digital codex texts like Hopscotch, 
labeling the entire group as one of the many subsets of “literature.”  By labeling hypertext-ish 
codex works “precursors” to hypertext and “print proto-hypertexts,” Douglas, Landow, and 
Murray position these codex works as belonging with digital works rather than with other paper-
bound works.  Espen Aarseth and Marie-Laure Ryan continue this trend, arguing that the most 
important aspects of these codex works are, in fact, their computer-like features.  For instance, 
Espen Aarseth’s important book on digital textuality, Cybertext, is subtitled Perspectives on 
Ergodic Literature.  For Aarseth, the wide variety of works he considers in the book all fall 
under the general rubric of “literature.”  He notes that Hopscotch is one of “the most resonant 
ergodic experiments and thematizations” (53), referring to its “multicursal topology” of different 
reading paths (7).  By using a broadly inclusive understanding of “literature,” Aarseth is able to 
refer to Cortázar’s novel and computer games in the same sentence as examples of “forking 
text[s]” (64).  Furthermore, in Narrative as Virtual Reality: Immersion and Interactivity in 
                                                 
9   Given the lack of pagination in the online version of Moulthrop’s article, as well as his decision to fragment the article 
into numbered lexias, I have chosen to identify passages from this article by referring to the lexia number of the passage.  
By doing this, I will also remain consistent with my system for citing to the titles of lexias in digital works. 
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 Literature and Electronic Media, probably the most comprehensive attempt to date to apply 
narratology to the study of digital narrative, Marie-Laure Ryan also utilizes Aarseth’s key term, 
systematizing Hopscotch under the heading of “ergodic, nonelectronic, interactive texts” (209-
210).  In Ryan’s taxonomy, the only significant distinction between Hopscotch and Reagan 
Library is the codex (non-electronic) format of Cortázar’s work.  In an essay in an earlier book, 
Cyberspace Textuality: Computer Technology and Literary Theory, Ryan asserts that “the text as 
constructed (mentally) by the reader” is “always already a virtual object” because of the 
“complexity of the mediation between what is there, physically, and what is made out of it” 
(“Cyberspace” 96).  Ryan points out that ergodic, electronic texts, such as Reagan Library, add 
another level of virtuality due to the variability of the lexias that may be displayed on the 
computer screen.  In other words, just as reading a codex work multiple times will produce 
subtly (or not so subtly) different readings each time, navigating a hypermedia work also will 
produce subtly (or not so subtly) different materials to read, which will give rise to subtly (or not 
so subtly) different readings.  But, as Ryan notes, “the additional level is not exclusive to 
electronic texts.”  Cortázar’s Hopscotch is one of two “classical print examples of second-order 
virtuality” she mentions, although she qualifies this claim by adding that “the additional level of 
virtuality [the potential for different text to be presented or displayed, to the reader] is greatly 
facilitated by the electronic medium” (97).  Indeed, in her introduction to Cyberspace Textuality, 
Ryan goes so far as to caution that though “the ‘follow the links’ idea [of hypertext] can be 
implemented in print [. . .], these texts merely break the surface of a much deeper ground” (7).  
For both Aarseth and Ryan, the differences separating codex works like Hopscotch from digital 
works like Reagan Library are simply matters of degree, not of type. 
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 Other critics, such as Jay David Bolter and Michael Joyce, attempt to recontextualize 
digital works as being radical examples of experimental, paper-bound literature.  In his book, 
Writing Space: Computers, Hypertext, and the Remediation of Print, Bolter argues that digital 
fiction merely “refashions” older, more traditional narrative forms such as print.  Thus, in a 
chapter discussing “Interactive Fiction,” Bolter discusses seminal hyperfictions such as Michael 
Joyce’s Afternoon, A Story and Stuart Moulthrop’s Victory Garden alongside codex works like 
Hopscotch.  Both types of work, according to Bolter, should be considered “interactive,” but 
rather than thinking about them as computerized and computer-like, “interactive fiction belongs 
in a ‘tradition’ of experimental literature that has marked the 20th century – the era of 
modernism, futurism, Dada, surrealism, letterism, the nouveau roman, concrete poetry, and other 
movements of greater or lesser influence” (138).  Michael Joyce takes much the same tack in his 
book, Of Two Minds: Hypertext Pedagogy and Poetics, arguing that “future interactive fictions, 
in order to be more open, will appear more closed, i.e., more like current printed fiction than the 
computer programs we currently consider interactive” (136).  For Joyce, an author of both codex 
literature and digital narratives as well as a critic and theorist of digital textuality, the artistic and 
aesthetic goal for digital fiction is to move away from the outward signifiers of computer-ness, 
and instead to imitate the fixedness of the codex form – but without losing any of the 
computational and text-varying ability of the computer.  Elsewhere in Of Two Minds, Joyce 
explains the desires that led him to experiment with digital fiction.  After publishing a paper-
bound novel, he contemplated purchasing a word processor to replace his typewriter, but: 
What I really wanted to do, I discovered, was not merely to move a 
paragraph from page 265 to page 7 but to do so almost endlessly.  I 
wanted, quite simply, to write a novel that would change in 
successive readings and to make those changing versions 
according to the connections that I had for some time naturally 
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 discovered in the process of writing and that I wanted my readers 
to share.  (31) 
 
Eventually, Joyce describes his ideal “interactive fiction,” which looks very little like the digital 
works he himself has written.  Rather, his ideal text closely resembles an as-yet impossible 
computerized book imagined by novelist Neal Stephenson in The Diamond Age, or, A Young 
Lady’s Illustrated Primer.   
 
1.1.3. The Ideal Digital Work?: The Diamond Age 
 
Set in the twenty-second century, The Diamond Age tells the story of Nell, a young girl forced 
from her home, who must learn to survive by her wits with the help of a mysterious talking book, 
The Young Lady’s Illustrated Primer.  The Primer is an immensely powerful hand-held 
computer able to detect the sights and sounds of its surroundings and to interact with its reader 
with an astonishing level of sophistication.  In Stephenson’s novel, for instance, Nell reads the 
following passage in her Primer: 
A couple of days later, when Belle came back to our cave looking 
lonely and forlorn, we both did our best to make her feel welcome.  
Dojo began playing some special games with her, which Belle 
enjoyed so much that she kept coming back, and believe it or not, 
after a couple of years of this had gone by, Belle was able to flip 
me over her shoulder just as well as Dojo. (Stephenson 183) 
 
Nell is delighted by this story of a little female monkey, Belle, who was able to defend herself 
using martial arts against even an enormous opponent, Dinosaur, who narrates the episode.  Nell 
is so intrigued that she rereads the passage.  This time, the Primer notices Nell’s heightened 
interest and adapts itself accordingly: 
A couple of days later, when Belle came back to our cave looking 
lonely and forlorn, we both did our best to make her feel welcome.  
Dojo made a special meal in his kitchen out of rice, fish, and 
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 vegetables and made sure that she ate every scrap.  Then he began 
playing a special game with her called somersaults. (Stephenson 
182-183) 
 
The second version of the episode begins in the same way as the first, but quickly elaborates on 
the tale.  Just as an expert storyteller would, the Primer incorporates its audience’s interest level 
into its narration, passing quickly over certain events and embellishing others.  The new 
information provided by the Primer does not move the plot forward.  Instead, it provides 
information that will help Nell to survive alone in a hostile environment.  The proper nutritional 
information and self-defense techniques provided by the Primer are immediately put into 
practice by Nell.  In this instance, Nell’s actions determine not only the meaning of the text, but 
at a more basic level, they determine the very text itself. 
The Primer is structured around the frame tale of a quest in which a fictional Princess 
Nell must succeed in order to free her brother from a tower prison.  The quest forces Princess 
Nell to solve increasingly difficult puzzles to achieve her goals.  As the real Nell grows older, the 
puzzles become more challenging and more interactively open-ended.  While the Primer simply 
presented the initial puzzles to young Nell as narrative, later obstacles require Nell’s active 
participation in order to progress through the story.  The tale created by Nell as she reads the 
Primer, then, consists not only of the solutions to the many hurtles placed in Princes Nell’s way, 
but also of the learning process Nell goes through in her attempts to solve each of the puzzles. 
 In addition to this game-like interaction, the Primer adapts itself to Nell’s external 
situation, changing the story to reflect current events in Nell’s life.  In one scene early in the 
novel, Nell’s mother, Tequila, brings home a new boyfriend, Burt, who physically abuses Nell 
and her brother.  The Primer automatically changes its narrative to reflect the entrance of Burt 
into Nell’s life with the addition of a character named Baron Jack, who is mean to Princess Nell 
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 and her brother.  Nell apprizes the Primer of the real situation by speaking to it, enabling it to 
further substitute details of her own life for elements of the Primer’s original tale: 
“Sometimes he would burn their skin with cigarettes too,” Nell 
whispered.  The letters changed on the page of the Primer.  
“Princess Nell’s pee-pee turned red too,” Nell said, “because the 
Baron was a very bad man.  And his real name wasn’t Baron Jack.  
His real name was Burt.”  As Nell spoke the words, the story 
changed in the Primer.  (Stephenson 200) 
 
The horrific conditions experienced by Nell and her brother have nothing to do with the plot of 
Princess Nell’s quest, but they are instantly incorporated into the text, becoming a part of the 
narrative and determining the rest of the tale.  The Primer recognizes the real danger Nell and 
her brother are in and advises them through the narration of the quest to get out of their mother’s 
apartment before Burt can seriously injure them.  Princess Nell and Prince Harv’s escape from 
their home then becomes a major theme in the Primer’s tale, a plot development that reflects not 
the general purpose of the Primer, but rather the Primer’s ability to interact with its reader and to 
adapt itself to its reader and her best interests. 
 Like the Young Lady’s Illustrated Primer, Michael Joyce’s ideal interactive fiction 
would, he writes, “restore the Homeric situation to the extent that its branching would be driven 
by (1) previous conditions and (2) detection of audience interests, rather than by direct 
intervention of the audience into the story” (144).  In other words, Joyce’s ideal interactive text 
resembles oral storytelling tradition in that the narrative itself is set and constructed by the 
performer/author, but the performer/author has the ability to gauge the audience’s interests and 
adapt the narrative to the audience as the tale progresses.  Because of this feedback loop between 
the audience, storyteller, and tale, no two tellings would ever be identical, and the tale itself 
would always be ideally tailored to satisfy its audience.  And, perhaps most satisfying of all, the 
ideal interactive fiction would avoid the oft-repeated criticism that digital narrative does not feel 
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 like a book.  As many literary critics have pointedly noted, hyperfiction’s insistence that the 
reader constantly consider various linking options and select a meaningful navigational strategy 
interferes with the pleasures of immersive reading.  The strain of contemplating countless 
“troubled choices” between links forces New York Times Book Review critic Laura Miller to 
groan: 
Meandering through the lexias of hypertext works like Michael 
Joyce’s Afternoon, A Story, Stuart Moulthrop’s Victory Garden [. . 
.] and even floridly naughty Grammatron [by Mark Amerika] is a 
listless task, a matter of having to choose among alternatives, each 
of which, I’m assured, is no more important than any other.  This 
process, according to [George P.] Landow, makes me a “truly 
active reader,” but the experience feels profoundly meaningless 
and dull. (43) 
 
The most persistent complaint, however, is purely phenomenological, and has become known as 
the “bathtub complaint.”  Tim Parks approaches this issue obliquely, writing in the New York 
Review of Books that “during our most intense reading we are hardly aware of turning the pages, 
or of the sounds in distant rooms.  The situation is difficult to recreate when the mind is halted by 
a troubled choice between four links” (51).  Parks, a novelist and translator, is distressed that he 
cannot enjoy the traditional feel of a book, that he cannot, in effect, read a digital narrative in the 
bathtub.  The Young Lady’s Illustrated Primer, however, and possibly also Joyce’s ideal 
interactive fiction, has no keyboard to type, no mouse to move across a screen, and no hyperlinks 
to identify and select.  Though the Primer is an incredibly powerful supercomputer, as 
Stephenson’s narrator dryly notes, “it looked exactly like a book” (63).  And, owing to the 
aesthetic philosophy of its creator, it is designed to look and feel like the finest example of 
English Victorian bookbinding skill.  As one of the novel’s characters marvels upon being 
presented with the freshly constructed Primer, “If I found it in an antiquarian bookshop, covered 
with dust, I shouldn’t give it a second glance” (106). 
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1.1.4. Sufficiency and Necessity: The Distributed Mode 
 
The questions raised by all of these theorists, critics and novelists – whether digital works are 
“literature”; whether digital-ish codex works are “digital”; and whither digital narrative: to 
embrace the computer or to disguise itself in older forms – are, unfortunately, entertaining and 
mentally stimulating diversions from the more important issue of how to resolve the tension that 
these questions reveal between codex and computer.  The discourse about codex works that are, 
in whatever way, important to a theoretical or critical understanding of digital narrative reveals 
that while digitality is interesting and affecting, it is not necessary.  Indeed, the critical literature 
is replete with examples and examinations of codex works that achieve many, if not all, of what 
are claimed as the defining and identifying features of actual digital works.  Appendix A 
provides a brief bibliography of critical references in digital media theory to frequently-discussed 
major codex works. 
 The recurrence of codex works such as Hopscotch, Sterne’s Tristram Shandy, and Pavic’s 
Dictionary of the Khazars in theoretical discussions of digital work is unsurprising; as we have 
seen, many theorists explicitly endeavor to establish a close connection between experimental 
literature and digital works.  What should be surprising, however, is how close that connection 
appears to be.  If the codex form is capable of utilizing structural devices analogous to digital 
works, capable of achieving the same readerly affect as digital works, capable of exploring 
identical poetic and narratological issues and tropes, and capable of requiring its readers to 
possess and employ the same literacy and extra-literacy skills to successfully interpret the work, 
then Digital Literacy is a distinction without a difference. 
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  When we use the term Digital Literacy to refer to the set of skills needed to be able to 
successfully create and make sense of certain types of works, it is now obvious that we need not 
and indeed should not require the works in question to be digital.  Digitality is a sufficient 
attribute, but it is not necessary.10  Therein lies the dilemma for Digital Literacy – if Digital 
Literacy does not require digital works, and it is clear now that it does not, what are we to call 
the odd union of digital and digital-ish codex works that seem to share so many fundamental 
features?   
This project has its roots in computerized hyperfiction, but it extends into a bewildering 
array of other media and forms.  Reading contemporary literature, watching contemporary film, 
in fact, engaging with practically every form of contemporary art, demonstrates that hyperfiction 
does not have an exclusive claim to fragmentation.  Every conceivable artistic field has countless 
examples of its practitioners moving away from linearity and embracing fragmentation, multiple-
perspectives, collage, pastiche, and the disorientation of the consumer of the work of art.  Labels 
such as “postmodern” have been deployed with alarming frequency to describe this pan-media 
movement, but this label in particular fails to take into account that these works were being 
produced long before postmodernity.  Lumping Lawrence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy, for 
instance, with Alain Robbe-Grillet’s In the Labyrinth and Moulthrop’s Reagan Library ignores 
the historical formation and context of each work. 
Instead, fragmented, hypertext-like works share a formal, structural basis – which exists 
within various historical periods, and is not the product of any one – which persists across media 
and across time.  I advance the term distributed mode to describe the structural and artistic 
conventions that connect these works.  Espen Aarseth coins the term “cybertext” to describe 
ergodic literature.  In his book of the same name, Aarseth explains that “a cybertext is a machine 
                                                 
10 Here I am employing both the colloquial and formal logical sense of the terms “necessary” and “sufficient.” 
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 for the production of variety of expressions” (3).  This definition certainly seems to fit the almost 
aleatoric arrangement of lexias in digital hypertext, as well as Cortázar’s construction of the 
multiple possible paths through Hopscotch.  It also recalls Michael Joyce’s desire, mentioned 
previously, to “change in successive readings and to make those changing versions according to 
the connections that I had for some time naturally discovered in the process of writing” (Of Two 
Minds 31).  As we have seen, though, neither the distributed mode, as I have briefly outlined it, 
nor cybertexts, in Aarseth’s formulation, are exclusive to digital media.  Almost as soon as he 
has introduced the term, Aarseth takes pains to explain that “cybertext is used here to describe a 
broad textual media category.  It is not in itself a literary genre of any kind” (Cybertext 5, 
emphasis in original), and that “the concept of cybertext does not limit itself to the study of 
computer-driven (or ‘electronic’) textuality; that would be an arbitrary and unhistorical 
limitation” (Cybertext 1).  Furthermore, as Aarseth concludes, when considering digital works 
and the digital-ish codex works, “there is no evidence that the electronic and printed texts have 
clearly divergent attributes” (Cybertext 70).  While I wholeheartedly agree with Aarseth that any 
consideration of these works must include non-digital forms and media, I disagree with his 
apparent insistence on the primacy of text to these works.  Aarseth’s other label, “ergodic 
literature” is understandable, especially in light of the efforts of other theorists in the field to bind 
“Literature with a capital ‘L,’” in the words of Sven Birkerts (“Present” 12), to digital works 
such as Michael Joyce’s Afternoon, A Story, and Stuart Moulthrop’s Reagan Library, but it 
ignores many of the features – such as the use of different media within a single work, the 
changeability and aleatoric nature of the work, and the effect and affect of multilinear and 
fragmented narratives  – that a signifier such as “cybertext” is particularly poised to probe. 
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 A final difficulty with using “cybertext” as a broad categorical descriptor lies in the fact 
that Aarseth limits “cybertext” to only those texts which “involve calculation in their production 
of scriptons” (Cybertext 75).  This is a reference to the prose presented to the reader (scriptons), 
which are generated from the prose as it exists in the text (textons).  So, as Aarseth explains, in 
Queneau’s “Cent Mille Milliards de Poèms,” “there are only 140 textons,” (the 140 lines of the 
poems), “but these combine into 100,000,000,000,000 possible scriptons” (Cybertext 62).  In 
Aarseth’s taxonomy, however, Queneau’s poems would not qualify as a cybertext because there 
is no calculation involved in scripton formation.  In Reagan Library, though, the decreasingly 
randomized prose representing the successive “states” in the work generates different scriptons 
for each of the lexias from the available textons.  Thus, many works that might appear to have 
significant similarities would be classified differently by the cybertext criterion.  The ability of a 
work to change its narrative based on the actions of a reader – as opposed to the ability of a work 
to display different narrative bits based on the navigation of a reader – is an interesting analytical 
and aesthetic dimension, but it is not sufficiently significant to become the central factor in a 
narrative typology. 
 Marie-Laure Ryan adapts Aarseth’s concepts of cybertext and ergodics, devising a hybrid 
descriptor she terms “ergodic design” in her examination of interactivity in literature.  Ryan 
acknowledges that her definition of ergodic design – “a built-in reading protocol involving a 
feedback loop that enables the text to modify itself, so that the reader will encounter different 
sequences of signs during different reading sessions.  This design turns the text into a matrix out 
of which a plurality of texts can be generated” – is practically identical to Aarseth’s definition 
and usage of cybertext.  She writes, however, that she prefers “ergodic, because cybertexts 
suggests to most people an electronic support” (Narrative 206, emphasis in original).  The 
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 category of “ergodic design” also makes possible the consideration of non-textual works, such as 
film, graphics-only digital works, and the non-prose elements of both codex and digital works, as 
all of these are designed, but may not fit easily into the prose-bound understanding of “text” or 
“literature.”  It is unfortunate, therefore, that Ryan devotes very little time to her discussion of 
ergodic design, treating it only briefly, and only as a means to devise a more precise typology of 
interactivity. 
 My proposed category, the distributed mode, attempts to refine the important 
contributions of both Aarseth and Ryan by focusing on the fragmented nature of the narrative 
works under consideration.  Cybertextuality depends on fragmentation, as the reader’s choices in 
or between certain fragments are what triggers the calculations that determine fragments yet to 
be seen.  Ryan’s phrase, ergodic design, suggests both the fragmented nature of the ergodic work 
and a concern for the mechanics of its creation; this is entirely appropriate.  The distributed 
mode, as a mode,11 connotes the style, manner, and design principles governing works created 
within its purview, as well as the analytical frameworks for interpreting those works.  
Additionally – as is becoming increasingly important due to the proliferation of fragmented 
works being composed and consumed via the medium of the Internet – the distributed mode, like 
narrative or drama, is broad enough to include both fiction and non-fiction works produced in 
this way.  The ecumenical nature of the distributed mode encompasses the compositional and 
interpretive features common to both fiction and non-fiction works, much like the hybridization 
demonstrated by academic writing programs in “creative non-fiction.”  
                                                 
11  Here I am referring to the Latin meaning of the word (“modo – in the manner of, according to the style of, like”) 
although the musical sense is also apt (Traupman 185-6).  The classical modes are musical scales with various 
arrangements of half and whole steps between the tones.  The classical modes are: Ionian, Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian, 
Mixolydian, Aeolian, and Locrian.  The Ionian mode is best known today as the major scale.  The modes were used in 
early Western music to structure the composition of Gregorian chant, and knowledge of the structure of the modes, 
especially the final (tonic) and dominant of each mode is essential for analysis of works composed in them. 
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  Thus, neither the digital-ness of Digital Literacy nor the literacy-ness is exactly what it 
would appear.  Literacy is a term that has come to mean a bewildering range of different skills – 
from traditional notions of reading and writing, to any cognitive operation requiring the 
perception, manipulation, and production of data, to entire philosophies of demeanor and being-
in-the-world.  At the conservative end of the spectrum, the definition of literacy as the basic 
ability to read and write printed alphabetic prose is unable to account for either the range of 
different media potentially comprising the work, or the range of cognitive activities the reader 
must perform in order to navigate many works.  In other words, the ergodic and multimodal 
aspects of the work have no place in such a definition.  The New London Group – a collective of 
literacy researchers who began meeting in 1994 in New London, New Hampshire – has proposed 
a theory of “multiliteracies” that comes closer to accommodating the distributed mode, but still 
fails to explain or include ergodicity (Multiliteracies). 
When we use the term Digital Literacy to refer to the set of skills needed to be able to 
successfully create and make sense of certain types of works, it is now also obvious that we 
cannot and indeed should not limit this skill set to literacy.  Literacy is a necessary attribute, but 
it is not sufficient to describe the skills needed by the consumer to engage successfully with a 
work in the distributed mode.  Therein lies a second dilemma for Digital Literacy – if Digital 
Literacy requires not merely literacy, and it is clear that it does, what are we to call the odd 
conglomeration of skills, activities, and cognitive demands required by the would-be consumer 
of works in the distributed mode? 
A possible solution to this dilemma involves expanding the definition of literacy to 
include more activities and in more diverse situations, so that literacy becomes even more 
multivalent than in the New London Group’s efforts with Multiliteracies.  Pursuing this potential 
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 answer takes us farther along, towards perhaps the middle of the spectrum, literacy has become a 
secondary signifier for a bewildering number of concepts.  We see discussions of computer 
literacy, math literacy, media literacy, information literacy, and a host of others.  It is now 
becoming common to think of “literacy” as “proficiency,” removed from any sort of context and 
divorced from the particular set of basic skills it traditionally denoted.  Also in the mid-region of 
the spectrum is the idea of literacy as an accumulation of “Discourses.”  James Paul Gee defines 
“Discourse” – differentiated from the common meaning of discourse as communication by the 
addition of the capital letter – as “saying (writing)-doing-being-valuing-believing combinations,” 
“ways of being in the world,” and “forms of life which integrate words, acts, values, beliefs, 
attitudes, and social identities as well as gestures, glances, body positions and clothes” 
(“Literacy, Discourse” 526).  Neither literacy-as-proficiency nor literacy-as-Discourse, however, 
offers a useful approach to Digital Literacy.  Literacy-as-proficiency is so broad in scope that it 
reduces “literacy” to relative meaninglessness.  Literacy-as-Discourse, on the other hand, 
through its all-encompassing purview, manages to achieve both necessity and sufficiency as a 
definition of Digital Literacy.  Since it describes the “ways of being in the world,” any successful 
activity in the world – such as creating and consuming digital-ish works, or preparing and eating 
a ham sandwich – would necessarily require Discourse, and Discourse would be sufficient to 
describe any such activity.  But, again, the price paid is meaningfulness.  Neither concept enjoys 
the special or privileged relationship with narrative and composition that would be required to 
make it a useful approach.   
Instead, what is needed is a definition of literacy that is broad enough to encompass all of 
the activities involved in the consumption and production of works in the distributed mode, but 
that is also sufficiently peculiar to the demands of distributed narrative to be pedagogically 
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 useful.  Such a definition, though, cannot be formulated without a thorough examination of three 
central, interrelated concerns.  First, what are the experience and action of “reading” in the 
distributed mode?  Second, how does multimodality affect the work and its interpretation?  And, 
third, what effect does the distributed mode have on “writing?”  The following sections of this 
chapter will explore these questions and the implications their answers have for interpretation. 
 
1.2. THE LIMIT OF LITERACY 1: THE ERGODIC WORK 
 
Answering the question motivating this section, “what are the experience and action of ‘reading’ 
in the distributed mode,’ requires, first, an exploration of reading, and the reasons behind its 
quarantine in scare quotes in the framing question.  As previously noted, the distributed mode is 
a way of composing in which narrative meaning is fragmented and distributed across a series of 
interconnected nodes.  In Reagan Library, for instance, the blue “Pavilion” screen presents a 
fragment of narrative prose, a panoramic vista, and a set of graphical and prose hyperlinks, one 
of which the user must select to be shown any more of the work.  The multimedia aspects of 
works in the distributed mode will be considered in the next section, but even if only the prose 
from Reagan Library is considered, the user of the work does much more than merely read that 
prose.  The process in which she must engage to navigate the work I refer to as enactment, a term 
that attempts to capture the performative aspect of engagement with works in the distributed 
mode while avoiding the reductive but distressingly common tendency to label all engagement 
with meaningful narrative works as “reading.”  Once freed from the limitations of the term 
“reading,” we will be at liberty to explore the action, both cognitive and physical, of enactment, 
as well as the experience it produces.  
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1.2.1. Enactment 
 
Poet William Dickey seems instinctively to mistrust the term “reading” when describing the 
consumption of poetry.  For Dickey, the essential problem with “reading” is made more easily 
visible by the advent of the distributed mode.  Dickey asks whether the poem even exists on the 
page, or whether “the poem becomes real each time it is performed, recited from memory, on a 
stage, by its author, or experienced in the simulated performance in which we hear the spoken 
language behind the text we are scanning on the printed page” (149).  Dickey’s terms are 
instructive, as he refuses the label “reading,” because it would only obscure the “simulated 
performance” of the reader’s cognitive consumption of the poem.  In the distributed mode, the 
structure of a poem itself is initially unknown to the consumer of the poem; as she navigates the 
lexias of the poem, their order, and thus the meter, stanzas, rhyme scheme, and presentation of 
lines are all determined in part by the poet and in part by the consumer’s navigational path.  
Poetry, perhaps even more than any other form of narrative in the distributed mode, is 
hypersensitive to the ordering process resulting from hyperlink navigation, as the navigation 
alters the form and, hence, meaning, of the poem.  Such alterations may be absorbed by the 
gestalt of the looser structural constraints of other narrative forms, but are immediately apparent 
and significant in poetry.  Dickey writes that in the distributed mode, “the viewer’s apprehension 
of the visual and conceptual shape of the poem is generated in the process of viewing it, rather 
than appearing as an initial given” (147).  Again, Dickey avoids the term “reader,” this time 
substituting “viewer,” which, while possibly more accurate, still fails to signify the implications 
of the cognitive choices made by the “viewer” as she engages in her “process of viewing” the 
poem. 
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  Brenda Laurel’s seminal book, Computers as Theater, adds a vital complication to the 
“reading” conundrum arising within the distributed mode – positing that the ergodic nature of the 
distributed mode makes the reader a participant in the action, and thus the mode itself is 
incapable of being narrative.  Instead, Laurel argues, the distributed mode, and all human-
computer interaction, is fundamentally drama.  Though I disagree with Laurel that works in the 
distributed mode cannot be narrative, her point that these works exhibit dramatic elements and 
dynamics is important.  Laurel defines three key differences between narrative and drama: 
enactment, intensification, and unity of action.  Laurel defines enactment in this context as 
“meaning to act out rather than to read.  Enacted representations involve direct sensing as well as 
cognition.  To state it more simply, the stuff of narrative is description, while the stuff of drama 
is action” (94, emphasis in original).  Dickey’s concept of poetry agrees with Laurel’s 
contention, as the poem is not described, but rather enacted by the consumer’s actions among the 
hyperlinks established by the poet, allowing the poem to arise from the conscious action of the 
navigator.  Ergodics, as the Greek words ergon (work) and hodos (path) indicate, implies 
activity, not description. 
 Laurel’s second distinction, intensification, refers to the fact that, in most drama: 
[. . .] incidents are selected, arranged, and represented, in general, 
so as to intensify emotion and condense time.  Narrative forms 
generally employ the reverse process, extensification, where 
incidents may be reported from a number of perspectives and in 
ways that expand or explode time (for example, perceptions that 
take only an eye-blink in the “real time” of the characters in a 
novel by James Joyce or Virginia Woolfe consume whole chapters 
with perceptual and cognitive detail).  The common-sense 
observation is simply that time has a different scale when you are 
acting out than it does when you are reading.  In Aristotelian terms, 
this is one of the formal differences between drama and narrative.  
(94, emphasis in original) 
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 This property is the most problematic for some forms in the distributed mode.  While computer 
games and films in the distributed mode do, in fact, intensify emotion by condensing and tightly 
controlling time, others, such as Hopscotch and Reagan Library, actually engage in 
extensification, as Cortázar and Moulthrop allow their works’ consumers to move through the 
work in a variety of different ways.  Pacing, in other words, is nearly impossible.  While a film 
director or a traditional novelist can exert forms of control over the time frames in their works, 
alternating intense passages and scenes to create excitement at particular times, with more 
relaxed, perhaps contemplative passages or scenes to slow the pace of the work at other times, 
the navigator of a work in the distributed mode is given the possibility of altering the sequence of 
the work, and hence, of altering the pacing and the time scale.  In this, the distributed mode 
demonstrates qualities of both narrative (extensification) and drama (intensification), depending 
on the materiality, structure, and ergodic possibilities of the individual work. 
 Laurel’s third distinction, unity of action, involves “the structure of incidents.”  She 
explains that “Dramas typically represent a strong central action with separate incidents that are 
causally linked to that action, something the neoclassicists called the unity of action.”  Narrative, 
on the other hand, “tends to be more episodic; that is, incidents are more likely to be quasi-
independent and connected thematically rather than causally to the whole” (95, emphasis in 
original).  This distinction would seem to place the distributed mode clearly in the camp of 
narrative, as the fragmentation of the work into lexias and links makes each lexia into an episode 
that is, structurally, at least “quasi-independent.”  However, cognitive demands placed on the 
consumer by works in the distributed mode generally require that these works be as efficient as 
possible in reducing the number of characters and settings.  Hopscotch is set in only three major 
locations, and the cast of characters is surprisingly small for a novel of its size.  Any more, and 
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 the novel risks becoming completely incomprehensible.  Reagan Library features only four 
character/narrators, each set in a distinct and easily distinguishable location that is a cognate of 
the other three locations.  In both of these works the incidents are presented in a highly unified 
manner, even if that unification is not immediately apparent due to the fragmentation imposed by 
the form. 
 Laurel’s estimation of the distributed mode as being essentially drama, instead of 
narrative, solves many of the impasses presented by traditional approaches to the distributed 
mode.  On any given day, or for any given session, the works themselves are not literary, per se, 
but enactments, performances of the narrative work.  Just as actors are constrained in their range 
of actions when performing a dramatic work – at some point, the work ceases to be the same 
work that was written by the writer, and becomes something else – so too are the enactors of 
works in the distributed mode constrained in their reenactment of the work.  The fact that neither 
actors nor enactors have absolute freedom enhances rather than diminishes the artistic value of 
the performance. 
 One of the most visible differences between being an audience at a performance and 
enacting a work in the distributed mode, however, is the fact that distributed works are enacted, 
not for an audience, as in the case of drama, but rather for the enactor herself.  Laurel relates 
ergodic works to dramatic improvisation, as “Mediated improvisations are not performance 
pieces in the traditional sense.  As theater viewed from the outside, the entertainment value of the 
improvisations was largely mediocre.  In contrast, the interactors’ experiences were dramatically 
quite powerful” (191).  Mediated improvisation rarely produces the polished, artistic product 
associated with scripted works, and so is usually less capable of inducing affect in its audiences.  
The affective experience of the work on the improvisers, however, is profound.  In a similar way, 
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 the affective experience of watching someone enact a work in the distributed mode is frequently 
negligible, while the affective experience for the enactor can be profound. 
 
1.2.2. Conventions 
 
Enactment, in the context of the distributed mode, raises many of the issues associated with the 
so-called reader-response movement of literary theory.  If the enactor’s actions result in the 
assemblage of the work – or, at least, the assemblage of that portion of the work experienced by 
the enactor and, hence, that portion of the work which is, for the enactor, the entirety of the work 
– then the relationships between the enactor, her enactment, the work itself, and the composer of 
the work become pressing hermeneutical problems.  For the ways in which the enactor interprets 
the work are influenced, and perhaps even determined, by these relationships.  Jonathan Culler 
concludes, for instance, that “to speak of the meaning of the work is to tell a story of reading” 
and, hence, “the structure and meaning of the work emerge through an account of the reader’s 
activity”  (On Deconstruction 35).  In S/Z, Roland Barthes asserts that “the stakes of literary 
work (of literature as work) are to make the reader no longer the consumer but the producer of 
the text” (38).  Jean-Paul Sartre goes even further in the diminution of the author, writing in 
“What Is Literature?” that “there is no art except for and by others” (52).  And Wolfgang Iser 
clarifies this asymmetrical  relationship between author, work, and reader, stating that the text 
“offers guidance as to what is to be produced, and therefore cannot itself be the product” (Act 
107).  Thus, the author produces merely a blueprint for the reader to follow in the construction of 
a representation of the work.  The true literary work, then, exists as the average of the work and 
its realization.  As he explains, “the literary work cannot be completely identical with the text, or 
with the realization of the text, but in fact must lie halfway between the two” (“Reading Process” 
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 956).  All of these theories have profound implications for the interpretation of narrative works, 
but all are grounded in the cognitive processes of reading. 
 Enactment, on the other hand, incorporates these cognitive processes – as well as the 
cognitive processes required to experience narrative material presented in media other than prose 
text – and also gives attention to the mechanical processes of “reading” in the distributed mode.  
These processes are manifest as the conventions of navigating works in the distributed mode, 
conventions which vary substantially from the conventions associated with the codex.  In Espen 
Aarseth’s terminology, the ergodic nature of distributed narratives requires the reader to expend 
“non-trivial effort” in the navigation of the work.  The reader of Reagan Library, if she wishes to 
continue reading the work, must engage in an elaborate decision-making process.  She must 
decide what lexia she wishes to visit next, and then must determine how best to achieve that 
transit.  To make those decisions, however, she first must reflect on what she already knows 
about the narrative, what she would like to learn more about, and what strategies are most likely 
to result in the successful achievement of her wishes.  In his article, “A Poetics of the Link,” Jeff 
Parker contrasts the quality and quantity of navigational practices used in distributed narratives 
with those used in codex works: “When readers turn the pages of a book, they are getting from 
point A to point B.  It is meaningless, merely a function of the distribution device that is the 
book, therefore on the whole invisible” (np).  Though I hesitate to call the turning of pages 
“meaningless,” Parker’s description of the action as “invisible” seems fair.  As readers gain 
facility with the conventions of reading codex works, the thrill of reading turns from excitement 
over what may be on the next page (as in illustrated books for very young children) to 
excitement over what may happen next – whether on the next page or in the next chapter. 
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  Turning pages generally becomes a transparent action, one that appears so simple and 
devoid of meaning as to be invisible to critical attention or self-reflection, though it remains in 
front of us always.  Turning pages requires little or no conscious thought – readers ordinarily are 
not removed from their immersion in the narrative by having to turn the page.  This is a fact well 
known to late-night readers, who promise themselves to put the book down after just “one more 
page.”  That one more page stretches into dozens, possibly hundreds, as their enjoyment of 
immersion in the narrative keeps them reading.  Turning pages becomes visible only when the 
codex itself breaks down or is subverted.  A second-hand paperback copy of Tom Robbins’ 
novel, Still Life with Woodpecker, illustrates the former:  
The romance of new love, the romance of solitude, the romance of 
objecthood, the romance of ancient pyramids and distant stars are 
means of making contact with the mystery.  When it comes to 
perpetuating it, however, I got no advice.  But I can and will 
remind you of two of the most important facts I know: (1) 
Everything is part of it.  (275-6) 
 
There the book ends.  The second most important fact remains a mystery, perhaps itself an 
encouragement from Robbins or his narrator for the reader to make contact with the mystery for 
herself.  Of course, the book does not really end like that.  Examining my copy closely, I noticed 
that it was missing its final page.  After purchasing a new copy, page 276 may be turned to 
reveal page 277 and the second fact, “(2) It’s never too late to have a happy childhood.”  The 
lack of the final page to turn to, and the data that it carries, brings the reader up short, and makes 
visible the materiality of the page. 
 Lawrence Sterne’s The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman intentionally 
subverts the page, with similar results.  At one point, Sterne’s narrator instructs us that “without 
much knowledge, you will no more be able to penetrate the moral of the next marbled page 
(motley emblem of my work!) than the world with all its sagacity has been able to unravel the 
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 many opinions, transactions, and truths which still lie mystically hid under the dark veil of the 
black one” (III.36 178).  Following this, as promised, is a marbled page.  The inclusion of a 
prose-less page of black marbling in the narrative strikes the reader as odd, for it does not 
accomplish what pages usually do in novels.  It does not reveal the world of the narrative to the 
reader, but rather makes a point to the reader about herself.  Later, Sterne instructs the reader to 
call for pen and ink and to draw the Widow Wadman, “as like your mistress as you can – as 
unlike your wife as your conscience will let you” (VI.38 368-9).  The page following these 
instructions is, accommodatingly enough, left blank for just this purpose.  Again, Sterne subverts 
the page, making it not a transparent medium for information, but a material, usable and abusable 
object.  But these examples, and others like them, gain their power to disrupt the reading process 
precisely because they are the exception rather than the rule in codex works of fiction. 
 The complicated calculations that are required for the reader to navigate the textual 
spaces of a distributed narrative, like the broken codex or the subverted page, are anything but 
transparent, and they are the rule, not the exception.  They are highly visible and require 
conscious reflection that is made necessary by the organizational strategies imposed by the 
distributed mode.  In other words, though the “literacy” required for productive engagement with 
works in the distributed mode includes traditional reading skills, it also requires the enactor to do 
a host of other things, many of which are conditioned by and dependent on the ergodic 
conventions of the particular work.  These conventions result in a more concrete product – 
namely, the assemblage of the lexias of the work – than the cognitive processes which allow the 
reader to (re)construct the narrative mentally as she reads.  Thus, the contribution of the 
composer of the work in the distributed mode is less ambiguous and less contentious than in the 
writings cited above by Culler, Barthes, Sartre, and Iser, at least at the level of the assembled 
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 work.  The enactor assembles the fragments of the work as she is allowed by the composer of the 
work.  She is neither the author nor the composer of the work, although, given a sufficiently 
large work, she may assemble a version of the work that is unique.  In other words, in her 
relationship with the work, the enactor is much like the flaneur or the bricoleur, enacting a 
wandering path through the various lexias, as she assembles her cognitive (re)presentation of the 
narrative.12  The relationship between the enactor and the composer, then, is one of ambivalent 
cooperation – the enactor is both allowed to navigate in certain ways by the work’s composer 
and also prevented from navigating in others.  She is “rewarded” by the composer when her 
navigation results in the satisfaction of her hypotheses concerning the work and its links, and she 
is “punished” when her navigation results in further confusion and frustration.  And, importantly, 
she rebels against the composer when she rejects the ergodic conventions established for the 
work – such as reading Hopscotch in an order that follows neither of the endorsed paths, or 
through altering the programming code of a digital work such as Reagan Library.  “Hacking,” as 
such tampering is called in computer circles, is one response to the sense of frustration and 
disorientation that can result from the fragmented style of the distributed mode, and it raises an 
important question about the relationship between the enactment and the work as it was 
composed. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12  With respect to the winding, often looping path that the nature of links and linked fragments often forces the enactor 
to take, she resembles the flaneur.  Susan Buck-Morss explains that the flaneur wandered “in the relatively tranquil shelter 
of the arcades” of nineteenth century Paris, where “he practiced his trade of not trading, viewing as he loitered, the 
varied selection of luxury goods and luxury people displayed before him” (102).  However, with respect to the enactor’s 
need to consume the fragments she encounters, she is more like the purposeful bricoleur, who assembles works of art by 
cobbling together found materials. 
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 1.2.3. Aporia/Epiphany 
 
The digital environment of the computer allows Stuart Moulthrop to prevent his readers from 
having as wide a degree of reading freedom within Reagan Library as the codex reader has 
within that form.13  The enactor of Reagan Library has no choice but to follow the hyperlinks 
established by Moulthrop, progressing through the work via any number of combinatorial 
pathways, but always within the system established by Moulthrop.14  In the case of both Reagan 
Library and Hopscotch, however, the reader is left in much the same existential state, free to 
choose from a possibly bewildering number of navigational options, with no indication provided 
by the author which option would satisfy the reader’s textual and narrative desires.15  Silvio 
Gaggi describes the reader’s dilemma, writing that “The complexity of the web and the 
possibility of having to make decisions without sufficient information regarding where any 
choice may lead can result in a disorientation that precludes meaningful freedom” (104-5).  The 
freedom provided by the codex platform, and the more constrained freedom offered by the 
computer platform, can thus be seen not as libratory, but as constricting, binding the reader in a 
web of decisions to be made on the basis of too little information.  Given the enactor’s latitude in 
selecting her navigational pathways, the possibility of altering the digital work or of 
                                                 
13   The codex reader, for instance, has the ability to move throughout the work as she desires.  Movement through 
digital works often requires the enactor to find and activate certain hyperlinks.  In addition, the hyperfiction software 
Storyspace allows the work’s composer to impose “guard fields” that prevent the enactor from reaching certain lexias 
until she has accessed certain others.  In this way, the Storyspace composer can prevent his enactors from reading the 
ending first, so to speak.  The codex composer has no such mechanism at his disposal. 
14   Another important aspect of the analysis of the programming artistry underlying computerized works, to which I 
alluded above, involves the ability of the experienced Internet user to “hack” computerized works – to interfere with or 
alter the work or system.  Such readers can hack the system, circumventing the limiting hyperlinks by typing in the 
Internet address of the lexia they wish to access next, regardless of whether there is a link to that lexia on the current 
page.  More advanced readers can also hack the work directly, accessing the underlying code and altering it in any way 
they may see fit.  These hacks illustrate yet another way that the material condition arising from the computer platform 
differs from that of other platforms – although other platforms may be similarly hacked or altered once digitized, as 
demonstrated by film director Kevin Smith’s unauthorized reediting of George Lucas’ The Phantom Menace, renamed The 
Phantom Edit and distributed to wide acclaim via the Internet. 
15   Though Cortázar does, of course, offer guidance about the “proper” option for navigating the novel (through his 
“Table of Instructions”), the reader has no real assurance that hopscotching will result in greater narrative satisfaction.  
As it contravenes codex reading convention, it may rightly be assumed to result in greater narrative frustration. 
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 contravening the conventional ordering of a codex work (as by flipping to a different page at 
will), and the lack of narrative coherence initially presented by the distributed mode, the 
hermeneutical problem of the relationship between the enactment and the work it is enacting 
arises.  Is there any way to expect or to require the enactment to remain faithful to the work 
being enacted?  In other words, does enactment necessarily entail “wrong” interpretation? 
 The reader of Hopscotch has no idea whether hopping from chapter 2 to chapter 116 will 
provide more information or less about Oliveira’s relationship with the ephemeral figure of La 
Maga, or of her son, Rocamadour.  Oliveira tells us that “I don’t want to write about 
Rocamadour, at least not right now, because I would have to get so much closer to myself, to let 
everything that separates me from the center drop away” (15).  Would hopping more than 450 
pages provide the space and time needed for Oliveira to feel comfortable enough to explain the 
tortuous relationship between himself, La Maga, and her son?  Or does the next chapter, chapter 
3, begin to fill in the pieces of this puzzle?  Which path should the reader choose? 
 The reader of Reagan Library might feel that selecting the visual object hyperlinks – 
clicking on the image of the black obelisk on the left side of the panoramic view in the blue 
“Pavilion,” for instance – is likely to move the reader to the blue “Obelisk,” and thus might allow 
the reader to continue her investigation into the figure of Emily St. Cloud.  The Obelisk is 
shared, however, by both the blue zone and the black-black zone, and selecting it transports the 
reader to the black-black “Obelisk,” thus frustrating the reader’s expectations just as Cortázar 
frustrates his reader’s expectations by making chapter 116 a digression on the nature of 
narration.   
 The aporia-and-epiphany effect of the distributed mode, however, presents a possible 
resolution to the narrative indeterminacy and confusion experienced by the enactor.  As each 
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 aporia is replaced with the epiphany of an additional fragment of narrative, the enactor must 
undertake a rigorous project of narrative construction.  The enactor’s constructions are, in my 
formulation, (re)constructions both as an acknowledgment that it is the enactor constructing the 
narrative for herself as she navigates the work, and as an acknowledgment that the enactor is 
reconstructing a narrative that originally was created by someone else.  As the enactor is 
provided little guidance as to the (re)construction of the narrative, she is left to assemble the 
fragments she encounters more or less as she sees fit, but not without some logical constraints.  
Each new lexia that contradicts her provisional (re)construction forces her to modify her “free” 
play in the narrative to make allowances for the new, conflicting data.  In this, the distributed 
narrative seems much like what Umberto Eco names the “open work.” 
 In The Role of the Reader, Eco explains that an open text is one that “not only calls for 
the cooperation of its own reader, but also wants this reader to make a series of interpretive 
choices which even though not infinite are, however, more than one” (4).  The link structure of 
the distributed mode establishes a high, but finite, number of “interpretive choices” for the reader 
to make.  The links also create an open-ended system, in which there is no definitive beginning, 
middle, or end.  The reader, however, is not free to construct closure in any way she pleases.  
Eco is careful to specify that open texts do not grant their readers free license to do to the text 
whatever form of damage, pace Barthes,16 they wish.  Eco clarifies that “You cannot use the text 
as you want, but only as the text wants you to use it.  An open text, however ‘open’ it be, cannot 
afford whatever interpretation.  An open text outlines a ‘closed’ project of its Model Reader as a 
component of its structural strategy” (9).  Thus, the reader really is constrained in her 
                                                 
16   As Barthes explains in his book, The Pleasure of the Text, “Thus, what I enjoy in a narrative is not directly its content or 
even its structure, but rather the abrasions I impose upon the fine surface: I read on, I skip, I look up, I dip in again.  
Which has nothing to do with the deep laceration the text of bliss inflicts upon language itself, and not upon the simple 
temporality of its reading” (11-12). 
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 (re)construction, first in her attempt to make sense out of something that, she supposes, made 
sense to its creator, and second in her attempt to render that sense in terms that are relevant to 
her.  And so, to construct a mental version of the work, the enactor must interpret both the work 
and her own enactment and interpretation.  The interpretation and critique of the enactor’s 
enactment and interpretation is necessary in order to enact well, and it is also frequently invoked, 
as the enactor experiences frustration and wonders what she is doing “wrong.” 
 
1.2.4. Self-Awareness 
 
Enactment in the distributed mode, therefore, is about the discovery of patterns, linkages, 
themes, and threads spread across a possibly vast array of textual nodes, and with varying 
degrees of obviousness.  Enacting and interpreting in this environment is an active process, 
requiring a good deal of self-conscious thought and effort.  Furthermore, as already noted, the 
lack of an apparent controlling narrative can induce anxiety in the reader and frustration as she 
attempts to reconstruct the work into its assumed original unity that has been, she may believe, 
fractured intentionally by the author.   
 In his book The Philosophy of Rhetoric, I.A. Richards argues that “Words are not a 
medium in which to copy life. Their true work is to restore life itself to order” (133).  This claim 
is countered by James Seitz in Motives for Metaphor, where he notes that “While I have no wish 
to dispute that language can provide a sense of order and harmony, Richards seems here to forget 
what he has recognized so perceptively earlier on – namely, the potential of language [. . .] to 
create dissonance and anomaly as well as consonance and design” (45).  “Dissonance and 
anomaly” are apt descriptors for distributed narrative, which even Stuart Moulthrop, one of its 
most distinguished practitioners, calls “a technology of trauma” (“Traveling” 75).  It is, however, 
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 precisely this potential for trauma that makes the distributed mode a powerful tool for literacy 
pedagogies, and which suggests answers to the hermeneutical problems of the relationships 
between enactment and self-knowledge, and between enactment and reading as it is traditionally 
understood. 
 In their introduction to Hypermedia and Literary Studies, Paul Delaney and George P. 
Landow assert that “Since the essence of hypertext lies in its making connections, it accustoms 
students to make connections among materials they encounter,” and that “Hypertext also helps a 
novice reader to learn the habit of nonsequential reading characteristic of more advanced study” 
(22).  The plentitude of paths presented to the enactor in the distributed mode may, as Hilmar 
Schmundt points out, cause “cognitive overload” in the reader as she attempts to order the 
disparate elements of the narrative, and may cause her to feel “lost in hyperspace,” but it also 
forces her to interrogate her own reading practices.  Indeed, it is this double interrogation – of the 
work and of her own reading strategies simultaneously – which overloads the enactor in the 
distributed mode, and which allows for the conscious consideration of cognitive activities that 
are usually performed on an subconscious level while reading. 
 Trauma, however, no matter how pedagogically useful, brings with it risks.  In his article, 
“Reading Hypertext: Order and Coherence in a New Medium,” John Slatin makes the important 
point that: 
The more cryptic the link or node identifiers are, the harder it is for 
the reader to predict the results of activating a particular link.  The 
harder it is to make such predictions, the greater the likelihood that 
the reader will simply opt out of the process in frustration.  And 
even if the reader does go ahead there is no guarantee that s/he will 
know the place when s/he gets there.  (164) 
 
For George P. Landow, one of the pioneers of criticism and theory regarding hypertext, this 
frustration should be viewed as a sign of success rather than failure.  In his seminal theoretical 
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 work, Hypertext 2.0: The Convergence of Contemporary Critical Theory and Technology, 
Landow quotes at some length Morse Peckham’s philosophy on the disruptive duty of art.  
Peckham argues that “Art offers not order but the opportunity to experience more disorder than 
any other human artifact, and . . . artistic experience, therefore, is characterized . . . by 
disorientation” (85).  This is, perhaps, counterintuitive for the literary critic, used to the world-
ordering operation of traditional narrative.  Peckham, however, is convinced that: 
The artist’s role is to create occasions for disorientation, and . . . 
the perceiver’s role to experience it.  The distinguishing mark of 
the perceiver’s transaction with the work of art is discontinuity of 
experience, not continuity; disorder, not order; emotional 
disturbance, not emotional catharsis, even though some works have 
a cadential close.  (85) 
 
The consumer of art is rewarded for enduring such disturbance, Peckham argues, because “Art is 
the exposure to the tensions and problems of a false world so that man can endure exposing 
himself to the tensions and problems of a real world” (85).  Though Peckham’s theory does 
explain the appeal of some types of disorienting art, such as the experimental novel and many 
works in the distributed mode, his dismissal of art that may offer consolation or an intentionally 
pleasurable experience instead of disquietment makes Peckam’s a poor choice for a general 
theory of art. 
 In my own experiences teaching the distributed mode to undergraduates at the University 
of Pittsburgh, the disorientation produced by these works does, indeed, represent a productive 
site of learning and self-reflection.  My students bear out Delaney and Landow’s contention that 
the burdens placed on the enactor by the distributed mode can enhance the enactor’s ability to 
read –even to read traditional printed codex work – self-consciously and critically.  At the same 
time, though, Slatin’s warning about the frustration arising from the enactor’s attempted 
engagements with the distributed mode is a valid concern.  The resistance expressed by my 
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 students is invariably, if less so than I would like, ameliorated by the multiple methods of 
expressing and presenting narrative material available to digital works such as Reagan Library.  
The inclusion of graphics, audio files, video clips, and other modes of representation thus 
potentially provides a more welcoming point of entry to a difficult work.  These modes, 
however, also require their own careful consideration. 
 
1.3. THE LIMIT OF LITERACY 2: LOGOCENTRISM AND THE MULTIMODAL 
WORK 
 
Although, as we have seen, non-digital works can be composed in the distributed mode, the 
range of media made available by computer technology allows for radical alterations in the form 
and content of the narrative work.  From a hermeneutical, or interpretive, perspective, the ability 
to include non-prose material in narrative reveals an important problem to be considered: what is 
the relationship between language and narrative meaning?  Early personal computers lacked the 
memory and processing speed to present much more than prose text on a screen, but modern 
computers have no problem simultaneously displaying prose text and video clips, and playing 
music.  In addition, haptic control devices, such as Logitech’s iFeel mouse, allow programmers 
and composers to include the sense of touch in their works, causing the mouse to buzz, vibrate, 
and pop in the user’s hand in response to whatever is happening on the screen.  As the Web site 
for the Immersion Corporation, the producer of the software that translates the embedded code 
into “force feedback,” explains, while playing a computer game with a haptic mouse “you can 
experience the pulsing power of casting a spell, or the tug of ripping a tree out of the ground.”  
The iFeel mouse can also be programmed to buzz whenever the user moves her cursor over a 
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 hyperlink on a Web page or over the buttons on the toolbars for popular applications such as 
Microsoft Word.   
Prose text, audio files, video files, images, and haptic response are all examples of modes of 
representation, and the computer, by integrating these and other modes, is a multimodal 
platform.  As the distributed mode is itself a set of ways of composing and enacting works, so too 
do the representational modes entail different ways of composing and enacting meaning.  As 
James Paul Gee notes, in multimodal works mixing prose text and images, “the images often 
communicate different things from the words” (Video 14).  Not only do images and words often 
convey different things, but they do so in sometimes radically different ways.  In the brief 
introduction to Moulthrop’s Reagan Library earlier in this chapter, it was necessary to include a 
figure (figure 1) depicting the Internet browser screen displaying the blue “Pavilion.”  Displaying 
figure 1 was necessary, rather than merely the conspicuous exercise of screen-capturing 
software, because the blue “Pavilion” is more than the prose included on the page and, indeed, 
the work itself is far more than the collected prose comprising it.  Obviously, the interactive 
panoramic vistas at the top of each page, in addition to the colored bars at the left side of the 
page, also convey meaning.  Not only do the objects and locations revealed in the panoramas 
convey meaning about the narrative work, but also the ability to view the environment in 360° 
suggests meanings to those who view the work.  A literacy of multimodal works, then, must take 
into account both the variation in meanings conveyed across modes, and the variation in the 
ways by which the modes convey those meanings. 
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 1.3.1. Logocentrism 
 
In his book Literacy in the New Media Age, Gunther Kress further develops the idea of the 
distribution of meaning across different modes, asserting that “The world told is a different world 
to the world shown” (1, emphasis in original).  In a subsequent passage, Kress explores the 
ramifications of this difference, writing: 
If two modes – say, image and writing – are available and are 
being used for representing and communicating, it is most likely 
that they will be used for distinct purposes: each will be used for 
that which it does best and is therefore best used for.  Two 
consequences arise: one, each mode carries only a part of the 
informational ‘load’; no mode fully carries all the meaning.  Two, 
each of the two modes will be used for specialized tasks, the tasks 
which are best done with that mode.  As a consequence writing is 
no longer a full carrier either of all the meaning, or of all types of 
meaning.  (21) 
 
Kress’s conclusions about multimodality point to the need for a dramatic shift in our 
understanding of meaning and the way it is conveyed and understood.  First, Kress’s argument 
suggests the pedagogical need for a method for integrating and interpreting the various messages 
of the various modes in a given work.  Even in canonical codex works, examples of 
multimodality are not unknown.  We have already seen, for instance, the ways in which Sterne 
incorporates the visual mode in his novel Tristram Shandy, achieving effects not possible 
through the mere use of prose text.  Similarly, W. M. Thackeray was commissioned for both 
prose and steel plate etchings and woodcuts illustrating his novel Vanity Fair.  Though many 
modern editions of the novel omit the images, they offer commentary on the prose, and hence 
convey meaning integral to the work.17  Second, Kress presents a model in which the modes are 
not merely used for rhetorical purpose, but possess intrinsic rhetorical qualities.  Aristotle defines 
                                                 
17   An example of this occurs at the end of chapter 7.  The chapter ends with Becky Sharp in a carriage riding to Sir Pitt 
Crawley’s town house.  Thackeray includes a small woodcut of a young girl (far younger than Becky) sitting on the floor, 
assembling a house of cards.  The reader is left to infer the relationship between the image and the narrative. 
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 rhetoric as “an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion” 
(Rhetoric I.2.1355a, 36).  The modes, in Kress’s view, each possess individual means and 
abilities of persuasion.  The traditional rhetor was expected to match his argument to both the 
topic at hand and his audience.  Knowing which mode to use to convey a particular message, as 
Kress suggests, merely updates the ancient rhetorical tradition.  Third, Kress states that written 
language is no longer the sole transmitter of meaning and, importantly, that language no longer is 
the transmitter of “all kinds of meanings.”    
 It is this point that speaks most directly to the question of the relationship between 
language and narrative meaning.  If language is unable to transmit “all kinds of meanings,” then 
there are certain meanings that language cannot “carry.”  These meanings are presumably to be 
transmitted through the deployment of other modes besides language, which means that the 
modes exist not merely as ornament or illustration to print language, but as coequal media for the 
construction and communication of meaning.  In our increasingly visual culture, this may not 
appear noteworthy, but as Kress points out in an essay in the New London Group’s book on 
Multiliteracies, “At the moment our theories of meaning (hence our dominant theories of 
cognition) are entirely shaped by and derived from theories founded on the assumption of the 
dominance of language.  Meaning is in fact identified with ‘meaning in language’” (“Design” 
159).  Nowhere is the idea that meaning is inextricable from language as visible as it is in the 
field of philosophical hermeneutics, especially in those theories developed from the works of 
Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. 
 For Heidegger, language was not a medium for communication, but rather the ontological 
basis for the existence of all things.  In his Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger writes that  
“words and language are not the wrappings in which things are packed for the commerce of 
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 those who write and speak.  It is in words and language that things first come into being and are” 
(13, qtd. in Palmer 135).  In other words, Heidegger inverts the expectation that language was 
constructed to describe the things of the world.  The things of the world exist in language before 
and above all utterances of or about them.  It is this reversal that leads to Heidegger’s famous 
pronouncements that “language ‘speaks us,’ not vice versa” (qtd. in Collins and Selina 150), and 
“language is the house of being,” (qtd. in Palmer 135).  For it is language that exists and acts, not 
things or people.  As Richard Palmer summarizes, Heidegger believed that “man does not invent 
language any more than he invents understanding, time, or being itself” (153).  All four are 
irreducible ontological grounds from which existence and man’s sense of being in the world 
arise, and which allow and condition man’s experiences in the world. 
 Hans-Georg Gadamer, one of Heidegger’s students, accepts the primacy and importance 
of language, but adopts a more cognitive approach to the issue of language and being.  As 
Gadamer explains in Truth and Method, “language characterizes our human experience of the 
world in general” (456).  Thus, it is not that being arises from language, as in Heidegger, but 
rather that our ability to experience the world is dependent on language.  Whereas Heidegger 
denies that language is a medium, Gadamer embraces the idea, writing that “It is from language 
as a medium that our whole experience of the world, and especially hermeneutical experience, 
unfolds” (457).  This allows Gadamer to conclude, as he writes in his essay, “The Universality of 
the Hermeneutical Problem,” that “language is the fundamental mode of operation of our being-
in-the-world and the all-embracing form of the constitution of the world” (3).  Thus, the world is 
constituted by language, but not because of the ontological function of language, as in 
Heidegger.  Instead, the world is constituted by language because we understand the world, and 
our understanding is constituted by language.  This associative model of the linguisticality of the 
49 
 world finds its strongest enunciation in Gadamer’s conclusion, in the final section of Truth and 
Method, that “Being that can be understood is language” (474). 
 Heidegger and Gadamer suggest that the only answer to the question of the relationship 
between language and narrative meaning is that narrative meaning can only exist and be 
understood by and through language.  And yet, this is a profoundly troubling for those who 
create and enjoy non-prose works.  Both Heidegger and Gadamer consider and enjoy visual art, 
and yet neither gives a satisfactory explanation for the exact relationship between language and 
the non-prose arts.  Gadamer takes up the task of theorizing the interpretation of modern – by 
which he usually means abstract and non-representational in the traditional sense – art, but 
refuses to think of the works as being anything other than language.  Indeed, his solution is to 
determine that modern art is “speechless language,” not because it has nothing to say, but 
because, like the stutterer, it “wants to say too much at once and is unable to find the words to 
express the pressing wealth of things [it] has on [its] mind” (“Speechless” 83).  This speechless 
language, Gadamer explains, expresses “a meaning that cannot be unlocked” (“Image” 75).  
Having seemingly positioned modern art as expressing a meaning that is hermetically sealed, and 
hence uninterpretable, Gadamer proceeds to interpret the meaning of modern art as being “the 
rejection of meaning rather than its expression” (“Art” 101).  Even if we accept Gadamer’s thesis 
that painting is a language which expresses the sense that “there is no meaning,” we are still left 
with the dilemma of why painters would go to such trouble to create so many different works all 
expressing the same four-word meaning.  Or, alternately, if we adopt Gadamer’s presupposition 
that modern art expresses a language which is too full of meaning to be intelligible, we are still 
left with the question of how and what that language means.  In short, we are left with the 
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 realization that the modality of visual art conveys meaning in ways that are so fundamentally 
different from language that the two are incomparable.18   
Cognitive researchers, such as Claudia Brugman (Story of Over), Antonio Damasio 
(Descartes’ Error), George Lakoff (Women, Fire), Eve Sweetser (Etymology), and Mark Turner 
(Literary Mind), reject the notion that language is the fundamental basis for either existence or 
human thought.  Turner explains that the fundamental unit of cognition is not linguistic, but 
imagistic.  He refers to this unit as an “image schema,” which he defines as the “skeletal patterns 
that recur in our sensory and motor experience.  Motion along a path, bounded interior, balance, 
and symmetry are typical image schemas” (16, emphasis in original).  Turner’s examples of 
image schemas are instructive, as they demonstrate concepts that are describable with words, but 
which also are able to be experienced and understood without words.  Long before a toddler has 
the vocabulary to express “balance,” for instance, she will experiment with achieving it and 
experience its attainment and failure countless times.  Simple image schemas, such as balance 
and motion along a path are, according to Turner, combined to form more complex image 
schemas, such as walking.  When combined with a simple image schema such as a ball, the 
resulting image schema becomes a story (13.)  These stories are combined to form parables, 
which Turner defines as “the expression of one story through another,” and, more specifically, 
the “projection” of one story onto another to create meaning through narration (7).  Parables, in 
turn, are combined to form narratives, which, Turner argues, are fundamental to the cognitive 
processes of prediction, evaluation, planning, and explanation – in other words, to the entire 
range of cognition (20). 
                                                 
18   While I agree with Gadamer that we all possess a facility for interpreting and understanding non-prose art forms, I 
disagree with his position that our understandings of art are necessarily language-based.  In fact, Gadamer’s limit-case of 
abstract art may demonstrate that art and language are not merely incomparable, but incompatible in any meaningful way. 
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 Common sense suggests that narratives are built out of language, and that as we acquire 
and become proficient with more complicated language, we are able to construct more 
complicated narratives.  Turner argues exactly the reverse, explaining that the brain’s functioning 
suggests that language is not prior to narrative, but “follows from these mental capacities as a 
consequence; it is their complex product” (168).  For Turner, then, and the other cognitive 
researchers exploring image schemas, the relationship between language and narrative meaning 
is causal, but in the opposite direction from that proposed by the philosophical hermeneuticists.  
Though Turner relates his ideas to works of prose narrative, the concept of image schemas is 
equally applicable to the other representational modes.  If the mind functions narratively, which, 
in turn, allows for the development of language through which to express those narratives, so too 
might the other modes develop from the mind’s ability to think in this way. 
Gunther Kress’s final sentence in the passage quoted earlier, that language “no longer” 
can express the entire range of expressible meanings, asserts the need to study and understand 
the non-prose modes as being fully capable of expressing meaning, even narrative meaning.  The 
multimodal nature of works in the distributed mode demonstrates the ways in which non-prose 
modes signify narrative content.  Unless we believe that these modes are somehow new, though, 
Kress’s assertion also indicates that these modes have always had the capacity to express 
meaning.  From the prehistoric cave paintings at Lascaux to DaVinci’s The Last Supper, from 
the statuary of ancient Greece to the giant mobiles of Alexander Calder, we see that this is 
certainly the case, which reveals Kress’s “no longer” to be polite, but incorrect.  Rather, 
language has never been able to express everything expressible – nor has it been able to express 
in the same ways or with the same effects as other modes.  This realization casts the relationship 
between language and narrative meaning in a new light, and one that demands an interpretive 
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 theory able to engage with the various modes on their own terms, rather than merely as other 
instances of language. 
 
1.3.2. Text-ism 
 
This need for a theory of multimodal interpretation, however, raises the hermeneutical problem 
of the relationship between the interpreter and the object under interpretation.  Expressing the 
same desire as the hermeneutical characterization of the entire realm of understandable being as 
language, it has become fashionable of late to consider the entire realm of understandable being 
as constituting “texts,” thus positioning interpreters as “readers” pondering the multitude of 
“books” that comprise all of reality.  The proliferation of the notion of “text” as the universal 
container of all meaning allows literary scholars to lay claim to and theorize a broad range of 
human interactions and artifacts, but it disfigures these phenomena even as it offers insight into 
them.  Elizabeth Bergmann Loizeaux and Neil Fraistat summarize the effect of the shift to “text,” 
writing that “Semiotics, which has done so much to allow us to see sign systems in relation to 
one another and to make interdisciplinary work possible, nonetheless tends to homogenize 
difference so that everything appears to behave like language” (Loizeaux and Fraistat 6).  
Despite their potential similarities, at the essential level film does not behave like print, and 
discourse does not operate in the same way that a written narrative does.  The 1980s yuppy 
television melodrama, Thirty-something, consciously played on this distinction in advertisements 
for the show, proclaiming, “It’s just like your life, only with better writers.”   
 Derridean agent provocateur Gregory Ulmer notes that the distinction is not just at the 
level of the operation of the text, but also includes the materiality and the media potential of the 
text’s platform: 
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 The enabling fiction that carried literate study from a national 
literature to a global culture – the theoretical proposition that the 
world is a text – has been put into crisis by the increasingly 
obvious fact that the world is a text and a picture (to retain this 
reductive shorthand). Actually, it is a text and a picture and a 
soundtrack.  (244) 
 
Works like Reagan Library demonstrate the importance of this consideration, as they are 
fundamentally reliant on the author’s ability to establish meaningful connections between the 
various media used in the work.   
The spread of the “text” meme brought with it the spread of the word “reading” as the 
universal descriptor for the consumption of “texts.”  Thus, we now “read” everything from books 
to shopping malls for their semiotic codes.  This is deeply problematic, not least of all when 
considering the distributed mode.  The semantic shortcut represented by the verb “to read” now 
reifies the “textual” nature of the object being “read,” even when the object is no more textual 
than the process of experiencing and analyzing it resembles reading.  Gregory Ulmer spells out a 
major implication for this, arguing that the increasingly canonical field of “media literacy” itself 
is undermined by the rhetorical action of the term “literacy.”  According to Ulmer, “Media 
literacy makes sense when our only tool is the book.  The strategy is in the terms themselves: 
impose book models on the alien forms and practices emerging within the new media” (245).  
The distributed mode, with its positive fetishization of media promiscuity and hybridization, is 
especially vulnerable to the colonizing imperative implicit in the term “literacy.” 
The “reader” of Reagan Library does indeed read the prose sections of the work, but she 
must also look at the panoramic view, visually analyze the arrangement of image and text on the 
Web page, and attempt to predict where the prose and object links will take her as she enacts the 
work.  Other works of art composed in the distributed mode, like Terry and Gabrielle Braun and 
the London Sinfonietta’s hypermedia symphony, 3-D Music, require their enactors to listen to 
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 the music of the symphony and to watch the motion of various objects rendered in the virtual 
space of the work.19  Referring to the enactor’s activities with 3-D Music as “reading” or to the 
work itself as a “text” is both completely misleading and antagonistic to any efforts to achieve a 
deep understanding of the work and of its mode of enactment and interpretation. 
 In his well-known essay, “From Work to Text,” Roland Barthes explores the cognitive 
and phenomenological processes of reading, arguing that while all written materials are works, 
only those that produce rich imaginative realizations in the mind of the reader are Texts.  As 
Barthes writes, “the work is normally the object of a consumption,” but  “the Text (if only by its 
frequent ‘unreadability’) decants the work (the work permitting) from its consumption and 
gathers it up as play, activity, production, practice” (161, 162).  Or, to put it more plainly, the 
work exists as a musical score which must be performed – or, enacted – in order to come to its 
full expression as Text.  Obviously, as Barthes argues and as my own emphasis on enactment 
indicates, the mental re-presentation of the work is of vital importance and interest.  However, as 
a multimodal art form, the distributed mode presents us with an interesting alternative.  If these 
works are (through the digital representation of data) uniquely able to use hybridization to 
present narrative and nonfiction information in multiple modes, then they are certainly no longer 
texts.  In Reagan Library, for instance, the panoramic vistas convey different information than 
the prose passages, but each is vital to constructing an understanding of the work as a whole.  In 
many games, such as Rand and Robyn Miller’s Myst, sound cues are essential for understanding 
the game environment, for solving puzzles, and for progressing to other portions of the game.  
Rather than reifying a supposed supremacy of the prose in these works – as the label “text” does 
                                                 
19   3-D Music can be accessed on the WWW at the following address: .  In this work, the reader becomes an 
explorer, using her mouse to move through a series of virtual spaces, while sections of the Brauns’s symphony play.  The sections of music played are 
determined by the explorer’s location within the space of 3-D Music, and by the actions of the explorer as she manipulates objects such as spheres and 
crystalline pillars.  Only by exploring the entire virtual space, and by manipulating all of the objects provided, can the explorer gain the complete 
experience of the symphony. 
http://www.braunarts.com/3dmusic/
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 – I propose that we move “From Text to Work.”  The unimodal medium of text, even when 
supplemented with illustrations, is, in the distributed mode, supplanted by multimodal media, 
each of which produces a different but simultaneous re-presentation of the work as a whole. 
 It is not Barthes’s ideas in this instance to which I am opposed; rather, it is his 
terminology.  The use of “text,” even in this highly mediated sense, recirculates and perpetuates 
the linguistically imperialist tendencies of “text” (as referring to all interpretable phenomena), 
“reading” (as the process of consuming these “texts”), and “literacy” (as the skills needed to 
“read,” interpret, and output these “texts”).  Instead, by rejecting the term text except in reference 
to works of alphabetic prose writing, the relationship between the interpreter and the work 
becomes clearer.  The work is revealed, by the very openness of the term, to be multimodal, and 
the enactor of the work is thus required to effect a multimodal interpretation using various senses 
beyond mere sight and alphanumeric character-recognition. 
 
1.3.3. Sense and Sensorium 
 
The more open relationship between the work and its interpreter – open in the sense of 
multimodality and a more fully engaged sensorium, not in the sense that Umberto Eco uses to 
refer to indeterminate texts (Role) – reveals, however, yet another hermeneutical problem.  Given 
the potentially multimodal nature of works in the distributed mode, how is the interpreter to 
effect the integration of those modes and the meanings they convey? 
 In her book, Writing Machines, N. Katherine Hayles argues for an analytical practice she 
names “media specific analysis” (MSA).  Initially presented as being ideally suited to the 
interpretive needs of multimodal digital works, “MSA moves from the language of text to a more 
precise vocabulary of screen and page, digital program and analogue interface, code and ink, 
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 mutable image and durable mark, computer and book” (Hayles 30-1).  Hayles argues against 
limiting MSA solely to computerized works, explaining that “If we restrict the term hypertext to 
digital media, we lose the opportunity to understand how a rhetorical form mutates when it is 
instantiated in different media” (31).  Thus, for Hayles, the multiplication of the media inherent 
in the distributed mode is no hindrance to the rhetorical analysis of them.  By tying MSA to 
rhetorical analysis, Hayles also reiterates Kress’s assertion that modality is inherently rhetorical.  
Indeed, the multiple media at play in Reagan Library enhance the affective power of the work, as 
the number of different rhetorical devices available to Moulthrop is limited only by the number 
of media deployed in the work.  Furthermore, as the number and type of media deployed in any 
given distributed narrative is dependant on the creator of the work, and by the limitations of the 
medium in which the work is being composed, not the work of art itself, any comprehensive 
analytical strategy for distributed narrative must follow something like Hayles’s MSA.  Hayles 
grounds MSA in the materiality of the work, explaining: 
Materiality thus emerges from interactions between physical 
properties and a work’s artistic strategies.  For this reason, 
materiality cannot be specified in advance, as if it preexisted the 
specificity of the work.  An emergent property, materiality depends 
on how the work mobilizes its resources as a physical artifact as 
well as on the user’s interactions with the work and the interpretive 
strategies she develops – strategies that include physical 
manipulations as well as conceptual frameworks.  In the broadest 
sense, materiality emerges from the dynamic interplay between the 
richness of a physically robust world and human intelligence as it 
crafts this physicality to create meaning.  (32) 
 
In other words, a medium-specific rhetoric for distributed narrative would not be a set of 
interpretive or evaluative rules, but rather an approach to the constantly shifting body of works 
whose inherent flexibility requires a similarly flexible and nuanced hermeneutic. 
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 1.4. THE LIMIT OF LITERACY 3: THE COMPOSED WORK 
 
Hermeneutics is usually thought of as the set of interpretive strategies and skills used to make 
sense of difficult texts.  More specifically, hermeneutics may be thought of as what we do when 
we read a difficult prose text.  The original forms of hermeneutical analysis all involved reading: 
interpreting scripture, legal code, and, eventually, poetry and literature.  And yet, if we believe, 
as many of us do, that writing is a valid and important method of interpretation and analysis, then 
writing, too, is a method for achieving understanding.  This view of writing disputes the belief 
that writing exists to record and allow the transmission of analysis and interpretation that has 
already been generated.  Of course, some writing does this, but it is important to remember the 
moments when, during writing, a new thought occurs to the writer.  Equally stunning is the 
moment in which the writer re-reads her work and discovers an idea that she had not been aware 
of.  Despite the common view that writing is merely the record of previous cognition, writers 
know that through the action of writing, of putting down thoughts in written form, new 
connections are formed and reveal themselves in the written work.  This may not occur as often 
as we would like, but writing becomes exploration often enough that the interpretive power of 
writing cannot be dismissed or discounted.  Of course, if writing is an analytical tool, then it is, 
quite properly, hermeneutical.  Hans-Georg Gadamer’s definition, cited at the beginning of this 
chapter – that “something distant has to be brought close, a certain strangeness overcome, a 
bridge built between the once and the now” (“Scope” 22) – also applies to writing.  The writer 
interprets, and thus brings into personal understanding, something distant, strange, and difficult.  
As we have seen, however, the context of the distributed mode invariably presents complications 
to the easy understanding of common literacy- and narrative-related concepts.  Specifically, the 
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 ergodicity and multimodality that revealed the inadequacy of “reading” and “text” as labels, here 
show “writing” to be a misnomer. 
 
1.4.1. Composing 
 
Seen through the lens of the distributed mode and its multimodal works, “writing” is a term 
much in need of clarification.  As mentioned previously, Moulthrop’s creation of Reagan 
Library required him to work within multiple modes of representation.  By doing this, he is no 
longer, strictly speaking, an author.  Instead, he becomes an author/artist/programmer hybrid.  
Referring to his constructive process as writing is, plainly, neither accurate nor sufficient.  
Imagine the ridiculousness of claiming that someone has written a painting or a video clip.  
Instead, I propose a serious return to the concept of composition.  As we commonly use it, 
composition refers to a wide variety of creative activities: we compose symphonies, letters to 
friends, paintings; we analyze the composition of sculptures, film scenes, and even chemical 
substances.  In all of these fields, composition refers to the intentional invention and 
arrangement of materials.  In our own writing, and the writing we ask our students to create, we 
attempt to harmonize our argument with the form in which we present it.  I am not advocating a 
return to the dogmatic days of process writing; instead, we need to acknowledge that our cultural 
and technological moment is changing the nature of composition, whether we like it or not.  
Digital media make it easy to incorporate visual, audio, and animated material into our “written” 
communications.  Thinking about composition as a recursive process of multimodal invention 
and arrangement keeps our notions of what composition is firmly grounded in our earliest 
rhetorical traditions, while also allowing us to include other modes of communication within the 
rubric of composition, without misrepresenting what we are doing. 
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  The New London Group’s Multiliteracies pedagogy is an excellent conceptualization of 
the needs of composers, enactors, and readers in multimodal environments.  The Group refers to 
their pedagogy as one of “multiliteracies” because, they write, it engages with “the multiplicity 
of communications channels and media” as well as with “the increasing salience of cultural and 
linguistic diversity,” thus combining multimodality with multiculturalism20 (Cope and Kalantzis 
5).  Briefly, the centerpiece of the Multiliteracies pedagogy is the concept of “Design,” which the 
Group uses to designate the process of multimodal composition as well as the strategies and 
structures employed to compose.  Design, in the Multiliteracy pedagogy, makes use of 
“Available Designs” to compose a new work, referred to as “the Redesigned,” which is the 
product of existing traditions and forms of composition even as it is a unique assemblage of 
modes and meanings (New London Group 22-23).  The Group’s theory of Design allows for 
recursive invention and arrangement, coupled with the composer’s intent – that which motivates 
the Design – in both the process of Design and in its aftermath.  As they write, “in its turn, the 
Redesigned becomes a new Available Design, a new meaning-making resource” (New London 
Group 23).  The recursive nature of the Redesigned becoming new Available Designs which 
allow for the composition of new Redesigned compositions, and so on, points to a fundamental 
interrelation between enacting, reading, and composing. 
 As the Group explains, Design is not limited to composers.  Instead, “Listeners and 
readers encounter texts as Available Designs.  They also draw upon their experience of other 
Available Designs as a resource for making new meanings from the texts they encounter” (New 
London Group 22-23).  The point here is that, as readers gain experience reading, they become 
                                                 
20  The New London Group is clearly concerned with the issues raised by Brian Street and others under the rubric of the 
New Literacy Studies.  In their desire to ensure that their Multiliteracies pedagogy contributes to the “design of [better] 
social futures,” they avoid the trap of what Street terms the “‘autonomous’ model of literacy,” in which literacy is seen 
purely “in technical terms, treating it as independent of social context” (Street 5).  In the context of the distributed mode 
and of Digital Literacy in general, the “‘autonomous’ model of literacy” is a widespread, but not incontrovertible, 
perspective.  See: Wysocki and Johnson-Eilola (“Blinded”) for an incisive critique of this tendency. 
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 better readers.  What is noteworthy about this conclusion, however, is the level of clarification 
allowed by the redefinition and specialization of the terms used by the Group.  The processes in 
which readers and enactors engage as they read and enact works are parallel to the process by 
which composers Design their works.  The process of consulting the mental storehouse of other, 
similar works to guide and structure the interpretive act underway is identical.  The Group seems 
to hold that the Redesigned becomes a new Available Design “in its turn,” or, after the 
Redesigned composition is completed.  I believe this is overly cautious.  In reading and enacting, 
the reader and enactor is constantly comparing new data presented by the work against the 
storehouse of data, including that which has just been read and enacted.  The pre-existing data is, 
in multiliteracies parlance, a set of Available Designs, ready to be deployed or modified as new 
data and new interpretations of the work require.  In the same way, Redesigned compositions 
give rise to new Available Designs even in the process of composition.  As design elements 
produce favorable or intended results, the composer may – and should – recycle and reinterpret 
those design elements, so that they may be further improved and made even more effective in the 
present composition and in later composing.  Composers, as they enact their works, in other 
words, must interpret their own composition. 
 In the distributed mode, the fragmented nature of the works results in a series of nodes 
connected by links.  Links, as has been noted previously, cross liminal spaces between the 
narrative material of the nodes, and may themselves function as conveyers of narrative 
meaning.21  In the distributed mode, the absences between the narrative fragments also gain a 
positive semiotic value.  In other words, the empty (devoid of explicit narrative material), liminal 
space traversed by the hyperlink in the distributed mode is made into a positive signifier, whose 
                                                 
21   The semiotic potential of links will be discussed in a forthcoming article.  For more on this, Nicholas Burbules’s essays, 
“The Web as a Rhetorical Place” and “Rhetorics of the Web: Hyperreading and Critical Literacy,” are excellent 
resources.  
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 meaning must be interpreted by the consumer of the work.  The distributed mode, then, is also 
distinguished by the fact that works created thereby are importantly present even in their most 
absent spaces.  As we have already seen, the distances between enacting, reading, and 
composing are not so vast.  For practical purposes, the distributed mode shortens that distance to 
negligibility.  As the enactor navigates the work, she is faced with links which may or may not 
suggest narrative material connecting the narrative fragments they bridge.  Regardless, the 
enactor is required to “compose” tentative narrative material to make sense of the progression 
and relationship of narrative fragments.  This process of composition, though almost certainly 
never physically incorporated into the work, becomes a part of the narrative enactment.  In 
Barthes’s essay “From Work to Text,” he announces that the mental construction of the work 
“requires that one try to abolish (or at the very least to diminish) the distance between writing 
and reading, in no way intensifying the projection of the reader into the work but by joining them 
in a single signifying practice” (162).  The enactor, in other words, does not become the “author” 
of the work, but is instead joined metaphorically with the original composer to compose the 
enacted narrative. 
 
1.4.2. Multimodal Composition 
 
The relationship between the enactor and the original composer of a work – a fundamental 
hermeneutical problem – becomes clearer when considering multimodal works.  The 
compositional function of the enactor in a prose-only text closely resembles the efforts of the 
work’s composer, and, hence, may suggest an overly aggrandized role for the enactor.  In a 
multimodal work, like Reagan Library, on the other hand, the limits and roles of this relationship 
are more sharply defined. 
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  In Reagan Library, the lexias blend prose text with panoramic graphics, as seen in figure 
1 above.  One of the effects of this integration is to strengthen the enactor’s sensation that each 
lexia does not merely represent a physical location, as narrative does, but actually presents that 
location for the direct observation of the enactor.  The blue “Pavilion” lexia, for instance, is not 
merely titled “Pavilion”; it gives the impression that it is the Blue Pavilion, with graphics and 
text merged to form a unified, spatialized semiological construction.  To read the text of the 
“Pavilion” lexia, or of any of the other twenty-seven lexias, the reader also must “travel” (using 
hyperlinks) to the “physical” location of the lexia.  Increasing the sensation of physicality in the 
text, the graphic in the top portion of the screen is actually a panoramic vista, able to display a 
360° view from the location of the current lexia.  Using the mouse, a reader can pan left, right, 
up, down, and may zoom in or out of the image, and thus is able to appreciate the entire vista 
from the location of the lexia.   
 As the enactor navigates from lexia to lexia, the narrative connections between the lexias, 
the states, and the zones, are only partially explained.  To create a sense of narrative wholeness, 
the enactor must tentatively compose, based on her interpretation of the work and of her own 
enactment, a great deal of connective material.  She cannot, however, compose new panoramas 
or alter the material form of the work.  Though her interstitial composing may resemble the prose 
text – if her composition takes the form of language, that is – it cannot resemble the other modes 
employed by Moulthrop in Reagan Library.  The enactor’s additional narrative material is thus 
revealed to be another mode of narrative meaning, necessitated, though not provided, by the 
work’s composer.  This mode is the result of the enactor’s integration of all of the modes 
employed by the work’s composer, as well as her interpretation of the narrative content of those 
modes. 
63 
  The New London Group lists five representational modes in their model of multiliteracy, 
and a sixth mode which they refer to as “multimodal integration” (New London Group 25-26).22  
The sixth mode is relevant to composers as well as enactors, as multimodal works require both 
roles to perform this level of meta-compositional analysis.  For the enactor, integrating the 
different modes of representation, their different contents, and their different ways of 
representing their meanings is a high-level cognitive task.  The composer, on the other hand, 
must analyze the intended work, construct a design for its composition, and then effect and 
revise the design.  The freedom afforded by digital media – the ability to compose multimodal 
works quickly, easily, and inexpensively using personal computers – may well overwhelm the 
would-be composer.  As previously noted, the freedom to navigate through the lexias of works in 
the distributed mode is easily interpreted not as freedom at all, but as a paralyzing lack of 
guidance and security.  The New London Group’s notion of Available Designs is here quite 
useful, as it suggests that the composer is never entirely abandoned in a labyrinth of available 
modes and messages.  Instead, she has the security of utilizing established, comfortable Designs, 
and the freedom to experiment with them as she sees fit.  Additionally, the Group notes that even 
prose-only compositions are already multimodal, as written prose text is itself a visual 
phenomenon.  Furthermore, they note:  
Desktop publishing puts a new premium on Visual Design and 
spreads responsibility for the visual much more broadly than was 
the case when writing and page layout were separate trades.  So, a 
school project can and should properly be evaluated on the basis of 
Visual as well as Linguistic Design, and their Multimodal 
relationships.  (New London Group 29) 
 
                                                 
22   The five modes identified by the New London Group are: Linguistic Design, Audio Design, Spatial Design, Visual 
Design, and Gestural Design.  See “A Pedagogy for Multiliteracies” (25-30) for more on this. 
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 This is perhaps obvious to anyone who has given writing assignments with minimum page limits 
to undergraduate students.  Our students are increasingly becoming expert at desktop publishing 
formatting, as they manipulate fonts, font sizes, margins, and line spacing so that their work 
appears to satisfy the required number of pages.  Many of our students now have worked with 
computers since they started elementary school.  If our students are already comfortable 
experimenting with visual design – and most of them are – then it is time to incorporate 
multimodal composition in our assignments and in our expectations of what college-level writing 
should be. 
 
1.4.3. Form and Compositing 
 
One important consequence of multimodal composition is that it entails the production of 
meaning through different representational logics.23  Not only is the composer free to combine 
modes to best convey her meanings, but she is also free to experiment with form.  The 
distributed mode is predicated on the notion that multilinearity is a valid affective and 
communicative form.  For the composer, shifting from unilinear argumentation, to which much 
argument- and thesis-driven writing is supposed to aspire, to a distributed format can be a 
liberating experience.  The distributed mode seems unparalleled in encouraging connective, 
associative analysis and composition.  The need to link fragments causes composers to consider 
not what point should come next, but what points might come next, and why.  This follow-up 
question, why should those points come next, is a strong indicator of the analytical utility of the 
distributed mode. 
                                                 
23 The New London Group refers to the semiotic systems and styles of the different modes as “grammars,” noting, 
however, the uncomfortableness of the term, and acknowledging the pejorative connotation of the term, as well as its 
linguistic inference (20).  I prefer the term “logic” to describe the ways in which the modes operate and are structured, as 
it avoids these issues. 
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  Multimodal distributed composition also presents the composer with a range of affective 
options.  Moulthrop’s creation of the illusion of physical presence in each of the lexias of 
Reagan Library strongly reinforces the sensation that each link results in actual travel, 
reinforcing the spatial metaphor of navigation implicit in the mode.  The spatialization achieved 
by Moulthrop also suggests the experience of playing a graphical computer game such as Myst or 
Syberia.  In these games, the player assumes the identity of an on-screen avatar and moves her 
through a series of lushly rendered environments.  The sense of immersion in a fully-realized 
world is one of the most appealing features of these games.  Moulthrop acknowledges, in the 
“Introduction” to Reagan Library, that the work is game-like.  Further, he indicates that the 
distinction is unimportant, except to “Idiot Questioners” (most likely academics) who insist on 
the categorization and segregation of such works.  He writes: “Now a word from our Idiot 
Questioner.  Is this ‘fiction’ or is it a ‘game?’  Exactly.  As one of the inmates says: ‘The world 
is what you see and where that takes you.’  And where would that be?  You’ll find out” 
(“Introduction”).  The work is inherently ludic, an affective mode that may be uniquely suited to 
the distributed mode. 
 The concept of a “ludic work” raises the question of whether the work serves as a game 
played with the enactor or played on the enactor.  Cortázar’s Hopscotch, for instance, seems to 
do both.  Cortázar originally titled the novel Mandala, the wildly complex and usually circular 
images representing man’s understanding of the universe, used to assist in meditation.  Cortázar 
changed the name to Rayuela (Hopscotch) before publication, perhaps explicitly signaling the 
ludic intention behind the work.  The change from Mandala to Rayuela also indicates a different 
perspective toward the novel – no longer viewing it as a model of the world, but rather as a game 
to be played within the world.  One game Cortázar plays on his reader is readily apparent in the 
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 “Table of Instructions” – an endless loop established by Cortázar as the male-reader hops from 
chapter 131 to chapter 58 which directs the reader to hop back to chapter 131.  As Michael 
Hardin makes clear, “If one takes the novel seriously as a game – and the switch in title from 
Mandala to Rayuela suggests that we should – then the female-reading is the only one which 
provides a possible winning move; it allows the actual reader to exit, which in this novel 
constitutes victory at the simplest level of playing” (51, emphasis in original).  The endless loop 
is a classic trap in computer programming, as computers follow instructions – even bad 
instructions – without deviation.  But in a ludic novel, does deviating from the rules – such as 
exiting the recursive loop – cause the enactor to forfeit the game? 
 Another game played on the enactor involves the denigration of the enactor.   Hopscotch 
presents two sanctioned methods of progressing through the work, and yet the reader who 
chooses to read straight through, from chapter 1 to chapter 56, is later described in the novel as a 
“female-reader” and is denigrated.  Morelli, a novelist in Hopscotch, writes, in what is described 
as “an exceedingly pedantic note,” that he aspires: 
To attempt [. . .] a text that would not clutch the reader but which 
would oblige him to become an accomplice as it whispers to him 
underneath the conventional exposition other more esoteric 
directions.  Demotic writing for the female-reader (who otherwise 
will not get beyond the first few pages, rudely lost and scandalized, 
cursing at what he paid for the book), with a vague reverse side of 
hieratic writing.  (396) 
 
Of course, the true female-reader (el lector-hembra) would never know about this insult, as it is 
included in chapter 79, well beyond the “end” of the female-reader’s version of the novel. 
 Cortázar also seems to play games with his enactors, one involving the title itself – 
Hopscotch.  Further, Cortázar plays with the idea of hopscotch with his accomplice-readers (el 
lector cómplice).  Using the hopscotch reading order, the so-called male-reader eventually reads 
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 every chapter in the book except chapter 55, in which Talita returns to her lover, Traveler, and 
tells him that Oliveira kissed her.  Is this chapter the playground square in which the hopscotch 
pebble is placed, and in which the player is forbidden to land?  If so, the chapter is far too 
important to ignore, and the male-reader is tempted to read the chapter in violation of the rules of 
the game, a temptation made stronger by the very rules that she will transgress if she reads 
chapter 55. 
 The fragmented form of the distributed mode, and the multimodal support offered by 
digital technology, allow easy experimentation with affect and strategies for communication.  
This is a definite benefit when viewed from an expressivist perspective, but poses significant 
challenges from a pedagogical one.  The challenges of teaching multimodal composition, for 
instance, are significant.  As teachers already know, unimodal prose writing is difficult to master, 
and difficult to teach.  Encouraging teachers of composition to branch out into uncharted 
territory may, therefore, seem cruel and unnecessarily distracting.  However, as “writing” 
becomes increasingly multimodal – as the ubiquity of personal Web pages, blogs, emoticons, and 
PowerPoint’s complete dominance in the sphere of business writing, indicate – our pedagogies 
will have to adapt. 
 In the next chapter, I set forth a rhetorical hermeneutic designed to accommodate the 
expanding pedagogical needs of twenty-first century digital literacies.  The two chapters 
following explore the pedagogical application of this rhetorical hermeneutic in the fields of 
reading and composition instruction, respectively.  The hermeneutical problems identified in the 
present chapter and expanded upon in the second, are, in the third and fourth chapters, 
contextualized in the setting of the literature and composition classroom.   
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2. RHETORICAL HERMENEUTICS 
 
We are what we think. 
All that we are arises with our thoughts. 
With our thoughts we make the world. 
(Buddha, The Dhammapada 3) 
 
 
Where, indeed, but to rhetoric should 
the theoretical examination of interpretation turn? 
(Hans-Georg Gadamer AScope@ 24) 
 
 
 
2.1. COMPOSING IN FRAGMENTS 
 
This chapter is devoted to developing a hermeneutic capable of interpreting the fragmented and 
disjointed works of the distributed mode.  This section, “Composing in Fragments” introduces 
the main works under consideration in this chapter, arguing for the essentially rhetorical nature 
of fragmentation, and hence, of the fragmented works of the distributed mode.  The second 
section, “Rhetorical Performances, Estrangement, and the Politics of Affect,” examines the 
concept of rhetorical hermeneutics from contemporary and ancient perspectives.  This section 
continues the discussion from Chapter 1 of the distributed mode as an inherently rhetorical form 
of artistic production, comparing the rhetorical strategies employed by composers in the mode to 
the “Verfremdungseffekt” of Bertolt Brecht’s Berliner Ensemble, and then exploring the affective 
and pedagogical uses of alienation effects in the distributed mode.  The third section, 
“Conformation: The Work of Constructing the World of the Work,” describes the multiple 
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 processes involved in rhetorically interpreting works in the distributed mode.  The final section 
of this chapter, “Rhetorical Hermeneutics and Conformation,” reexamines the major theories of 
hermeneutics within the context of this rhetorical hermeneutic, focusing on the agency of the 
interpreter. 
 The distributed mode utilizes fragmentation not merely to alienate enactors, but also to 
represent more faithfully the shifting dynamics and relations between interconnected items and 
ideas.  Similarly, this chapter, specifically the third section, has been written in an explicitly 
fragmentary and distributed manner.  The elements of the rhetorical hermeneutic of 
conformation operate recursively, cooperatively, and often seemingly simultaneously.  
Describing them as a sequence of steps performed by an enactor would, therefore, fundamentally 
misrepresent these processes.  I encourage you to exercise your navigational ability here and 
throughout this work to seek out discussions of materials when and as you decide you need to 
learn about them, to best configure your own understanding. 
 
2.1.1. Fragmenting Film: The Qatsi Trilogy and Baraka 
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed examples of the distributed mode from the platforms of the 
print codex and hypermedia.  The distributed mode also operates in film, as several films from 
the past few decades attest.  In 1983, Godfrey Reggio’s groundbreaking meditation, 
Koyaanisqatsi – which features no acting, dialog, or narration – matched images of nature and of 
human civilization with a haunting score by minimalist composer Phillip Glass to depict “life out 
of balance” (the translation from Hopi of the film’s title).  Although Koyaanisqatsi presents its 
material in a linear fashion, with no opportunity for the viewer to “jump” to other filmic lexias, 
the film is nevertheless an example of the distributed mode because of the demands it places on 
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 its viewers.  Just as enactors of hyperfictions such as Reagan Library or novels such as 
Hopscotch must navigate across the hyperlinks – inventing a rationale and explanation for the 
hyperlink, and attempting to weave the disparate lexias into a coherent narrative whole – the 
viewers of Koyaanisqatsi must invent rationales and explanations not only tying the seemingly 
random images captured by Reggio to Glass’ soundtrack, but also tying each combination of 
sounds and images to the sounds and images that precede and follow. 
 The film’s opening, for instance, shows cave paintings of humans, while a men’s chorus 
chants “koyaanisqatsi” over and over.  The viewer may know the translation of the Hopi word, in 
which case she, presumably, would attempt to reconcile the still, and beautiful, image of the cave 
painting with the aural message, “life out of balance.”  The connection is far from obvious.  
From the cave painting, the action shifts suddenly to a tremendous explosion of fire, rendered in 
extreme slow-motion, but accompanied by the same bass chant and pipe organ arpeggios.  
Eventually, the image is revealed to be the firing of gigantic engines lifting a rocket off the 
ground, presumably into outer space.  The next images show a desert landscape of bizarrely-
eroded rocks, and the music changes to a series of slow, sustained tones carried by string 
instruments, with a slow arpeggio descant outlined by clarinet.  With no sign of human presence, 
the eerie red rocks are difficult to identify – they could as easily be located on Mars as in the 
American Southwest.  The transition from the rocket to the barren landscape gives credence to an 
other-worldly interpretation, but only momentarily, as the landscape is gradually revealed to be, 
indeed, the desert Southwest of the United States.  The procession of images and music 
continues throughout the film’s 87 minutes, sometimes at a rate too quick for conscious 
reflection, and the viewer is left to try to make sense of it all.  In this, the action of the film on the 
viewer is nearly identical to that of the distributed mode in other platforms. 
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  The title of the film, Koyaanisqatsi, provides the viewer with her only extra-contextual 
assistance in making sense of the disjointed and fragmented nature of its narrative.  “Life out of 
balance” is a relatively straightforward polemical message, and helps the viewer to organize 
what she sees and hears.  This message is developed in the two sequels to the film, Powaqqatsi: 
Life in Transformation (1988) and the conclusion to the trilogy, Naqoyqatsi: Life as War (2002).  
A related film, Baraka (1992), was directed by the cinematographer of Koyaanisqatsi, Ron 
Fricke, and continues the narrative style of Koyaanisqatsi.  Like the original film, Baraka takes 
as its title a non-English and unfamiliar word: this time the language is Sufi and the term means 
“a blessing” or “the breath or essence of life from which the evolutionary process unfolds.”  
Baraka represents a refinement of the innovative elements of Koyaanisqatsi, and is arguably at 
once more beautiful, more affecting, and more challenging than the earlier film.   
 Films in the distributed mode share many of the game-like qualities of the ludic novels 
described earlier.  Each of these films presents itself as a riddle to be untangled and intuited by 
the viewer, a test of the viewer’s shrewdness, and a display of the director’s cleverness.  As there 
are no definitive answers, however, the riddles become exercises in solipsism – each viewer’s 
interpretations are, within the long-argued and still unresolved limits of interpretation common to 
all acts of reading, equally valid.  The ludic novel and, now, the ludic film, play games either 
with or on their audiences; meanwhile, hyperfiction establishes a labyrinthine space in which 
enactors may feel they are trapped in a comparable textual game.  Discussing the ludic aspects of 
these works, however, begs the question: if all of these “textual” works in the distributed mode 
are game-like, are games correspondingly and significantly textual?  Ultimately, is the 
distributed mode so innately ludic that its game-like aspects render it unsuitable for “serious” 
analytical work and theory? 
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2.1.2. Fragmenting the Folio:  Composition No. 1 
 
In 1963 Simon and Schuster published a translation of an exceedingly odd French novel.  Marc 
Saporta’s Composition No. 1 consisted of 150 unnumbered and unbound pages, enclosed in a 
cardboard box.  Each page was entirely self-contained and independent of the rest.  Sentences 
did not bleed from one page to next, nor was their any indication in what order the pages should 
be placed.  Quite to the contrary, Saporta included the following introduction to his work: 
The reader is requested to shuffle these pages like a deck of cards; 
to cut, if he likes, with his left hand, as at a fortuneteller’s.  The 
order the pages then assume will orient X’s fate. 
 For time and the order of events control a man’s life more 
than the nature of such events.  Certainly there is a framework 
which history imposes: the presence of a man in the resistance, his 
transfer to the Army of Occupation in Germany, relate to a specific 
period.  Similarly, the events that marked his childhood cannot be 
presented in the same way as those which he experienced as an 
adult. 
 Nor is it a matter of indifference to know if he met his 
mistress Dagmar before or after his marriage; if he took advantage 
of Helga at the time of her adolescence or her maturity; if the theft 
he has committed occurred under cover of the resistance or in less 
troubled times; if the automobile accident in which he has been 
hurt is unrelated to the theft – or the rape – or if it occurred during 
his getaway. 
 Whether the story ends well or badly depends on the 
concatenation of circumstances.  A life is composed of many 
elements.  But the number of possible compositions is infinite.  
(Saporta np)24
 
Saporta’s work features an unnamed protagonist, here referred to as “X,” whose life (as narrated, 
at least) seems to consist of a surprising number of parallel situations.  The work describes X’s 
                                                 
24  Due to the lack of page numbers and the aleatoric ordering of the work, I abandon the “np” – no page number – 
convention for citation.  Instead, I will provide the entire page each time I quote from Composition No. 1. 
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 relationship with the German governess hired by his mother when he was sixteen or seventeen, 
as well as the announcement that X’s wife will hire a governess for their small children.  The 
narrative also describes X’s wife, Marianne, his mistress, Dagmar, and the two thefts committed 
by X – one for the French Resistance, the other to pay off personal debts.  These events, overtly 
repetitive and frequently described in similar terms, are fragmented into mere moments of 
narration and shuffled together to form a collage of the events and impressions of X’s life. 
 
2.1.3. Figuring the Fragments: Juxtaposition, Interpretation, and the Kuleshov Effect 
 
In the 1920s, Soviet filmmaker Lev Kuleshov performed a series of experiments with 
juxtaposition in film editing.  In the most famous, Kuleshov explains:  
I created a montage experiment which became known abroad as 
the “Kuleshov Effect.”  I alternated the same shot of [well-known 
Soviet actor Ivan] Mozhukhin with various other shots (a plate of 
soup, a girl, a child’s coffin), and these shots acquired a different 
meaning.  (“In Maloi” 200). 
 
The alternation of physical objects – which bore no relation to Mozhukhin or his performance – 
inspired Kuleshov’s audience to assume the existence of a causal connection between the shots.  
Mozhukhin, followed by a shot of a bowl of soup, and then returning to Mozhukhin, caused the 
audience to interpret Mozhukhin’s expression as one of hunger and longing for the soup.  The 
juxtaposition of the images in the Kuleshov experiment resulted in the metaphoric ascription of 
meaning where none was intended.  The image of the soup exerted a metaphoric power over 
Mozhukhin, arguing that Mozhukhin’s expression was the result of the soup. 
 A second experiment performed by Kuleshov involved spatial relationships and editing.  
Kuleshov provides a thorough description of this later, more complex experiment: 
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 Khokhlova is walking along Petrovka Street in Moscow, near the 
central department store; Obolensky is walking along the Moskva 
River embankment (about two miles away).  They see each other, 
smile, and begin to walk towards one another.  Their meeting is 
shot at Prechistensky Boulevard, which is located in an entirely 
different part of town.  They shake hands in front of the monument 
to Gogol, turn around, and what should they see but the White 
House! – for at this point, we cut in a segment of the American 
film The White House in Washington.  In the next shot they are 
again on the Prechistensky Boulevard.  They decide to leave and 
ascend the enormous stairway of the Cathedral of Christ the 
Savior.  We filmed them and edited the sequence, as a result of 
which they are seen climbing up the stairs of the White House in 
Washington.  We screened this part of the film, and it was clear to 
everyone who saw it that the central department store stood on the 
bank of the Moskva River, that Prechistensky Boulevard was 
located between the department store and the Moskva River, and 
that on the boulevard was the monument to Gogol, with the White 
House standing directly opposite it.  For this we used no trick 
photography, no double exposure – the effect was achieved purely 
by the organization of material, through its cinematic treatment.  
This scene confirmed the immense possibilities of montage, which 
turned out to be so powerful that it could radically alter the 
material itself.  (Art 137) 
 
In this experiment, juxtaposition also creates a causal relationship between the shots, but not in 
the same way as with the bowl of soup.  This experiment demonstrated that film audiences, when 
shown people or objects in motion followed by a new location, assume that the people or objects 
have traveled to the new location, even when, as above, the locations in question are not 
connected as depicted. 
 The Kuleshov effect predicts that juxtaposition does more than merely “shock” or amuse 
audiences.  Instead, juxtaposition affects the material so juxtaposed.  Through juxtaposition, the 
post hoc, ergo propter hoc logical fallacy is instantiated in the filmic sequence, causing the bowl 
of soup to become the motivation for Mozhukhin’s expression, and locations miles apart to be 
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 mentally rearranged to conform to an imaginary contiguity.25  Both of these experiments by 
Kuleshov point to a two-step and two-layered interpretive requirement imposed by fragmentation 
and juxtaposition; they demand the enactor interpret the individual fragment both as itself and as 
an element in a larger chain of signifying items.  At the same time, the experiments also suggest 
the active role played by enactors and audiences in the construction of the narrative work.  
Finally, the Kuleshov effect reveals the inherently rhetorical nature of fragmentation and 
juxtaposition.   
Roland Barthes, in his eponymous work, Roland Barthes, provides evidence that the 
affective power of fragmentary works reaches not only the works’ enactors, but their composers 
as well.  Barthes explains: 
I have the illusion to suppose that by breaking up my discourse I 
cease to discourse in terms of the imaginary about myself, 
attenuating the risk of transcendence; but since the fragment 
(haiku, maxim, pensée, journal entry) is finally a rhetorical genre 
and since rhetoric is that layer of language which best presents 
itself to interpretation, by supposing I disperse myself I merely 
return, quite docilely, to the bed of the imaginary.  (95) 
 
There are, as usual for Barthes, several interesting points in this short passage.  First is Barthes’ 
admission that he employs the fragmentary form in an effort to control the meaning of the text by 
taking the text out of the realm of the imaginary.  Barthes hopes that his readers, when faced with 
independent fragments, will be prevented from interpreting the text, and will allow him the 
power to construct his autobiography as a purely denotative object, free from the meddling of its 
readers’ interpretations.  This would have been, if successful, an example of the apex of 
rhetorical power – the ability to control absolutely the interpretive faculties of his audience 
through communication. Barthes’ second interesting point is his concession that the independent 
                                                 
25   Post hoc, ergo propter hoc is a Latin phrase meaning: “after this, therefore because of this.”   It refers to the logical 
mistake of confusing sequence (this follows that) for causality (this is caused by that). 
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 and self-sufficient fragment – as opposed to a unified work that is fragmented after being 
composed – is, after all, a purely rhetorical genre, as the enactor is required to “interpret” the 
text, thus subjecting it, potentially, to all manner of connotation and misinterpretation.  In the 
absence of completion or wholeness, the enactor is left to interpret the bits she is given to the 
best of her ability.  Stuart Moulthrop’s idea of the distributed mode as a “technology of trauma,” 
cited in the previous chapter, here gives rise not merely to affect, whose deployment and 
inducement is a classic rhetorical concern, but also to interpretation, which Barthes also connects 
to rhetoric.  Finally, Barthes himself is manipulated into the “bed of the imaginary” by his own 
use of the rhetorical device of fragment, an interestingly effective display of persuasion. 
 In the following section, “Rhetorical Performances, Estrangement, and the Politics of 
Affect,” I turn to a number of contemporary and ancient theorists of rhetoric to establish the 
bases from which my rhetorical hermeneutic develops.  First, and most importantly, 
interpretation is fundamentally rhetorical in nature.  This is supported by close attention to 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics, as well as the Platonic dialogues, which reveal the second 
fundamental claim: the inextricability of rhetoric from both poesis (the traditional view of 
rhetoric as a generative technè) and poetical interpretation (rhetoric as a hermeneutical technè).  
“Rhetorical hermeneutics,” thus, is revealed not as a type of hermeneutics specifically concerned 
with the discovery and understanding of tropes and labeled with ancient Greek terms such as 
“bdelygma,” “hysterologia,” or “prozeugma.”26  Rather, the third claim asserts that rhetorical 
hermeneutics denotes the centrality of affect – achieved through the use of rhetorical strategies, 
and understood through the interpretation of those strategies – to the interpretive process.  In 
                                                 
26   In his indispensable Handlist of Rhetorical Terms, Richard A. Lanham defines these terms in the following ways.  
Bdelygma is an “expression of hatred, usually short.  As Emilia to Othello: ‘O gull!  O dolt! / As ignorant as dirt!’ 
(Othello, V, ii)” (29).  Hysterologia occurs when “a phrase interposed between a preposition and its object: ‘I ran after 
with as much speed as I could, the thief that had undone me’ (Peacham)” (89).  Prozeugma is, of course, “a type of 
Zeugma in which the verb is expressed in the first clause and understood in the others: ‘Pride oppresseth humility; 
hatred love; cruelty compassion’ (Peacham)” (126). 
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 rhetorical hermeneutics, then, affect is seen not as antithetical to critical awareness and 
interpretation, as may be presumed, but rather as an integral part of interpretation and a 
complementary force to critical analysis.  The final sections of this chapter, “Conformation: The 
Work of Constructing the World of the Work” and “Rhetorical Hermeneutics and 
Conformation,” explore rhetorical hermeneutics and its implications for literary analysis. 
 
2.2. RHETORICAL PERFORMANCES, ESTRANGEMENT, AND THE POLITICS 
OF AFFECT 
 
The passage from Roland Barthes, quoted above, suggests that interpretation is a nested series of 
rhetorical performances.  First, the work itself is a rhetorical object, acting upon and influencing 
the interpreter.  Second, since, as Barthes says, “rhetoric is that layer of language which best 
presents itself to interpretation,” the act of interpretation is inherently rhetorical.  Steven 
Mailloux, in his book, Rhetorical Power, argues this second point as part of his theory of 
rhetorical hermeneutics.  Mailloux writes that “academic criticism, like other interpretive 
practices, is rhetorical through and through, from the macro-structures of the institutionalized 
discipline, discussed in this chapter’s first section, to the micro-practices of critical readings, 
analyzed in the last” (50).  Though Mailloux is specifically concerned with the realm of 
academic literary criticism, which he sees as inscribed within the institution of the academy and 
constrained by the rhetorical tropes and practices of literary discourse, he agrees that all 
interpretation, even outside the academic setting, as a form of “rhetorical action, attempts to 
convince others of the truth of explications and explanations” (15).  Here, I would add that 
before an interpreter can convince others of the truth of her explication, she must first convince 
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 herself, making the rhetorical action of persuasion first an internal and personal act, before it can 
be deployed in a public arena. 
 I raise the issue of the rhetoricality of interpretation to point out the essential redundancy 
of the concept of rhetorical hermeneutics.  If hermeneutics is the study and practice of 
interpretation, and if interpretation is inherently rhetorical, then there would appear to be no need 
to specify or contemplate a rhetorical hermeneutics.  However, when considering the 
development of hermeneutics from the nineteenth century work of Friedrich Schleiermacher and 
Wilhelm Dilthey through the twentieth century theories of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul 
Ricoeur, the centrality of rhetorical action and of affect to the interpretive processes is 
conspicuously absent.  By retaining the modifier “rhetorical,” I hope to foreground this 
centrality, as it is vital to understanding the affective hermeneutical demands imposed by works 
in the distributed mode. 
 
2.2.1. Rhetorical Performances and World Creation 
 
Mailloux’s examination of Mark Twain’s The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn amply supports 
the second half of the nested series of rhetorical performances mentioned above – not only is the 
interpretive act a rhetorical performance, but the work being interpreted is, as Mailloux shows, 
also a rhetorical performance.  Unambiguously, Mailloux asserts that “To investigate the novel’s 
rhetoric is to unfold its complicated nature as ideological performance” (69).  In the case of 
Huckleberry Finn, that ideological performance centers around issues of racism and slavery.  
What is particularly interesting about the rhetorical power of narrative performances is their 
ability to affect interpreters far removed in time and space from the original audiences of the 
work.  In rhetorical terms, the kairos of Twain’s 1884 audience – the “circumstances obtaining at 
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 the moment of oration,” in Susan Jarrat’s terms (11) – is markedly different from the kairos of a 
contemporary audience reading Huckleberry Finn.  Classical rhetorical understandings would 
predict that this change in kairoi would reduce or prevent the effectiveness of the rhetorical act, 
but this is not necessarily the case with narratives such as Twain’s novel. 
 Mailloux explains that Twain’s novel maneuvers its readers into judging the moral and 
ethical positions of its characters, rather than merely observing their actions and dialogue.  As 
Mailloux writes, Huckleberry Finn “continually asks its readers to take on the role of critical 
audience observing a series of staged debates and speeches.  In these dramatized arguments, 
readers both witness rhetorical power in the narrative and experience its effects in the act of 
reading” (60).  Mailloux points to the novel’s early, humorous treatment of racism, and the 
novel’s problematic resolution.  Interpreting the ending requires readers to reassess their earlier 
interpretations of the novel’s beginning and middle, in an attempt to reconcile the book’s 
rhetorical project.  As Mailloux points out: 
Reading the text has created the problem insofar as readers have 
been persuaded to take the earlier humorous critiques of racism 
seriously.  As a result, they must decide whether the ending shows 
Twain’s ideological retreat or his political realism, whether it 
contradicts his earlier attack on racism or deliberately represents 
the impossibility of the ex-slave’s freedom.  (98) 
 
The rhetorical action of the novel implicates the reader during interpretation, as every act of 
interpretation requires the reader to take a position.  Each position, then, can be called into 
question by later rhetorical acts, requiring the reader to form not only new interpretative 
positions, but to attempt to reconcile these new positions into a rhetorically persuasive and 
coherent master interpretation. 
 This is crucial to understanding not only Twain’s novel, but all novels.  Mailloux 
concludes that, “In a sense, it simply does not matter whether the interpretive and evaluative 
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 problem is resolved in Twain’s favor or not.  The fact that the problem appears at all testifies that 
the novel works, not as a formal unity, but as a rhetorical performance in which the reader must 
participate in order to read at all” (98).  Whichever decision the interpreter reaches – whether she 
agrees that Twain’s ending supports his anti-racist rhetoric or contradicts it – the reader has to 
reach some conclusion in order to make sense of the novel.  For Mailloux, concerned with the 
ideological play of narrative, a work like Huckleberry Finn is an ideal work to discuss, as its 
constitutive elements address the still-relevant problem of institutionalized racism.  However, as 
we shall see, all narratives – regardless of their overt political and ideological messages – are 
composed of elements that must be interpreted.  Once interpreted, these elements frequently 
come into conflict with the work’s other elements, requiring the interpreter to reinterpret the 
work’s assemblage of narrative elements to construct a rhetorically satisfying and coherent 
gestalt interpretation. 
 David Kaufer’s work with rhetorical hermeneutics helps to explain the rhetorical function 
of narrative.  Kaufer’s work recuperating rhetoric from its mistaken identity as a purely 
productive methodology, and instead showing how rhetoric is best understood as a design art, 
leads him to conclude that rhetoric and narrative are more intimately connected than is 
traditionally assumed.  As Kaufer explains: 
Rhetoric is not the application of language to define external 
situations.  It is rather the application of language to bring about a 
world, a cast of characters, and a contest to the listener’s here and 
now.  The speaker’s job is to have the audience associate the near 
future with the historical world that contains the characters and 
contest that best fits the speaker’s interests as he or she 
understands them.  But this is a world that must be carefully 
designed to adjust the audience to the speaker’s purpose and vice 
versa.  To design it, the speaker must rely on a battery of tools 
taken from the toolkit of rhetorical design.  (269) 
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 The beauty of Kaufer’s formulation is that is explains, effortlessly, the operation of political 
rhetoric in both ancient and contemporary settings, as well as the rhetorical operation of narrative 
in both ancient and contemporary settings.  Mailloux’s theories of the rhetorical performance of 
Twain’s Huckleberry Finn are here explained as Twain’s successful creation of an internally 
inconsistent world, in which easy dismissals of racism are challenged by the tougher demands of 
institutionalized racism.  Rhetoric, as Kaufer notes, is far more than merely a “theory of 
argument.”  Instead, “argument is a tactical action that is taken only when a speaker’s description 
of the world is interrupted and when the speaker resorts to argument in order to overcome the 
interruption and to resume the telling” (272).  Again, the economy with which Kaufer explains 
both the operation of political discourse and narrative discourse is impressive.  By revealing 
argumentation to be the failure of rhetoric rather than its raison d’être, Kaufer explains the 
phenomenon of the didactic narrative, and why it fails to aesthetically satisfy its interpreters.  
Narratives that descend into didacticism fail in their primary rhetorical role of world-creation, 
and so resort to argumentation to convey their rhetorical-narrative content.  Though it may seem 
odd to refer to the rhetorical-narrative content of a work of literary art, in the following section I 
will briefly demonstrate how the history of rhetoric and poetics itself supports just such a 
convergence. 
 
2.2.2. Aristotle’s Rhetorical Poesis and Poetical Rhetoric 
 
In application, the twin disciplines of rhetoric and poetics are difficult to disentangle.  
Coleridge’s famous poetic ambition, “to transfer from our inward nature a human interest and a 
semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of imagination that willing suspension 
of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith,” speaks to this trouble (Biographia 
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 388).  For Coleridge, the writing [logos] of his contributions to the Lyrical Ballads would need to 
be persuasive enough to provoke in his listeners not merely the willingness to engage in a 
particular cognitive process, but the actual enactment of the suspension of disbelief.  Coleridge’s 
agenda, in other words, is to move his readers to action based on his reputation as a poet [ēthos], 
his skill in the poems themselves [logos], and his ability to convey the human interest [pathos] of 
his creations – the three areas of rhetorical study, applied here to poetics in service and 
fulfillment of what Coleridge calls the “poetic faith.” 
 Even in this example, though, my discussion of the interpenetration of rhetoric and 
poetics reinstates the ideological and conceptual separateness of the two disciplines.  Roland 
Barthes summarizes the dichotomy between rhetoric and poetics in his essay, “The Old Rhetoric: 
An Aide-Mémoire”:   
Aristotle wrote two treatises which concern the phenomena of 
discourse, but they are quite distinct: the Technè rhétorikè 
[Rhetoric] deals with an art of everyday communication, with 
public discourse; the Technè poiétikè [Poetics] deals with an art of 
imaginary evocation; [. . .] these are, for Aristotle, two specific 
ways of proceeding, two autonomous “technai”; and it is the 
opposition of these two systems, one rhetorical, the other poetic, 
which in fact defines Aristotelian rhetoric.  (20-1) 
 
And yet, despite Barthes’ conviction that the two works take as their subject discrete forms of 
discourse, the two fields of discourse actually overlap to a considerable extent.  Aristotle defines 
rhetoric as “an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion” 
(Rhetoric I.2.1355a, 36).  This is glossed in Plato’s Phaedrus as “a method of influencing men’s 
minds by means of words, whether the words are spoken in a court of law or before some other 
public body or in private conversation.”  Though Plato’s concern is not the similarities between 
rhetoric and poetics (he is more intent on illustrating the differences between rhetoric and 
philosophy), he follows Socrates’ “general definition” of rhetoric with a telling question: “And is 
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 not some art involved whatever the importance of the subject under discussion?” (261, 73, 
emphasis added).  Plato emphasizes the artfulness and artifice employed in rhetoric, contrasting 
that with the scientific pursuit of philosophy.  Indeed, as Aristotle writes, there is no specialized 
field of technical knowledge that could constitute the study of rhetoric: “But rhetoric seems to be 
able to observe the persuasive about ‘the given,’ so to speak.  That, too, is why we say it does not 
include technical knowledge of any particular, defined genus [of subjects]” (Rhetoric I.2.1355a, 
37).  Aristotle titles his treatise on rhetoric the Technè rhétorikè, the art of rhetoric (Rhetoric 23), 
positioning it in opposition to, and possibly as being superior to, the scientific disciplines.  Susan 
Jarratt describes rhetoric as “a meta-discipline through which a whole spectrum of language uses 
and their outcomes as social action can be refracted for analysis and combination” (Jarratt 14).  
The meta-disciplinarity of rhetoric, through which it is able to find the persuasive in any given 
topic, problem, or field of learning, is, of course, highly reminiscent of the meta-disciplinarity of 
fiction-writing and poetics.  As a skilled rhetor does not need to be an expert in agriculture to be 
able to argue persuasively for certain agricultural policies before the Senate, neither does 
Sophocles need to be an expert on statecraft to write Oedipus Rex.  But beyond these operational 
similarities, Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics themselves explicitly demonstrate the overlapping 
of the two fields. 
 In Aristotle’s codification in Poetics, for instance, tragedy is understood to be comprised 
of six constitutive elements: “Every Tragedy, therefore, must have six parts, which parts 
determine its quality – namely, Plot, Character, Diction, Thought, Spectacle, Song” (VI.7, 62).  
The first two are universal characteristics of fictional works, and need not be discussed much 
here.27  The last two are especially interesting for the study of works in the distributed mode, due 
                                                 
27   By focusing explicitly on fictional works, I am attempting to exclude lyrical poetry from this analysis, as the 
particularities of the form raise specific problems that are not germane to the present study. 
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 to the form’s ability to incorporate graphics and sound into the work in a truly spectacular and 
song-filled experience.  Though these spectacles and songs are not identical to those 
contemplated by Aristotle, they are analogous, and will be considered at a later point in this 
chapter.  It is the middle two parts that are especially relevant for any discussion of rhetoric and 
poetics, as diction and thought are shared terms in both disciplines. 
 Aristotle explains, in Poetics, that thought “is required wherever a statement is proved, 
or, it may be, a general truth enunciated” (VI.6, 62).  Though literary scholars and readers across 
the ages have turned to literature to find just this – the evocative and powerful statement of 
universal truths – Aristotle’s bald statement about the logical and argumentative power of drama 
still seems to be out of place in the Poetics.  Aristotle himself apparently recognizes this, as he 
refers his readers to the Rhetoric for further instruction: 
Concerning Thought, we may assume what is said in the Rhetoric, 
to which inquiry the subject more strictly belongs.  Under Thought 
is included every effect which has to be produced by speech, the 
subdivisions being – proof and refutation; the excitation of the 
feelings, such as pity, fear, anger, and the like; the suggestion of 
importance or its opposite.  (XIX.1-2, 93) 
 
Although thought “more strictly belongs” to the field of rhetoric, it is still an essential element of 
tragedy, and hence an essential element of Aristotle’s poetics.  Interestingly, it is under the 
category of thought that Aristotle includes all of the affective power of tragedy – its ability to 
evoke the cathartic pairing of pity and fear, as well as anger and “the like.”  In the Rhetoric, and 
in a similar vein, Aristotle goes so far as to claim that “The emotions [pathē] are those things 
through which, by undergoing change, people come to differ in their judgments and which are 
accompanied by pain and pleasure, for example, anger, pity, fear, and other such things and their 
opposites” (II.1.1378a, 121).  Both texts, supposedly representing different practices, establish 
the elicitation of emotion in an audience as a central premise.  In the Poetics, Aristotle discusses 
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 the need to conceive of dramatic action and dramatic dialogue as being essentially identical 
because, he writes, “it is evident that the dramatic incidents must be treated from the same points 
of view as the dramatic speeches, when the object is to evoke the sense of pity, fear, importance, 
or probability” (XIX.3, 93).  The actor, here, is cast in the role of the orator or rhetor. 
 When describing the third part of tragedy, diction, Aristotle blurs even more the border 
between rhetoric and poetics.  In the Poetics, Aristotle explains that, “as regards Diction, one 
branch of the inquiry treats of the Modes of Utterance.  But this province of knowledge belongs 
to the art of Delivery and to the masters of that science. [. . . .] We may, therefore, pass this over 
as an inquiry that belongs to another art not to poetry” (XIX.4-5, 94).  Though the provinces of 
diction, utterance, and delivery belong to another “art” – as Plato referred to rhetoric in the 
Phaedrus – they are still central to the construction and understanding of the dramatic forms.  
Delivery is central not merely to poetics, but also to rhetoric, as Aristotle – and centuries of 
elocution instruction in the rhetorical handbooks produced since the Rhetoric – makes clear.  
Delivery, he writes, “has the greatest force, but has not yet been taken in hand” (III.1.1403b, 
217-8).  This happened because, according to Aristotle, “originally, the poets themselves acted 
their tragedies.  Clearly there is something like this in rhetoric, as in poetics” (Rhetoric 
III.1.1403b, 218).  As the actor assumes the role of rhetor when declaiming dialogue on stage, so 
too does the rhetor assume the role of actor when he orates.  Aristotle explicitly concedes in the 
Rhetoric that “Whenever delivery comes to be considered it will function in the same way as 
acting” (III.1.1404a, 219).  Since rhetorical and dramatic delivery are indistinguishable, Aristotle 
finally simply refers his readers in the Rhetoric to the relevant passages in the Poetics for more 
information (III.1.1404a, 220).  Thought and diction are such fundamental aspects of both 
rhetoric and poetics, according to Aristotle, that mastery of either discipline requires research 
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 and practice in the other, and makes the placement of either aspect into only one discipline or 
reference book impossible.  For although both thought and diction “belong” “more strictly” to 
the field of rhetoric, his discussion of poetics is incomplete without them. 
 Returning to the earlier discussion of the rhetorical process of narrative world creation, 
we now can see that Kaufer’s theory of the role of rhetoric traces its lineage back to Aristotle’s 
codification of rhetoric as a frequently-poetic art, and that Mailloux’s theory of the rhetorical 
performance of narrative derives from Aristotle’s vision of poetics as a frequently-rhetorical art.  
Combining the two yields a more complete understanding of narrative as a deeply political and 
rhetorical enterprise, and rhetoric as an essentially narrative pursuit, allowing a truly rhetorical 
hermeneutic to utilize both aspects of the rhetorical-poetical narrative confab.  
 
2.2.3. Performativity and Politicization 
 
In the previous section, I cited a passage from Roland Barthes that argued: “it is the opposition of 
these two systems, one rhetorical, the other poetic, which in fact defines Aristotelian rhetoric” 
(20-1).  By now it should be apparent that this opposition is more conceptual than practical.  
While Aristotle did, apparently, see fit to write separate treatises on each system, labeling each 
differently, he also acknowledged the similarities and overlap between the two.  Later in his 
essay, Barthes explains that rhetoric and poetics ceased to be separate categories by the Middle 
Ages: “The fusion of Rhetoric and Poetics is consecrated by the vocabulary of the Middle Ages, 
when the poetic arts are rhetorical arts, when the great rhetoricians are poets” (21).  The blending 
of the rhetorical arts and the poetic arts is easily comprehended by, and is predictable based on, 
the mutual topics and practices shared by the “two” fields as set forth in the Rhetoric and the 
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 Poetics.  For Barthes, this unification of rhetoric and poetics marks the end of Aristotelian 
rhetoric and the beginning of a new practice, literature: 
The last stage of Aristotelian rhetoric: its dilution by syncretism: 
Rhetoric ceases to be set in opposition to Poetics but becomes a 
transcendent notion which we should today call “Literature”; it is 
no longer exclusively constituted as an object of instruction but 
becomes an art, in the modern sense of the word; it is henceforth 
both a theory of writing and a thesaurus of literary forms.  (26-7) 
 
Barthes identifies the assimilation of rhetoric by poetics, resulting in the creation of the poetical 
form of literature.  Modern and postmodern theorists, however, have identified signs that the 
assimilation went both ways, that poetics was also absorbed by rhetoric, and that the two have 
become so hopelessly intermingled and contaminated that it is no longer possible to say where 
rhetoric ends and poetics begins.  Theories of performativity and politicization, in particular, 
address the indivisible nature of contemporary rhetorics/poetics.  
 Theories of performativity, such as Judith Butler’s well-known work with gender and 
identity performance, are predicated upon a notion of personal performance that is, at all times, 
also political.  In her essay, “Imitation and Gender Insubordination,” Butler explains that “gender 
is not a performance that a prior subject elects to do, but gender is performative in the sense that 
it constitutes as an effect the very subject it appears to express” (1521).  This performance of 
gender, in which the subject is created through its own representation of “itself,” reifies and 
strengthens the “causal or expressive sequence that the heterosexual norm produces to legitimate 
itself as the origin of all sex” (1525).  In other words, the social nomoi [community-specific 
customs and laws] enforce what Butler labels “compulsory heterosexuality” (1519), which 
irresistibly persuades the individuals within the society to adopt and perform certain externalized 
gender roles, as if they were actors on a stage.  These roles serve a double (at least) purpose – 
actually constructing the identities that they are widely thought to make simply visible and, at the 
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 same time, reinforcing the political dominance of heterosexual normativity.  Regardless of the 
sexual orientation of the individual, according to Butler, his or her gender performance, scripted 
by the nomoi as carefully as any Athenian tragedy, exerts a persuasive political message in all 
directions.  The poetical and the rhetorical fuse indistinguishably, not as abstract and arcane 
discursive disciplines, but as the lived experience of every person.  The feminist motto, later 
adopted by the gay rights and gay studies movements, that “the personal is political,” is again 
vindicated.   
 Theories of performance are not the only loci of the contemporary conflation of rhetoric 
and poetics: the foundational ideas of postmodernism also rely on a rhetoricized poetics and a 
poeticized rhetoric.  In her book, The Politics of Postmodernism, Linda Hutcheon explains that 
postmodernity means “there is no directly and naturally accessible past ‘real’ for us today: we 
can only know – and construct – the past through its traces, its representation” (113).  Hutcheon 
is here asserting that, in order to understand the past, and in understanding the past achieve a full 
and meaningful understanding of the present, the postmodern individual must resort to pastiche 
and parody.  The implications of this statement are monumental, but unsurprising given the 
previous discussion: in order to form a political position, the postmodern individual must resort 
to imitation, to poetics.  Thus, in postmodernity, political agency is predicated upon poetic skill.  
This is not dissimilar to Butler’s assertion that political effectiveness is dependent upon poetic 
skill in effecting the roles of externalized gender.  Similarly, Hutcheon asserts that “Postmodern 
art cannot but be political, at least in the sense that its representations – its images and stories – 
are anything but neutral, however ‘aestheticized’ they may appear to be in their parodic self-
reflexivity” (3).  Locked in a vicious circle, postmodern art cannot be other than political, and 
postmodern politics are dependent on artistry.  And yet, of course, once art and politics become 
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 fatally entangled, each loses its ability to serve as an independent critic of the other.28  In 
Hutcheon’s terms, postmodern political criticism “is a strange kind of critique, one bound up, 
too, with its own complicity with power and domination, one that acknowledges that it cannot 
escape implication in that which it nevertheless still wants to analyze and maybe even 
undermine” (4). 
 If, in postmodernity, it is impossible to separate poetics from rhetoric in either political 
discourse or artistic production, then the question remains, why construct a hermeneutical 
rhetoric for works in the distributed mode?  Barthes asserts that “all our literature, formed by 
Rhetoric and sublimated by humanism, has emerged from a politico-judicial practice,” and that it 
is “in those areas where the most brutal conflicts – of money, of property, of class – are taken 
over, contained, domesticated, and sustained by state power, where state institutions regulate 
feigned speech and codify all recourse to the signifier: there is where our literature is born” (“Old 
Rhetoric” 92-3).  The thought that literature has such violent and agonistic origins should dismay 
only those who view literature as being apart from the viciousness and venality of life, pertaining 
instead to the realm of the Platonic ideals and High Culture.  Throughout the Poetics, Aristotle 
describes drama as depicting struggles, while in the Rhetoric the rhetor is described as publicly 
engaging in struggle. 
 Works composed in the distributed mode partake of the struggles of contemporary life, 
and persuade their enactors to engage in hermeneutical struggles of their own – struggles that 
mirror the personal and political struggle to make sense of the random events of everyday life.  
Furthermore, works in the distributed mode actively engage in the struggle to teach reading, 
                                                 
28   This is readily demonstrated in contemporary politics by the opposition mounted by conservative religious 
organizations to the acceptance of funding from the Bush Administration’s Faith Based and Community Initiative, 
documented in Parent, “The Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives: An Ongoing Case Study of American 
Belief, Symbol, and Ritual.”  Journal of Ritual Studies 17.1 (2003).  19-31. 
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 providing a revolutionary arena in which student and instructor can meet as virtual equals to 
share reading strategies and to become better, more critical, and more self-aware readers.  In The 
Theory of the Novel, Georg Lukács establishes a typology of literary forms that is tied to the 
cultural and societal formations of the times in which the forms arose.  Tracing the development 
of “the great and timeless paradigmatic forms of world literature: epic, tragedy, philosophy,” 
Lukács connects the material social and psychological conditions of artistic production to the 
artistic product (35).  He concludes that “The novel is the epic of an age in which the extensive 
totality of life is no longer directly given, in which the immanence of meaning in life has become 
a problem, yet which still thinks in terms of totality” (56), and he awaits the new art form that 
will be responsive to the new world.  The distributed mode is just as closely tied to the times and 
culture from which it arose.  The affective, political, and active aspects of classical rhetoric, tied, 
as they necessarily must be, to the more aesthetic aspects of poetics, allow for the new 
hermeneutical understandings of literary form and of literacy that the distributed mode makes 
possible to come into being in their most powerful and revolutionary state. 
 
2.2.4. Awareness through Estrangement 
 
By framing the rhetorical project as one of constructing persuasive narrative worlds, David 
Kaufer is able to conclude that “the rhetor is an architect of the social world” (270).  In this, 
Kaufer echoes Percy Shelley’s famous pronouncement in his “Defense of Poetry” that “poets are 
the unacknowledged legislators of the world” (765).  If rhetors are, indeed, able to present 
persuasive models of what is, what may come to be, and what should come to be, then they are, 
indeed, the designers of both the world now and the world to come.  In the same way, the 
rhetorical function of narrative presents persuasive worlds waiting to be interpreted and brought 
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 into being in the consciousness of the interpreter – actions which may profoundly affect the 
interpreter’s worldview.  The fragmented, highly rhetorical, and often highly disorienting 
structures of works in the distributed mode suggest the rhetorical performances of the Berliner 
Ensemble, where Bertolt Brecht’s idea of “Verfremdungseffekt” offers a glimpse of what Susan 
Jarratt later would refer to as the nomoi [community-specific customs and laws] and the kairoi 
[the circumstances obtaining at the moment of an oration] that produce, and are produced by, the 
distributed mode. 
 Brecht’s earliest written explanation of what he means by “Verfremdungseffekt” appears 
in his essay, “Alienation Effects in Chinese Acting.”  Brecht writes that the goal of the alienation 
effect in epic theater is to prevent the spectator “from feeling his way into the characters.  
Acceptance or rejection of the characters’ words is thus placed in the conscious realm, not, as 
hitherto, in the spectator’s subconscious” (15).  Brecht later explains that “Any empathy on the 
spectator’s part is thereby prevented from becoming total, that is, from becoming a complete 
self-surrender.  An admirable distance from the events portrayed is achieved.”  The purpose of 
the alienation effect is, ultimately, to cultivate “an observing, watching attitude” in the spectator 
(“Chinese Acting” 17).  Ideally, the spectator at one of Brecht’s plays is unable to immerse 
herself in the action on stage, and instead is all but forced to consciously analyze the drama, 
experiencing the production critically and from “an admirable distance” instead of losing herself 
in the events and identifying with the characters. 
 The enactors of works in the distributed mode, too, find themselves held at arm’s length 
from the narrative events.  The immersive state of reading codex fiction or watching films is 
perpetually forestalled by the fragmented structure of distributed works.  No sooner has a reader 
become intrigued by the narrative presented in a lexia, then she must stop thinking immersively 
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 about the narrative, and must instead think critically about her progress through it.  She must 
assess her own state of knowledge about the events in the lexia and in the work as a whole (to the 
extent she has explored the narrative world), she must determine her own needs for further 
information, and she must evaluate the navigational options available to her. 
 For Brecht, estrangement should result, in part, in the dismantling and reconstruction of 
identity, producing a new, socially-aware modern subjectivity.  Brecht writes against the 
universalizing tendency of drama, explaining that drama generally depends on empathy 
generated by the audience for the characters on stage, resulting in everyman and everywoman 
portrayals with whom every audience member can identify.  This is, in Brecht’s view, 
completely ahistorical, as it denies the historical differences between the time and social milieu 
being presented on stage and the time and social milieu of the audience.  The aim of the 
alienation effect, Brecht writes, is “the historification of the events presented” (“Chinese Acting” 
20), thus reversing the loss of history furthered by traditional drama.  Because audience members 
were forced to think their way through Brecht’s epic theater, they never could forget the essential 
differences between the time of the play and their own time.  The competing historical and social 
milieus could not, Brecht hoped, be conflated.  By foregrounding the differences between the 
setting on stage and the setting in the audience, Brecht hoped to foster critical awareness of both 
the past and the present that would be necessary for social change and improvement. 
 Since the time of Brecht’s experiments with epic theater, the cultural shifts lumped under 
the heading of postmodernity have suggested to many theorists that Brecht’s main problematic – 
societal change, brought about through the gift of historical awareness – is itself problematic.  
The difficulty of establishing a connection with the past is a central preoccupation with theorists 
of postmodernity.  Fredric Jameson, for instance, begins his extended exploration of 
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 postmodernity by stating: “It is safest to grasp the concept of the postmodern as an attempt to 
think the present historically in an age that has forgotten how to think historically in the first 
place” (Postmodernism ix).  Jameson concludes that, as postmoderns, “we are condemned to 
seek History by way of our own pop images and simulacra of that history, which itself remains 
forever out of reach” (Postmodernism 25).  Brecht’s concept of using historical consciousness to 
effect societal change becomes impossible when historical consciousness itself is argued to be an 
impossibility. 
 Jameson’s conclusion, that the only way left for our attempts at regaining a sense of 
history is through our own self-made pastiche of pop culture and pseudo-history, affirms Linda 
Hutcheon’s belief that pastiche is the defining artistic form of postmodernity.  In the distributed 
mode, pastiche is both a formal and a substantive element.  The hyperlinked, fragmented 
structure of many of the works in the distributed mode lends itself to the inclusion of multiple 
media, and to the construction of lexias in different media.  This is especially visible in digital 
works, given the computer’s facility with hyperlinking and multimodality.  Shelley Jackson’s 
distributed narrative, Patchwork Girl, a retelling of Frankenstein from a female monster’s 
viewpoint, links lexias comprised solely of prose to graphical lexias that contain no prose at all.  
In 3D Music, the narrative world is a virtual space of rooms connected by tubes.29  The “reader” 
of the work is able to move through the spaces at will, manipulating objects such as spheres and 
blocks in the spaces.  As the reader moves through the spaces and manipulates the objects, her 
actions cause the computer to play different sections of a contemporary symphony.  In 
Patchwork Girl, 3D Music, and Reagan Library, multiple media are combined in a pastiche that 
contributes to the overall structure of the work, as well as to the narrative itself.  Even in digital 
                                                 
29   3D Music is a WWW distributed musical narrative by Terry and Gabriella Braun and London Sinfonietta, which can 
be accessed at the following address: http://www.braunarts.com/3dmusic/. 
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 works that feature only prose, such as Stuart Moulthrop’s Victory Garden, textual pastiche is a 
major element.  Passages from actual news broadcasts, quotes from books of critical theory, and 
references to real celebrities are not extra-narrative ornaments, but important narrative elements. 
 
2.2.5. Critical Awareness 
 
Brecht’s audiences, as well as the enactors of the distributed mode, are prevented from losing 
themselves in the action of the drama or narrative.  Moreover, while Brecht’s audiences were 
intended to find historical consciousness, distributed narratives intend their readers to find their 
own particular reading strategies and styles.  As Frank Kermode points out in his book, The 
Sense of an Ending, “it is ourselves we are encountering whenever we invent fictions” (38-9).  In 
this case, the reader’s hyper-awareness of what she has read, what she is reading, and what she 
wants to read next to best answer her questions about the narrative, makes visible the usually 
transparent reading strategies she employs every time she reads. 
 Kermode also argues that “It is not expected of critics as it is of poets that they should 
help us to make sense of our lives; they are bound only to attempt the lesser feat of making sense 
of the ways we try to make sense of our lives” (3).  The self-awareness arising from enacting 
works in the distributed mode turns the reader into a critic.  Distributed narratives inspire a 
fascinating series of nested awarenesses, both of the self and of the text.  To begin to engage in 
the process of narrative (re)construction, the reader must gain a critical awareness of the text, 
which is a requirement that all but the most challenging codex fictions and films refrain from 
imposing on their non-academic readers.  To be able to navigate the work, the reader must gain a 
critical awareness of her own reading process.  Differentiating what she knows, what she 
suspects, and what she knows to be wrong, forces the reader to connect her critical awareness of 
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 the work with her critical awareness of her own actions and cognition while reading.  
Furthermore, to refine her narrative (re)construction and her navigational skill, the reader must 
gain a critical awareness of the outcomes of her own actions and cognition.  In other words, the 
reader forms expectations and assumptions that allow her to navigate the text and to construct 
her provisional narrative, and these assumptions and expectations will sometimes be correct, and 
at other times incorrect.  To improve her chances of finding the information she wants, and to 
gain confidence in her provisional narrative, she must evaluate her own evaluation of the text to 
determine whether there are patterns underlying her successes and failures.  These patterns, then, 
must be incorporated into a meta-strategy for reading the text.  The hermeneutical circle moves 
from the text to the reader and back again, each time demanding a new level of critical awareness 
of the object being read, and the subject doing the reading. 
 
2.2.6. The Distributed Mode and the Politics of Affect 
 
Postmodern theory assumes that the past is forever out of reach, that the present is a constantly-
shifting procession of cultural artifacts appropriated from the cultural consciousness, 
subconscious, and dimly-recalled memory, and that the future is knowable only in the sense that 
it will be much like the present, only more so.  In this setting, the cultural conditions (to say 
nothing of the technological conditions) necessary for the establishment of the distributed mode 
as a viable form of artistic (and hence, political) expression are clearly manifest.  Lukács, in The 
Theory of the Novel, longs for a new world in which the individual can coexist with society, and 
in which society is able to incorporate the individual into a community without assimilating her 
into an individuality-crushing collective (144-5 et passim).  The tension between the whole and 
the parts, here rendered on the level of the individual, is also cited by Jameson.  In writing about 
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 the Westin Bonaventure Hotel in Los Angeles, Jameson notes that the confusing postmodern 
architecture of the hotel “has finally succeeded in transcending the capacities of the human body 
to locate itself, to organize its immediate surroundings perceptually, and cognitively to map its 
position in a mappable external world” (44).  The connection between mapping the body in space 
and the reader’s mapping of her progress through the non-space of the distributed narrative 
should be clear, but Jameson puts an even finer point on his observation about postmodern 
embodiment and proprioception: 
It may now be suggested that this alarming disjunction point 
between the body and its built environment [. . .] can itself stand as 
the symbol and analogon of that even sharper dilemma which is 
the incapacity of our minds, at least at present, to map the great 
global multinational and decentered communications network in 
which we find ourselves caught as individual subjects.  (44) 
 
While the shopper searching in vain for a particular boutique at the Bonaventure may become 
unintentionally lost (the Bonaventure was designed to make shopping easier, but, Jameson 
reports, exactly the opposite has occurred), the distributed mode intentionally sets out to create 
this sense of lostness, this affective attack on the reader’s sense of a secure and ordered narrative 
world that book critic Laura Miller found so disturbingly lacking in distributed narratives in the 
last chapter. 
 The reader is not helpless, though, even when firmly in the clutches of the most 
affectively powerful and discomfiting work in the distributed mode, as her narrative impulse 
works to counteract the cognitive dissonance created by the fragmented narrative.  And it is in 
this conflict, this agon between reader and text, that the distributed mode’s politics of affect is 
most clearly visible.  If the postmodern world is itself fragmented and “unmappable,” then it 
seems unarguable that the distributed mode is structurally a deeply realist, deeply mimetic art 
form, as the non-spatial but spatialized lexias replicate the hyperspatial arrangements of 
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 postmodern life.  In interacting with works in the distributed mode, the reader enacts not merely 
a model of reading, she also enacts a model of the world and of her conscious interaction with it.  
Given the kairoi and nomoi of postmodernity, distributed narrative can be seen as engaging in 
the political struggle to redefine human interaction with texts, and to inculcate in the minds of its 
readers an explicit and visible critical awareness of their own reading strategies, and of the 
strategies that readers deploy to attempt to make sense of complicated and ambiguous texts.  As 
the texts and the world-situation of postmodernity share certain similarities, these hermeneutical 
strategies also can be employed in navigating the hyperspaces of postmodern life, which makes 
the political scope of the project of the distributed mode not merely textuality and textual study, 
but the realm of human life and interaction itself. 
 
2.3. CONFIRMATION: THE WORK OF CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD OF THE 
WORK 
 
The moment when one first begins to read, enact, or view a work is filled with tension.  The 
work, as yet, has no understandable form or structure, the characters are largely unknown and 
motivated by as-yet mysterious drives and fears, and the resolution is still very far away.  As the 
interpreter progresses through the work, however, structure begins to fall into place, characters 
reveal themselves, and the teleology of the work, its sought-after resolution, coalesces and 
steadily approaches.  The processes by which all of this is accomplished are far from simple. 
 I label these hermeneutical processes described here conformation, referring to the work 
of the enactor to construct a mental representation of the narrative, i.e., the world of the work.  
The world of the work is the product of the enactor, and yet constrained by the work itself.  As 
the name suggests, then, the work of conformation is the effort to bring the enactor’s constructed 
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 world of the work into conformity with the revealed content of the work itself.  Conformation, as 
will be explained, is an inherently ludic process whereby the enactor performs enactment and 
interpretation on the work to produce the world of the work.  Enactment and interpretation are 
both complex processes, whose individual components will be discussed in detail (enactment 
includes encounter, navigation, and configuration; interpretation includes macro-analyzation, 
micro-analyzation, and resonance). 
 
 
2.3.1. Nomad Games 
 
In their book, A Thousand Plateaus, Giles Deleuze and Félix Guattari propose a typology of 
spaces both real and metaphysical, labeling space either striated or smooth.  Cities are examples 
of striated space, areas in which the territory is marked out, organized, divided into parcels, and 
each parcel given an identifier and a purpose (482).  Smooth space, on the contrary, is more like 
a desert, an area in which points and specific locations are less important than the totality of the 
territory (ibid.).  As Deleuze and Guattari write, “In striated space, lines or trajectories tend to be 
subordinated to points: one goes from one point to another.  In the smooth, it is the opposite: the 
points are subordinated to the trajectory” (478).  In striated spaces, one goes from point A to 
point B to reach point B; in smooth spaces, one traverses points A and B to achieve motion.  The 
inhabitants of smooth spaces are nomads, in Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology, occupants of 
the entire territory who are constantly moving and thus able to perceive the constant evolution 
and transformation of themselves and the land around them, instead of fixing themselves and 
their space into stable states. 
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 Though the example of the desert as a smooth space would seem to imply that smooth 
spaces are fundamentally homogeneous, Deleuze and Guattari argue that this is not the case.  As 
they write, “Homogeneous space is in no way a smooth space; on the contrary, it is the form of 
striated space” (Deleuze and Guattari 370).  Though sameness would help to dissipate the 
locational and ideological power of points within the space – as in the striated space of a city, 
with its differentiated downtown, arts districts, shopping centers, and suburbs – smooth spaces 
are filled with emergences rupturing any semblance of uniformity.  The lack of imposed 
regimentation allows new ideas to cross conceptual and ideational boundaries, resulting in what 
Deleuze and Guattari call “nomad science,” a constant birthing of new, unexplained, possibly 
unexplainable thoughts (363 et passim).  Nomad thought is, they explain, unexplained and 
unexplainable because it is the product of the distributed “rhizome” nature of smooth space, 
since “any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be” (7), thus 
allowing combinations of spaces and ideas impossible in striated space.   
 Smooth space and nomad science, however, can neither exist without nor independently 
of striated space.  As Deleuze and Guattari write, “the two spaces [smooth and striated] in fact 
exist only in mixture: smooth space is constantly being translated, transversed into a striated 
space; striated space is constantly being reversed, returned to a smooth space” (474).  As smooth 
space is constantly being “translated” into striated space, and striated space becomes smooth, the 
two merge and blur, creating hybrid spaces out of the flux.  Deleuze and Guattari explain that: 
As a general rule, a smooth space, a vectorial field, a nonmetric 
multiplicity are [sic] always translatable, and necessarily 
translated, into a ‘compars’: a fundamental operation by which one 
repeatedly overlays upon each point of smooth space a tangent 
Euclidean space endowed with a sufficient number of dimensions, 
by which one reintroduces parallelism between two vectors, 
treating multiplicity as though it were immersed in this 
homogeneous and striated space of reproduction, instead of 
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 continuing to follow it in an ‘exploration by legwork.’  This is the 
triumph of the logos or the law over the nomos.  But the 
complexity of the operation testifies to the existence of resistances 
it must overcome.  (373) 
 
Several important points need to be extracted from this passage: first, that smooth space is 
translated into striated through the superimposition of an ordered, “Euclidean” grid.  It would 
follow, then, that smooth space is reclaimed from striated by the destabilization of the structural 
grid supporting it.  Second, striated space is the symbolic realm of the logos, the power of 
language and the letter (McComiskey 81), whereas the smooth is the realm of the nomos, 
translated from the Greek variously as “democratically derived custom-law” (Schiappa 10), 
“community-specific customs and laws” (Jarratt 11), “A self-conscious arrangement of discourse 
to create a politically and socially significant knowledge” (Jarratt 60), and “laws and policies,” 
though specifically the laws and policies of the rhetor’s immediate environs (McComiskey 81).  
Harkening back to the terms of classical rhetoric, Deleuze and Guattari present the logos as 
imposing its will through language as law, whereas the nomos is individual and particular, 
determined by the unique confluence of time and space, and thus must be perceived and detected 
constantly.30  Finally, the “complexity” of the transformations from smooth to striated and vice 
versa illustrates that such translation is not without resistance, that inertia and the inherent 
difficulty of the process impede such changes.  This last point is especially relevant to the study 
of interpretation. 
As mentioned earlier, the initial access to a narrative is frequently characterized by 
tension and uncertainty.  The interpreter is confronted with an initially confounding set of 
characters and situations, while lacking knowledge of the relationships between them necessary 
                                                 
30   In classical rhetoric, of course, the expert rhetor (who was almost always male) was expected to adapt his logos to the 
particulars of the nomos in which he found himself speaking.  By careful observation of the nomos and of his audience, the 
rhetor would be better able to persuade his audience, and thus to impose his will. 
101 
 to interpret or understand the work.  In this, the interpreter is presented with what appears to be 
an expanse of smooth space, a heterogeneous mixture of eruptions and irruptions, which will 
have to be tamed, translated into the orderly structure of striated space for the interpreter to 
achieve resolution and closure.  She initially feels like a nomad, wandering the uncharted and 
untamed wilds of the undiscovered narrative, lacking even the most basic of guides to the 
narrative space in which she finds herself.  As Deleuze and Guattari note, “It is true that nomads 
have no history; they have only a geography” (393).  As they later note, “All history does is to 
translate a coexistence of becomings into a succession” (430).  This is precisely what 
interpretation, in one of its aspects, attempts: to translate a series of narrative becomings into a 
coherent and causally-connected succession, which the interpreter may then understand.  At that 
point, the translation is complete, and what seemed the vastness of smooth space has been 
reclaimed as regimented and interpreted striated space. 
 But there is more to it than a simple one-to-one process of smooth-space reclamation.  
The narrative work is always heavily striated.  Regardless of the intent or the experimental nature 
of the work, the composer’s efforts always effect striation.  Indeed, it is one of the most 
important and difficult tasks of reading, viewing, and enacting to discover, interpret, and 
understand the “plan(e)” of striation, the organizing principle of the work (Deleuze and Guattari 
265 et passim).31  Deleuze and Guattari describe plane(e)s as being “structural or genetic, and 
both at once, structure and genesis, the structural plan(e) of formed organizations with their 
developments, the genetic plan(e) of evolutionary developments with their organizations” (265).   
Put simply, the plan(e) is both the underlying structure of a work, in which the entire world of 
the work is arranged and packaged, as well as the structure of the work which allows for the 
                                                 
31   In his note on the translation of A Thousand Plateaus, Brian Massumi comments that in French, “the word plan 
denotes both a ‘plane’ in the geometrical sense and a ‘plan.’  [. . . .]  Where both meanings seem to be present (as in the 
discussions of the plan d’organisaton) ‘plan(e)’ has been used in the translation” (xvii). 
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 generation of the world of the work in the consciousness of the interpreter.  As such, the plan(e) 
of the work is of the utmost importance to interpretation, and yet, as Deleuze and Guattari write, 
the plan(e) “is always inferred.  [. . . .] This opens the way for all possible interpretations”.  They 
conclude: “Life plan(e), music plan(e), writing plan(e), it’s all the same: a plan(e) that cannot be 
given as such, that can only be inferred from the forms inferred from the forms it develops and 
the subjects it forms, since it is for these forms and these subjects” (ibid., emphasis in original).  
The plan(e) of a work is most visible in its absent spaces, in the connective tissue holding the 
various elements of the work together and allowing these various elements to form a unified 
whole capable of giving rise to a world.  As Barthes realizes in Roland Barthes, the interstitial 
rationale of the composition of a work – especially visible when considering a fragmented work 
composed in the distributed mode, but no less true for traditionally composed narratives – is 
always fundamentally tacit, and therefore only comprehensible through the action of 
interpretation. 
In traditional narratives, convention suggests to interpreters that their patience will be 
rewarded with the revelation of a sufficient amount of narrative material to deduce the work’s 
plan(e) and allow the work’s world to resolve in narrative closure.  In the distributed mode, 
however, that suggestion is muted, as an aleatoric and enactor-driven navigation through the 
work seems to make such resolution impossible.  In the last chapter, I quoted Salon and New 
York Times book critic Laura Miller’s dissatisfaction with the “feel” and navigational 
conventions of hyperfictional examples of the distributed mode.  Her unhappiness, however, did 
not end there, but also encompassed this lack of narrative closure and structure.  As she 
comments, “Hypertext is sometimes said to mimic real life, with its myriad opportunities and 
surprising outcomes, but I already have a life, thank you very much, and it is hard enough putting 
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 that in order without the chore of organizing someone else’s novel” (43).  Her colleague, senior 
book critic for the New York Times, Michiko Kakutani, expounds on the dissatisfaction caused 
by the distributed mode’s attack on traditional narrative plan(e)s: 
In the end, one of the oddest arguments advanced by hypertext 
proponents is that hypertext is lifelike, that it captures the 
randomness, arbitrariness and repetitiousness of life.  Do we really 
need a more lifelike art?  Once upon a time, in the pre-hypertext 
past, art aspired not to imitate life but to shape it, intensify it, 
imprint it with a single person’s vision.  It represented an 
individual’s attempt to find order in chaos, a pattern in the carpet.  
Hypertext smashes that old conception of art: the artist is dead, it 
suggests, and the rug is patternless – the reader alone is left to 
make sense of a senseless world.  (42) 
 
Both critics have a valid point: the process of discovering the plan(e) of the work in the 
distributed mode is a startlingly different experience than that of traditional narrative, but it is 
neither futile (as Kakutani suggests) nor gratuitous (as Miller suggests).  Rather, the process is 
inherently ludic. 
In the previous chapter, the ludic nature of works in the distributed mode was a frequent 
concern.  In that chapter, the question of whether the works were playing games on their 
enactors, or with them, pointed out the hermeneutical problem posed by the ludic, namely, what 
is the relationship between play and enactment?  Further, we may well ask whether the same 
relationship holds between play and reading and viewing.  In Marc Saporta’s Composition No. 1, 
for instance, the boundaries between enacting, reading, and play are, even on the surface, 
extremely porous.  The work’s introduction, mentioned previously, famously begins with the 
invocation of a game of cards: “The reader is requested to shuffle these pages like a deck of 
cards; to cut, if he likes with his left hand, as at a fortuneteller’s.  The order the pages then 
assume will orient X’s fate.”  While not everyone would classify the fortuneteller’s art as a game 
per se, the mythic proclivity of Fate to play with human destiny is here transferred to the enactor, 
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 whose shuffling, like the spinning of Fate’s wheel, will “orient X’s fate.”  The very act of 
shuffling Saporta’s pages, configuring the work so that it may be read, a pre-navigational 
enactment of the work’s material structure, is indistinguishable from the set-up to an ordinary 
game of cards. 
 Koyaanisqatsi approaches play differently, experimenting with the play of images, a 
visual analog to wordplay.  As I mentioned earlier, in the film’s first scene, the camera pans 
slowly across a series of primitive paintings depicting early humans.  From this ancient milieu, 
Reggio makes the transitions to early man’s greatest achievement, fire.  Slowly, the billowing, 
raging fire is revealed to be the product of a rocket being launched.  The surprising transition 
between ancient and space-age technology via the image of fire is clever and effective, and sets 
the tone for later juxtapositions.  The scenes immediately following the rocket launch, in fact, 
depict a barren, alien-looking red landscape – a credible vision of Mars, or some other distant 
planet.  The audience is thus presented with the opportunity to engage in play alongside Reggio – 
the images are not of Mars, but of the terrestrial desert Southwest of the United States, but by 
imagining that the rocket has taken the audience to a distant planet, the audience is able to 
participate in a highly ludic metaphor.  By agreeing with Reggio’s assertion that the desert 
mesas, plateaus, and canyons are extraterrestrial, the full power of metaphor is unleashed. 
In his book Motives for Metaphor: Literacy, Curriculum Reform, and the Teaching of 
English, James Seitz argues that metaphor is best understood as operating not at level of 
comparison, but at the level of equivalence (7).  In this example from Koyaanisqatsi, the 
Mars/Arizona equivalence works on at least two levels: the level of causation, and the level of 
play.  As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Kuleshov effect suggests that juxtaposing an 
image of a mode of transportation with a new location will result in audiences constructing a 
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 causal connection between the two – the rocket in the second scene took us (or at least a camera) 
to Mars in the third scene.  Seitz argues that “metaphor ignores the ordinary rules governing the 
ascription of names; rather than keeping names and things in their proper places, it brings them 
together in unusual discursive combinations” (36).  As Kuleshov noted, causality in these scenes 
results from the metaphoric properties of montage.  In effect, Reggio’s montage makes the 
implicit claim that the landscape is the destination of the rocket, metaphorically conflating the 
actual content of the landscape with the unexpected content of outer space.  The tension between 
these two meanings may strain the bounds of an audience’s credibility, but, as Seitz writes, 
“Simply put, metaphor must strain if it is to produce new relationships and not merely describe 
those that are already taken for granted” (37).  The new relationship between the locations gives 
rise to the second level of metaphor active in these scenes, the ludic level.  At the level of game, 
the audience members who choose to play along are rewarded with the opportunity to fully revel 
in the equivalence of the two locations – an equivalence made far more powerful than its analogs 
in prose by the majesty and mastery of Reggio’s images and the alien cadences of Philip Glass’ 
score.  Just as sharp wordplay can be a delight to sparring interlocutors and audiences alike, the 
interpretive and cognitive conflict between accepting the Martian interpretation and recognizing 
the terrestrial nature of the images adds the frisson of complicity in a game whose purpose the 
audience does not know. 
 Hans-Georg Gadamer writes that the work of art inherently and always operates as play, 
reflecting its origin in what he calls “the exuberance and superabundance of life” (“Play” 130).  
Gadamer cites Johan Huizinga’s seminal Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture, 
which argues that play is “a significant function – that is to say, there is some sense to it.”  In 
fact, Huizinga argues, “In play there is something ‘at play’ which transcends the immediate 
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 needs of life and imparts meaning to the action.  All play means something” (1, emphasis in 
original).  Huizinga’s ideas of something being “at play” in play that “transcends” ordinary life is 
an appealing concept for Gadamer, who holds that “the play of art is a mirror that through the 
centuries constantly arises anew, and in which we catch sight of ourselves in a way that is often 
unexpected or unfamiliar: what we are, what we might be, and what we are about@ (APlay@ 130).  
In other words, the significant function of play allows those participating in play, in the play of 
the work of art, to gain knowledge of the world and of the self in ways that surpass ordinary 
experience. 
 For Huizinga, this transcendence was an integral part of play, quite apart from art.  As 
Huizinga writes, play involves “a stepping out of common reality into a higher order” (13 
emphasis in original).  Huizinga is very specific, however, that this higher order is not a 
hallucinatory replacement of the real world, but rather the creation of a new space entirely.  
Huizinga uses the example of a child’s play to illustrate the “higher order” realized through play: 
The child is quite literally ‘beside himself’ with delight, 
transported beyond himself to such an extent that he almost 
believes he actually is such and such a thing, without, however, 
wholly losing consciousness of ‘ordinary reality.’  His 
representation is not so much a sham-reality as a realization in 
appearance: ‘imagination’ in the original sense of the word.  (14) 
 
Huizinga also explicitly ties literariness and narrativity to play, a connection that will be central 
to Gadamer’s understanding of art and interpretation.  As Huizinga writes, “Poesis, in fact, is a 
play-function” (119).  Gadamer is wholly supportive of Huizinga’s metaphor – for both men, 
engaging with and interpreting the work of art is not like play, it is play. 
 Gadamer adapts the notion of a higher order separate from ordinary reality, arguing that 
by engaging in play or in interpretation, the player and interpreter is subsumed in the process.  
Gadamer explains that in play, neither player is as important as the game itself being played.  
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 The game, however, is not merely being played, but is itself playing the players.  Gadamer notes 
that “all playing is being played.  The attraction of a game, the fascination it exerts, consists 
precisely in the fact that the game masters the players” (TM 106).  At this point, Gadamer 
espouses a quasi-ascetic and zen-like dymanic – for only players or interpreters so played by 
their games and their works of art, who surrender themselves to being played, are capable of 
experiencing the transcendency of art or games.  In Gadamer’s estimation, “absorption into the 
game is an ecstatic self-forgetting that is experienced not as a loss of self-possession, but as the 
free buoyancy of an elevation above oneself@ (AProblem@ 55). 
 Gadamer’s “ecstatic self-forgetting” is an inspiring, and potentially quite intimidating, 
metaphor for interpreting the work of art, but its extremism renders it a questionable model for 
more quotidian engagements with literary and narrative art.  For that, I advance a definition and 
theory of games and play developed more than thirty years after Huizinga’s Homo Ludens.  In 
his book, The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia, philosopher Bernard Suits simplifies and 
distills previous work on games and play, arriving at the following definition:  
[T]o play a game is to engage in activity directed towards bringing 
about a specific state of affairs, using only means permitted by 
rules, where the rules prohibit more efficient in favor of less 
efficient means, and where such rules are accepted just because 
they make possible such activity.  (34) 
 
Suits’ definition of play has four components, each of which is relatable to narrative 
interpretation.  The first element is what Suits refers to as a “prelusory goal,” that is, the “specific 
state of affairs” that the players attempt to effect.  For most players, this goal is to win the game, 
whatever that means within the constraints of the game.  For some players, though, the goal may 
simply be to lose by only a certain number of points.  In any case, the prelusory goal is a goal 
that exists prior to the initiation of the game, and that motivates the players’ actions during the 
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 game.  The second element is the “lusory means,” the way in which game play is performed, and 
includes equipment, the game’s initial situation, and the features that make up game play.  The 
third element is termed the “constitutive rules,” because they constitute the game qua game – an 
activity made artificially more difficult than absolutely necessary.  The constitutive rules are the 
specific features of ludic rules that establish the obstacles with which the game players must 
contend.  In other words, while many activities may have rules governing their performance, it is 
the gratuitously “inefficient” character of the “constitutive rules” that helps to transform a rule-
governed activity into a game.  The final element is what Suits terms the “lusory attitude,” the 
mindset that allows the player to cheerfully submit to competition against an opponent or 
opponents through an intentionally inefficient method. 
 Gadamer posits a clear parallel between interpretation and the ludology of Huizinga’s 
Homo Ludens.  Carrying the pattern forward in time, the homology between interpretation and 
Suits’ theories of play is even stronger.  When engaging with a narrative work, as Suits would 
suggest, the interpreter must intend to engage with that work, and must have, therefore, a “pre-
enactive goal” of interpreting that work.  Even the most hypnotic and seductive media, such as 
ambient music or television, are not absolutely irresistible.  The conventions of reading, of 
viewing, of navigating, and of listening constitute the “enactive means” for engaging with 
narrative works.  Narrative conventions and tropes themselves form an effective set of 
“constitutive rules,” as the entire range of narrative stylistics and interpretive strategies 
developed to make sense of them attest to the basic incomprehensibility of others.  In A 
Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari make the following provocative assertion: 
Speech communities and languages, independently of writing, do 
not define closed groups of people who understand one another but 
primarily determine relations between groups who do not 
understand one another: if there is language, it is fundamentally 
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 between those who do not speak the same tongue.  Language is 
made for that, for translation, not for communication.  (430) 
 
Their conclusion is inescapable – language is necessary because communication is so very 
difficult, if not, ultimately, impossible.  Recalling Suits’ category of the “constitutive rules” of 
play – the elements that impose unnecessary obstacles in the path of the players, and thus 
transform the activity into play – recasts the role and value of difficult language.  The more 
artistic, the more complex, the more convoluted a narrative becomes, the more explicitly the 
narrative itself espouses the properties of play.  This is precisely what we see when we consider 
the difficult narratives of the nouveaux romans, and the labyrinthine prose of theorists such as 
Deleuze and Jacques Derrida.  Finally, the “enactive attitude” is that which explains why the 
enactor is willing to pick up a book or watch a film or navigate through a hypernarrative.  As 
Suits argues, “The attitude of the game player must be an element in game playing because there 
has to be an explanation of that curious state of affairs wherein one adopts rules which require 
one to employ worse rather than better means for reaching an end” (38).  The “enactive attitude” 
– which is also, of course, precisely a “ludic attitude” – also explains the peculiar mindset that 
allows a reader to perform the real cognitive work of constructing the narrative within her own 
consciousness.  In Huizinga’s model, play is a “realization in appearance.”  This phrase also goes 
a long way toward describing the cognitive results of reading and of engaging with narrative 
material in any media – the interpreter envisions the narrative, constructing what I will term the 
world of the work, while still remaining more-or-less cognizant of the ordinary reality around 
her. 
 Earlier in this section I argued that the initial contact with a narrative gave rise to the 
sense that the interpreter was exploring a narrative smooth space, undifferentiated by structure 
and an imposed regimentation.  In the early stages of interpretation, the interpreter is left to 
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 engage in nomad thought, attempting to draw inferences and connections without sufficient 
information or understanding of the work, guided more by intuition than by experience.  A 
masterful narrative will heighten this sense of nomadicity to avoid obviousness or boredom on 
the part of the interpreter.  Thus, though the interpreter strives throughout the work to decipher 
the disguised plan(e) of the work, and thus to reveal the work’s true affinity with striated space, 
the difficulty of this task, coupled with the inherent improbability of speaking the same “tongue” 
as the work’s composer, leaves the interpreter in a game space, with all the danger, excitement, 
and uncertainty possible for those playing nomad games. 
 
 
2.3.2. The World of the Work 
 
It is no accident that Johann Huizinga and Hans-Georg Gadamer equate narrative engagement 
with play and, specifically, with children’s play.  For, when we approach a narrative work we 
commit ourselves to the imaginative construction of an unreal space populated with unreal 
persons and objects, quite similar in effect to children’s games of “make-believe.”  This 
imaginative construction is the world of the work, a label popularized by Paul Ricoeur in his 
hermeneutical writings.  As Ricoeur notes, the world of the work is “the centre of gravity of the 
hermeneutical question” (“Function” 132).  The world of the work is, as we shall see, the center 
of gravity of interpretation because it is the summation and ultimate goal of interpretation.  This 
is consistent with Mailloux’s assertion that the narrative work is always a rhetorical performance 
(60 et passim), and Kaufer’s claim that rhetoric is “the application of language to bring about a 
world” (269).  The interpreter enacts this rhetorical presentation of a narrative world through the 
processes of conformation, constructing her own mental version of the world of the work. 
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  Let us begin our exploration of the phenomenon of the world of the work with an 
example from Marc Saporta’s Composition No. 1.  After the enactor has shuffled the deck of 
pages (or not) according to Saporta’s instructions, she may see this page: 
For the summer vacation, Maman has decided to hire a girl to live 
in and take care of the two younger children.  Preferably a German 
girl, so that the children can learn the language better.  Besides, 
German students have the reputation of not minding work and 
being willing to accept their share of household tasks. 
 The country house is enormous and difficult to keep up.  
The governess can have one of the third-floor rooms that is usually 
kept locked. 
 Maman makes clear that no emotional involvement will be 
tolerated, which is quite natural.  But the presence of the young girl 
in the house suggests, even so, that the summer will be an unusual 
one. 
 Maman is surprised by the lack of enthusiasm that greets 
her plan.  In her opinion, the German girl could even be an 
agreeable playmate in her spare time. 
 Considering how subtle Maman is, it would be best not to 
oppose the plan too openly.  She would guess at once that girls do 
not necessarily constitute an object of contempt, as boys of sixteen 
or seventeen prefer people – at least their parents – to think. 
 However good she may be at smelling out lies, Maman 
seems to have been taken in by this one. 
 
This could be the first page the enactor reads or the last – the process of shuffling has forcibly 
separated the concepts of “sequence” and “chronology” – and yet the prose text of the work on 
this page offers quite enough clues to allow the enactor to assign a rough place in the chronology 
of the narrative.  The interpretation of this page will be discussed in later sections of this chapter, 
but for our purposes let us assume that the page has already been interpreted by the conscientious 
enactor – a process that cannot exist prior to the conformation of the world of the work, nor prior 
to the enactment of the work, but only in reciprocal cooperation with these processes. 
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  The enactor, in reading the passage above, visualizes the situation narrated – a surprising, 
but by no means rare, performance due to the lack of visual cues presented in the passage.  The 
enactor conforms, from this page, a situation more so than a location, although the location is 
important.  From this page, the enactor constructs an “enormous” country house that is “difficult 
to keep up,” with an unused and shuttered third floor.  The enactor peoples this house with a 
matriarch whose faculty for “smelling out lies” is highly developed but not infallible, her son, a 
boy “of sixteen or seventeen,” whose interest in girls has developed, but is not yet widely known, 
and a pair of younger siblings who shall be placed under the care of a to-be-hired German 
governess.  The emotional atmosphere of the manor, enforced by “Maman,” is one of near-
Victorian propriety, with all of the subterfuge and secret desires and passions that such 
repression invariably produces.   Though Saporta does not describe the appearance of any of 
these people – at least, not on this page – the enactor has no problem constructing what she 
considers to be appropriate representations of Maman, the narrator (whom she may suppose to be 
the work’s mysterious protagonist, “Mr. X,” as a boy), the younger children, the German 
governess, and the country house.  She hears, though Saporta does not include direct quotation 
on this page, Maman’s commentary on the virtues of a German governess, as well as on her 
lodgings and on the potential for her son’s socialization – though highly regulated and 
constrained – with the governess.  The visual and auditory hallucination that arises from the 
enactor’s conformation of this page is a piece of Composition No. 1’s world, as are the (nomad) 
thoughts of the enactor, the connections she senses between this page and any other pages she 
may have encountered, and between this work and her own life and experiences. 
 As the pages have been shuffled, the sequence of the narration is unpredictable, and the 
enactor may turn from the page quoted above to this one: 
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  Marianne agrees to let a girl board with them, to take care 
of the children during the summer vacation.  But only on certain 
conditions.  Since Marianne’s nerves cannot endure the presence of 
a stranger in her home, the girl cannot use the kitchen or the living 
room.  In fact, she must stay in her own room, the guest room on 
the second floor of the villa, and one other room, the children’s 
room, where she is to watch them while they play.  And she will be 
entitled to go there only at certain hours.  Thus all the other parts 
of the villa can be kept locked.  This is what Marianne calls 
protecting her privacy.  The idea that an outsider can walk into her 
home is a torment to her.  This way, the girl’s comings and goings 
will be reduced to a minimum.  Besides, the girl will generally take 
the children out during her few hours of service.  That way, 
Marianne will see her as little as possible. 
 It would be absurd to think that Marianne is ashamed to 
show anyone the neglected state that the house is in.  In fact, she 
takes a certain pleasure in living in a chaotic and expensive 
bohemian atmosphere. 
 But she is convinced that her equilibrium would be 
imperiled if anyone tried to alter the established disorder, even 
with the innocent intention of putting something away. 
 The last housemaid was fired for trying to clean up the 
bathroom, Marianne’s inviolable kingdom and the sanctuary of her 
“privacy.” 
 
This page, like the previous one, contains very little visual description.  The “neglected state” of 
the house, for instance, is left entirely to the imagination of the enactor to supply.  Marianne – 
Mr. X’s wife, the enactor may suppose, in a daring act of interpretation – is ageless and 
featureless.  She may be a great beauty, or she may be plain or even disfigured.  Her obvious 
nervous condition may be immediately visible, or may be carefully hidden from view.  The 
enactor, however, visualizes Marianne, adding her to the world of the work.  Additionally, the 
narrator’s tone colors the enactor’s perception of Marianne, as the enactor may presume that this 
page, like the previous one, is narrated by Mr. X, now grown to adulthood.  The narrator appears 
to view Marianne with a barely-contained sense of disdain, a derision that may influence the 
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 enactor to imbue Marianne with the air of one used to suffering, or that may result in the enactor 
imagining Marianne to be a ridiculous figure, deserving of the plight described by the narrator. 
The addition of this second page expands the world of the work in notable ways.  First, until 
possibly proven incorrect by later pages, the enactor’s conformation may now stretch across time 
from the narrator’s childhood to his married life in adulthood.  The chronological span of the 
world of the work is an important element in conformation, especially when engaging with a 
work composed in the distributed mode.  In this case, the enactor may have, at this point, two 
temporal positions established, two poles between and around which the remaining content of the 
work can be configured.  Second, the parallelism of these two passages cannot be, the enactor 
may conclude, coincidental.  Rather, the world of Composition No. 1 begins to appear as one of 
seconds, doubles, and repetitions.  In such a world, déjà vu is not the exception but the rule, and 
events from a given time period invariably resonate through their doppelgangers.  Having 
encountered the page with Maman’s decision to hire a governess first, the enactor’s 
conformation of the second page is haunted by the question of a relationship between the 
narrator and the governess.  Did a young Master X pursue his prurient interest in the German 
girl, and will this interest become a pattern, a predictor of his relationship with other women, 
including the governess to be hired by Marianne?  As we see, the order in which the pages of the 
work are encountered affects the conformation of the work, as conformation is always affected 
by the subjective state of the enactor.  Just imagine if these two pages had been encountered in 
the reverse order. 
 When considering a film – Koyaanisqatsi, for instance – the world of the work is a less 
obvious construction.  Toward the motion picture’s end, Reggio films business people entering a 
large elevator, more and more people pressing forward to squeeze into the car before the doors 
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 close.  As the doors begin to close, one last man tries to fit himself into the packed car, but fails – 
there is no more room.  As the mirrored doors shut, the film’s audience has no doubt that the 
people in the car will be traveling either up or down many, many floors – the size and 
sophistication of the car suggest a large building – although Reggio provides no clear 
establishing shot of the building.  Furthermore, the scene easily could have been shot on a sound 
stage, fabricated from scratch.  The filmic space of the scene, however, extends above and below 
the space shown on screen to include the rest of the office building, and even the city in which 
the building is located.  The world of a filmic work encompasses more than is merely shown on 
screen – it includes all of the spaces implied, necessitated, or made possible by the film itself.  
As with Composition No. 1, the audience of Koyaanisqatsi is left to complete the world of the 
work.  Some audience members will interpret the elevator scene as workers in a hurry to leave 
work at the end of the day.  Those members may complete the world of the work by supplying 
dozens and dozens of floors beneath the floor shown, through which the elevator’s occupants 
will descend on their way to the ground and, eventually, their homes.  Other audience members 
will interpret the scene as the morning ritual of riding the elevator up to offices located high 
above the street.  These audience members may supply the upper floors of what could be a sky 
scraper, stocked with offices, cubicles, and other office accoutrements.  The world of a film, 
however, does not merely include physical space.  As we saw with Composition No. 1, the world 
of the work also includes the conclusions that enactors reach or are persuaded to reach by the 
work. 
 In Koyaanisqatsi, the elevator scene is preceded by a series of shots depicting city grids, 
streets and buildings extending in all directions in a mesh of horizontal and vertical lines.  
Reggio then cuts to shots of circuit boards, chips, and connections also arranged in densely-
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 packed grids.  The visual metaphor here is clear, made stronger by the extreme change in scale 
from the very large spaces of the city to the very small spaces of microcomputer chips.  From the 
circuit boards, Reggio cuts to time-lapse photography of skyscrapers at night, lights in offices 
being turned on and off, seemingly at random.  From the light show, we are shown an older man 
sitting in front of what appears to be a control board for the power grid.  The man seems visibly 
disturbed as he smokes a cigarette and grabs his forehead, either out of boredom or desperation.   
 The montage continues with a series of shots of city life – masses of people walking 
along city sidewalks, the elevator scene, paramedics lifting a man who is either unconscious or 
dead onto a stretcher, people walking through the rubble left by a fire.  The series ends with 
time-lapse images of stock brokers on the trading floor, their motion rendering them spectral 
waves rather than distinct figures.  Scraps of paper cover the floor as the ghost brokers run back 
and forth across the screen.   
 The film’s final sequence begins with a transition from the scraps of white paper littering 
the trading floor to images of white material raining to the earth.  We quickly realize that we are 
being shown a rocket launch, perhaps the same rocket from the beginning of the film.  The 
gantry tower blows its umbilical cables to the rocket, and it rises into the sky, propelled on a 
column of flame.  Shortly into its flight, the rocket suddenly and spectacularly explodes.  Out of 
the mass of fire comes a piece of the rocket’s engine, burning and spinning as it falls through the 
air.  For almost three minutes Reggio shows the engine falling, burning, spinning through a 
cloudless blue sky.  The final image is a return to the cave paintings from the opening of the 
film.  The world of Koyaanisqatsi includes not merely bizarre landscapes, cities, computer 
components, urbanites, rocket explosions, and cave paintings, but also the implication that, for 
all of our technological power and prowess, life remains violently uncontrollable and, as the title 
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 informs us, “out of balance” with the natural order.  Additionally, today the world of the work 
includes the two Space Shuttle disasters – the Challenger and the Columbia.  While it is true that 
Challenger exploded shortly after liftoff in 1986, and Columbia exploded on reentry in 2003, 
three years and twenty years, respectively, after the completion of Koyaanisqatsi, the world of 
the film is conformed by audiences, and so it is impossible for most contemporary audiences to 
watch the explosion on film without thinking of the later tragedies. 
 Hermeneutics, since Schleiermacher and Dilthey, has investigated the relationship 
between the work – the product of a foreign mind – and the work’s interpreter.  In the nineteenth 
century, Dilthey wrote that “Exactly because a real transposition can take place [when man 
understands man], because affinity and universality of thought . . . can image forth and form a 
social-historical world, the inner events and processes in man can be distinguished from those of 
animals” (GS vol. 5, 250).  As Richard Palmer glosses it, Dilthey’s theory predicted that 
hermeneutics made possible the “reconstruction and reexperiencing of another person’s world of 
experience,” and that this reconstruction and re-experiencing “brings with it the possibility of 
finding in another person the profoundest depths of our own experience; from the encounter can 
come the discovery of a fuller inner world” (104).  In other words, Schleiermacher and Dilthey’s 
school of “divinatory” hermeneutics (so called because of their attempts to “divine” the inner 
thoughts and feelings of the composers of the works being interpreted) posited that enactment 
(though they would not have used such a term) of others’ works leads directly to self-knowledge, 
as we come to know ourselves through the divination of the selves of others via the interpretation 
of works. 
 The preceding discussion of Composition No. 1 and Koyaanisqatsi, however, reveals the 
limitations of such a theory.  While the juxtaposition of images in the film may suggest to 
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 audiences certain beliefs that Reggio may share (namely, that life is “out of balance” with 
nature), even this platitude is impossible to ascribe to Godfrey Reggio himself, who may well 
have completed the film as an attempt to construct a visual argument whose conclusion he does 
not actually espouse.  Such a methodology may seem perverse, but there is no guarantee against 
perverse motivation in artistic composition.  The inner thoughts and feelings of Marc Saporta in 
Composition No. 1 are even more opaque, and attempting to divine his sympathies even for his 
protagonist is quite impossible.  The inscrutability of the composer, however, does not preclude 
the hermeneutical possibility of self-knowledge. 
 The world of the work is a world – a self-contained totality – separate from, yet contained 
within the world of human experience.  Before the world of the work can be constructed by an 
enactor, it first must be composed.  Thus, the work of first composing the world of the work is an 
artistic project in which a composer attempts to fashion a totality, necessarily rejecting the 
totality of the actual world, and instead fashioning just enough material necessary to present the 
illusion of a self-contained world.  As Umberto Eco writes, “Texts are the way to reduce the 
world to a manageable format, open to an intersubjective interpretive discourse” (Limits 21).  
Here Eco points out that the world of the work is always a reduction of the complexity and 
wholeness of the world of human experience.  This reduction allows for artistry – the material 
composed is presented just so, and to achieve certain artistic effects.  David Kaufer’s 
characterization of rhetoric as a “design art,” as mentioned earlier, here is made manifestly 
apparent, as each detail included in a work’s content, as well as each detail omitted, has the 
potential to affect the enactor and thus contribute to the enactor’s perception and construction of 
the world of the work.   
119 
  Gadamer is unambiguous on the world of the work, though he does not use exactly this 
terminology.  As he writes, “A work of art is a whole, self-sufficient world” (TM 335).  The 
importance of this point lies in the fact that there is always a divide between the actual world and 
the world of the work.  This divide is easy to perceive in works like David Foster Wallace’s 
Infinite Jest, which is set an unspecified number of years in the slightly dystopian future.  Works 
set in what may be the present, such as Jonathan Franzen’s The Corrections, pose a more 
difficult challenge, and yet must also be interpreted as fundamentally separate from the actual 
world.  The most difficult test cases involve works set firmly and unambiguously in the realistic 
present, such as Raymond Carver’s masterful short stories.  His collection, Where I’m Calling 
From, presents nothing extraneous to the actual world, and yet the worlds created by Carver’s 
stories are independent of the actual world.  This is not to imply that the enactor must “forget” all 
that she knows of the actual world to interpret a work.  On the contrary, as will be explored in 
later sections of this chapter, the enactor’s knowledge of and experiences in the actual world are 
necessary for conformation. 
 In the last chapter, I cited Gunther Kress’ assertion that “The world told is a different 
world to the world shown” (1, emphasis in original).  Here it becomes apparent that the world 
experienced is different from the world conformed.  The process of composing a world-in-toto 
necessarily differentiates the world of the work from the world of human experience, which – 
though it can be described – can never be reduced.  Nor can it be affected as completely as the 
world of a work, whose very foundation is alterable by its composer.  Indeed, Gadamer asserts 
that it is this alterability of the world of the work that is central to the work’s artistry: 
But art is present whenever a work succeeds in elevating what it is 
or represents to a new configuration, a new world of its own in 
miniature, a new order of unity in tension.  This can occur whether 
the work presents us with specific cultural content and familiar 
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 features of the world around us, or whether we are confronted by 
the mute, yet profoundly familiar, Pythagorean harmonies of form 
and color. (AArt@ 103) 
 
In the next section, I will explore the issue of artistry and narrative works, but for now suffice it 
to say that the fashioning of the work, the pre-conformational composition of the world of the 
work, is one of the most appealing aspects of conformation. 
 
2.3.3. The Enactor and the Work 
 
If the world of the work is the central feature and “product” of engagement with works, what 
importance does the work itself have for conformation?  This section will explore the ontological 
status of the work and the relationship revealed between composer, work, enactor, and 
enactment.  Fundamentally, a work can be considered the physical manifestation of the effort of 
a composer (here, retaining the sensitivity to multimodality required by the distributed mode, 
referred to as composition).  The issue becomes more complicated when we ask about the 
relationship between narrative works, the bound (and in the case of Composition No. 1, unbound) 
stacks of printed pages, and works of art.  Are narrative works works of art? 
 The work is an artifact, irrespective of whether an enactor has ever encountered it.  As an 
artifact, the work represents the artistry of the composer, which may be substantial and towering, 
minimal and derivative, or somewhere between.  The work is, therefore, potentially a work of 
art.  The experience of that art, however, is a thing substantially removed from the work’s 
existence.32  An example may be instructive here.  Sitting on my bookshelf at this moment, 
waiting patiently to be read, is Ann Patchett’s 2001 novel, Bel Canto.  The only things I know 
                                                 
32   Paul Ricoeur voices his approval of this dichotomy, following Roland Barthes’ terminology in “From Work to Text.”  
Ricoeur writes that “the text cannot, therefore, be purely and simply identified with writing” (“Function” 132).  For 
Ricoeur, the transcendent entity of the “text” is the world of the work, which, as Barthes writes of the Text, “asks of the 
reader a practical collaboration.”  Without this collaboration, the writing on the page has no claim on art. 
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 about the book are that it involves opera and a hostage situation, and that it won the 
Penn/Faulkner Award.  If asked whether this book is work of art, I would answer in the 
affirmative, noting the award and remembering the glowing recommendation Bel Canto received 
from a friend for whose taste I have the highest regard.  But the state of being a work of art and 
the prospect of having any sort of meaningful experience of that artistry are separated by the act 
of enacting the work, an act I have yet to perform.  I would argue the same conclusion to the 
question of whether daVinci’s Mona Lisa is a work of art.  Irrefutably it is, and yet it is 
profoundly not a work of art in my experience, as I have never seen it.  My encounters with 
reproductions of the painting lack aura, the “presence in time and space, [the painting’s] unique 
existence at the place where it happens to be,” in Benjamin’s famous definition, which the 
original is presumed to possess (220).  Just as the world experienced is different from the world 
conformed, so too is the work of art experienced different from the work of art reputed. 
 The subjective nature of the artistry of a work, divorced from its codification qua work, 
underlies most, if not all, theories of artistry, even as subjectivity is denied.  As a formulation of 
artistic greatness, some perceive the superior work of art to be simultaneously beyond the reach 
and taste of the multitude, and the highest good for even the lowest and most common.  Harold 
Bloom, for instance, in his polemic in favor of reading and the canon, How to Read and Why, 
argues: “Yet the strongest, most authentic motive for deep reading of the now much-abused 
traditional canon is the search for a difficult pleasure” (29).  This claim is notable for its nested 
assumptions and arguments.  First, Bloom argues for the importance of deep reading – an 
interpretive act with a high “degree of difficulty,” as they say in the worlds of gymnastics and 
diving.  The difficulty of deep reading puts it beyond the reach of many readers, and yet, Bloom 
argues, reading is necessary “if individuals are to retain any capacity to form their own 
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 judgments and opinions,” and certainly deep reading is the superior form of reading, the most 
capable of ensuring this capacity (21).  Second, Bloom argues in favor of the traditional canon, 
insinuating that the canon is the ideal – possibly the only – source of the “difficult pleasure” that 
is the hallmark of deep reading and the salvation of Western culture.  This insinuation can be 
seen in Bloom’s claim that “A childhood largely spent watching television yields to an 
adolescence with a computer” (23).33  Finally, the need for “difficult pleasure” as an indicator of 
both literary quality (the traditional canon provides it) and superior interpretation (the deep 
readers experience it) again indicates an essentially elitist pursuit, albeit one that should be 
pursued by all. 
 The world of the work, however, indicates that the artistic quality of a work is, in part, an 
inherently subjective measure.  Speaking authoritatively about the artistry of any work requires 
the speaker to have previously conformed the work – all other assertions are the merest hearsay.  
This subjectivity suggests an inherent duality in artistic quality: the greatness of a work of art 
must lie in what is perceived, in the transcendently artistic conformation by individual 
interpreters, and in the reproducible and general, in the ability of the work to elicit transcendently 
artistic conformations across populations and across time.  The former, without the latter, leads 
to idiosyncratic “personal favorites;” the latter without the former leads to “legendary” works 
which no one currently reads. 
 In the previous section, I noted that the enactor’s real-world knowledge and experience 
are necessary for conformation; Umberto Eco’s concept of the “Model Reader” explains why 
this is so.  In The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts, Eco states that “To 
organize a text, its author has to rely on a series of codes that assign given contents to the 
                                                 
33   By now it should be apparent that, though I share Bloom’s desire to spread the love of narrative – and yes, even of 
reading works not composed in the distributed mode – the views expressed here are solely those of Professor Bloom, 
and do not necessarily represent those of the present composer. 
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 expression he uses.  To make his text communicative, the author has to assume that the ensemble 
of codes he relies upon is the same as that shared by his possible reader.”  Eco labels the best 
possible reader a “Model Reader,” defined as one who is “supposedly able to deal interpretively 
with the expressions in the same way as the author deals generatively with them” (7).  In other 
words, the Model Reader for a given work by a given author is one who has the ability and 
knowledge necessary to correctly interpret every code and expression (in all of their ambiguities 
and multitude of meanings) used by the author to construct the work.  Clearly this is an ideal, 
rather than a pragmatic description, and yet if the enactor had access only to what she has learned 
from other texts, she would be largely incapable of interpreting the composer’s codes, most of 
which derive from the composer’s experience in the actual world. 
 Though a wide and varied repertoire of actual world experiences proves to be an asset in 
conformation, this is not sufficient in and of itself for the task of interpretation.  As Eco writes, 
“In Opera Aperta [trans. The Open Work], even though stressing the role of the interpreter [a 
“Model Reader”] ready to risk an ideal insomnia in order to pursue infinite interpretations, I was 
insisting that to interpret a text means to interpret that text, not one’s own personal drives” 
(Limits 50).  The distinction is an important one – the enactor’s experiences mediate the 
transaction between herself and the work during conformation, but without close attention to the 
work itself, to the physical manifestation of the composer’s efforts, the conformation cannot be 
authentic.  As Joel Weinsheimer notes, “True interpretation is not just true to the play [Macbeth]; 
it is interpretation of the play’s truth.  It is not only the play that comes to exist in the 
interpretation but the thing that the play represents” (113).  For Weinsheimer, even the most 
worldly of interpretations is invalid if it does not conform the world of the work as the work 
itself demands.  Furthermore, fidelity to the constraints of the work is crucial.  Eco notes: 
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 The Model Reader does not have to figure out each place and 
individual mentioned by the novel.  It is sufficient he or she 
pretends to believe to know them.  The Model Reader is not only 
required to display an enormous flexibility and superficiality, he or 
she is also required to display a consistent good will. (Limits 81-2, 
emphasis in original). 
 
Here, Eco is alluding to what Bernard Suits calls the “ludic attitude,” the willingness to submit to 
the play of the work, with all of its interpretive hurdles and stylistic difficulties.  Conformation 
demands that the enactor submit, willingly, to the affective strategies of the work while 
simultaneously interpreting the work and its rhetorical play.  The duality of immersion and 
interpretation will be discussed in the following chapter, but for now, the following examples 
will suffice to indicate the counterintuitive truth of this proposition. 
In the two pages from Composition No. 1 quoted previously, the narrative voice is highly 
nuanced and, in the second page, critical of Marianne, suggesting a subtle and potentially 
devious character.  Louise Rosenblatt notes in The Reader the Text the Poem that “Even as we 
are generating the work of art, we are reacting to it” (48).  The enactor who conforms these two 
pages from Composition No. 1 without reacting to them in toto, and to the narrator’s sexual 
subterfuge and condescension specifically, can neither hope to interpret them fully, nor to 
construct the world of the work in all of its affective and rhetorical fullness.  Similarly, the final 
sequences of Koyaanisqatsi are interpretable from a purely intellectual perspective, and yet the 
world of the work that results bears little resemblance to the affecting work composed by 
Reggio.  Interpretations of Composition No. 1 or Koyaanisqatsi that ignore or consciously 
exclude these affective, immersive aspects are not, in Weinsheimer’s terms, “true 
interpretations,” as they do not represent interpretations of these works’ truths.  As I shall show 
in the following chapter, this holds true for all narrative works, not merely compositions in the 
distributed mode. 
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2.3.4. Enactment, Encounter, and Configuration 
 
“Enactment” emerges as the central difference between past hermeneutics and the rhetorical 
hermeneutic demanded by the distributed mode, not because previous theorists have ignored the 
actions of the enactor (though they do not refer to her as such) – they have not.  Gadamer writes 
that AReading with understanding is always a kind of reproduction, performance, and 
interpretation@ (TM 160).  In those three terms, reproduction, performance, and interpretation, 
Gadamer neatly summarizes the essential nature of conformation as the construction of the world 
of the work, enactment as the active engagement with the work, and interpretation as the process 
by which “foreign” content is made intelligible, and thus understandable.  Umberto Eco notes 
that “any act of interpretation is a dialectic between openness and form, initiative on the part of 
the interpreter and contextual pressure” (Limits 21).  Eco’s concern for interpretive verifiability 
is here balanced by the acknowledgement that interpretation requires an active engagement with 
the “open” facets of the work, as is prevalent in the distributed mode.  And finally, hypermedia 
author and theorist Michael Joyce provides the following gloss on enactment and structure in the 
distributed mode.  While discussing three hyperfictions, Stuart Moulthrop’s Chaos, John 
McDade’s Uncle Buddy’s Phantom Funhouse, and Carolyn Guyer and Martha Petry’s Izme Pass, 
Joyce writes: 
Narrative is the series of individual questions that marginalize 
accepted order and thus enact history.  Hypertext links are no less 
than the trace of such questions, a conversation with structure.  All 
three are authentically concerned with consciousness rather than 
information, with creating and preserving knowledge rather than 
with the mere ordering of the known.  (Of Two Minds 182) 
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 The distributed mode facilitates relationships rather than orderings, dynamic operations rather 
than static structures – and perhaps is incapable of operating otherwise.  Without the active 
engagement of an enactor, however, these operations and relationships remain unrealized and 
meaningless.  It is through enactment that the potential for “creating and preserving knowledge” 
of works in the distributed mode – as well as traditional works – is actuated. 
 Though existing theories of hermeneutics and digital poetics have embraced the basic 
concepts of enactment, conformation is differentiated by its explicit examination of the many 
sub-processes of enactment.  Enactment is a blanket term for the complex actions required to 
experience the content of the work, even in traditional, non-distributed works.  Under the rubric 
of enactment are included elements I have termed encounter, navigation, and configuration.  
Encounter is the most universal in terms of application across the distributed mode and 
traditional forms of narrative, as it refers to the sensory process of engaging with the work to 
experience the content of the work.  Encounter is obligatory regardless of medium, platform, or 
mode.  Narrative cannot be interpreted without the enactor’s reading, viewing, listening, or 
otherwise sensorially gathering the data of the work.  In Stuart Moulthrop’s Reagan Library, 
encounter requires the enactor to read the prose text and view the panoramic vistas.  In 
Cortázar’s Hopscotch, and in Saporta’s Composition No. 1, encounter is a matter of reading 
prose text only.  In Koyaanisqatsi, its two sequels, and in Baraka, encounter involves viewing 
the film and listening to its soundtrack.  Encounter is such an automatic process, in most cases, 
that it often is left out of critical and hermeneutical discourse. 
 Navigation is another element of enactment, discussed previously in relation to Reagan 
Library and Hopscotch.  Navigation – traversing the work – has become a constant across all 
modes of representation since the advent of the DVD.  The “chapter selection” feature of most 
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 DVDs allows for the free navigation through the various “chapters” of the work – an intriguing 
strategy of fragmentation for even the most essentially unified filmic works.  In Composition No. 
1, navigation may appear to be strictly linear following the initial shuffling of the pages, but the 
codex-like physical format of the work still allows the enactor to skip ahead or back through the 
stack of pages at will.  Furthermore, Saporta’s injunction to shuffle loosens the convention 
against skipping throughout a narrative work – if the last page could well have been the first 
page before shuffling, there cannot be any harm in looking at the pages out of order at any time.  
The decisions governing the enactor’s progress through the stack of pages are every bit as 
dependent on volition and conscious choice as those in a digital hyperfiction. 
 The navigational choices made by the enactor must be carefully considered in the context 
of the particular enactment, as well.  An enactor who reads the two pages in Composition No. 1 
about Maman and Marianne’s decisions to hire governesses may be sufficiently intrigued by the 
parallelism and the potentially unreliable narrator that she may scan through the stack of pages, 
setting the remaining pages aside until she encounters another page depicting a similar scene or 
its consequences.  In other words, the enactor may navigate through the work to only those pages 
that interest her at that moment, leaving the others for a later examination.  The work, as 
conformed in this scenario, will be very different from the world of the work conformed by a 
more random arrangement of pages.  The juxtaposition of scenes that may arise naturally from 
the shuffling of pages may be defeated, and instead the fragmented work may be configured at 
the level of navigation into a more logical, unified, traditional whole. 
 The final element of enactment is configuration, the enactor’s efforts to assemble the 
content of the work into the world of the work.  This action usually takes place in the 
consciousness (and sometimes the subconscious) of the enactor, except in cases like Composition 
128 
 No. 1, in which configuration occurs both as a cognitive activity and as a physical act of 
shuffling the pages of the work.  Usually, however, configuration refers to the enactor’s efforts to 
identify the chronological, character, and geographical referent encountered in the work.  As I 
mentioned earlier, for example, the chronological referents of the Maman and Marianne pages 
are the past (during the narrator’s sixteenth or seventeenth year) and presumably the present 
(during his married adult life).  Interpreting the material of the work – which will be discussed in 
the following section – allows the enactor to configure the pages into a structure that will allow 
her more easily to proceed with the acts of encounter, navigation, configuration, and 
interpretation.  Configuration indicates one of the ways in which reading and writing, encounter 
and composition, are inseparable.  The enactor’s efforts to configure the material of the work 
into a coherent world of the work are cognitively analogous to a composer’s efforts to configure 
her ideas into a coherent and communicable message.   
 Enactment, as the complex of encounter, navigation, and configuration, also is relatable 
to the enactor’s actual world interactions.  The actual world must be perceived to allow for 
meaningful interaction, thus necessitating encounter.  Encounter’s multitude of perceptions must 
be configured into a coherent representation, which will allow for further encounters to be 
seamlessly integrated into the configuration and will facilitate decision-making, as in navigation.  
Gadamer comments on the similarities between interpreting works and operating in the world: 
The work of art provides a clear example of that universal 
characteristic of human existence – the never-ending process of 
building a world.  In the midst of a world in which everything 
familiar is dissolving, the work of art stands as a pledge of order.  
Perhaps our capacity to preserve and maintain, the capacity that 
supports human culture, rests in turn upon the fact that we must 
always order anew what threatens to dissolve before us.  This is 
what the productive activity of the artist and our own experience of 
art reveals in exemplary fashion. (AArt@ 103-4) 
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 Though his comments here seem to recall the complaints of Michiko Kakutani (“Never-Ending 
Saga”) and Laura Miller (“www.claptrap.com”) that the distributed mode lacks a coherent vision 
of life and is thus artistically corrupt, Gadamer’s point is not so much the importance of 
coherence in art as it is the universal and innate narrative instinct.  In A Thousand Plateaus, 
Deleuze and Guattari write that “All history does is to translate a coexistence of becomings into a 
succession” (430).  This is the essence of the narrative instinct, the need to translate a random 
series of events into a causal and coherent narrative.  The narrative instinct is at play in our 
existence in the world, and it is the cognitive foundation of enactment, especially the processes 
of configuration and navigation.  Because of the narrative instinct, composers in the distributed 
mode are free to experiment with fragmentation and extreme disruptions of traditional narrative 
progression – there is presumably no series of events, whether narrated or experienced, that an 
enactor cannot configure into at least a minimally satisfying narrative.  This makes the affective 
and immersive experience of the world of the work vital.  The immersive, emotional, and 
rhetorical power of the work – unlike the purely analytical experience of the work, which can 
mask an artistically weak work through the operation of the narrative instinct – emerges as a 
reliable indicator of the artistic value of the work. 
 
2.3.5. Interpretation, Analysis, and Resonance 
 
Enactment, however, is incomplete without interpretation.  Interpretation is the process by which 
“foreign” content is made intelligible, and thus understandable.  Interpretation, like enactment, is 
always mediated by the enactor’s experience and knowledge of the actual world.  All forms of 
action in the world are mediated by the enactor’s experience and knowledge of the actual world, 
and interpretation and enactment are no different.  The work itself is fundamentally outside the 
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 world of the enactor – it is foreign to her knowledge and experience, and remains so irrespective 
of the number of times she has conformed the work.  The work, as the physical manifestation of 
the effort of the composer, begins its existence as the product of a foreign consciousness, is 
encoded in unknown terms, and relates a narrative whose origin, development, and resolution are 
foreign to the enactor.  What is internalizable is the world of the work, the construction of the 
enactor based on the content and constraints of the work.  The work itself thus remains forever 
apart from the enactor, but the world of the work is incorporable into the world experiences of 
the enactor.  When I think of a particular work, what I remember most vividly is my 
conformation of that work.  The physical being of the work, the book, film, or hypermedia, is of 
markedly less importance.  In the instances where the work itself is commonly fetishized – the 
case of a first or rare edition, or the sentimental value of a gift, for instance – what is valued is 
not the work per se, but rather the aura of the work, in the first case, and the nostalgic value of 
memories of the giver or the reception of the gift in the second.  In the first case, the aura of the 
work results in the sensation of being displaced in time, of being transported to an earlier time.  
The work’s aura makes the act of conformation appear to be either rare, and therefore privileged, 
or closer to the conformations performed by the original interpreters of the work.  In the second 
case, the work serves as a surrogate for the object of nostalgia; conformation does not, initially, 
figure in the value of the work. 
 As enactment denoted a set of related and interdependent activities, so too does 
interpretation, encompassing acts of analysis at the gestalt and atomistic level, and also the 
operation of resonance between the narrative world and the interpreter’s world.  Analysis refers 
to the dual processes of micro-analyzation, determining what the content of the work being 
analyzed means in itself, and of macro-analyzation, determining what the content of the piece of 
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 the work being analyzed means in the context of the work as a whole,.  Analysis can also refer to 
the process of determining what a particular idea about the work means, both in the context of 
the gestalt work and when applied only to a specific fragment of the work.  The analytical 
processes, of course, are neither mutually exclusive nor determinately sequenced.  In the 
example from Koyaanisqatsi of the rocket launch followed by the “alien” landscape, it may be 
impossible to identify which operated first, micro-analyzation or macro-analyzation.  At the 
micro level, the landscape first must be identified before it can be metaphorized as the 
destination of the rocket, and that identification must result in a sufficiently foreign descriptor to 
allow the Kuleshov effect to operate after the scene with the launched rocket.  At the macro 
level, the Kuleshov effect prepares audiences for the macro-scale interpretation of the landscape 
as the destination of the rocket.    The question of which occurs first is almost certainly pointless, 
in any case, as the interpretation of the scenes requires both, oscillating between micro and 
macro analysis, each scale providing more information for the other to further refine the 
enactor’s analysis. 
 I have termed the other interpretive sub-process resonance because it is the fluctuating 
interaction between the enactor’s world and the world of the work that constantly accompanies 
interpretation and enactment during conformation.  Resonance asks the question: What do the 
content of the work and my thoughts about the interpretation and enactment of the work mean to 
me?  Resonance is the process by which the enactor’s knowledge and experience of the world 
inform the interpretation and enactment of the world of the work, and also by which the world of 
the work informs the enactor’s world knowledge and experience.  The two worlds resonate – 
sometimes at a high frequency – with each other, affecting each other and being affected, in turn.   
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  Resonance, as I have described it, has a strong connection to what Gadamer sees as the 
relationship between interpretation and understanding.  In Truth and Method, Gadamer explains 
that: “Interpretation is not an occasional, post fact supplement to understanding; rather, 
understanding is always interpretation, and hence interpretation is the explicit form of 
understanding” (307).  Thus, the act of interpretation is the outward manifestation of 
understanding.  In his later essay, “On the Problem of Self-Understanding,” Gadamer returns to 
the theories of understanding proposed by his mentor, Martin Heidegger, which prompts him to 
differentiate what he sees as the process of interpretation from the event of understanding.  
Gadamer writes: 
In the last analysis, all understanding is self-understanding, but not 
in the sense of a preliminary self-possession or of one finally and 
definitively achieved.  For the self-understanding only realizes 
itself in the understanding of a subject matter and does not have the 
character of a free self-realization.  The self that we are does not 
possess itself; one could say that it “happens.” (55, emphasis in 
original) 
 
Following Heidegger, Gadamer here asserts that, as understanding is an event, a “happening,” 
and not a conscious effort, self-knowledge must also be an event, and therefore cannot be 
effected by the application of willpower or thought.  This position forces Gadamer to explain 
how interpretation – the goal and action of hermeneutical inquiry – can lead to understanding, 
since understanding is outside of ordinary human control.  To solve this dilemma Gadamer again 
looks to Heidegger, and concludes that “It is not really we ourselves who understand: it is always 
a past that allows us to say, ‘I have understood’” (“Problem” 58).  In other words, understanding 
can only occur when the interpreter already understands, but does not know that she 
understands.  Then, understanding occurs as the “coming into being” of self-knowledge, which is 
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 really the conscious awareness of prior knowledge now made manifest through the mediation of 
the work of art. 
 Rather than follow Gadamer and Heidegger down the metaphysical garden path, I 
suggest that understanding is one possible result of conformation – whether of the creation of the 
world of the work of art or of the enactment and interpretation of the actual world.  Resonance 
allows for prior knowledge to effectuate the analyzation of new knowledge, which then can 
resonate with the enactor’s world experience and knowledge.  Or, to put it another way, the 
content of the work may trigger specific thoughts and memories from the enactor’s world, which 
resonate with the content of the work even though the work and the enactor’s experiences may 
be strikingly dissimilar.  An enactor may read about Marianne’s neuroses and resonate with 
Marianne’s need to control her space.  The enactor, never prone to territorialism or 
possessiveness, may have no experiences in common with Marianne’s need to restrict the 
governess’ movements and to maintain her bathroom sanctuary as inviolate, yet the enactor may 
depend on her morning routine in the actual world to ensure her balance throughout the day.  The 
enactor may reflect on her own reactions to disruptions to her routine, reactions which may 
mirror Marianne’s, and the resonance between the two scenarios may result in the enactor 
gaining a new awareness of her weaknesses and their possible consequences.  The difference 
between this model of understanding and Gadamer’s can be summarized thusly: whereas 
Gadamer writes that understanding arrives with the realization, “I have understood,” resonance 
allows for the acquisition of understanding through conscious effort, and with the recognition, “I 
never realized.” 
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 2.4. RHETORICAL HERMENEUTICS AND CONFORMATION 
 
Joel Weinsheimer writes: AArt understands non-art by representing it as, and this understanding 
is therefore metaphorical regardless of whether the artwork contains metaphors.  In other words, 
it is the relation (between art and non-art), not one of its terms, that is metaphorical@ (78).  
Weinsheimer’s point is well-taken – since the world of the work is not the actual world, but is 
instead a fabricated, artistic reduction of a possible world, the work of art is itself metaphorized.  
The world of the work presents itself as a real, actual world, even though it is not.  The tension 
between the world of the work and the actual world energizes the enactor’s interactions with the 
world she is conforming from the work, and strengthens the need for resonance between the two 
worlds.  The work of art, thus, is fundamentally rhetorical, persuading enactors to engage in the 
work of conformation even in the face of the hermeneutical difficulties inherent in engaging with 
a work. 
 Though I disagree with his understanding of understanding, Gadamer’s ideas also support 
the fundamental rhetorical nature of the work of art.  In Gadamer’s theories, as discussed 
previously, the work of art persuades (or shocks) the interpreter into eventuating her latent self-
knowledge into being. 
 Paul Ricoeur also holds that the work of art, and specifically the literary work, “is the 
medium through which we understand ourselves.”  For Ricoeur, the work of art 
extends the fundamental characteristic of all discourse whereby the 
latter is addressed to someone.  But in contrast to dialogue, this vis-
à-vis is not given in the situation of discourse; it is, if I may say so, 
created or instituted by the work itself.  A work opens up its 
readers and thus creates its own subjective vis-à-vis.  (“Function” 
143) 
 
135 
 Ricoeur argues that the task of hermeneutics is not, as many have asserted, the discovery of a 
hidden meaning buried in code within the work.  Instead, in Ricoeur’s terms, the world of the 
work unfolds in front of the work, in plain sight of the enactor.  Thus, “to understand is to 
understand oneself in front of the text.  It is not a question of imposing upon the text our finite 
capacity of understanding, but of exposing ourselves to the text and receiving from it an enlarged 
self, which would be the proposed existence corresponding in the most suitable way to the world 
proposed” (“Function” 143, emphasis in original).   
Much earlier in this chapter, I mentioned Plato’s denigration of the rhetoricians and 
sophists in the Phaedrus, as Plato felt that only philosophy could discover the truth and improve 
mankind.  Ricoeur’s imagery of enlargement following exposure to the work of art is highly 
reminiscent of this ancient turf battle over the claim to truth and knowledge, except for two 
important divergences.  First, for Ricoeur, Gadamer, and Heidegger, the transcendent force is not 
oratory, as practiced by the rhetoricians and sophists, nor philosophy, as evidenced by the 
Socratic dialogues, but rather the work of art.  In this, I suspect the hermeneuticists and the work 
of art are closer in spirit to the rhetoricians and sophists, as both groups appreciated the artful 
construction and deployment of communication that may characterize the work of art.  As for 
Plato, though he explicitly decries the practice of writing in the Phaedrus, in that dialogue and all 
of the others his use of rhetorical and affective strategies is masterful and utterly without qualm.  
Second, and more importantly, unlike Plato’s belief in the active pursuit of truth, hermeneutical 
theories descended from Heidegger espouse an essentially passive role for the reader.  The reader 
“exposes” herself to the work of art and “receives” from it a transcendent experience.  Though 
Ricoeur discusses the structuralist analysis performed by the reader, and Gadamer discusses the 
ludic work of interpretation, the metaphysical nature of their transaction between the work of art 
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 and its interpreter is, in my view, a fundamental flaw.  Not only does it ignore the real effort 
expended by the reader during conformation, but it also renders literary interpretation finally 
unteachable.  In the following chapters, I demonstrate the application of a conformation-based 
pedagogy to the teaching of reading and writing at the college level, and the insights that such a 
pedagogy sheds on both. 
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3. MASTER OF THE MAZE: READING AS GODGAME,  INTERPRETATION AS 
EXPERIENCE 
 
“The godgame is over.” 
“The what?” 
“The godgame.”  For a moment there was something  
both faintly mischievous and sardonic in her eyes.   
“Because there is no God, and it is not a game.”   
(Fowles, The Magus 637) 
 
 
The eternal allure of the maze is the seemingly unattainable center.  
(Wright 3) 
 
 
Stripped of all secondary motives, all addictions are one:  
to make a world of our own.  (Kelly 233) 
 
 
3.1. INTO THE LABYRINTH: A PEDAGOGY OF DIGITAL DIFFICULTY 
 
The Wachowski brothers’ film, The Matrix, posits a world created by computer simulation, 
which is indistinguishable from reality, and which allows the intelligent machines to harvest 
energy from humans plugged into this virtual reality matrix.  In this world, the humans’ great 
hope in the fight against the machines is the hero known only as “the one.”  Morpheus, one of 
the leaders of the human resistance, takes Neo deep within the matrix to the Oracle to determine 
whether Neo is the one.  As they approach, Neo asks Morpheus about the Oracle: 
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 Neo:   And she knows what . . . everything? 
Morpheus:  She would say she knows enough. 
Neo:   And she’s never wrong? 
Morpheus:  Try not to think of it in terms of right and wrong.  
She is a guide, Neo.   
She can help you to find the path. 
 
As he waits for his audience with the Oracle, Neo sees children engaged in different activities, 
sitting in the Oracle’s waiting room.  Two young girls calmly levitate blocks, moving them back 
and forth between themselves in a hands-off, gravity-free display of juggling.  A young boy with 
a shaved head sits in front of a collection of metal spoons, each of which has been twisted into a 
fantastic knot.  The boy picks up a large spoon and looks at it.  Neo’s reflection is captured by 
the back of the bowl of the spoon.  As the boy looks placidly at the spoon, its stem bends and 
twists, moving its bowl in a figure-eight pattern around the stem in the boy’s unmoving hand, 
before snapping back to its original shape and rigidity.  The boy hands the spoon to Neo, who 
looks at it, worriedly. 
Boy:  Do not try and bend the spoon.  That’s impossible.  Instead, 
only try to realize the truth. 
Neo:  What truth?  
Boy:  There is no spoon. 
Neo:  There is no spoon? 
Boy:  Then you will realize that it is not the spoon that bends, it is 
only yourself. 
 
Neo focuses on the spoon and it slowly starts to bend toward the floor.  When one of the Oracle’s 
attendants informs Neo that the Oracle is ready to see him, the interruption causes the spoon to 
instantly regain its previous spoonish form.  Neo, shaken, hands the spoon back to the boy. 
 This scene, like something out of the Uri Geller playbook, illustrates the distinction 
between awareness and appearance that is central to this chapter.  To Neo, it appears that the boy 
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 has the miraculous power to bend the spoons with only the power of his mind.  When the boy 
hands the spoon to Neo, the challenge for Neo to bend the spoon is initially an impossible task.  
The boy’s response, “there is no spoon,” recontextualizes the contest of wills from human vs. 
spoon to human vs. self, as Neo must harness his own awareness of the matrix.  In the computer-
generated world of the matrix, there literally is no spoon, merely bits and bytes of data appearing 
to be a spoon.  The difficulty for the more enlightened Neo is to reject his previous experiences 
and assumptions about life in the matrix, and thus to enable himself to see the seeming 
impossibility of mental spoon-bending as a challenging but possible exercise in his own ability to 
master his own expectations.  By focusing on the “impossibility” of bending the spoon, Neo is 
able to experience a deeper connection with the realities and subtleties of the matrix. 
 This chapter takes up the difficult questions of reading – what happens, what do we want 
to happen, and how can we teach those practices.  I focus my discussion on two notoriously 
challenging and heavily fragmented works, Italo Calvino’s novel If on a winter’s night a traveler 
and Michael Joyce’s hyperfiction narrative Afternoon, A Story.  Both works present a range of 
interpretive challenges and a host of difficult narrative pleasures.  I first discuss an approach to 
interpretation based on the counter-intuitive strategy of embracing interpretive difficulties.  
Working through the difficulties of these works leads to the realization that these challenges are 
not incidental, but rather are integral features of the narratives and their presentations, making 
these works something akin to tests for the interpreter.  Examining the literary trope of the 
godgame and its use in such works as John Fowles’ The Magus, Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying 
of Lot 49, and the Medieval romance, Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, sheds light on the 
antagonistic dynamic established by Traveler and Afternoon between the works’ authors and 
their enactors.   
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 The history and experience of mazes and labyrinths provides another crucial piece to the 
puzzle presented by these works, and by difficult works in general: the role of affect and 
subjective experience in the learning process.  It is affect that finally allows us to reach an 
understanding of the interpretive demands these works make on their enactors, for the 
conformation of their worlds demands not merely a keen intellect, but also an affective, 
immersive engagement with the work.  As I shall argue, nested immersive experience (as the 
reader is immersed in her own enactment of the work, she also maintains a state of immersion in 
the work’s narrative) is crucial to interpretation and to the process of world-creation from works 
in general, and it is largely absent from our literary pedagogies.  Preferring to avoid the risk of 
solipsism, we frequently avoid discussing the affective dimensions of works in our research and 
in our classes, and yet we ourselves would be hard pressed to read without becoming immersed 
in both the narrative and our own interpretation of that narrative.  The conclusion to this chapter 
argues for the teaching of immersive reading in our literature classes, and indicates ways to keep 
those discussions from degenerating into chaos and the abdication of interpretation.  As I have 
argued before, and will argue in the next chapter, works in the distributed mode are not necessary 
to teach these concepts or to experience these effects – the distributed mode simply makes them 
more easily visible, and thus more easily apprehended by students and teachers alike. 
 
 
3.1.1. Putting Difficulty to Work 
 
In the world of English studies, the difficult work often holds a special pride of place.  Eliot’s 
“The Waste Land,” Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury, Shakespeare’s King Lear, Borges’ 
“Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” all hold a fascination and an esteem that is in no small part 
connected to their notorious ambiguity and complexity.  We love (and teach) these works and 
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 others like them because they challenge us, and because they constantly reward our efforts with 
new insights and connections, and a new appreciation for their authors, their stories, and for our 
own interpretive abilities.  But what of our students? 
 Mariolina Salvatori argues that our treatment of difficult works should make explicit not 
merely our knowledge of the works, but also, and more importantly, our interpretive heuristics.  
She writes: 
If we are really concerned lest pedagogy become a strategy of 
exclusion, our pedagogical imperative should be consciously and 
consistently to make manifest the rules and practices of 
interpretation we have acquired from institutional training, and to 
teach all students – remedial as well as mainstream, undergraduate 
as well as graduate – the very methods we practice in the 
classroom and use to produce the texts that grant us professional 
status. (“Toward” 81, emphasis in original) 
 
For Salvatori, this is not merely a matter of pedagogical efficacy, but also of pedagogical ethics – 
unless we find ways to make our own strategies and acts of interpretation visible in the 
classroom, we run the risk of teaching students to memorize facts and conclusions about works, 
but not how to interrogate the work and the facts gleaned from them to reach their own 
conclusions.  Salvatori notes, however, that “When inexperienced readers read complex texts, 
their ‘difficulties’ consistently identify actual and venerable interpretive cruxes.  This, I believe, 
is a fact worth reflecting on” (“Toward” 82-83).  Salvatori’s observation suggests that students 
already possess interpretive instincts, and are able to identify productive interpretive cruxes in 
the difficult works they are asked to read.  However, as she notes, “Whereas experienced readers 
see in a difficulty the ‘beginning’ of a critical reading of a text, inexperienced readers see in it a 
form of entrapment” (“Toward” 83).  Rather than try to ameliorate her students’ feelings of 
“entrapment” when reaching a difficulty in a text, Salvatori has devised a pedagogy for engaging 
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 with that difficulty, validating it as the beginning of a serious, interpretive engagement with the 
work. 
 Salvatori uses what she calls “difficulty papers” in her courses to help students 
recontextualize their own moments of difficulty.  In her essay “Understanding Difficulties: A 
Heuristic,” Salvatori includes the text of the difficulty paper she assigned while teaching a course 
on writing about poetry: 
You can expect to write regularly in this course.  In preparation for 
class discussion and writing assignments, you will write short (1/2 
to 1 page) ‘difficulty papers’: these are papers in which you 
identify and begin to hypothesize the reasons for any possible 
difficulty you might be experiencing as you read a poem.  Each 
week, you will write a difficulty paper on one or more of the 
assigned poems.  Each week, I will select one or two of them as 
unusual or representative examples of the readings you produce.  I 
will photocopy, distribute, and use them to ground our discussions.  
My goal, in doing so, is to move all of us from judging a difficulty 
as a reader’s inability to understand a text to discerning in it a 
reader’s incipient awareness of the particular ‘demands’ imposed 
by the language/structure/style/content of a text.  (368) 
 
Rather than labeling a difficult moment something that makes interpretation impossible, the 
difficulty paper asks students to begin to think of these moments as textual features which make 
interpretation necessary and possible at a deeper level than that which the reader/writer 
previously had been capable.  The difficulty paper is also noteworthy in that it foregrounds a 
notion which may be foreign to students: that works place interpretive requirements upon their 
readers, and that different works require different interpretive skills.  In other words, “reading” is 
revealed to be not an enactment of a unitary skill, but rather the contextualized deployment of a 
number of approaches and hypotheses. 
In their book, The Elements (and Pleasures) of Difficulty, Mariolina Salvatori and Patricia 
Donahue point out that “As students put their difficulties in writing, as they write them out, they 
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 give themselves a chance to acknowledge the complexity of reading, which, if not captured 
through writing, would easily slide away” (5, emphasis in original).  Reading happens in time, it 
is sequential, and the thoughts, worries, and connections we construct while conforming a work 
are all capable of being replaced by what comes later in the process.  By requiring their students 
to pause during the reading process, or at least to return as best they can to a prior moment in 
their cognition, and by making that pause a mandatory part of the coursework, Salvatori and 
Donahue normalize for their students the interpretive investigation performed by more 
experienced readers.  What may appear to the students as an admission of failure or stupidity – 
the acknowledgement of an interpretive challenge so difficult as to impede the student’s 
understanding of the work – becomes an enabling moment and the surest guide toward a 
meaningful engagement with the work.  As Salvatori and Donahue write, “That is what we want 
to promote, an engagement with difficulties that prevents them from bringing to a halt – from 
making impossible – the challenging work of reading, writing, and thinking” (2).  A pedagogy of 
difficulty fosters in students the self-awareness that trying to “get” everything in a difficult text 
on the first reading – like using mental power to bend a spoon – is impossible.  Rather, students 
can use their own difficulties to begin to understand the interpretive requirements the work 
places upon its readers.  In such a dynamic, it is not the spoon – or the difficult work – that 
bends, it is only the reader and her strategies for making sense of the work. 
 
3.1.2. If on a semester’s night a reader . . . 
 
Italo Calvino’s If on a winter’s night a traveler is one of the codex novels frequently cited and 
discussed by hypertext theorists.  It is, in other words, a codex work that shares many features 
with works in the distributed mode, and these features combine to make Traveler a difficult and 
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 frustrating read.  The work itself is comprised of twelve numbered chapters, between each of 
which is a named chapter.  The numbered chapters recount the book-buying and book-reading 
(mis)adventures of “you,” the Lettore.  As the Lettore – the (male gendered) reader, in Italian – 
you read that “you” have recently purchased “Italo Calvino’s new novel, If on a winter’s night a 
traveler” (Traveler 3).  The second chapter, named “If on a winter’s night a traveler,” presents 
that narrative – or, rather, the first thirty-two pages of that narrative, which is interrupted by a 
printing error, causing you to return to the bookstore in chapter two and demanding a complete 
copy of Calvino’s book.  At the bookstore, you meet the beautiful Ludmilla, the “Other Reader” 
(in Italian, the Lettrice), who becomes your love interest through the course of the book.  You 
also learn that what you thought was Calvino’s If on a winter’s night is actually Outside the town 
of Malbork, by Polish author Tazio Bazakbal.  Wanting to finish what you had begun, you pick 
up a copy of Malbork, flirt with the Other Reader, and head home to finish your book.  Or so you 
think.  Malbork is “really” Leaning from the steep slope, by Cimmerian author Ukko Ahti . . . 
and so the book progresses.  Each numbered chapter narrates your attempts to acquire a novel 
and a lover, and each named chapter recounts the incipit of a different book entirely.  The book 
is, if this has not already become clear, a challenging, frustrating work to get through, at least the 
first time one reads it. 
 The beauty of using something like Salvatori’s (and Donahue’s) difficulty papers lies in 
the attention that gets paid both to the phenomenology of reading and to the hermeneutics of 
reading.  The approach validates and foregrounds the reader’s experience of reading, asking for 
the “unpleasant” interpretive moments to be privileged via their immortalization in writing, 
instead of allowing these moments to remain unspoken signifiers of shame and inadequacy.  At 
the same time, the pedagogy of difficulty also provides not a method (pace Gadamer) but an 
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 approach to interpretation that is inseparable from the student herself and her own particularities 
of experience, interest, and insight.  In a class of twenty students, there will be a wide range of 
difficulties identified; even if the different difficulties are related, each student’s approach to the 
difficulty – what it means, why it is important, what it might be indicating – will be different. 
 Were I to write a difficulty paper about If on a winter’s night a traveler, I would identify 
Calvino’s narration throughout the numbered chapters as a major stumbling block.  When I begin 
reading the book, I am accosted by Calvino’s use of the second person familiar (the tu form in 
the original Italian, “you” in Weaver’s English translation), and immediately recognize this as a 
postmodern trope of simultaneous distancing and intimacy.  In other words, the first sentence, 
“You are about to begin reading Italo Calvino’s new novel, If on a winter’s night a traveler,” 
does not bother me (3).  Much.  It is, of course, impossible that Calvino wrote the novel with me, 
individually, in mind, and yet I recognize that by this Calvino is signaling his intention to attempt 
to involve me in the action of the narration.  This is all well and good, but the rest of the chapter 
continues in the same exhortative mood, as Calvino spends pages instructing me on the best 
ways to prepare myself physically and mentally to receive his new novel.  He writes, for 
instance: 
Find the most comfortable position: seated, stretched out, curled 
up, or lying flat.  Flat on your back, on your side, on your stomach.  
In an easy chair, on the sofa, in the rocker, the deck chair, on the 
hassock.  In the hammock, if you have a hammock.  On top of your 
bed, of course, or in the bed.  You can even stand on your hands, 
head down, in the yoga position.  With the book upside down, 
naturally.  Of course, the ideal position for reading is something 
you can never find.  (3) 
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 His concern would be touching if I believed for a moment that my comfort were important to 
Calvino.  Instead, this paragraph, and the rest of the chapter, resembles a pointless list.34  If I am 
reading Calvino’s suggestions about the best posture in which to read Calvino’s book, then I am 
already reading Calvino’s book, and his instructions, no matter how well intentioned, are likely 
unnecessary.  Because I actively desire to begin reading Calvino’s new book, his lengthy 
discourse on my approach to his book strikes me as irritating.   
I am reminded, in fact, of a similarly irritating literary figure who used lists to dominate 
another: Sam-I-Am, from Dr. Seuss’ classic children’s book, Green Eggs and Ham.  Sam-I-Am 
hounds Seuss’ unnamed protagonist, demanding that the protagonist eat the eponymous dish.  
Forced to rebut each solicitous offer, the protagonist famously responds: 
I could not, would not, on a boat.  I will not, will not, with a goat.  
I will not eat them in the rain.  I will not eat them on a train.  Not 
in the dark!  Not in a tree!  Not in a car!  You let me be!  I do not 
like them in a box.  I do not like them with a fox.  I will not eat 
them in a house.  I do not like them with a mouse.  I do not like 
them here or there.  I do not like them ANYWHERE!  (46) 
 
Seuss’ un-hungry hero capitulates in the end, conceding, “Sam!  If you will let me be, I will try 
them.  You will see,” and to no one’s surprise, he does like them (54).  Without the extreme 
persistence of Sam-I-Am, however, this conversion would not have occurred.  I am left to 
wonder, to dread, whether Calvino’s intention throughout the novel is the same – to hound his 
reader until “I” surrender to his superior insight and experience. 
 Calvino’s list-making seems to operate as a delaying tactic, as if he were attempting to 
stall the telling of the novel by constantly reminding the reader of some new position to assume 
                                                 
34   A masterful use of the pointless list occurs in Christopher Guest’s mockumentary (mock documentary) film, Best in 
Show.  Guest’s character, a breeder and shower of hound dogs, informs the “documentary” film crew that as a child, he 
would recite the name “to every nut that there was.”  Then, in a slow, Southern drawl, he proceeds to name nuts, 
“Peanut. Hazelnut. Cashew nut. Macadamia nut,” occasionally editorializing on the type of nut he had just named.  The 
scene is comically brilliant, providing insight into the character of the dog breeder, and also making the audience 
increasingly uncomfortable as he continues talking about nuts. 
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 (in chapter one), or by describing in detail the increasingly far-fetched missions the Reader 
undertakes to secure a complete novel and to seduce Ludmilla, the Other Reader (chapters two 
through eleven).  The traditional “narrative” chapters, those with names, further the sense of 
being delayed as each occupies the reader without presenting any further progress toward 
narrative closure or resolution.  Chapter twelve, however, is only a few lines long, and recounts a 
bedtime conversation between the Reader and the Other Reader, who are now married.  Ludmilla 
turns out her light and tells you to do the same, but you demur, “Just a moment, I’ve almost 
finished If on a winter’s night a traveler by Italo Calvino” (254).  And having so read, so have 
you finished the book.  The book’s ending presents its own difficulties, though, as the reader is 
left to interpret the meaning of this statement.  As far as the reader knows, the Reader was never 
able to find a complete copy of Calvino’s Traveler, and so the reader is left to ponder: what is it 
that the Reader is reading? 
The pedagogy of difficulty takes as its starting point the student’s own interpretive 
actions and challenges, but also brings in the work of literary theorists to supplement the 
students’ work with these texts (“Toward” 84-85).  Looking at the critical reception and 
engagement with Traveler, for instance, might result in noticing that Madeleine Sorapure argues 
that the role of the Reader is that of “detective,” but that role is “doomed to fail in Calvino’s 
work and in much of contemporary fiction, to be bombarded by the clues, leads, and details it 
tries desperately to organize.”  This desire to organize and to structure chaos is, Sorapure asserts, 
“essentially a manifestation of man’s desire to do the impossible: to get out of time, out of a 
necessary pluralistic, disordered situation in the world and in the world of the text” (707).  In 
fact, she writes, the Reader “finds neither the end – the resolution to his confusion – nor the 
origin – the source of his confusion – to the tales that have so intrigued him” (706).  Sorapure 
148 
 seems to indicate an interpretation of the ending of the work as being not entirely reliable – the 
Reader’s assertion that he is finishing Traveler, in other words, cannot be taken literally, because 
he has not found that imaginary work by the real work’s end. 
Yet Salvatori encourages her students to assert “their authority and autonomy,” and 
Sorapure’s conflation of the universal desire for resolution with the Reader’s particular 
resolution strikes a false chord (“Toward” 84).  The Reader, we will have noted, has 
unambiguously resolved his romantic quest for Ludmilla, succeeding in his pursuit of the 
quixotic and ephemeral Other Reader; is it outside the realm of possibility that he also finally has 
succeeded in “assembling” the text of If on a winter’s night a traveler?  If so, we are left with yet 
another difficulty – what is that work, and how should it be interpreted?  If we take the “easy” 
solution to this difficulty and assume that the “work” is the conglomeration of the multiple 
numbered and named chapters, then we are still left with a problem, for the numbered chapters 
present a coherent (if implausible) narrative, while the named chapters recount ten different 
incipits to other, more or less framed, narratives.  Should we, then, treat Traveler as an 
anthology, or as a novel?  In short, how are we to resolve the essentially fragmented and 
seemingly irresolvable nature of the work? 
 
3.1.3. Hyper(textual) Difficulty 
 
In my own teaching, I have taken a slightly different approach to difficulty than Salvatori and 
Donahue.  As I understand their project, the hermeneutical goal of working with difficulty is to 
allow readers to engage with their own interpretive processes in a visible, scriptable manner.  
Reading remains a difficult subject to teach or discuss because so much of it simply happens.  
What happens when you sit down and read a book, or this chapter, dear reader?  How would you 
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 explain all of it to others?  At what point do you become aware of these 
things/activities/awarenesses?  The previous chapter was an attempt to freeze interpretation in 
time and present a synchronic portrait of the multiple activities readers perform diachronically as 
they enact works.  The pedagogy of difficulty attempts much the same, though localized at 
particular “hot spot” moments, when such activities may become most visible through the 
challenge of the difficult work.  Fragmented works in the distributed mode, and especially 
hypertextual works, foreground those moments of aporia in which the pedagogy of difficulty is 
most interested – the moments when the enactor’s ability to continue interpreting is forced to 
stop at a gap or fissure in the work. 
 I adapted (very loosely, as will become apparent) the pedagogical impetus behind the 
difficulty paper to meet the interpretive needs of hypertextual narratives, and in so doing realized 
that the hermeneutical activities performed by my students as they enacted a hypernarrative are 
largely identical to those performed every time they read – even when they read a completely 
traditional codex work.  In a course examining issues of literary engagement with contemporary 
issues and concerns, I discussed hypertext – with which all were familiar due to their experiences 
with the World Wide Web – and how it may be applied to telling stories.  I then asked my 
students to enact Stuart Moulthrop’s Reagan Library, discussed in the first chapter of this work.  
In addition to enacting the work, though, they were asked to record their enactment and reflect 
upon it.  Below, I have reproduced the hyperfiction reading response I assigned my students.  
Reading Response: Reagan Library 
 
“The number of pages in this book is literally infinite.  No page is the first 
page, no page is the last.  I don’t know why they’re numbered in this 
arbitrary way, but perhaps it’s to give one to understand that the terms of 
an infinite series can be numbered in any way whatever.” 
(Borges, “The Book of Sand” 482) 
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 Overview:
 
The computer has become ubiquitous in Western society, and html is its lingua 
franca.  The code that allows for the creation of killer web pages, however, can 
also be used for more literary pursuits.  Imagine the network of web pages linked 
to each other that comprises the World Wide Web.  Each page contains 
information, and each page links to other pages that have something (usually) to 
do with what you “clicked on,” to activate that hyperlink.  Now imagine a novel 
or short story written this way.  What you’re imagining is called “hyperfiction.” 
 
For this Reading Response, you are to visit English Literature Professor Stuart 
Moulthrop’s web site, and read a hyperfiction story included in the hypertext 
fiction of the site, entitled Reagan Library.   The URL for the story is: 
 
http://iat.ubalt.edu/moulthrop/hypertexts/rl/ 
 
Hypertext is a way of creating linkages instead of linearity.  Instead of reading 
from word to word, sentence to sentence, and page to page, you must choose 
which hyperlink to activate, which “path” to take through the constellation of 
textual fragments that comprise the story.  For this reason, reading hyperfiction 
can be quite confusing and frustrating.  This is normal, and an important part of 
the aesthetic experience of reading hyperfiction. 
 
Reagan Library is a narrative comprised of text and images.  Each page has a 
piece of text, and a panoramic graphic depicting the “world” around you.  You 
may click on the hyperlinked words or phrases in the text, or you may explore the 
panoramic image and click on the objects you see.  Both navigational methods 
will move you through the text/world of Reagan Library. 
 
This Reading Response has two parts: notes, and a written summary.  In the first 
part, you are to take notes on at least the first 50 lexias you read. (A lexia is a 
“chunk” of the work, usually displayed by itself on the screen in hyperfiction.)  
Your notes should consist of four types of information: 1) lexia name; 2) link 
selected; 3) what you expected – or hoped – to find by choosing that link; and 4) 
how your expectations were either met or frustrated by choosing that link.  You 
may record this information in any format you like, although something legible 
would be nice.  
 
 
Part 1:  The Four Types of Data
 
Lexia Name 
Write down the name of the lexia you are currently reading.  In Reagan Library, 
the lexia names are given in a colored strip to the left of the page.  You may note, 
however, that some of the names are the same except for either the color of the 
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 strip, or the color of the sky in the graphic, or both.  Because of this, I suggest that 
you record the color of the strip (and, in the black strips, the color of the sky) 
along with the lexia name.  Make a list of the first 50 (at least) lexias you read as 
you progress through and around Reagan Library. 
 
Link Selected 
Which link did you click on?  In Reagan Library there are two different types of 
clickable links. You may click on: 1) underlined words or phrases in the lexias; or 
2) the objects visible in the panoramic graphic.  (You may zoom in toward the 
objects by pressing the SHIFT key, and zoom out by pressing the CTRL key.)  
Because your choices are important to the development of the story, I encourage 
you to think through your choices before you implement them.  
 
 
 
Expectations 
As you think through your reading experience, try asking yourself questions about 
your reading.  What do you already know?  What characters do you know?  What 
do you know about them?  What do you want to find out?  What sounds 
interesting to you?  The answers to these questions will tell you what your 
expectations are for each link/lexia. 
 
Outcome 
So?  How did your link satisfy your expectations?  Was the new lexia what you 
expected, or something completely different?  What connections do you see 
between the lexia you just left, and the one you just arrived at?  What is the author 
trying to say by connecting these two lexias?  Is it what you expected? 
 
 
Part 2: Reflection
 
This Reading Response is an attempt to get you thinking about the ways we think 
when we read.   Because of this, expect it to be both hard and frustrating.  But 
after your excellent work with Borges, I have confidence that you are up to the 
challenge. 
 
For the reflection part of this response, I want you to write a prose narrative of 
your experience.  Consider the following questions: how do you read; what are 
you thinking as you read; what things do you do as you read; which of these 
thoughts and actions help you to understand what you are reading, and which ones 
prevent you from getting it; what was the story/stories; how do these different 
stories/characters connect?  Most importantly, how did you figure out these 
connections? 
 
This part of the Reading Response should be the usual 1-page, single spaced. 
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 Because of the difficulty of this Reading Response, I will assign bonus points to 
exceptional Responses.  Specifically, in the first part, I will reward detailed 
descriptions of why you selected links and what the outcome was.  In the second 
part, I will reward students who really attempt to engage with the material, its 
unconventional format, and the process of reading, in a thoughtful, reflective way.  
Why is the story being told in this form?  What does that accomplish? 
 
At the head of the assignment I included a brief passage from Jorge Luis Borges’ short story, 
“The Book of Sand,” which tells of an impossible book comprised of every book ever written 
and that ever would be read.  The pages were, therefore, as infinite as the number of grains of 
sand.  We had read the story immediately preceding our engagement with Reagan Library, so the 
notion of a fragmented, intertextual narrative was not entirely foreign to them.  The epigraph was 
thus a suggestion of connections to be made between and among the various course works, but 
also a subtle reminder that though the assignment focused on one particular work, the students’ 
experiences with other works and in other interpretive situations might be useful.  Though I have 
no proof that epigrams, thus used, can help to reduce the compartmentalization of knowledge and 
experiences that modern education seems so adept at instilling in our students, I remain 
committed to the attempt. 
 The hyperfiction reading response was designed to accomplish a number of important 
interpretive goals.  First, the assignment literally requires students to navigate at least fifty 
different lexias.  The course is designed for lower division undergraduate students, and is a 
favorite with non-majors.  These students, I worried, might simply shut down when faced with 
the interpretive requirements of Moulthrop’s hypermedia work.  The reading response provided a 
structure for navigating the work, which could, I hoped, be used as the basis for an insightful 
interpretation later.  Second, the assignment asks students to become aware of their actions as 
they enact the work.  The first part of the response is simply a table of data, recording the 
students’ navigational progress through the work, their choices from the many linking options, 
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 their expectations for those links, and the outcomes from those choices.  By writing down this 
data, the students gain a tangible artifact of their enactment, an artifact that can be searched later 
for patterns as part of the second half of the assignment, the reflection.  The third goal of the 
assignment is to make students aware not only that reading and enacting are active processes, but 
that they make choices throughout their enactment.  Every time an enactor is presented with 
more than one linking option, she is required to evaluate her options and to select the option 
which seems most likely to lead to the satisfaction of her needs.  This is an extremely complex 
set of interpretive acts, and yet our students do it every time they surf the Internet.  This aspect of 
the assignment attempts to make this connection of skills and habits explicit and visible to the 
students, so that they may feel confident in their abilities, even though the abilities are being 
called upon in an unfamiliar setting.  The fourth goal of the assignment is to make the world-
construction inherent in conformation visible to my students.  By asking them to formulate a 
rationale for their choices and then to record those rationales, I am asking my students to 
verbalize their own processes of world-creation.  Each link choice represents a hypothesis about 
the world of the work.  By then asking the students to evaluate the outcomes of those link 
choices, I am asking them to consciously measure the accuracy of those hypotheses. 
 The explanation of my hyperfiction reading assignment, however, sounds far more 
painful and complicated than its actual performance.  The fragmented nature of hyperfiction 
requires enactors to make decisions about navigation the work, just as fragmented paper-bound 
works do.  The substantial difference lies in the nature of the digital work, which may actively 
prevent the enactor from pursuing navigational paths unless they have been constructed 
explicitly by the composer.  In Julio Cortázar’s Hopscotch, Milorad Pavić’s Dictionary of the 
Khazars, or Marc Saporta’s Composition No. 1, for instance, the enactor has the power to move 
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 to whatever page she wishes at any time.  This does not obviate the need for, or the desirability 
of, understanding her navigational choices, but it means that the nature of the enactor’s choices 
may differ substantially.  While the enactor of Hopscotch might decide to hop to another chapter 
because she is tiring of the plot lines of the present chapter, the enactor of Reagan Library has 
only the choices made possible by Moulthrop’s composing and coding of the work.  Thus, in the 
hyperfiction reading assignment, the students must engage interpretively with the choices 
presented by the composer, and so must interpret from within the constraints set by the 
composer.   
After completing the fifty-lexia requirement for the enactment log, the students are then 
asked to reflect on the process and on their own actions and patterns of navigation and 
interpretation.  This reflection is often the start of a very productive interpretation of both the 
hyperfiction work and the enactor’s own interpretive style and skills.  The hyperfiction reading 
response asks students to think of interpretation as something that happens constantly during 
enactment, rather than as a “conclusion” one reaches after finishing reading the work.  In 
hyperfiction works, this is a crucial perspective to adopt, as the web-like structure of lexias and 
links means that, for most works, there literally is no end of the work – an enterprising (and 
tireless) enactor could continue to select links indefinitely without reaching a terminus.  The 
reflection, then, becomes a provisional conclusion, a contingent stopping place from which to 
evaluate the meta-interpretive progress and process of the enactor, regardless of whether the 
enactor has achieved a sense of narrative closure.  Many hyperfictions, Reagan Library included, 
seem to actively prevent just that sense of narrative closure, but perhaps none more famously – 
or more successfully – than Michael Joyce’s Afternoon, A Story. 
 
155 
 3.1.4. An Agonizing Afternoon 
 
In his book, Of Two Minds: Hypertext Pedagogy and Poetics, Michael Joyce explains the 
impetus behind Afternoon, writing that: 
What I really wanted to do, I discovered, was not merely to move a 
paragraph from page 265 to page 7 but to do so almost endlessly.  I 
wanted, quite simply, to write a novel that would change in 
successive readings and to make those changing versions 
according to the connections that I had for some time naturally 
discovered in the process of writing and that I wanted my readers 
to share.  (31) 
 
This desire led Joyce to collaborate with Jay David Bolter to create the Storyspace hypertext 
authoring system, and to compose Afternoon, A Story, the first Storyspace hyperfiction.  In 
Afternoon, Peter, our protagonist, tells us: “I want to say I may have seen my son die this 
morning” (“I want to say”).35  The first lexia in the work, though, gives little sign of this 
impending morbid turn of events.  Figure 2 shows the first lexia in Afternoon, titled simply 
“begin.” 
                                                 
35   In Afternoon, as in Reagan Library, citation is challenging.  I will provide the name of the lexia from which all passages 
from Afternoon have been excerpted.  This passage, for instance, is the entire text contained in the lexia “I want to say.” 
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Figure 2: Afternoon, A Story’s first lexia. 
 
Unlike Reagan Library, Afternoon was composed in the Storyspace program, and requires the 
Storyspace viewer to be displayed.  In Figure 2, the gray frames around the prose text are the 
Storyspace viewer program.  “Begin” presents its own difficulties – who is the “I” and who is the 
“she?”  What is the relationship between these two people?  What is the gender of the “I?”  What 
are they talking about?  What relationship does this have to anything else in the work?  When 
does this dialog occur within the chronology of the narrative?  In a traditional narrative, simply 
plugging along through the pages of the work might be expected to lead to enlightenment.  In a 
hyperfiction, however, because the enactor is required to make a choice, to select a word or 
phrase to link from, these questions gain greater significance in and of themselves.  Interpreting 
the first lexia, in other words, is an exercise in micro-analyzation, one that has no recourse to 
macro-analyzation, or to any of the other elements of conformation.  Even so, the enactor cannot 
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 help but begin to form hypotheses about the world of the work composed by Joyce, and her 
choices will – she hopes – prove those guesses and inferences to be correct. 
 “Begin” also includes second-person address, as does Calvino’s work.  At the end of the 
lexia, the narrator asks, “Do you want to hear about it?”  It is unclear to whom the narrator is 
speaking, whether to the “she” or to the reader, but the reader has a way of responding that is 
impossible in If on a winter’s night a traveler: at the bottom of the screen, on the left side, are 
two buttons marked “Y” and “N.”  Should the enactor click on the “Y” button, she would be 
taken to a lexia named “yes,” and should she click “N,” she would be taken to “no.”  The buttons 
at the bottom, then, seem to form a feedback loop with the (not so) rhetorical question in the first 
lexia, allowing the enactor another set of navigational options for progressing through the work. 
 Afternoon also includes a button at the bottom center of the window marked “Links,” 
which, if clicked, shows a table of all of the possible links from the present lexia, listed by the 
link “path,” the destination of the link path, and the “guard field” restricting the enactor’s 
navigation along that path.  There are twenty paths from “begin,” but not all of them are 
accessible the first time through this lexia, because Joyce has installed “guard fields” that will 
redirect or make inoperable certain links until the enactor has visited certain other lexias.  Every 
word displayed in the text is a possible link.  Most words in “begin” link to “I want to say,” 
which reveals the dramatic tension in the narrative – the possible death of the narrator’s son.  In 
another example of the post hoc propter hoc logical fallacy first discussed in relation to the 
Kuleshov effect, “I want to say I may have seen my son die this morning” appears to answer the 
question “Do you want to hear about it?” though the reference to the son dying “today” and the 
narrator’s efforts to “recall winter” make that interpretation unlikely upon close examination.  In 
any case, the sparseness of the “I want to say” lexia gives the enactor a narrative purpose, a goal 
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 toward which she will attempt to move – namely, determining whether the narrator’s son really 
did die. 
 Unfortunately, the narrator, Peter, is deeply, profoundly ambivalent: he is desperate to 
find out what happened, if anything; and he is terrified of learning that his suspicions are correct.  
These conflicting motivations are structurally represented in the work by the linking structure 
and the guard fields, which prevent the enactor from reaching a lexia that may prove conclusive 
one way or another until she has first visited a great number of the lexias.  Jane Yellowlees 
Douglas, perhaps the greatest critical authority on Afternoon, writes that there are 539 lexias in 
Afternoon, and that those are connected by 905 links (End of Books 96).  Douglas identifies the 
lexia “white afternoon” as the key to unlocking the riddle of the potentially deceased progeny, 
but as she notes, “it is reached only after a lengthy visitation of fifty-seven narrative places [. . .] 
‘white afternoon’ represents the furthest reaches of the physical spaces within Afternoon, the 
textual equivalent of a basement – or the end of a novel” (End of Books 106).  Reaching “white 
afternoon” is the enactor’s quest, much as assembling a completed narrative is the quest of the 
Reader in If on a winter’s night a traveler.  But knowing which 57 lexias in Afternoon 
collectively lower the guard field surrounding “white afternoon,” and being able to navigate 
through the 539-lexia work to reach those lexias in order, is a task far beyond the scope of my 
students’ hypertext reading assignment, which only requires navigation through 50 lexias.  It 
may be a task beyond the patience and interpretive powers of many enactors who come to the 
work, which means that many interpretations of the work will, of necessity, be forced to struggle 
without this missing answer to the central narrative concern.  In Traveler, Calvino continually 
distracts the reader (and the Reader) with new narratives, and in Afternoon, Joyce erects barriers 
between the enactor and her target.  Both works prevent, or at least postpone, any sort of 
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 traditional narrative closure and the reader’s satisfaction that such resolution brings.  These 
forms of delayed narrative gratification lead to the stress and frustration of feeling trapped in a 
game you cannot win because the rules are known only to the one who composed the ludic work. 
 
 
3.2. POWER PLAYS AND POWER PLAYERS AT THE GODGAME 
 
In 1940, David W. Maurer published The Big Con: The Story of the Confidence Man, now 
considered the classic work on the language and scams of the con game.  In the book, Maurer 
explains the tricks of the confidence game, and produces a fascinating journalistic work of a 
thriving criminal culture.  After describing several important genres of confidence game, Maurer 
pauses to consider the fallacious, but widespread, “feeling among legitimate folk that anyone 
who is the victim of a confidence game is a numskull.”  Quite the opposite, we are told, is the 
case.  Maurer explains that “the higher a mark’s intelligence, the quicker he sees through the deal 
directly to his own advantage” (103).  The mark – the victim of a confidence game – is presented 
with a scenario that promises to reward the mark handsomely for his participation and 
cooperation in some scheme.  Frequently, the mark is led to believe that the scheme will produce 
greater profit for the mark than for the con artist who proposes it, though that is never made 
explicit.  Instead, the perspicacious mark will analyze the situation, realize the asymmetrical 
rewards to be gained, and agree to play the game.36   
                                                 
36   Currently, a number of e-mails are circulating online, all of which purport to have been sent by exiled civil servants, 
or the adult children of government officials, from various countries in Africa.  The e-mails inform their recipients that 
the government official has collected a large sum of money (usually in the tens or hundreds of millions of US dollars), 
and would like to transfer this money to a safe bank account – such as yours – for safe keeping until some trouble/civil 
war/natural disaster has abated.  This rather sloppy confidence game attempts to prey upon the recipient's desire to take 
the money and run, but of course once the recipient provides a bank account, the transfer of funds likely would proceed 
in the opposite direction.  It goes without saying that the classic confidence games, while following the same general 
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  When a skilled confidence artist plies his or her “trade,” the lies of the game form a 
coherent, self-sufficient, and altogether plausible alternate reality in which the mark becomes 
trapped.  As Maurer describes the phenomenon, “The mark is thrown into an unreal world which 
very closely resembles real life; like the spectator regarding the life groups in a museum of 
natural history, he cannot tell where the real scene merges into the background” (103-104).  The 
confidence artist depends on the eagerness and greed of the mark to obscure the seams and holes 
in the game narrative.  In his or her zeal to take advantage of the “naïve” confidence artist, the 
mark neglects to question the game’s fictions – such questioning may prevent the mark from 
participating in the game before the opportunity passes, or else it may offend the con artist, who 
will take the opportunity elsewhere.  As Maurer concludes, “it is not intelligence but integrity 
which determines whether or not a man is a good mark” (104).  A mark with high integrity will 
not be willing to take advantage of the situation or of the confidence artist, and thus cannot be 
victimized by the artist. 
 The confidence game depends upon a foundational narrative, a rhetorical world-situation 
which is able to be mistaken for the real world.  This world is composed by, and controlled by, 
the confidence artist – the mark is simply a tourist in the con game’s environment.  Everything 
the mark sees, hears, and does – while in the world of the game – is determined by the artist.  
The mark’s thoughts, of course, are independent of this, but the game manipulates the mark into 
reaching certain conclusions and forming certain plans, as the con depends on the self-interest 
and the carefully directed “initiative” of the mark. 
 This section explores the trope of the literary godgame, another situation in which a 
controlling entity subjects a victim to a specially-composed world-narrative to achieve an ulterior 
                                                                                                                                                             
principles, were more complex and more plausible.  Digital artist Ze Frank has recorded a humorous video of himself 
performing (reading aloud while being videotaped) one such con game e-mail, complete with the typographical errors 
endemic to these e-mails.  Frank's video may be accessed online at <http://www.zefrank.com/request/>. 
161 
 purpose.  The term “godgame” was coined by English novelist John Fowles in his novel, The 
Magus.  Lest the comparison to the confidence game leave the wrong impression, the godgame is 
not always malicious.  It does not always culminate in the victim’s loss of something precious.  
And finally, as Maurer insists, the comparison need not be considered slanderous to writers; “Of 
all the grifters,” Maurer writes, “the confidence man is the aristocrat” (1, emphasis in original).  
The skill, finesse, and rhetorical prowess of the confidence artist are formidable and, at their 
best, provide a not inconceivable role model for authors interested in honing their craft.  For, 
what is narrative, but a collection of lies told so persuasively that the reader is able and willing to 
accept it as real while she reads? 
 
 
 
3.2.1. The Literary Godgame 
 
In his novel The Magus, John Fowles tells the story of aimless young Englishman Nicholas Urfe, 
who accepts a job teaching English at a school in the Greek islands.  While in Greece, Urfe 
meets the wealthy and reclusive Maurice Conchis, who systematically subjects Urfe to a series of 
increasingly bizarre, disturbing, and sexual situations with a cast of actors playing different roles 
in Conchis’ tableaux.  Urfe is fascinated by the scenario and sexually infatuated with one of the 
female players, and so continues to return to Bourani, Conchis’ villa, at every opportunity.  
Eventually, as the lies, performances, and stakes grow increasingly more serious, Urfe is forced 
to preside in a sort of courtroom trial as judge of Conchis and the others.  The trial, of course, is 
actually a test of Urfe, to see whether the events at Bourani have had an effect on the feckless 
Englishman. 
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  At the beginning of this chapter, I included a short interchange between Urfe and Mrs. 
Lily de Seitas, one of Conchis’ associates in the dramatic affairs at Bourani.  In the passage 
quoted, de Seitas explains the term employed by herself and Conchis to describe the experiences 
provided for Urfe – a godgame, because, as de Seitas archly notes, “there is no God, and it is not 
a game” (637).  Fowles’ use of the term is new, though the concept, and its use as a literary 
trope, is not.  Postmodernist theorist Robert Rawdon Wilson defines the godgame as: 
a specific class of illusions that, while strongly characteristic of 
modernity, does not spring from the experience of this bewildering 
century.  [. . .] a precise mode of illusion in which one person (or 
several) is made a victim by another person’s superior knowledge 
and power.  Caught in a cunningly constructed web of 
appearances, the victim, who finds the illusion impenetrable, is 
observed and his behavior is judged.  (“Spooking Oedipa” 187) 
 
The trope of the godgame is essentially providential, and hence, as the name implies, a 
borrowing from the theological origins of hermeneutics.  In attempting to understand the patterns 
and plans of Creation, the notion of Providence is employed to justify the existence of evil and 
the experience of suffering.37  Pain and injustice are part of God’s plan, it is asserted, and thus, 
eventually, they result in goodness – as the Plan is good, and as Creation itself is, essentially, 
good.  In the absence of an active and visible God, as in any such vacuum of power and 
authority, a lower-case god will act. 
 The godgame, like the theological concept of Providence, has four main components: a 
god, a subject, a testing game, and the observation and evaluation of the subject, who is 
expected, throughout the godgame, to struggle.  This suffering is due, in part, to the subject’s 
                                                 
37   In the Judeo-Christian tradition, the notion of Providence recurs throughout scripture.  In the Hebrew Testament, 
for instance, Deuteronomy 29:29 states: "The secret things belong to the LORD our God: but the things revealed 
belong to us and to our children forever, that we may observe all the words of the law."  The Christian Testament, in 
Romans 8:28, expands upon that theme, asserting that "We know that God causes all things to work together for good 
to those who love God, to those who are called according to His purpose."  Both verses express the ineffability of the 
theistic Plan, and attempt to rationalize human adherence to that Plan through the notion that, in theological terms, it is 
all for the best.  All Biblical verses in this chapter are taken from the Revised Standard Version. 
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 “attempts to think his way out or through (that is, discover the rules)” of the game (“Spooking 
Oedipa 187).  By the end of the game, as in life, the trials and tribulations of the game are 
generally expected to result in the purification – or, at least, the edification – of the subject.  As 
Ernst von Glaserfeld notes, the godgame in The Magus constitutes “a novel kind of therapy,” 
whose “purpose is to awaken, to change attitudes and ideas, and, ultimately, to install what I 
would call wisdom” (“Reflections” 445).  As a literary device, the godgame leads to the growth 
of the protagonist – through the protagonist’s suffering, development occurs and the narrative 
concludes with the protagonist facing the world as a stronger, more self-aware individual.  In The 
Magus, however, this is not the case.   
Fowles’ book easily could be considered a tragedy in the classic sense, as the inveterate 
callowness of Nicholas Urfe prevents him from accomplishing anything more than realizing his 
own weaknesses and flaws.  Before the trial, Urfe is placed in a cell with an enormous mural of a 
gigantic figure painted all in black, sprawled across either a field of grass or a bed of fire.  The 
giant points to a small mirror that has been hung on the wall of the cell.  Fowles writes Urfe’s 
reaction to the image: “A gaunt hand pointed down to a little mirror hanging on the wall; 
exhorting me, I supposed, to look at myself, to consider that I must die” (499).  For Urfe, a 
specialist in literature and the humanities, the only interpretation for the dark figure is the cliché 
of the skeleton, and the mirror is only a reminder of his own mortality.  The simple and profound 
interpretation – that the figure represents the pain and suffering of life, and that the mirror is an 
exhortation to self-reflection – is lost on Urfe, who seems incapable of all but the most 
superficial self-awareness.  Earlier, Conchis dismisses Urfe with the following words, doomed 
never to be heeded: “You had your chance.  I suggest you reflect on what it is in you that caused 
you to miss it” (454).  For Urfe is incapable of seeing beyond the moment, and especially of 
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 seeing beyond his own, narrowly-construed self-interest.  During the trial, one of the players 
reads a blisteringly harsh and mortifyingly accurate psychological portrait of Urfe and his 
shortcomings.  Urfe’s response: “There was some truth in what she was saying.  But I knew 
nothing could justify such a public analysis, even if it were true” (519).  The mirror in his cell, 
the heightened drama of the situation, which he acknowledges – all of this is insufficient to cause 
Urfe to rise above his usual myopia to see the need for true self-reflection and change.  In the 
tragic sense, it is his own lack of depth that causes Urfe to miss every opportunity to learn about 
himself and to reform his own deep insignificance.   
At the novel’s end, Urfe’s hamartia leads him to strike his former girlfriend, Alison, 
rather than begging her forgiveness and acceptance.  Though he had betrayed Alison numerous 
times at Bourani, Urfe expects her to beg him for forgiveness now that he has returned from 
Greece.  When she does not, Fowles writes, “My arm flicked out and slapped her left cheek as 
hard as it could.  The blow caught her completely by surprise, nearly knocked her off balance, 
and her eyes blinked with the shock, then very slowly she put her left hand to the cheek” (666).  
The pedagogical, and sometimes sadistic dramas at Bourani should have encouraged Urfe to 
reexamine his life.  Instead, he is only able to realize his own inadequacy, but without the 
necessary action of rectifying that lack (667).38  Earlier in the novel, Urfe challenges Conchis’ 
right to play god, asking “What makes you so sure you know my real self?”  Conchis responds, 
“I do not claim that.  My decision is based on the certain knowledge that you are incapable of 
knowing it yourself” (447).  The closest Urfe comes to knowing himself is through analogy to an 
apocryphal tale of Marie Antoinette and the French Revolution.  As the peasants storm 
                                                 
38   I stand by my interpretation of The Magus as classical tragedy, as I think it the most plausible explanation for the 
failure of the godgame.  However, a more provocative reading of the work suggests itself.  If we agree with Ralph Berets, 
that the godgame was successful in enabling “an ‘elect’ individual to impose a meaningful pattern on his existence” (90), 
a reading supported by a passage in Fowles’ text (540), then we are left with a terrifying, and harshly misogynistic, 
portrait of the Godless world, and those in it chosen to be elect.  For in this version of the tale, Nicholas Urfe is not a 
failure, but is cleansed and sanctified, to carry on his aimless wanderings, absolved of all injuries caused along the way. 
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 Versailles, a butcher, meat cleaver in hand, bursts into the royal apartments and finds the queen 
standing by a window.  Rather than hacking her to bits, he falls to his knees in tears.  Urfe tells 
this story to Lily de Seitas, whose response is “Poor butcher” (642).  Urfe affirms that he 
believes that was Antoinette’s response, as well.  Urfe knows that he is engaged in an 
asymmetrical power struggle, and yet he is unable to get up off his knees and ennoble himself, to 
take his destiny in hand and overthrow the old regime of his life.  The godgame ends in tragedy, 
and the chosen/created/elect is left abject and fallen. 
Most literary godgames, however, are resolved more affirmatively.  The classic medieval 
romance, Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, for instance, is structured around a clear godgame – 
the chivalric testing of the knights of King Arthur’s court.  It is Christmas at Camelot, and the 
festivities are interrupted by the intrusion of an enormous green apparition – a knight on 
horseback – who challenges anyone of the court to a beheading.  The responding knight will 
attempt to decapitate the Green Knight and, should the Green Knight survive, in a year’s time, 
the Green Knight will have the opportunity to return the blow.  The knights quail before the size 
and ferocity of the Green Knight, and only Sir Gawain is brave enough to defend the King’s 
honor by responding.  He cleanly severs the Green Knight’s head from his neck, whereupon the 
Knight picks up his head, reminds Gawain that he is now obligated to find the Green Chapel in 
one year’s time to receive a similar blow, and rides from Arthur’s hall. 
Gawain sets forth on his own quest to locate the mysterious Green Chapel, and comes 
upon a wondrous castle in the middle of a forest green.  The lord of the castle bids him to stay 
and hunt with them, and the lady of the castle – a beautiful and seductive woman – bids Gawain 
to lie with her.  Gawain enjoys his host’s hospitality, and refrains from succumbing to the lady’s 
charms, though he does kiss her twice, and receives from her a beautiful green silk scarf to wear 
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 as her charm.  At New Years, the lord of the castle provides a servant to show Gawain the way to 
the Green Chapel.  Gawain prepares himself for his certain demise, but it does not come.  The 
giant Green Knight merely feints at Gawain twice, and when Gawain flinches, he scratches 
Gawain’s neck with his enormous axe on his third attempt.  The challenge is thus concluded with 
nothing more than a flesh wound suffered by Sir Gawain. 
All is not as it appears, however.  The Green Knight informs Gawain that the three 
attempts he made with his axe were repayment for liberties taken by Gawain, for “True men pay 
what they owe” (2354, 49).39  As he later explains, the blows were in response to Gawain’s 
actions at the castle: 
For that is my belt around you, that same braided girdle, 
My wife it was that wore it; I know well the tale, 
And the count of your kisses and your conduct too, 
And the wooing of my wife – it was all my scheme! 
She made trial of a man most faultless by far 
Of all that ever walked over the wide earth; 
As pearls to white peas, more precious and prized, 
So is Gawain, in good faith, to other gay knights.  (2358-2365, 49) 
 
The Green Knight, in truth Sir Bercilak de Hautdesert, used the magic of Morgan le Fay, half-
sister to King Arthur and a noted sorceress, to effect his headless performance at Arthur’s court.  
He later tested Gawain through feats of hunting and of chivalric restraint (through the truly 
clever advances of Lady de Hautdesert) – a godgame which Gawain passed, as evidenced by his 
survival.  Gawain, shamed by the discovery of his (admittedly mild) dalliances with the 
(extremely forward) Lady de Hautdesert, offers to return the green silk to its rightful owner, but 
Bercilak refuses, noting that it will serve to remind Gawain of his frailty and encourage his 
humility, and thus should remain with the imperfect, but honorable, knight.  Gawain responds: 
But your girdle, God love you!  I gladly shall take 
                                                 
39   I will cite to passages from Gawain by line number as well as page number from the Boroff translation.  Hence, the 
passage on repayment cited as (2354, 49) – is from line 2354, on page 49 of Boroff’s translation. 
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 And be pleased to possess, not for the pure gold, 
Nor the bright belt itself, nor the beauteous pendants, 
Nor for wealth, nor worldly state, nor workmanship fine, 
But a sign of excess it shall seem oftentimes 
When I ride in renown, and remember with shame 
The faults and the frailty of the flesh perverse, 
How its tenderness entices the foul taste of sin; 
And so when praise and high prowess have pleased my heart, 
A look at this love-lace will lower my pride.  (2429-2438, 51) 
 
With this speech, Gawain proves his success in the godgame – he has not only acquitted himself 
admirably (by refusing Lady de Hautdesert’s forceful advances), but has learned a valuable and 
chivalric lesson from the experience, a lesson he is not too proud to recount to his tutor in the 
game, the Green Knight (who is, of course, Bercilak de Hautdesert magically disguised).   
 In Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, as in The Magus, the godgame’s “god” is a central 
figure in the narrative.  Bercilak de Hautdesert and Maurice Conchis are main characters in their 
respective narratives, and are able to interact with their subjects throughout their stories.  In The 
Crying of Lot 49, however, Thomas Pynchon introduces a deus absconditus to the godgame – a 
god who has absconded from the scene of the game – the deceased Pierce Inverarity.  Inverarity, 
a California technology and manufacturing magnate, dies and makes Oedipa Maas, with whom 
he had a brief affair years before, the executrix of his estate.  In her attempts to settle Inverarity’s 
estate, Maas stumbles upon a massive conspiracy involving the Trystero, an ancient organization 
devoted to destroying postal operations.  Maas discovers an independent European postal system, 
Thurn and Taxis, which held “a postal monopoly throughout most of the Holy Roman Empire,” 
but which was destroyed utterly by the anti-governmental force of the Trystero (Crying 66).  
This heretofore unknown bit of world history is not merely historical, as Maas begins to suspect 
that the Trystero is still in operation, maintaining an underground postal system marked by the 
acronym W.A.S.T.E. – “We Await Silent Trystero’s Empire,” usually scrawled on trash cans 
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 doubling as drop boxes – and that Pierce Inverarity had discovered the Trystero’s secret before 
his death (169).  By the end of the novel, Maas has embraced her descent down the rabbit hole, 
and lies in wait at an auction of Inverarity’s effects; the bidders for a set of Trystero stamps, she 
believes, will be members of the present-day Trystero, and her suspicions will be confirmed. 
 One of the novel’s characters asks Maas, near the end of the novel, whether she should 
not view the entire W.A.S.T.E. conspiracy as a giant game, asking: “Has it ever occurred to you, 
Oedipa, that somebody’s putting you on?  That this is all a hoax, maybe something Inverarity set 
up before he died?” (167).  But Maas refuses to discount what she herself has seen – appearance 
and perception trump the commonly agreed-upon reality.  As she notes, “With her own eyes, she 
had verified a WASTE system: seen two WASTE postmen, a WASTE mailbox, WASTE stamps, 
WASTE cancellations.  And the image of the muted post horn [the Trystero’s icon] all but 
saturating the Bay Area” (132).40  Though the Trystero’s shadowy past and secretive present 
suggest only a minor digression from common reality, it is enough to upset Maas’ balance in life.  
Her pursuit of the secret W.A.S.T.E. system, as well as her resolution to find the Trystero, mark 
her successful completion of the godgame set for her by her former lover, Pierce Inverarity.  
Pynchon signals her passage through the testing of the godgame by noting that, by the last pages 
of the novel, Maas now possesses, in the immortal words of Janis Joplin, “the courage you find 
you have when there is nothing more to lose,” which allows her to stake out the forged 
W.A.S.T.E. stamps to be auctioned as lot 49 (182).  The novel ends with Maas’ initiation into a 
world of shadowy groups, secret agents, and much activity sub rasa.  The auctioneer, Passerine, 
“spread his arms in a gesture that seemed to belong to the priesthood of some remote culture; 
                                                 
40   At this point in the novel, Maas has only seen the initials, and does not realize they are an acronym.  Hence, the lack 
of periods between the letters. 
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 perhaps to a descending angel.  The auctioneer cleared his throat.  Oedipa settled back, to await 
the crying of lot 49” (183). 
 
3.2.2. Playing the Mark: The Ludic Work and the Meta-Literary Godgame 
 
In confidence games, and in illusionism, the trick is focusing the mark’s (or the audience’s) 
attention away from where the action is really occurring.  In the confidence game, the mark’s 
interest is piqued by the risk to the con artist, not to himself.  In prestidigitation and other feats of 
“magical” illusion, the magician keeps the audience focused on the front of a box, while his 
assistant has disappeared from its false back.  The literary godgame is much the same.  While the 
reader’s attention is focused on the skill and psychological insight of the narrative’s god figure, 
the real work is being performed by the narrative’s composer.  For it is much easier to write a 
godgame than to stage one, and yet every masterful godgame in literature owes its existence to a 
masterful composer able to analyze the psychology of his subject and construct a game difficult 
enough to test and transform the subject without destroying the subject in the process. 
 Whether the god is an active character in the narrative (as in The Magus and Sir Gawain 
and the Green Knight) or an absconded deity (as in The Crying of Lot 49), the composer is the 
real genius – devising and constructing game worlds within the world of the work that retain 
their intelligibility and conformability by readers.41
 But once we begin to consider the author behind a godgame narrative, we begin to 
wonder where the boundaries of the godgame lie.  Robert Rawdon Wilson argues that the 
godgame is universal because it expresses an archetypal human fear: “Beneath every literary 
                                                 
41   Of course, godgames occur throughout narrative.  Though I discuss only literary godgames in this chapter, there are 
many notable filmic godgames, such as The Wizard of Oz, The Game, Willy Wonka and the Chocolate Factory, and The Silence of 
the Lambs, to name but a few. 
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 godgame there lies a situation that recalls (while evoking the appropriate feelings) the common 
human intuition of being made a victim, a scapegoat, or a sacrifice, and of being deluded by 
someone, by a they set over and against oneself” (“Spooking Oedipa” 203).  When Nicholas Urfe 
is snared by the lures of Maurice Conchis, and Sir Gawain by the bounties of Bercilak de 
Hautdesert, and Oedipa Maas by the weird systems of power revealed by Pierce Inverarity’s 
empire, we empathize with these characters, because we know the feeling of being taken 
advantage of by superior force, resources, or intellect.  And we note the seductive quality of the 
godgame – who would refuse the special attention and lures of a psycho-sexual adventure 
designed specifically for themselves? 
 If we reduce the literary godgame to its constituent elements, we are left with a god (the 
composer of an alternate “game” world), a subject (who will be asked to interpret that world and 
to interact with it in substantive ways), a series of tests (difficult or ambiguous elements and 
activities in the composed world requiring interpretation and intervention by the subject), and an 
opportunity for growth or development by the godgame’s subject (the resonance between the 
conformed world and the interpreter’s world, and the adaptation and evolution of the 
interpreter’s world caused by that resonance).  The comparison to reading and interpreting in 
general is clear – the literary godgame is a instantiation in narrative of the phenomenon of 
reading in general.42  And if all readers are engaging in a godgame with an absconded deity – as 
in Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49 – then the frustrations and obstacles to our enactments of 
Calvino’s If on a winter’s night a traveler and Joyce’s Afternoon, A Story fit into a larger pattern, 
                                                 
42   Wilson, whose work on godgames is central to my thesis here, rejects this claim in a 1981 article.  Wilson writes, “It 
may be that the author can be said to play a game [. . .] in writing.  That would not be to grant the fundamental assertion 
that all literary works are games (or have ‘gamelike’ structures) but it would admit that the creative playfulness of literary 
creation may take the shape of a game” (“Three Prolusions” 87).  To this I reply that some games are deadly serious, and 
that all interpretation, as Hans-Georg Gadamer reminds us, occurs as play between the work and the interpreter (TM 101-
134).  Thus, it is not necessary to assert that the literary work qua literature is a game to note the game-like dynamic of 
literary interpretation. 
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 a more productive model than merely the sadistic whims of two particular postmodern authors.  
But if this is the case, then what are we to make of the rules of the (god)games we are being 
asked to play in Traveler and Afternoon?  As Wilson notes, “The victim of a godgame finds 
himself in the bewildering necessity of having to think himself out of a context that he cannot 
understand” (“Godgames” 7).  With the greater time and resources available to readers (as 
compared with the constrained time and resources available to characters caught in godgames), 
what can we determine about the nature of the labyrinth we find ourselves in when we attempt to 
enact each work?  How do we make sense of the rules of the game, and how can we teach these 
skills to our students? 
 
3.3. IN THE LABYRINTH 
 
Maze or labyrinth – we may suspect that one involves multiple paths, and the other a highly 
circuitous single path, but which is which?  The common perception of difference between the 
two terms is the first misdirection we will encounter in our exploration of the labyrinth.  
Penelope Reed Doob and Craig Wright, in their landmark studies of mazes in history and culture, 
agree that “the words have different etymologies but mean the same thing” (Doob 1).  Indeed, 
“there is no difference between the two,” either in contemporary usage or in their earliest 
references (Wright 4 et passim).  Labyrinth is the older term, and Wright notes the similarity 
between the word and the Greek labrys – the double-headed axe, which structurally resembles 
the ancient labyrinths recorded in murals and illustrations (4).  Doob, on the other hand, argues 
that the word derives from the Latin labor and intus, labor and in-ness.  She writes: “The key 
word in almost all medieval etymologies [of ‘labyrinth’] is labor, with all its connotations of 
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 difficulty.”  She explains that, “etymologically speaking, then, the labyrinth is a process 
involving internal difficulty (or error, or artistry, or fatiguing effort); and what happens inside is 
more important than whether it is hard to get in or out” (97).  Perhaps fittingly, the uncertainty 
over the origins of labyrinth are mirrored in the etymology of maze.  Doob explains that “The 
English mase, of uncertain origin, also stresses difficult process, annoyance, confusion,” but 
“whatever its roots, the word enters Middle English with Old English amasod, ‘astonished, 
bewildered’” (98).  In English usage the two words, maze and labyrinth, come to mean the same 
thing “by a kind of metonymy, the effect giving its name to the cause.”  This linguistic operation 
is possible because of “the confusion and bewilderment common to both: if a mazed man is 
confused or deluded and a labyrinth confuses and deceives, then a labyrinth is a maze” (Doob 
98-99). 
 Jorge Luis Borges, in his story “The Two Kings and the Two Labyrinths,” tells the tale of 
two kings – “the king of the Arabs” and “the King of the isles of Babylonia.”  The Babylonian 
king constructed “a labyrinth so confused and so subtle that the most prudent men would not 
venture to enter it” (263).  While on a visit, the king of the Arabs was invited into the maze, 
whereupon he wandered, lost and humiliated.  The king of the Arabs prayed to Allah, who 
showed him the door out of the monstrous maze.  The vengeful king of the Arabs then conquered 
Babylonia and captured its king.  The king of Babylonia was taken three days’ journey into the 
desert, where he was released.  The Arabian king announced: 
In Babylonia didst thou attempt to make me lose my way in a 
labyrinth of brass with many stairways, doors, and walls; now the 
Powerful One has seen fit to allow me to show thee mine, which 
has no stairways to climb, nor doors to force, nor wearying 
galleries to wander through, nor walls to impede thy passage.  
(263) 
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 Of course, released in the middle of the desert, the Babylonian king “died of hunger and thirst,” a 
victim of a far more cunning maze (264). 
 This section will examine multicursal mazes – those with multiple paths – and unicursal 
mazes – those with only a single path.  In the first chapter, I briefly discussed the problems 
enactors have when they attempt to orient themselves among the multitude of lexias in a 
hypertextual narrative.  The experience is often described as being lost in a maze, unable to reach 
either the center or exit.  In this chapter, we shall look at the experience of the maze, and the 
ways in which being amazod by a narrative can (and cannot) truthfully and productively cause 
the narrative itself to be metaphorized as a type of maze. 
 
 
 
3.3.1. Turning in the Gyre: Experiencing Unicursal Mazes 
 
The unicursal maze is the oldest type of maze invented by humans.  Figure 3 shows a diagram of 
the unicursal maze inlaid into the stones of the floor of the cathedral at Chartres, France. 
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Figure 3: The unicursal maze at Chartres, France. 
 
Penelope Reed Doob succinctly describes unicursal mazes as creating “the most circuitous route 
conceivable within any given space, the longest possible way to get to the center” (48).  The 
unicursal maze at Chartres, for instance, requires its visitors to travel over nearly the entire area 
of the maze to reach the center.  During that long walk, the visitor is sent through thirty-four 
turns, spiraling sometimes nearer and sometimes farther away from the center before reaching 
the final path into the middle of the maze.  What is most surprising about the unicursal maze, 
however, is it was the ancient world’s only model.  Doob notes that: 
What is most important for present purposes is that, except for one 
fresco at Knossos, unknown from 1400 B.C. until Sir Arthur 
Evans’s excavations, and a wall labyrinth (only vaguely 
multicursal) at Poitiers dating from the twelfth century, all classical 
and medieval mazes share a remarkable characteristic: they are 
unicursal, with no forked paths or internal choices to be seen.  (40, 
emphasis in original) 
 
175 
 Thus, the labyrinth in the myth of Theseus and the Minotaur, for instance, was created with a 
unicursal maze in mind.  Umberto Eco, in his book, Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, 
points out that “Theseus entering the labyrinth of Crete had no choices to make: he could not but 
reach the center, and from the center the way out” (80).  The single path of a unicursal maze 
leads inexorably to the center of the maze, but once at the center, the maze-walker must turn 
around and follow the path back out again, traversing the length of the maze twice.  The 
adventure may be tiring, but it is hardly life threatening.  The narrative implications and 
contradictions from this fact are startling and disturbing, but Eco attempts to rectify our 
understanding of the myth by noting that “That is the reason by which at the center there was the 
Minotaur, to make the whole thing a little more exciting.  [. . . .]  In this kind of labyrinth the 
Ariadne thread is useless, since one cannot get lost: the labyrinth itself is an Ariadne thread” (80, 
emphasis in original).43  In a unicursal maze, the maze itself may be devastatingly complex and 
“amazing,” but it cannot prevent the determined traveler from ultimately reaching its center, and 
then its entrance/exit again simply by following the only path available. 
 Craig Wright, examining the uses and meanings of mazes in myth and culture, notes that 
“Mazes which have a path to the center also have something more: someone on that path [. . . .]  
The name of this warrior may change, but he is inseparable from the maze.  Every myth needs a 
hero” (4).  The Cretan labyrinth’s power of amazement is legendary, but more famous yet are 
Theseus and Daedalus, the hero and inventor of the maze.  Outside of myth and legend, the 
unicursal maze requires only perseverance to solve, though the solution may well leave the 
maze’s hero disoriented and thoroughly amazed. 
                                                 
43   In The Metamorphoses, Ovid is far less concerned with Theseus’ act of bravery than he is with Ariadne’s betrayal by 
Theseus and her transformation into stars by Bacchus.  In Ovid’s telling of the tale, Daedalus and his son Icarus were 
not imprisoned in the labyrinth, either.  Rather, their flight from Crete was to escape their exile on the island.  As Eco 
writes, the Cretan maze is fearsome only because of the monster at its center, and though “as one entered it, only a wary 
mind/ Could find an exit to the world again,” it does not possess the power to amaze and befuddle its creator, as is 
sometimes recounted.  (Metamorphoses Book VIII, 220.) 
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3.3.2. Testing the Reader’s Faith: Calvino’s Unicursal Labyrinth 
 
The maze in the cathedral at Chartres is, as all of the cathedral mazes are, a peculiarly trying 
form of labyrinth.  We expect a maze to present us with high walls, our vision limited to only the 
path immediately before and behind us, but the floor labyrinths, inlaid in the stone, provide only 
a path for the maze-walker’s feet.  The center remains always visible, and yet kept out of reach.  
Each turn inward promises access to the goal, and yet all of the first thirty-three turns eventually 
lead away from the sought-after center.  Calvino’s If on a winter’s night a traveler is structured 
in a similar way.  The reader beginning Calvino’s novel is lead through a series of delays and 
switchbacks in chapter one, but expects the first named chapter, If on a winter’s night a traveler, 
to lead to the center of the narrative.  No sooner does the reader become enmeshed in the scene, 
however, but Calvino interrupts the narrative and sends the reader back toward the perimeter of 
the maze with another numbered chapter.  And so the pattern repeats itself through numbered 
and named chapters – promises of narrative coherence, and eventually closure, broken as the 
plots weave and circle around a center whose very existence becomes increasingly problematic 
as the novel continues. 
 And yet, of course, the novel is a traditionally-manufactured novel, printed on numbered 
and bound pages, with no special arrangements or tables of instruction to subvert the codex 
reading conventions.  Craig Wright argues that the necessary quality for an adventurer in a 
unicursal maze is faith (3).  Faith is central, because without faith in the center, without a guiding 
belief in the larger structure of the maze, the maze-walker is not engaged in a noble activity, but 
rather, either a random wandering or a nihilistic exercise in masochism and busy-work.  So, we 
shall profess our faith in Italo Calvino and his work, setting our feet on the path of the work and 
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 following it through to the end, which we avow – in the absence of proof, which we will not be 
able to collect until we finish the novel – will reveal the center of the narrative. 
 Enactment, in the processes of conformation, includes encounter, navigation, and 
configuration.  In a unicursally-designed work, such as a traditional codex work, navigation is 
subsumed by the standard conventions of reading, barring acts of willfulness on the part of the 
enactor who violates the sequential presentation of the work.  Configuration is still a part of the 
interpretive process, but in a much weaker form than while enacting a more heavily fragmented 
work.  Interpreting hypertext narratives, for instance, requires a double process of configuration: 
the enactor configures the fragments of narration, a process accomplished by navigating through 
the work; and the enactor also configures into a more-or-less coherent world the analyses she 
produces while enacting the work.  Thus, the work itself is configured through the enactor’s 
navigation, and the world of the work is configured by the enactor’s entire process of 
interpretation.  In If on a winter’s night a traveler, however, configuration only occurs at the 
level of assembling the world of the work – the work itself is fixed in its order.  But most 
interesting is enactment itself when considering a work like Traveler.  As all works are static and 
mute without the cooperation of an interpreter, it stands to reason that enactment also has a 
necessary role to play in the reading of a novel like Traveler. 
 Enactment is more than the evocation of the world of the work from a recording of the 
work; enactment is the performance of the work with, ideally, all of the cognitive and affective 
features of the work intact.  What this means is that, while the enactor is busy conforming the 
world of the work, she also should be feeling the frustration and confusion Calvino has 
composed into the text of the novel.  Indeed, ignoring these feelings is a failure of enactment and 
a failure of interpretation, though indulging in them may also lead to impairment of the enactor’s 
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 interpretive faculties.  As Wright says of the unicursal maze, we must have faith and endure the 
frustrations devised by Calvino. 
If we recognize that Calvino, not unlike Maurice Conchis in The Magus, has devised a 
series of bizarre scenarios and entanglements for his readers, then we may begin to untangle the 
threads of the experience of enacting Traveler.  Calvino is our magister ludi, our master of 
games, and he has devised an experiential drama for our performance.  As we enact the work, we 
are faced with frustrated expectations and desires at every turn.  We know, however, that the 
work is unicursal, and so we continue through the work until we reach the end.  At the novel’s 
end, we are shown the Reader’s resolution to both his quests, though we have not been provided 
the same degree of closure ourselves.  Having reached the last page of the book, we have not 
reached the center of Calvino’s maze, nor of his game, for our interpretation of the work remains 
woefully thin.  This was Nicholas Urfe’s failure in The Magus: he mistook reaching the end of 
the game with winning the game.  He confused understanding the game with experiencing the 
game, and without the affective dimension of the godgame, Urfe’s understanding was never 
complete or profound enough to alter his personality or world view.  In his cell before the trial, 
for instance, Urfe never takes the broad suggestion of the mural to engage in self-examination 
and reflection.   
The Magus is an allegory of reading, just as Traveler is (a point to which I will return in more 
detail later in this chapter).  Urfe believes that making it through to the end should be sufficient, 
that his brute powers of deciphering what Julius Rowan Raper calls “the mythic masque, or 
psychodrama, that Maurice Conchis (the magus) stages to lead him out of his confusion” (61), 
can insulate him from having to become emotionally entangled in Conchis’ mess.  By rejecting 
the affective dimension of the masque and drama, Urfe remains as mired as ever in his 
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 confusion.  Urfe produces a highly intellectual and almost completely bloodless gloss on the 
affair, and so misses the most important feature of the game – that it is meant to be lived as much 
as it is to be understood.   
 In Samuel R. Delaney’s novel Triton: An Ambiguous Heterotopia, Bron (another 
emotionally and experientially stunted protagonist) unwittingly becomes an audience for a 
radical street theater performance designed by a character known as the Spike.  The guerilla 
theater incorporates music, pyrotechnics, acrobatics, and mixed scenes of violence and sexuality.  
Delaney describes Bron’s reactions: “His back and belly chilled.  He breathed out, breathed in, 
trying to catch the words”; “Chills encased him.  His eyelids quivered”; “His ears and tongue felt 
carbonated”; “His scalp crawled with joy”; “Awed, he looked up” (18); “He raised his hands, 
clapped, too – weakly: but it shook his whole body; he clapped again, wildly off-rhythm”; “Bron 
clapped again, alone, and realized tears were rolling one cheek”; “Bron swallowed, took a step, 
tried to bring himself back into himself: it seemed that fragments were scattered all around the 
square”; and “His body still tingled.  Anyway, it was exciting!  Exciting and . . . beautiful!  –
even to the point of nausea!” (19, emphasis in original).  Bron’s outward reaction to the troupe’s 
performance is one of immense gratitude: “Smiling back, he shook his head, a little bewildered, a 
little shaken.  ‘Thank-’  He coughed, shook his head again.  ‘Thank you …’ which was all there 
was to say.  ‘Please . . . thank you—’” (19).  Bron’s nonconsensual immersion into the Spike’s 
micro-godgame (she calls it “micro-theater,” as it lasts for seconds rather than minutes or hours) 
drives the narrative throughout the book, provoking a dissatisfaction with his life.  Bron’s 
famous thought on the novel’s first page – “I am a reasonably happy man” – changes its 
connotation from an expression of sufficiency to an admission of insufficiency.  Interestingly, it 
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 is reason, and the reasonableness of Bron’s experience of happiness, that is at fault, triggered by 
the aesthetic, affective, and emotional overload of the Spike’s micro-drama.   
 As soon as we begin seriously considering the interpretative necessity of subjective, 
emotional states, our analysis runs the risk of degenerating into the “everyone’s opinion is valid” 
solipsism that is the antithesis of hermeneutic inquiry.  In his studies of “open” works – art with 
explicitly ambiguous structures and meanings, which thus requires the audience to configure and 
interpret the work without definitive guidance as to the correctness of these configurations and 
interpretations – Umberto Eco reaches the only conclusion left available to him: if determining 
the “correct” interpretation is impossible, then the only way to validate interpretation is to 
determine what is not a correct interpretation.  As Eco writes, for open works “there is, perhaps, 
no way to decide which interpretation is the ‘good’ one, but it is still possible to decide, on the 
basis of the context, which one is due, not to an effort of understanding ‘that’ text, but rather to a 
hallucinatory response on the part of the addressee” (Limits 21).  Eco’s use of the trope of 
hallucination is reminiscent of Marshall McLuhan’s analysis of the information density of 
various media.  As McLuhan phrases it, media with high information density, such as films, are 
“hot,” and those with low information density, such as telephony and print media, are “cool.”44  
Hot media provide audiences with, typically, more information than they can handle at any given 
time, and in multiple modalities.  Cool media, on the other hand, require “completion by the 
audience” to be interpretable (Understanding Media 23).  The implications for this are, as 
McLuhan writes, that “in experiments in which all outer sensation is withdrawn, the subject 
                                                 
44   McLuhan notes that “the alphabet, when pushed to a high degree of abstract visual intensity, becomes typography,” a 
point to be discussed in the following chapter (23).  When McLuhan wrote the essays in Understanding Media – in the 
early 1960s – media were substantially different than they are today.  McLuhan considered television, for instance, to be 
a cool medium.  No one watching a cable news broadcast on television today, however, would consider the newscaster, 
insert picture of a field reporter, graphics and theme music for particularly flashy stories, and news “crawl” across the 
bottom of the screen, to be low-density.  Similarly, the newspaper has been considerably “hotted-up” in McLuhan’s 
terms by the evolution of layout design heralded and championed by USA Today and the newsmagazines like Time and 
Newsweek. 
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 begins a furious fill-in or completion of senses that is sheer hallucination.  So the hotting-up of 
one sense tends to effect hypnosis, and the cooling of all senses tends to result in hallucination” 
(32).  The novel, though dense with meaning, is a medium with low density of information.  This 
is hardly controversial – hermeneutics is based on the impossibility of perfect communication 
through writing, and though we do not usually speak of it as such, the mental construction of the 
world of the work (re)composed while reading is a conscious exercise in hallucination. 
 So then, is our assumption – that the reader’s frustration is an interpretable element of the 
work – a verifiable interpretation about the work, or is it merely a hallucination?  Mariolina 
Salvatori’s difficulty paper assignment asks students to make connections between the 
difficulties they encounter (such as narrative frustration) and possible interpretations of those 
difficulties (the sense of frustration is a necessary component of the world of Traveler).  In 
practicing such a pedagogy, a student may ideally develop, over the course of several papers, the 
following increasingly sophisticated chain of inferences stemming from her difficulty with the 
work: 1) Traveler is frustrating; 2) It is frustrating because Calvino refuses to get on with the 
story (through the first numbered chapter); 3) It is even more frustrating that the first named 
chapter is terminated before it reaches any sort of resolution; 4) Even worse, all of the named 
chapters begin, but fail to resolve, any sort of coherent narrative; 5) The only story with a 
beginning, middle, and end is the Reader’s story in the numbered chapters, but that story only 
exists to frame the named chapters; 6) The numbered chapters are especially frustrating because 
of Calvino’s constant attempts to tell the reader what s/he is feeling and/or doing as the Reader; 
7) The Reader is also frustrated, and for many of the same reasons as I (the reader) am – this 
doubling seems to be too structured to be purely coincidental; 8) The reader/Reader’s frustration 
also seems to be related to the description of the type of reading/book that either Ludmilla (the 
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 Other Reader/Lettrice) or her sister Lotaria want next to read – their descriptions determine the 
narrative style of the following named chapter; 9) This suggests that the book is – as many critics 
have noted – really a book about reading, and the “real” narrative follows the Reader, not the 
named chapter incipits; 10) If I am reading this novel about reading, and if I am having the same 
meta-narrative frustrations that the protagonist is having, then clearly Calvino is playing both the 
Reader and the reader, and such games usually have a pedagogical purpose; and 11) My 
interpretation of If on a winter’s night a traveler, then, should focus on the relationship between 
the readings and reading materials offered in the book, and should attempt to discern what it is I 
am supposed to learn from my very frustrating experience reading the book. 
 The hypertext reading assignment I discussed earlier in this chapter takes a different, but 
related approach to the difficulties of reading and interpretation, but one that is highly 
concordant with Salvatori’s.  In my hypertext reading assignment, I ask students to foreground 
the processes of micro-analyzation and macro-analyzation, asking them to think through the twin 
problems of “what do you know now” and “how does it relate to what you have already read.”  I 
do not ask my students to record their answers to these questions because, by recording the 
rationales behind their navigational choices and the outcomes of those choices, they are already 
performing the work of both analyzations and connecting those answers to their own 
expectations for the work.  In a work like Traveler, Calvino’s playfulness with his readers’ 
expectations is a fundamental structuring element.  In a multicursal work, like Michael Joyce’s 
Afternoon, the enactor’s sense of disparity between what she knows and what she wants to know 
guides her navigational choices.  By foregrounding the dynamic of expectations and surprise as a 
normal feature of narrative in the distributed mode, the “difficulty” of “reading” such moments is 
recontextualized from an impossibility into a (mandatory) opportunity for interpretation.  In a 
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 unicursal work like Calvino’s, the enactor’s expectations do not enable her to move through the 
work in a self-directed manner; she is at Calvino’s mercy, unless she chooses to violate reading 
conventions.  The hyperfiction reading assignment, however, foregrounds the interpretive 
richness possible at moments when the enactor’s expectations are rejected.  The experience of 
enacting heavily fragmented works in the distributed mode makes such rejection not an 
indictment of the reader’s interpretive skill, but rather a flag that something is going on in the 
work which may require (and reward) further investigation. 
 
3.3.3. Twisty Little Passages, All Alike: Experiencing Multicursal Mazes 
 
While unicursal mazes demand faith and perseverance from those who enter them, the 
multicursal maze “requires logic to solve a puzzle” (Wright 3).  Figure 4 shows a sample 
multicursal maze.  The defining characteristic of a multicursal maze is its inclusion of multiple 
paths, the majority of which lead neither to the maze’s center, nor to its exit.  Instead, the 
multicursal maze requires the maze-walker to decide among navigational options without 
advance knowledge of the correctness of the paths she chooses. 
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Figure 4: The multicursal hedge maze from Stanley Kubrick’s film, The Shining. 
 
 Craig Wright summarizes the historical transition from unicursal to multicursal mazes 
that occurred at the end of the sixteenth century, writing: 
 
Indeed, until the end of the sixteenth century, garden mazes, as 
well as representations of such mazes in the visual arts, were 
predominantly ‘one-way.’  Here the unicursal quadratic maze of 
the Roman villa was simply transplanted outdoors.  By the end of 
the sixteenth century, however, the numerical balance begins to 
shift decidedly in favor of the multicursal maze.  So synonymous 
did garden maze and multicursal maze become that when the 
Germans needed to coin a new word to denote a multi-path maze, 
they began to call it an ‘error garden’ (Irrgarten), whether the 
maze was in a garden or not.  By the seventeenth century most new 
mazes were multicursal.  (225) 
 
Today, the word “maze” invariably refers to the multicursal variety.  Umberto Eco notes that it is 
only in a multicursal maze that “one does need an Ariadne thread; otherwise, one might spend 
one’s life in turning around by repeating the same moves.  [. . . .]  A [multicursal] maze does not 
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 need a Minotaur: it is its own Minotaur: in other words, the Minotaur is the visitor’s trial-and-
error process” (Semiotics 81, emphasis in original).  The hedge maze in figure 4 illustrates the 
literally monstrous potential of the multicursal maze.  At the film’s climax, Jack Nicholson’s 
character, Jack Torrance, has been driven insane and pursues his son Danny into the hedge maze 
during a blizzard.  Torrance bellows in blind, bestial rage as he chases Danny through the 
towering hedges, assuming the role of the murderous minotaur, and yet the maze itself proves to 
be the most deadly foe.  Torrance is defeated by the maze – unable to find Danny and unable to 
escape the twisting passages, he freezes to death.  Danny, meanwhile, retraces his steps, 
following his own footprints in the snow like Ariadne’s thread, and escapes to safety. 
 Eco describes a third type of maze, neither unicursal nor multicursal, strictly speaking – 
the net, or web.  “The main feature of a net,” he writes, “is that every point can be connected 
with every other point, and, where the connections are not yet designed, they are, however, 
conceivable and designable” (Semiotics 81).  Though there are significant structural differences 
between multicursal mazes, such as in figure 4, and web-like mazes, the experience of the 
traveler wandering inside the walls of both mazes can be quite similar.  As Borges establishes in 
his story, “The Two Kings and the Two Labyrinths,” the contrast between multicursal mazes and 
web mazes, with the goal of demonstrating that web mazes may be even more amazing than 
multicursal ones.  If the maze-walker has a purpose in mind – either the center, exit, or some 
other point in the maze – then the lack of blind alleys may be insignificant to the visitor’s 
chances of finding the desired spot.  Unlike unicursal mazes, multicursal and web mazes alike 
present the visitor with a plethora of navigational choices, which necessarily means the visitor 
repeatedly may choose incorrectly and thus become lost. 
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  Hypertext narratives are frequently structured as web-like labyrinths, with the multiple 
link paths between lexias establishing a net of narrative elements through which the enactor 
moves.  In Afternoon, A Story, however, Michael Joyce employs a number of guard fields, like 
blind alleys preventing enactors from reaching certain lexias unless others already have been 
reached.  This feature bridges the differences between the two types of multicursal labyrinths, 
making Afternoon a hybrid form, combining the sense of structured pathways and restricted 
navigation of multicursal mazes with the sense of tacit connections and unimpeded associations 
organizing the seemingly open web mazes.  In both, as Borges makes clear, the visitor can 
become lost and confused – which is, arguably, the very purpose and pleasure of a maze. 
 
3.3.4.  “Not All Who Wander Are Lost”: Hyperfiction and the Enactor’s Choices45 
 
Penelope Reed Doob analyzes the symbolic differences between unicursal and multicursal 
mazes, noting that “The multicursal maze exemplifies the constant choice demanded of an 
individual, but the unicursal pattern describes the inevitability to which everyone in that 
particular maze must be subject.  In effect, a unicursal maze-walker is Everyman, not an 
individual” (50).  In If on a winter’s night a traveler, Calvino writes the story of Reader, whose 
frustrations are shared by his readers, whoever they may be.  Because Calvino cannot 
differentiate among his readers, his work operates as an allegory.  In Afternoon, A Traveler, on 
the other hand, the enactor must configure the work through her navigation – her decisions 
materially affect not the work but her own experience of the work.  As a result, though readers of 
Traveler may comfort themselves with the belief that the majority of other readers are suffering 
                                                 
45   The heading for this section comes from J. R. R. Tolkien’s The Fellowship of the Ring.  The wizard Gandalf writes to 
Frodo, a Hobbit, telling him to hurry to the elf town Rivendell.  His message reads, in part: “All that is gold does not 
glitter,/ Not all those who wander are lost;/ The old that is strong does not wither,/ Deep roots are not reached by the 
frost” (182). 
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 similar frustrations, the reader of Afternoon cannot escape the feeling that she is responsible for 
her narrative frustrations through her “poor” choices.  A walker in a unicursal maze cannot help 
but reach the goal, provided she simply perseveres.  A walker in a multicursal or web maze, no 
matter how long she walks, is not guaranteed success.  Failure is a tribute to the designer of the 
maze, but is, ultimately, a judgment on the skills of the walker.  In the narrative context, this has 
profound implications for the interpretation of heavily fragmented works. 
 The first lexia in Joyce’s Afternoon poses a question to the enactor – “Do you want to 
hear about it?” (“begin”).  If the enactor chooses to ignore the question, to treat it as a rhetorical 
question, and instead either presses the Enter key to follow the “default” link or clicks on one of 
the words in the lexia, chances are good that she will be shown “I want to say.”46  This provides 
the enactor with a narrative goal, a center of the labyrinth, which the enactor will attempt to 
reach.  Earlier in this chapter, I mentioned Jane Yellowlees Douglas’ interpretation of the “white 
afternoon” lexia as the work’s central fragment (End of Books 106).  In “white afternoon,” Joyce 
writes: 
The investigator finds him to be at fault. 
He is shocked to see the body so beautifully there upon the wide 
green lawn. 
The boy is nearby.  (“white afternoon”) 
 
In three other lexias, “1/”, “2/”, and “Lolly’s monologue”, Joyce provides an internal monologue, 
probably from Lolly, a psychotherapist, which explains, elliptically, that Peter caused a fatal 
accident by losing control of his car and swerving in front of his ex-wife and son as they were in 
the oncoming lane.  Peter’s literal loss of control, Lolly suggests, was due to the mental 
                                                 
46   Of course, in the narrative scenario of Afternoon, the question, “Do you want to hear about it?” is also a hypothetical 
question: there is no person asking the question, only a figment of Joyce’s imagination, and the object of the direct 
address – the enactor – is also hypothetical, from Joyce’s perspective. 
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 instability caused by learning that his boss, Werther, was sleeping with Peter’s ex-wife.  But 
when the enactor begins Afternoon, none of this is apparent, and Joyce’s guard fields ensure that 
it remains hidden from the enactor for quite some time. 
 “I want to say” provides the enactor with an enormous hint about the central conflict in 
the narrative, as well as its (hoped-for) resolution.  The reader who encounters it early in her 
enactment of the work knows, at that moment, what it is she wants to know from the work – she 
wants to know what, if anything, happened to Lisa and Andrew, Peter’s ex-wife and son.  When 
she attempts to learn what happened, by navigating through the lexias of the work, she quickly 
learns that Peter does not know, and is incapable of learning what happened.  Thus, the enactor 
discovers a second question to answer: why is Peter so passive in the face of the possible death 
of his ex-wife and son.  The hypertext reading response assignment discussed earlier in this 
chapter asks students to record their navigation through a hyperfiction work.  The table they must 
complete for the assignment requires them to ask themselves four questions every time they 
encounter a lexia: “what do I know”; “what do I want to know”; “how will I find what I want to 
know”; and “did I learn what I wanted to know.”  Salvatori’s difficulty pedagogy, and much 
contemporary hermeneutical theory, is predicated upon the belief that interpretation is an 
ongoing process, not something that occurs only when we finish reading a story.  The hypertext 
reading response asks students to make that ongoing process of interpretation visible, explicit, 
and conscious.  The enactors engaged in my reading response are required to develop and 
practice a hyper-rational and hyper-aware reading and enacting style.  As Salvatori and Donahue 
argue, writing helps the student to retain more of the details reached in each of the interpretive 
processes, and at every step of her enactment of the work (Elements 5).  In the labyrinth of lexias 
that comprise Afternoon, it is easy to become overwhelmed by the volume of data presented 
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 seemingly without thought to structure or organization.  Just as in a physical maze, the welter of 
options for making sense out of the entire edifice can easily become unmanageable.  The reading 
response allows students to take their time and reflect on each lexia and their own reactions and 
interpretations to it.  By being hyper-rational and hyper-aware, however, the enactor is faced 
with the obvious conclusion that Peter is not as driven as she is to find the answer.  As the 
enactor works her way through the narrative, Peter’s constant digression into reminiscences, 
daydreams, and philosophical reflections, among the few attempts he makes to ascertain the 
truth, indicate an individual who either is not aware of his own actions and thoughts, or is not 
fully in control of them. 
 As the student enacts the work, trying to discover the truth about Lisa and Andrew, she 
finds that her way to the truth is blocked at every turn.  We expect mazes to block our way to the 
center and to make our journey difficult.  We do not, however, expect narrative to do the same.  
This expectation of intelligibility is especially poignant for students, who are asked to engage 
with these works, and who know that their ability to make sense of the work is being evaluated.  
In this situation, it would be easy for a student to conclude that her enactment was a complete 
failure, as she could not discover the center of Joyce’s maze.  The hypertext reading response is 
an attempt to forestall that surrender to “impossibility” and instead to treat that challenge as a 
challenge that may be overcome.  By retaining a heightened awareness and sense of purpose, the 
enactor may become aware that Peter’s evasion of the truth about the accident, his inability to 
control his impulses and fears, becomes increasingly bizarre and hard to accept as the enactor 
continues to experience the work.  The enactor, in other words, is behaving correctly; it is Peter 
who is not, and his odd reactions and thoughts eventually become a source of anxiety and 
antagonism for the enactor.  Peter reveals himself to be, long before the “white afternoon” lexia, 
190 
 an unreliable narrator.  His unreliability also helps to explain the antipathy engendered in the 
enactor by Peter’s narration and digressions. 
 But none of these conclusions is foregone, especially not to a student enactor coming to 
Afternoon for the first time.  The multicursal maze is a structure that is designed to seem 
impossible to interpret, especially to someone within the maze’s passages.  The multicursal maze 
is an architectural taunt: “I dare you to try to understand me.”  It is only from the godlike 
perspective of a great height, or by studying the maze’s plan before entering it, that a visitor can 
readily make sense of the maze’s complexity.  In other words, only those who are shown the 
maze in its entirety, or those who have already experienced its amazement, can efficiently 
interpret the multicursal maze.  In his own hermeneutical practice, Hans-Georg Gadamer 
presupposes that interpretation takes place retrospectively.  In his essay, “Who Am I and Who 
Are You?”, about Paul Celan’s book of poetry Breath-Turn, Gadamer asserts that “each of the 
poems has its place in a sequence, and read within this context, each poem achieves a certain 
measure of precision – but the entire sequence of these poems is hermeneutically encoded” (67).  
The poems are not numbered and, though we may assume some organization in Celan’s ordering 
of them, Gadamer’s labeling of them as a “sequence” is itself an interpretation, and one that 
could be made only after reading all of the poems. 
All of which is to say that a macro-analytic pronouncement, such as Peter’s unreliability 
as a narrator, is easier to make after having spent a great deal of time with the work rather than 
while enmeshed in the links and guard fields of Afternoon’s lexias.  However, if we agree with 
Douglas that “white afternoon” holds the crux of the story, then we may also agree with her that 
the lexia “I call” holds the key to narrative closure.  In that lexia, Peter attempts to contact his 
lover, Nausicaa, and his ex-wife Lisa both at work and at her home, and failing all three times to 
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 reach either woman, Peter announces, “I do not call the hospital.  I take a pill and call Lolly” (“I 
call”).  In this lexia, we see that Peter takes a sedative to regain control of his panic and anxiety, 
and calls Werther’s wife, the psychotherapist.  The entire work, then, can be interpreted as either 
the prologue and necessary preparation for Peter’s therapy, or as the therapy session itself, 
narrated by Peter to Lolly.  In either case, the story – Peter’s profound ambivalence, torn 
between the terror of knowing and the terror of wondering – becomes secondary to its affective 
power for the enactor.  If the enactor believes Peter wants to know what happened, the 
digressions and evasions preventing this knowledge must be as frustrating and infuriating for 
Peter as they are for the enactor.  And so, as in Calvino’s If on a winter’s night a traveler, the 
enactor’s frustration is doubled in the narration, suggesting that the work’s true artistry might lie 
not in what is told, but in what is done to the enactor in an attempt to replicate Peter’s moods and 
states, and thus to provide a fully affective experience for the enactor. 
 
3.4. FINDING THE SWEET SPOT: ANALYSIS AND IMMERSION AT THE MAZE’S 
CENTER 
 
All reading is enactment.  It is easier to see this in digital environments – as with hypermedia 
narratives that require the reader to do certain things to be granted access to the rest of the story – 
but even in the most traditional works, the process of (re)constructing the world of the work, of 
comforming it according to the structures and material of the work, is always an enactment.  In 
the next chapter, I will discuss at length the ways in which writing is inseparable from and 
involves multiple processes of reading.  By the same token, and as may have become clear, 
reading requires “writing.”  Enactment, and the entire enterprise of conformation, is, 
fundamentally, a framework for mentally composing a narrative totality from that which has 
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 been recorded by another person.  In the first chapter, I cited Richard Palmer’s definition of 
hermeneutics as the process by which “something foreign, strange, separated in time, space, or 
experience is made familiar, present, comprehensible” (Hermeneutics 14).  The “making” of 
familiarity is itself a process of composition, of multimodal composition, for it usually includes 
far more than merely words.  Recalling a favorite novel, for instance, rarely brings to mind 
merely words, but rather the sights and sounds, the emotions of the characters and the reader, 
which arose from the enactment of that work.  These experiences – in part subjective because 
they come from the enactor’s personal world-view and experiences, and in part objective because 
they are evoked by, and grounded in, the material of the work – resonate with the enactor and 
provide an emotional impetus to incorporate the world of the work into the enactor’s own world-
view.  The affective power of narrative is so strong and so central to the experience of 
interpreting literature that it provoked Louise Rosenblatt’s famous dictum, “Someone else can 
read the newspaper or a scientific work for us and summarize it acceptably.  No one, however, 
can read a poem for us” (Exploration 33).  To fully engage with the resonant affective dimension 
of narrative, however, the reader must experience narrative immersion – a state usually 
considered antithetical to critical inquiry.  In her seminal book, Hamlet on the Holodeck, Janet 
Murray offers the following description of textual immersion: 
Immersion is a metaphorical term derived from the physical 
experience of being submerged in water.  We seek the same feeling 
from a psychologically immersive experience that we do from a 
plunge in the ocean or swimming pool: the sensation of being 
surrounded by a completely other reality, as different as water is 
from air, that takes over all our attention, our whole perceptual 
apparatus.  (98) 
 
This sensation should be familiar to all readers – the auto-hypnotic state in which the events in 
the story occupy all of our senses, in which we hear, see, smell, taste, and feel whatever the 
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 characters are experiencing.  As Calvino puts it, “Relax.  Concentrate.  Let the world around you 
fade” (Traveler 3).  When the outside world “fades” to insignificance and the reader becomes 
wholly enrapt by the narration, the distance and reflection necessary for critical engagement 
seems impossible.  And yet, as Murray points out, one of the important and often-overlooked 
aspects of immersion in distributed narratives is that, in this kind of structure, “immersion 
implies learning to swim, to do the things that the new environment makes possible” (99).  Both 
Traveler and Afternoon work very hard to prevent the reader’s immersion in the narrative: 
Calvino’s taunting incipits and Joyce’s recalcitrant protagonist/narrator and obstructing guard 
fields disrupt the seamless world of the narration as it is being, however painfully, conformed by 
the enactor.  What the reader learns from these works is a different form or level of immersion, 
as the enactor is submerged in her own enactment of the world of the work, sometimes in 
addition to, and sometimes rather than, the work’s world directly. 
 
3.4.1. Double Plays: Reading Writings/Writing Readings 
 
Marie-Laure Ryan pegs the disruption of narrative immersion on Calvino’s multiple writing 
styles in the named chapters of If on a winter’s night a traveler.  In the first named chapter, “If 
on a winter’s night a traveler,” for instance, Calvino begins: “The novel begins in a railway 
station, a locomotive huffs, steam from a piston covers the opening of the chapter, a cloud of 
smoke hides part of the first paragraph” (10).  Ryan argues that “by tracing step by step the 
emergence of the fictional world in the mind of the reader, the text prevents this emergence.  The 
fictional world remains partially hidden behind the activity that constructs it” (Narrative 169).  
In other words, because it is Calvino effecting the immersive effect, rather than the reader 
herself, distance is created between the sensory world of the work and the enactor conforming 
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 that world.  I agree with Ryan that the named chapters in Calvino’s book are deliberate attempts 
to disrupt immersion, but Ryan’s conclusion overlooks the far more disruptive effect of 
Calvino’s termination of each of his named chapters just as they become most interesting.  That 
Calvino is choosing to take the old creative writing commandment, “show, don’t tell,” to 
ridiculous, and possibly contradictory lengths does not automatically prevent the reader from 
becoming immersed in the incipits, even at their most bizarre.47  The critical reaction to Traveler 
seems curiously unanimous: as James Seitz writes, “Calvino creates a narrative structure that 
places the act of reading at the center of attention” (Motives for Metaphor 129).48  Many also 
situate Calvino’s interest in reading as a Barthesian exploration of the battle for supremacy 
between reading and writing.  As Melissa Watts notes, however, “according to Barthes, all this 
power invested in the reader must be at the cost of the author” (“Reinscribing a Dead Author” 
710).  Watts is here referring to Barthes’ essay, “The Death of the Author,” in which he 
announces that “The reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are 
inscribed without any of them being lost; a text’s unity lies not in its origin but in its 
destination,” and “the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the author” (148).  I read Barthes’ 
pronouncement of the death of the author as a call for serious investigation into the reader’s 
activities, and though Barthes is being characteristically hyperbolic, Traveler offers an 
alternative to the battle between what Salvatori calls the “writer’s authority” and the “reader’s 
autonomy.” 
                                                 
47   Calvino is, of course, showing the effects of the prose in each incipit rather than telling the prose and letting it produce 
its own effects in the reader.  Which, of course, means that he is also telling the effects, rather than showing them and 
allowing them to arise in the mind of the reader. 
48   See, for instance, Geoffrey Green’s “Ghosts and Shadows” 101; Carl D. Malmgren’s “Romancing the Reader” 
108; Ian Rankin’s “The Role of the Reader” 129; Mariolina Salvatori’s “Italo Calvino’s If on a winter’s night” 185; 
Madeleine Sorapure’s “Being in the Midst” 705; Jerry A. Varsava’s “Calvino’s Combinative Aesthetics” 16; and 
Melissa Watts’ “Reinscribing a Dead Author” 711. 
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  As I mentioned previously, each of the named chapters in Traveler is presented in a 
different style.  That style is determined by an announcement in the previous numbered chapter 
concerning the preferred reading style of the Other Reader, Ludmilla.49  Three examples of this 
dynamic will provide ample material to analyze Traveler’s stance on the supposed battle 
between reader and author.  In Chapter Two, Ludmilla announces: “I prefer novels, [. . .] that 
bring me immediately into a world where everything is precise, concrete, specific.  I feel a 
special satisfaction in knowing that things are made in that certain fashion and not otherwise, 
even the most commonplace things that in real life seem indifferent to me” (29).  The next 
named chapter, “Outside the town of Malbork,” begins: 
An odor of frying wafts at the opening of the page, of onion in fact, 
onion being fried, a bit scorched, because in the onion there are 
veins that turn violet and then brown, and especially the edge, the 
margin of each little sliver of onion becomes black before golden, 
it is the juice of the onion that is carbonized, passing through a 
series of olfactory and chromatic nuances, all enveloped in the 
smell of simmering oil.  Rape oil, the text specifies; everything 
here is very precise, things with their nomenclature and the 
sensations that things transmit [. . . .]  (33) 
 
In Chapter Four, Ludmilla changes her mind and tells the Reader that “The book I would like to 
read now is a novel in which you sense the story arriving like still-vague thunder, the historical 
story along with the individual’s story, a novel that gives the sense of living through an upheaval 
that still has no name, has not yet taken shape” (70).  The following chapter, “Without fear of 
wind or vertigo,” begins: “At five in the morning, military vehicles crossed the city; outside the 
food stores lines began to form, housewives with tallow lanterns; on the walls the propaganda 
slogans, painted during the night by the teams of the various factions of the Provisional Council, 
                                                 
49   There are two exceptions to this pattern: in Chapter 3, Ludmilla’s sister, the Other Other Reader, explains what it is 
that she likes best to read; in Chapter 6, Silas Flannery, the bestselling author and participant in a massive scheme of 
literary forgery, admits that he is obsessed with Ludmilla, and so writes each of his books in a manner calculated to 
satisfy whatever it is Ludmilla wants most to read at that moment.  Even Chapter 1, in which we do not know of 
Ludmilla’s existence, is styled after Ludmilla’s preferences, which she describes to the Reader in Chapter 2 (28-29). 
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 were not yet dry” (75).  The chapter continues in a highly traditional realist narrative style, until 
it breaks, several pages later, into Calvino’s usual metanarrative style: 
Several paragraphs ensue, bristling with names of generals and 
deputies, concerned with the shelling and retreats from the front, 
about schisms and unifications in the parties represented in the 
Council, punctuated by climatic annotations: downpours, frosts, 
racing clouds, windstorms.  All this, in any case, solely as a frame 
for my moods: a festive abandonment to the wave of events, or of 
withdrawal into myself as if concentrating myself into an obsessive 
pattern, as if everything around me served only to disguise me, to 
hide me, like the sandbag defenses that are being raised more or 
less on all sides [. . . .] (82) 
 
And in Chapter Seven, Ludmilla decides that “I like books [. . .] where all the mysteries and the 
anguish pass through a precise and cold mind, without shadows, like the mind of a chessplayer” 
(153).  The next incipit, “In a network of lines that intersect,” begins: 
Speculate, reflect: every thinking activity implies mirrors for me.  
According to Plotinus, the soul is a mirror that creates material 
things reflecting the ideas of the higher reason.  Maybe this is why 
I need mirrors to think: I cannot concentrate except in the presence 
of reflected images, as if my soul needed a model to imitate every 
time it wanted to employ its speculative capacity.  (The adjective 
here assumes all its meanings: I am at once a man who thinks and a 
businessman, and a collector of optical instruments as well.)  (157) 
 
The collector of optical instruments notes that: 
These pages I am writing should also transmit a cold luminosity, as 
if in a mirrored tube, where a finite number of figures are broken 
up and turned upside down and multiplied.  If my figure sets out in 
all directions and is doubled at every corner, it is to discourage 
those who want to pursue me.  I am a man with many enemies, 
whom I must constantly elude.  (158-159) 
 
The pattern is consistent across the ten named chapters and their origins in the ten numbered 
chapters preceding them. 
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 What Calvino provides in these incipits is a phenomenology of reading and of writing.  In 
the brief passage from “If on a winter’s night a traveler” quoted above, for instance, the fog and 
steam which “hides part of the first paragraph” is a recording of the subjective immersive 
experience of reading the “real” (meaning here, fully written-out in the traditional mode of 
realist narrative) prose.  The “reader’s” sensory engagement with the work becomes more 
important to the reader (the actual reader in the real world, not any of Calvino’s constructed 
readers or Readers) than the words themselves.  However, the same passage also records the 
experience and intention of the composer of the work.  As the first reader of the work is its 
composer (a truism that will be explored in the next chapter), the first person to experience the 
sensation of enshrouding fog and smoke is the work’s composer.  It also must be the case, 
though, that a composer bent on capturing, as Ludmilla prefers, “that sense of bewilderment a 
novel gives you when you start reading it,” and who uses swirling mist to concretize and convey 
that sensation to his readers, surely must intend for the effect to be as described (Traveler 28).50  
Thus, what we have in this passage is the recording of the motivation of the writing itself, a trace 
of the ideal text (which concept I shall discuss in the next chapter) envisioned by Calvino. 
In the examples above, Calvino provides exactly what it is Ludmilla professes to like in 
novels.  He also includes glosses on the narrative which summarize and condense narrative 
material to its most relevant aspects.  In this, Calvino provides his actual readers with what 
novelist and screenplay writer William Goldman calls a “good parts version,” an abridgement in 
which all of the tedious parts have been excised, leaving only the most exciting and important 
bits for the reader (Princess Bride 25).  In Traveler, this abridgement accomplishes two 
                                                 
50   Of course, this analysis is only possible because of Ludmilla’s helpful announcements in the numbered chapters.  
Absent such unambiguous indicators – which are here useful only because they and the named chapters are, together, 
part of the totality of Calvino’s novel – authorial intention remains unknowable and unreliable when suggested.  An 
alternative, less generous interpretation of Calvino’s intention is that he fears he will never achieve the effect and affect 
of his ideal text, and thus removes the possibility that his prose might fall flat.  Personally, I prefer the former. 
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 purposes: it represents either the narrative intent or the reader’s composition of the world of the 
work.  Calvino uses words like “should,” and states definitively what effect the effaced narration 
is having on the Reader/reader, showing the ideal state of writing he “hopes” is being 
accomplished.  That hope is rather fatuous, as Calvino does not allow his prose to fail to reach its 
highest potential, replacing the “working” bits of prose with their “successes.”  The summary 
and abridgement passages reflect the dilation and contraction performed by the reader as she 
enacts the work, reductively classifying lengthy – and putatively unnecessary – passages rather 
than attempting to remember them in their entirety.  The extensive genealogies in the Hebrew 
Testament of the Bible are often handled in the same way by readers more interested in other 
aspects of the text.51
The phenomenological descriptions of the immersed reading experience and the narrative 
glossing in Traveler are explorations and recordings of the cognitive processes of the reader, as 
well as of the author.  A similar dynamic is at work in Joyce’s Afternoon.  As Joyce’s enactors 
navigate the work, they are faced with the need to make interpretive decisions based partly on 
the narrative material Joyce presents, and partly on their own experiences enacting the work.  As 
I mentioned previously, Joyce considers the hypertextually linked structure of works like 
Afternoon to be organized according to “connections that I had for some time naturally 
discovered in the process of writing and that I wanted my readers to share” (Of Two Minds 31).  
The linked structure and guard fields in place in Afternoon, according to Joyce, represent Joyce’s 
own connections about the work.  Though, as I noted previously, authorial intention is, indeed, 
                                                 
51   The story of Jacob is an example of this.  Chapters 25-35 tell of the deeds of Jacob and 37-50 tell “the history of the 
family of Jacob,” focusing on the adventures of Joseph, he of the coat of many colors (Gen. 37:2).  In between is chapter 
36, a listing of “the descendents of Esau,” Jacob’s brother.  For 43 verses, we are told of the “descendent of Esau,” the 
descendents in “the hill country of Seir,” “the chiefs of the sons of Esau,” and so on.  Though the genealogies are 
important to many theological and historical aspects of the Testament and the relationships between Jehova and the 
Isrealites, from a narrative standpoint they are easily replaced with a mere mental notation of their presence.  The names 
and places involved in such extensive lists are, perhaps blasphemously, easily forgotten. 
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 suspect, it seems a safe assumption that the links do – at least in some instances – represent 
meaningful ideational connections on the part of the work’s composer.  This is not to say that all 
of the links are thus meaningful, or that the meaning behind even the most “meaningful” links 
can be definitively known or accurately attributed to Joyce.  However, the link structure does 
represent a patent cognitive process of composition and world-creation. 
 
3.4.2. Immersion and/as Critical Perspective 
 
The purpose of a maze is to induce amazement in those who enter it, to produce an affective state 
of awe and confusion.  Walking through a multicursal maze with a map of the passages reveals 
the truth of this – the experience is simply not a-mazing.  Even unicursal mazes can create this 
feeling of awe and confusion through their economy of space – practically every bit of space 
within the maze’s boundary is used and traversed in a unicursal maze, producing a marvelous 
pilgrimage within a relatively small area.  Godgames often use mazes (both real and 
metaphorical) to induce a sufficiently powerful affective state to motivate the subject to come to 
a new realization about the world and about herself, and most likely to adopt a new course of 
action or way of being as a result.  Perhaps most importantly, though, the affective states induced 
by reading are also crucial to the enterprise of English Studies. 
 As teachers of English, we are expected to love reading.  If we do, it is hardly believable 
that this is solely because we enjoy acquiring new information.  People who love to read do so 
for the mixture of information and affect, of data and immersion that comes from reading.  And 
yet, our students frequently report not loving reading.  Many struggle with the texts we assign, 
attempting to glean as much information as they can from the text so that they can complete the 
next essay or exam, and then forget the work completely.  For these students, reading is not an 
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 affective experience of wonder and engagement, and their interpretations often suffer because of 
it. 
 Salvatori’s difficulty pedagogy and my own hypertext reading response assignment 
attempt to grapple with this problem, “to make manifest the rules and practices of interpretation 
we have acquired from institutional training,” as Salvatori writes (“Toward” 81).  Difficult texts 
elicit a doubled immersion from experienced readers – immersion in the narrative itself and 
immersion in the interpreter’s efforts to enact and interpret the work.  When she reads Afternoon 
or Traveler, the experienced reader does not merely sink gracefully into the world of these 
works.  Instead, the interpreter moves between these two immersive states, enacting and 
conforming the world of the work, and reflecting and analyzing her own efforts to do just that.  
Calvino, for instance, keeps our critical attention on the godgame by refusing to allow us to 
remain narratively immersed.  As we become comfortable with and engrossed in the scenes in 
the named chapters, Calvino ends the chapters and yanks us back out into the parallel narrative 
of the Reader and Other Reader, making us face, once again, the effort being expended by us, the 
readers, the Reader, and the Other Reader, to assemble a completed narrative.  In this way, he 
toys with Brechtian “Verfremdungseffekt” – allowing us narrative immersion only to take it 
away, and thus to heighten both the affect of narrative immersion and the affect of its absence.  
In a sense, it is a chastening of the reader, a punishment for “forgetting” herself and her place in 
the world/work.  Joyce does much the same thing in Afternoon, providing enough narrative 
material in many of the lexias, and linking them together to produce strings of related narrative, 
only to end the sequence and disappoint the enactor with lexias on unrelated topics, thus forcibly 
postponing the enactor’s search for the answers to her existing questions about the work and its 
scenario. 
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  Even in works that would not be considered especially difficult, the experienced reader 
bounces between levels of immersion, pausing the enactment of the work to reflect on a 
particularly exciting or troubling development in the text.  The codex format makes it easy to do 
this; pages can be turned forward or back or skipped in large numbers as the reader wishes.  If 
the reader puts the book down, the action pauses, indefinitely, until the reader chooses to return 
to the work and its world.  In his essay, “Aesthetic Subjectivity and the Teaching of Literature,” 
Gary Farber notes: 
Many literature teachers, when they’re preparing a text, and some 
literature teachers, when they’re teaching it in class, become 
accustomed to moving back and forth easily from one mode [of 
immersion] to another.  Many of us, I think, know what it’s like to 
be continually bouncing in and out of the illusion as we read and 
make our notes in preparation for teaching.  (19) 
 
For Louise Rosenblatt, one of the earliest and most forceful advocates for encouraging 
immersive reading practices in students, being able to control the cognitive transition from 
narrative immersion to critical (or metacognitive) immersion can result in “the fusion of thought 
and feeling, of cognitive and affective, that constitutes the integrated sensibility” (Reader 46).  
We want our students to be able to develop complex interpretations of the works we assign in 
our classes, and to be able to do the same with the complex works they encounter elsewhere.  
Interpreting a work like Afternoon requires the enactor to feel “Oh my goodness, that’s horrible!” 
while thinking “Given what I’ve seen so far, how will I find out how this happened?”  This is, to 
use Rosenblatt’s term, an “integrated sensibility” to the work of interpretation and to the 
pleasures of reading, as well, of course, to the work of reading and the pleasures of 
interpretation.  It is a challenging skill to develop.  The integrated sensibility requires the reader 
to maintain the state of narrative immersion even while suspending that state to engage in critical 
connection-making and analysis.  By foregrounding the centrality of immersion, and the different 
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 types of immersion possible during reading, we can begin to teach our students the strategies and 
skills we ourselves practice when we read. 
Too often I have had students in my classes who are unprepared to approach a difficult 
work like Traveler or Afternoon.  Many of these students have been taught a mechanical 
approach to literature – something along the lines of looking for the “symbolism” contained in 
the story – that is not useful when enacting a work that demands its readers engage with it on 
cognitive, affective, and metacritical levels.  For these students, making sense of the multiple 
personalities of Calvino’s Traveler or the willful obfuscation and obstructions of Joyce’s 
Afternoon is a challenge akin to bending spoons with psychic power.  It is not that these students 
fail to try – they do try, and often quite admirably.  For them the task is simply impossible.  We 
must introduce new approaches to literary interpretation and engagement in our classes, and 
these approaches need to be adopted at every level of literary instruction.  Pedagogies like 
Salvatori’s and my own are attempts to provide students not with a set of templates, but with a 
guiding philosophy to help them find their own way into and through difficult works.  Once they 
become comfortable treating works like these as challenging climbs rather than impassable cliffs, 
they will begin to see that it is not the spoon that bends, but rather themselves and their own 
interpretive acts.  At that moment, they will gain a new awareness of literature and of their own 
power to make it productive and pleasurable, at which point we all – students and teachers alike 
– win. 
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4. DIGITAL DISCOURSE: COMPOSING IN AND WITH TECHNOLOGY 
 
 
 
Technologies become significant when social and cultural 
conditions allow them to become significant.                       
(Gunther Kress, Literacy in the New Media Age 18) 
 
 
Think of the computer, not as a tool, but as a medium. 
(Brenda Laurel, Computers as Theater 126) 
 
 
 
4.1. SELF-REFLEXXIVE PEDAGOGIES: A DIFFERENT KIND OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL APPROACH 
 
Environmentalism, when applied to literary criticism or composition, usually entails the 
exploration of literary representations of the natural world.  Writers such as Henry Thoreau, 
Ernest Hemingway, Rachel Carson, Wendell Berry, John Muir, and Leslie Marmon Silko figure 
prominently, their arguments and descriptions of the complex – and frequently disastrous – 
relationships between humans and the earth’s ecosystem forming a critical and poetical 
framework for examining human civilization.  Throughout this work, I have used the metaphor 
of environment in different settings, but rarely with the meaning it assumes in literarily 
ecological discourse.  It is in the realm of composition, and specifically the composition 
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 classroom, however, that my environmental approach to literacy pedagogy and practice becomes 
most explicit. 
 In the first chapter of the present work, my exploration of the specific qualities and 
features of the distributed mode foregrounds a notion of narrative as being spatialized; narrative 
content and ways of conveying meaning are distributed across numerous lexias and modes of 
representation, which establishes a narrative environment through which the enactor is called 
upon to navigate.  The second chapter introduces the concept of the world of the work, the 
cognitive construction of the imaginative totality of the narrative work, and the concept of 
approaching rhetoric as world construction.  The third chapter continues these discussions, 
focusing on the enactor’s processes of constructing the world of the work as a guide for the 
development of pedagogies of literary interpretation designed to enable enactors to become more 
explicitly and effectively self-aware readers and interpreters. 
 In this chapter I turn from the consumption and interpretation of works to their 
production, focusing on the composition classroom.  In so doing, I engage with the notion of 
environmentalism in a doubled sense: the composer constructs, piece by piece, the world of her 
work; and, while doing so, the composer operates within the environment of her technologies of 
composition.  Whether she practices her rhetorical skills with paper and pencil or with cutting-
edge computers and software packages, the composer is constrained and enhanced by the 
technologies she uses.  In this chapter, I will examine the ways computers and computer software 
affect and are affected by their composing users, focusing on ways to demystify the 
“transparency” that so often is assumed about computers.  By making the familiar and 
comfortable technologies of the Internet, the word processor, and other so-called “productivity” 
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 programs strange, I propose a composition pedagogy that sees the computer as both a tool and a 
topic for writing. 
 The National Council of Teachers of English (NCTE) has issued guidelines explicitly 
calling for the integration of technology and, specifically, multimodal discourse into composition 
curricula.  The NCTE Executive Committee writes: 
As basic tools for communicating expand to include modes beyond 
print alone, “writing” comes to mean more than scratching words 
with pen and paper.  Writers need to be able to think about the 
physical design of text, about the appropriateness and thematic 
content of visual images, about the integration of sound with a 
reading experience, and about the medium that is most appropriate 
for a particular message, purpose, and audience.  (n.p.) 
 
That is, the old understandings of “literacy” are no longer as useful as we may wish, because the 
activities we call “writing” and “reading” as they are most commonly practiced today diverge in 
important ways from those traditional understandings.  The Conference on College Composition 
and Communication (CCCC) has gone so far as to recognize that the impact of this shift in 
literate practices will materially affect the writing produced by researchers.  In a position 
statement on “Scholarship in Composition Guidelines for Faculty, Deans, and Department 
Chairs,” the CCCC proclaims that textbooks, computer software and programs, and curricular 
development are all “ways of presenting important new work in composition,” and “When they 
meet appropriate standards of scholarship, therefore, they should carry appropriate credit in 
tenure and promotion” (n.p.).  Which is to say that when we ask our students to engage seriously 
with multimodal composition, we should do so from a theoretically sound and well-researched 
basis (thus necessitating the creation of new textbooks and curriculum), such pedagogies may 
well need new software tools to maximize their effectiveness (as was the case when Michael 
Joyce collaborated with Jay David Bolter to create the hypertext authoring system Storyspace), 
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 and the research produced from such serious engagement with multimodal composition and 
pedagogies may well result in scholarship that bears little or no resemblance to the standard 
academic essay format (thus requiring the academy to adopt new strategies for evaluating 
scholarly digital works). 
 That NCTE and CCCC feel the need to call for such changes, of course, indicates that 
conditions throughout education are not yet fully conducive to such practices.  NCTE, for 
instance, notes that “Many teachers and students do not, however, have adequate access to 
computing, recording, and video equipment to take advantage of the most up-to-date 
technologies” (n.p.).  But even in classrooms with state of the art technologies and faculty 
proficient in their use, serious questions and issues about the use of multimodality in the 
composition curriculum remain.  In this section, I will look at some of the most pressing 
theoretical concerns about multimodality – the relationship between visual and linguistic rhetoric 
and design, the role of aesthetics in multimodal composition, the need to balance the desire for 
invention with attention to analysis, and the desperate lack of instruction in the pragmatics and 
artistry of code-switching among the various composed discourses.  As our technology evolves 
and makes more radical multimodality available and accessible to students and teachers alike, 
these issues move more and more forcefully to the forefront of digital composition theory.  The 
solutions we devise for them will chart the course for composition in the digital age. 
In this chapter, I discuss a series of assignments I have used in my composition classes.  
Appendix B reproduces my course syllabus for the first-year writing seminar in which I taught 
these assignments.  They are designed to require students to engage in traditional words-on-the-
page composition and in non-traditional multimodal composition.  By combining verbal and 
visual rhetorics in assignments, my students, hopefully, gain a deeper understanding of the ways 
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 in which modes affect and are affected by each other, of the ways in which our interpretation of 
works is affected by the modal choices (which are always, of course, rhetorical choices) of the 
composer, and of the ways in which the environment of the computer affects and is affected by 
the composer’s decisions.  A commitment to teaching multimodal, digital forms of discourse 
brings with it, however, a host of challenges and theoretical issues to consider.  I will first 
explore the broad, theoretical issues at play in digital discourse, and then turn my attention to the 
institutional implications for enacting a pedagogy of technological use and awareness, such as I 
propose here.  Pedagogical decisions are always complex – or, at least, they should be.  The 
complexity of the issues surrounding, and arising from, digital media and composition, as well as 
the benefits to be gained from incorporating digitality into the writing classroom are, I firmly 
believe, sure indicators that the enterprise is worth undertaking.  
 
4.1.1. Writing Requires Reading Times Three 
 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated the ways in which conformation requires readers to 
simultaneously “write” the world of the work as they “read” the work itself.  In this chapter, my 
focus is on writing, but the connection between reading and writing still obtains.  If anything, 
reading and writing are even less divisible during the many acts that make up writing, and are 
more visible, than they are during reading.  As I defined it earlier, conformation is the complex 
of activities and strategies employed by an interpreter as she engages with a composed work to 
(re)construct the world of that work.  It would be pointless to argue that reading is not an 
interpretive act, but if we want to extend to writing the same prestige, we are faced with an 
interesting problem.  To claim that writers do not merely put their interpretations down on paper 
or on screen, but that writing itself is inherently interpretive, suggests that the conformation 
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 model should also apply to composition.  Teleologically, composition, too, is concerned with the 
crafting of a world, and that world must be (re)constructed from some form of created concept.  
Certainly, processes of enactment and analyzation are also performed by writers, as they practice 
their craft.  The most noticeable difference between reading and writing as processes of 
conformation lies in the seeming absence of a work to be conformed.  In writing, however, the 
composer engages with an ideal work, a Platonic phantasm embodying the perfect, never-to-be-
achieved final form of the written product.  That is, the composer sits down to write something, 
and that goal takes the place of the work to be interpreted during reading.  Of course, since the 
perfectly ideal work almost certainly has yet to be composed, the process is rather like reading 
while wearing sunglasses in a dark room – the best the average composer can do is try to feel her 
way along without getting a nasty paper cut from the deceptively sharp edges of the pages. 
 Because the ideal work cannot be read directly, the composer engages in three 
simultaneous and continuous acts of reading while writing: she reads the topic of the 
composition – this is analytical reading; she reads the material that she is generating as she 
writes – this is writerly reading; and she reads the material she is writing as if she were a 
stranger – this is imaginative reading.  These three readings comprise the ideal constellation of 
reading strategies – a feedback loop – for the writer, but it is possible, I suppose, to write without 
engaging in any of them.  Such an endeavor would require one to write without a shred of 
analysis or even of narrative organization (for this requires a great deal of analytical thought and 
insight), without the slightest awareness of correctness, revision, or the practice of craft, and 
without a bit of concern for whether one’s readers will understand what has been written.  Such a 
composition might be interesting from an academic perspective, but as a piece of writing it 
would be almost certainly unintelligible. 
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  Setting aside the thought-experiment of reading-less writing, the first mode of reading, 
analytical reading, is the necessary precondition for writing.  Whether the composer is writing 
about a work of literature, a work of art, a current event, a memory, or what-have-you, that 
subject must be interpreted.  As I have mentioned previously, this act of interpretation is only 
truly “reading” when the subject is itself a text, by which I mean a composition in prose words.  
And yet, the ubiquity of the metaphor of reading for all other acts of interpretation is powerful.  
My use of it here is purely in the interest of intelligibility – this project advances enough 
neologisms and convoluted turns of phrase to achieve clarity that perhaps this misuse of reading 
may be excused. 
 Analytical reading is deceptively uncontroversial, even though its basis has been a 
serious bone of contention for compositionists and literary theorists for decades.  In 1978 
William Coles presented the idea of the “nominal subject” for the composition course in his 
seminal book, The Plural I: The Teaching of Writing, arguing that the subject of composition 
courses should be the compositions of the students, not “everything from The Reader’s Digest to 
Paradise Lost to William Golding” (11).  In 1993, College English published Gary Tate’s article, 
“A Place for Literature in Freshman Composition,” immediately following and rebutting Erika 
Lindemann’s article “Freshman Composition: No Place for Literature.”  This point/counterpoint 
in print generated such heat that two years later College English published a “Symposium” on 
“Literature in the Composition Classroom,” including follow-up essays by Tate (“Notes on the 
Dying of a Conversation”) and Lindemann (“Three Views of English 101”), accompanied by 
pieces by Michael Gamer (“Fictionalizing the Disciplines: Literature and the Boundaries of 
Knowledge”) and Erwin Steinberg (“Imaginative Literature in the Composition Classrooms?”), 
and a response by Jane Peterson (“Through the Looking-Glass: A Response”).  In my own 
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 composition courses, I teach literature.  I also teach essays, poetry, images, film, and sometimes 
music.  This presents certain advantages, as I will discuss later in this chapter, and it highlights 
certain disadvantages.  As I explored at length previously, our students need targeted instruction 
in reading and in literary interpretation.  Teaching literature in the composition classroom means 
that students will have a range of complex material in common (the course texts) about which to 
write.  It also means, however, that valuable class time will have to be spent teaching and 
discussing with students how to read instead of write. 
 Removing literature and narrative works from the composition curriculum, however, does 
not solve the problem of needing to teach reading skills in addition to writing skills.  Rather, all 
good writers spend a great deal of time and energy reading their own work.  Writerly reading, the 
second mode of reading, is a form of reading that is familiar to teachers of composition, and that 
is alien to many of our students.  Writerly reading is the activity that, ideally, allows writers to 
perceive the fine-grain issues of correctness, editing, and tone, and the big-picture issues of 
coherence, transitions, and organization.  Of course, moving between these two registers is an act 
of interpretation, indistinguishable from the interpreter’s movement between micro- and macro-
analyzation.  In my courses, I ask my students to submit their work electronically, using either e-
mail or the Web software package favored by my university.  Because of this, I am able to view 
my students’ work exactly as they see it on their computer monitors, with all of the red-squiggles 
and green-squiggles of an irate spell-checker and grammar-checker in place.  Only the students 
themselves know whether those tell-tale indicators show a lack of writerly reading, or merely a 
lack of time to engage in such reading, or even a grammar-checker designed by a computer 
programmer who may or may not have the desired proficiency with spelling and grammar.  In 
any case, however, these are only the most immediately visible signs of a lack of writerly 
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 reading, and whether this is due to inability, inattention, or shoddy software, we must make 
writerly reading an explicit, taught component of our composition pedagogies. 
 The third mode of reading, imaginative reading, is easily the strangest and the hardest to 
understand or practice.  Imaginative reading is the closest I have been able to come to explaining 
the phenomenon I like to call the “head paper” – that is, the paper whose brilliant gloriousness is 
complete and apparent only in the head of the composer.  On paper, many important details, 
explanations, transitions, and connections have been inadvertently omitted, thus leaving 
something more closely resembling a train wreck on the page.  Imaginative reading should be the 
act of pretending to be someone else, someone without access to the composer’s trove of 
memories, thoughts, and experiences.  The composer’s projection of herself into the imagined 
role of other allows her to determine what might and might not make sense to her readers.  It is 
an odd mode of reading, and difficult to explain, but the instant and distributed structure of 
audience feedback made possible by blogs, as I shall soon describe, provides one way of 
addressing the skills of imaginative reading. 
 
4.1.2. Blogging: Publication, Audience and Dialog 
 
When other teachers look at my composition syllabi, the first question many ask concerns my 
use of student-written blogs.  Web logs, the long-form origin of the unpleasant sounding 
contraction blogs, began as lists posted to personal web pages identifying interesting sites and 
content found online.  Such early blogs were frequently un-annotated, and provided a 
provocatively gnomic record of one’s activities on the Web.52  Today, blogs are used for much 
                                                 
52   Today, though blogs have become quite different, browsing other people’s links of interest remains a popular 
activity.  Del.icio.us, for instance, is an extremely popular site (accessible at http://del.icio.us/) which allows users to add 
their personal bookmarks to interesting Web sites.  These bookmarks are categorized by topic and by the user who 
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 more than merely recording Web “surfing.”  Contemporary blog programs allow their composers 
to post to the blog lengthy prose messages, images, video clips, sound files, and virtually any 
other form of information that can be digitized.  In my composition classes, I require that my 
students create a blog and post (publish their writing) to it at least twice a week. 
 
Figure 5: A student blog. 
 
 Figure 5 shows a student blog created for one of my courses, using the popular and free 
blogging service Blogger.53  Using a simple Web interface, my students select from a number of 
templates to determine the appearance of their blog, and are then free to post their thoughts, 
                                                                                                                                                             
posted them, and are viewable by anyone interested in the topic or user.  From a practical standpoint, del.icio.us offers a 
collection of links whose quality and usefulness is already attested to by their inclusion on the site.  From a personal 
standpoint, viewing the bookmarks of one’s friends can offer a revealing and highly entertaining portrait of the friend. 
53   Blogger can be accessed at http://www.blogger.com. 
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 comments, and reflections to the blog.  The standard blog contains a title (in this case, the 
amusing “Whatever Floats Your Boat”), and then a list of “posts” arranged down the page in 
reverse chronological order.  Along the right side of the page, in the blog sidebar, is a list of the 
contributors to the blog (each of which is a clickable link to the self-generated profile of the 
blogger), the titles of recent posts to the blog (each of which is a clickable link to that post), and 
a clickable listing of all previous posts which have been archived monthly. 
 Blogging allows for instant Internet publishing, and Blogger’s blogs are able to be 
viewed by anyone with a computer and an Internet connection.  Using Blogger, as my students 
have, a blog writer simply navigates to the Blogger home page, enters her login identification 
and password, and can then begin typing whatever she would like to have appear on her blog.  
What the blogger types will appear as a post on her blog.  In Figure 5, for instance, there are 
three posts, “Free Photo Ipod… no… really,” “The End,” and “Thanksgiving Break.”  Each was 
composed and published by one of the blog authors, and each is prominently featured on the 
main page of the blog.  Beneath each post, however, another way to write using blogs is 
indicated – through comments.  Blogger indicates that the post “The End,” for instance, was 
written by “Sarah” at “11:13 PM” and features 4 comments.  Readers visiting a blog may click 
on the “comments” link at the bottom of each post and type their own reactions and thoughts 
about the post, as well as reading comments already offered by others. 
 Pew Internet and American Life Project Director Lee Rainey, in a report entitled “The 
State of Blogging,” estimates that more than 8 million Americans “have created a blog or web-
based diary” (1).  It is much easier to post comments on other people’s blogs than to create and 
update your own blog, however, and the Pew report asserts that 14.4 million U.S. users “have 
posted comments or other material on blogs” (ibid.).  Even easier yet is simply reading blogs 
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 without posting or commenting at all.  “By the end of 2004,” Rainey indicates, “32 million 
Americans were blog readers” (ibid.).  The numbers are impressive and become even more so 
when factoring in blogs composed throughout the world.  Duncan Riley, at the Internet news site 
The Blog Herald, pegs the number of blogs worldwide as “greater than 34.5 million” (n.p.).54  
The number of blogs, bloggers, and blog readers is a persuasive indicator of the growing 
importance of blogs in contemporary literacy practice. 
 Two features of blogs in particular make them especially useful for my composition 
classes – blogs are public and they are dialogic.55  In contrast to traditional journal-writing, blogs 
are a public forum in which the composer presents her thoughts to the world.  As I discuss in the 
previous chapter, I believe it is important to give students safe spaces in which to begin to 
grapple with their interpretations and ideas.  This space usually takes the form of informal 
response papers in my classes.  The disadvantage of the response paper is that the student’s 
writing reiterates the closed – and, importantly, non-circulatory – nature of the writing 
traditionally produced for college courses.  This inaccessibility, however, is usually necessary for 
the response paper to be considered “safe.”  Most student work is generated by the student, seen 
and graded by the professor, and then returned to the student, who may or may not ever look at 
that work again.  Even if the student is a frequent contributor to class discussion, her most 
complex thoughts and their most professional presentation remain a private affair.  Blogs make 
student work public, which, as we shall see, has important implications for composition 
pedagogy.  The possibility of commenting also makes blog-writing a dialogic endeavor.  As I 
mentioned above, the blog post “The End” received four comments – all were from fellow 
                                                 
54   Riley admits that his figures are not scientific, but his investigation represents the best estimate to date of blogging 
numbers including the non-English-speaking world.  As Riley correctly notes, “the United States is not the entirety of 
the Internet” (n.p.). 
55   Of course, the public nature of blogs presents some serious issues to be considered carefully.  I discuss these in detail 
in section 4.5. 
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 classmates of the writer, but many other posts written by my students received comments from 
friends, family, and even complete strangers.  Writing in a public forum highlights the challenges 
of writing for an uncertain audience.  Instead of the traditional assumption that the student writer 
will be producing works for at most her class and at least her professor – all of whom share a 
common set of readings, discussions, and assignments for the course – the blog writer writes for 
an unknown group of readers, who may be intimately familiar with the topic under discussion or 
have no knowledge of it.  The blog writer finds herself frequently confronted with a reading 
public that responds to her writing with affirmation or disapproval, with questions about 
clarification or suggestions for further inquiry.  The model of writing posed by blogs is one in 
which writing is a social act, and in which the writer is able to interact with her readers.  Perhaps 
most importantly, writing in blogs helps my students to see their writing as a constantly evolving 
dialog, rather than as a finite exercise in assembling sets of words for grades. 
 The linking possible in blogs (from one blog post to other posts, other blogs, news 
articles, events, or anything else that may be found online), makes possible a sense of community 
among bloggers.  The blogs that I read most frequently, for instance, are also the ones to which I 
link most frequently in my own blog posts, and I look for those other bloggers to mention my 
blog posts occasionally on their own sites.  Linking may be a way of showing respect for a 
particularly insightful or quirky post, and a healthy exchange of links and cross-blog discussions 
of topics also helps the blogger to see her ideas as being important, and her writerly voice as 
having an audience of other writers.  The comments feature on blogs works in much the same 
way, allowing blog writers and readers alike an opportunity to contribute to the online discourse.  
These dialogic forms of blogging are a provocative answer to the problem of teaching 
imaginative reading.  By providing writers with instant feedback on their writing, blogs can help 
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 writers to develop the awareness of their audience’s cognitive and interpretive needs necessary 
for successful writing. 
4.1.3. The Weekly Blogging Requirement: The Habit of Writing 
 
In a recent course, I required my students to post to their blogs at least twice a week.  Each week 
I would assign a broad topic to address, such as “e-mail ‘novels’ vs. traditional novels,” 
“PowerPoint success or horror stories,” or “First thoughts on Mark Haddon's novel, The Curious 
Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time.”  The students could address these topics in any way they 
saw fit, and we would use their writings in our class discussions.  The second post each week 
could concern anything about which the student wanted to write.  Some posts were about music, 
others about sports, and one blog regularly analyzed and summarized several popular daytime 
television soap operas. 
 Kathleen Blake Yancey, in her Chair’s Address to the Conference on College 
Composition and Communication (CCCC) in 2004, pointed to the fact that our students are 
engaging in a bewildering amount of textual communication every day – from personal Web 
pages, to blog, to text-messaging on cellular phones, to instant messaging (IM) on computers, to 
e-mail – and all of this textual production is done because they want to write these messages, not 
because they are part of a writing assignment.  As she writes: 
Don’t you wish that the energy and motivation that students bring 
to some of these other genres they would bring to our assignments?  
How is it that what we teach and we test can be so different from 
what our students know as writing?  What is writing, really?  
(“Made Not Only in Words” 298) 
 
Over the past several years, I have asked my students if they have a personal web page and/or 
blog.  Not a semester has gone by that I have not had at least one student with each of these in 
each class.  Recently, I have noticed that the number of students who will admit to having a web 
217 
 page or blog is increasing.  Yancey is correct to note that digital technology is allowing a 
multitude of new ways to compose, disseminate, and consume textual, visual, and auditory 
messages, and yet our composition classes, by and large, do not even acknowledge these 
discourses, let alone address them as fertile topics for inquiry and opportunities for skill-
building. 
 I use a two-post-per-week schedule for my student blogs because I want my students to 
gain the benefits of responding to class topics in writing, and I also want them to get in the habit 
of writing.  Writing, in other words, can be something done every day, not merely for 
assignments.  This may seem obvious, yet Yancey’s critique is important – breaking down the 
barriers between writing for personal reasons and writing for course-related reasons is necessary 
if we hope to make our composition classes useful not only in the composition classroom, but in 
other classes as well as in all of the writing activities in which our students participate.  From the 
students’ perspective, this is crucial as well.  Scott DeWitt forcefully limns what is at stake when 
he writes: “To only value written culture (as academics typically do) implies that our students 
have failed themselves and that they come to our classes as empty vessels, lacking the abilities 
and experiences necessary for academic success” (22).  Our students are already proficient in 
many forms of discourse, but perhaps not in the one that is considered necessary to university 
success – standard formal written English.  Finding ways to build bridges between the various 
modes of written discourse our students already practice and those we want them to be able to 
practice will demand close attention to the different types of digital discourse. 
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  One of my students, whom I will call “Beth Roberts,”56 composed a post for her blog 
entitled “Physics Will Make You Tired,” describing her experience at a mandatory lecture given 
by a noted physicist.  Roberts57 writes: 
In the weeks before leaving Campus, I attended the 
Freshman Lecture on “Why the Universe Is Shaped the Way It Is.” 
A friend of mine, Austin, accompanied me. (And I just now 
remembered the ticket sitting in the pocket of my hoodie.) 
Austin’s original hope was to grab the ticket and leave, but 
the presenters had expected this, and told us they wouldn't be 
available until the end, and that we weren't permitted to leave early 
for any reason. I was getting the feeling that we were not in store 
for something at all entertaining. Austin had a mask of terror and 
panic from the moment he stepped inside. 
Our speaker, who’s name I can not find but will surely put 
back in here as soon as I do, was someone our introduction woman 
told us we should be “honored to have,” and began singing his 
praises. Finally, it was our actual speakers turn to impress us. 
He fired up a Power Point Presentation. 
God, no. 
He began to speak, and before he had a chance to impress 
me, I was counting everything he was doing wrong that was going 
to drown us all swiftly in a sea of lethargy, including how many 
times he could end a sentence with “Ok?.” It was like a check list 
right out of the “Cognitive Style of Power Point.” 
I had high hopes coming in, but when only one of his 
(completely recited!) slides had anything to do with how the 
universe is shaped, let alone WHY, I lost all faith in the 
presentation. There was evidence that his speaking style was 
supposed to NOT make us feel like stupid freshmen, but he bored 
us all. We all left sort of confused and with throbbing brains. 
                                                 
56   Throughout this work I have changed student names.  Many of my students have given me their permission to 
reprint their work using their real names, but one student raised an interesting point.  He granted me permission to use 
his name only in print media – not in online works – because he wanted to control his profile in online search engines 
such as Google and Yahoo.  As this work is being prepared for electronic submission, and as I cannot guarantee that it 
will never be available online, I have taken the (from my perspective unfortunate) step of providing pseudonyms for all 
of the students whose work I discuss. 
57   When referring to student writing, I have chosen to follow the traditional mode of academic citation, referring to the 
author by her last name.  This may appear to be cold or distancing, or even disrespectful.  Nothing could be farther from 
my intention.  If we seriously intend to treat student writing as important, and student writers as capable of producing 
work worthy of analysis, we owe it to our students to treat them with academic respect and formality. 
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 I thought, certainly, if they were offering it to Freshmen, 
that they would attempt to make even Physics interesting. My bad. 
 
Many sections of first-year composition require students to attend university lectures; after each 
lecture, students provide their professors with tickets handed out at the lecture to prove their 
compliance with the policy.  In this post, Roberts uses the routine of the ticket to create 
foreshadowing and mood.  She also conveys a wonderful sense of authorial voice, and though 
her post is far too informal to be considered an academic paper, she analyzes the lecture using 
visual rhetoric expert Edward Tufte’s screed against PowerPoint, The Cognitive Style of 
PowerPoint, and manages to make the analysis fit naturally and easily into her narrative of the 
event.  “Physics Will Make You Tired” offers a surprising amount of material to analyze and 
appreciate, and an encouraging wealth of ideas and perspectives which may be developed into 
longer, more formal papers.   
 Besides the two-post requirement each week, my students also were required to comment 
on at least two other blog posts.  Roberts’ post provoked several other students to share their 
thoughts on the lecture.  One student continued Roberts’ Tuftian analysis, noting that “the 
PowerPoint [slideshow] he had broke just about every single rule that Tufte presents. It was just 
slide after slide with bullet after bullet. Not exciting at all.”  Another commented on the 
comfortableness of the chairs in the lecture hall, noting how conducive they were to lecture-long 
naps. 
From my perspective as her professor, I wish Roberts had written her critique of the 
lecturer’s PowerPoint slides and “speaking style” in more detail, but her inclusion of her 
cognitive process during the composing of the post (most noticeably in her remembrance of her 
ticket and in her note to herself to add the lecturer’s name later) are fascinating.  As the person 
who will evaluate her writing, I am intrigued by this insight into her mental dialog during 
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 writing, and as a reader of the post, I find it creates a real sense of intimacy with the narrative 
voice.  The blog posts are not intended to replace writing assignments, especially long analytical 
works.  Instead, they are a writer’s notebook of sorts, a convenient and easy place to jot down 
ideas, descriptions, and vignettes.  Most of all, they are an opportunity to play with language, to 
try different ways of communicating or arguing a point in an environment that allows for rapid 
response and either validation or criticism of the writer’s effort.  In other words, blogs are an 
excellent way to help students to develop the habit of writing and the feel for language and its 
use that we want our students to have. 
 
4.2. COMPOSITION AND MULTIMODAL ARGUMENTATION 
 
Blogs are a useful introduction to digital discourse because they allow for public publishing of 
writing and because they offer a dialogic environment in which that writing is situated.  But 
blogs also allow composers the ability to engage in multimodal composition – bloggers can 
include everything from font to font color to sound, photo, and video files in their blog posts.  
Some blog composers publish posts comprised of nothing but images, constructing visual diaries 
and essays referred to as photoblogs.58   
 Shortly, I will describe two major assignments, part of a larger sequence of assignments 
designed to balance my desire for my students to gain proficiency with written language with the 
awareness that multimodal communication is an important, and frequently ignored element of 
contemporary literacy practices.  Additionally, these assignments focus the students’ critical 
                                                 
58   One of the best resources for photoblogs (as of this writing) is Photoblogs.org, which describes itself as “a resource 
designed to help people find all kinds of photoblogs.”  Photoblogs.org may be accessed at http://www.photoblogs.org, 
and lists thousands of photoblogs from dozens and dozens of countries. 
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 attention in two directions at once – toward the argumentative subject of their composition, and 
toward the technology they choose to compose their assignments.  This double analysis, of an 
external subject and of the hardware and software that allow them to find, format, and 
incorporate multimodal elements in their work, is the ultimate goal of these assignments. 
 
4.2.1. Making Theory: An Inductive Basis for Composing 
 
In her essay, “The Sticky Embrace of Beauty: On Some Formal Problems in Teaching about the 
Visual Aspects of Texts,” Anne Frances Wysocki discusses a self-consciously voyeuristic 
advertisement for Peek: Photographs from the Kinsey Institute, which depicts a woman standing 
in profile, naked except for black thigh-high boots and opera gloves.  The ad is deliberately 
provocative, and Wysocki writes that it evoked within her both “pleasure and offense.”  
Attempting to make sense of this ambivalent reaction, Wysocki turns to the critical literature on 
graphic and visual theory and design.  She writes, however, that: 
What I came to understand when I turned to what’s already 
published in the areas of visual composition is that these 
approaches most often only partially explain my pleasure and none 
of my offense with the Peek composition: not only do these 
approaches assume a separation of form from content, but they 
emphasize form in such a way that ‘content’ can be unremarkably 
disembodied – a very bad thing when the “content” is a particular 
body. (149) 
 
As a compositionist, Wysocki is scandalized by the inability or unwillingness of visual theorists 
to engage with the content of images and their context as composed, historically and socially-
situated objects.  Wysocki’s desire to see the larger network of semiotic meaning and affect 
analyzed for the Peek advertisement mirrors common composition practice: many of us want our 
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 students to be able to analyze the topic at hand not merely in its own particulars, but also – time 
and space permitting – the larger frame in which the topic operates. 
 Focusing on the image as a constellation of visual elements privileges what Roland 
Barthes might consider the denotated image, the work itself.  It avoids engaging with the far 
more interesting connoted message of the image, which, as Barthes explains, “is the manner in 
which the society to a certain extent communicates what it thinks of it” (“Photographic Message” 
17).  It is through the study of connotation that the intensely affective properties of multimodal 
elements can be identified and explored, and the larger semiotic linkages and patterns in culture 
and society can be made apparent.  Though much of the work on visual analysis fails to grapple 
with these larger issues of connotation and affect, it offers an important critical vocabulary that 
teachers and students may use while rectifying that failure.  The difficulty, however, enters when 
one attempts to work a complex body of theoretical and practical expertise into the already 
overstuffed and overburdened composition curriculum. 
 In my classes, I bring a variety of multimodal works to my students’ attention, from 
advertisements to video clips to Web pages to works of art.  I ask my students to bring to class 
their own examples of multimodal content, whether in physical or digital form.  All of this 
material is churned through the analytical mill of discussion and contemplation, for besides 
asking students to find examples that are particularly appealing or repulsive to the student, I also 
ask that the students prepare a brief analysis of those examples before class.  Thus, the class 
always has recourse to at least one individual – whoever brought the example to the class’ 
attention – who may be considered a provisional “expert” on that work.  Sometimes the class 
expert is myself, but more often it is a student who has not only sought out the work in question, 
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 but has spent some time with it, knowing that she will be expected to have something insightful 
to add to the class’ examination of it. 
 This approach uses raw data and immediate experience to construct inductive aesthetic 
and critical standards shared – or at least known – by the community of the class.  The 
advantages of this approach are multiple and, I believe, well worth the costs.  First, the inductive 
approach provides students with a mass of primary works to consider and, most importantly, to 
write about.  It has long been a tenet of mine that students write best when they are able to find a 
personal connection to the material under consideration.  This may be perfectly obvious, but 
students often are unaware of this dynamic and, even when it is intuited, often are unaware of 
how to go about finding an approach to the material that triggers their individual interest or 
revulsion.  The availability of multiple works about which the student may write puts the demand 
to choose on the student.  That choice, in turn, can and should be a topic of discussion during 
writing workshop.  Just as, in the previous chapter, I discussed strategies for making the various 
processes of reading and enacting visible in the classroom, so too does this move make visible 
the processes that may lead to good writing (however we may wish to define that, of course). 
 The inductive method also gives rise to a shared vocabulary and a shared body of 
experience through which that vocabulary is defined, while still valuing the students’ own 
backgrounds and personal experiences.  It does not presume that students will have a working 
understanding of canonical graphical and artistic art, but builds upon whatever experiences the 
students do have, and even in the case of the hypothetical student with no experience whatsoever 
with visual works, generates a small yet functional repertoire of examples on which to draw 
during analysis.  It also foregrounds the experience of the visual, as students may come to these 
works for the first time during in-class discussion.  This means, pragmatically, that many 
224 
 students will have no carefully considered opinions to share with the class, relying instead on 
their immediate reaction to the image in question.  For researchers interested in the study of 
affect, this is, frankly, ideal.  It also leads to less guarded comments from the students, which I 
find frequently leads to more interesting and challenging discussion, and which gives the 
students more to think through as they work to produce their own analyses.  But for all of these 
benefits, a troubling question remains: what is it that students are analyzing when they examine 
multimodal works, and what is it we should be evaluating when they produce their own?  Does 
the melding of modes necessarily lead to the privileging of aesthetic creativity, perhaps even to 
the extent that the student’s art overshadows analytical rigor?   
 
4.2.2. Arguing Using Words and … : Multimodal Composition 
 
In the first chapter I argued that if “literacy” has any meaning left, it would have to include a 
bewildering array of activities because semiosis is possible across the range of modes of 
representation.  Diana George puts this point succinctly when she writes “Literacy means more 
than words, and visual literacy means more than play” (“From Analysis to Design” 16).  As I 
discussed in the first chapter, the ludic work has a long, venerable, and still troubling tradition 
among experimental narratives, but George is discussing a different dynamic.  For many 
researchers and teachers of digital media and works in the distributed mode, visual literacy and 
visual rhetoric is an inescapable subject to be taught amidst the constellation of digital literacy 
skills.  Visual rhetoric, like the calls for media literacy that preceded it and provided a degree of 
academic freedom for researchers interested in it, has not been embraced in the United States.  
Just as composition is still referred to – in certain circles – as less serious work and a less 
complex research topic than work in literature and critical theory, so too is visual rhetoric 
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 sometimes seen as mere “playing” with pictures.  As anyone who has worked or taught in the 
field knows, and as George asserts, nothing could be farther from the truth. 
 
Figure 6: A recent banner from The Fund for Animals (http://www.fundforanimals.org/fur/). 
 
 In a recent class meeting, I asked my students to consider the juxtaposition of words and 
images on the Web site of an animal advocacy group, The Fund for Animals.  At the top of this 
Fund for Animals Internet Web page was a banner proclaiming “She needs her fur more than you 
do.”  The message was straightforward and understandable as an anti-fur slogan, and yet its 
rhetorical effectiveness was complicated and enhanced by the image placed next to the text.  
Figure 6 shows the banner as it appeared for our discussion.  Analyzing the banner, my students 
were immediately taken with four things: the size of the image in relation to the size of the text; 
the emotional appeal exerted by the image; the word-choice of the slogan; and the colors used for 
the text in the slogan.  The image of the kitten in her habitat takes up almost two-thirds of the 
width of the banner, occupying far more space than the words that may be assumed to be the 
most important part of the campaign.  In multimodal discourse, the image, or spokesmodel, may 
be more important to the process of conveying the intended message than whatever prose text is 
also used.  In this case, the spokesmodel for the Fund’s anti-fur campaign is a kitten, possibly a 
young bobcat.  Telegenic in ways rarely seen outside Disney cartoon films, the Fund’s kitten – 
seen in what appears to be her natural habitat – triggers the Web page visitor’s baby-protecting 
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 instincts through her enormous eyes and ears and slightly tilted head.  The head tilt is especially 
subtle and effective, suggesting puzzlement on the part of the animal that anyone would want to 
skin her to produce a luxury coat.  My students also noticed, however, two ways in which the 
prose text is rendered on the page.  First is the choice of words: by providing the kitten with a 
gender through the use of the female pronoun, the human viewer’s protective instincts are further 
stimulated.59  Second, the text font size and color further shape the affective and cognitive 
impact of the slogan.  By using two different font colors, the Fund separates the slogan into two 
separate, but related, messages.  The first, “she needs her fur,” is a simple statement of fact, 
supported by the biological reality that without her fur – and the skin out of which it grows – the 
kitten would bleed to death.  This message, furthermore, uses a bright white font color, giving 
the biological statement the sheen of purity, innate goodness, and trustworthiness (nevermind the 
race-inflected dichotomy established by the white-good/dark-bad visual shorthand).  The second 
part of the message, “more than you do,” rendered in dark, small type, uses typography to harden 
the tone of address to the viewer.  The darker, smaller type strengthens the sense of rebuke 
created by the words of the second phrase and, seemingly reflecting the dark pools of the kitten’s 
eyes, returns the viewer’s eyes to the image, closing the cycle of reference between image and 
prose.  Finally, the text size also plays into the meaning of the banner’s message.  The largest 
words on the page are the possessive “her fur,” reinforcing the notion that fur coats are produced 
by robbing an animal of her skin.  Back and forth, the viewer’s attention shuttles between the 
hypnotic image, with its painful cuteness, and the prose, with its multivalent messages, to 
conform a meaning far more complex than either could present on its own. 
                                                 
59   I am especially interested in the role of gender assumptions in this (and other) digital media works.  Here, for 
instance, no matter the viewer’s beliefs about gender, the resulting response is one of protection.  For feminist viewers, 
the banner may represent another example of patriarchal capitalism.  For even hardened anti-feminists, the use of “she” 
may trigger stereotypes of weakness and defenselessness on the part of the non-male kitten, again resulting in a 
protective reaction. 
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  Rather than positioning image as a competitor against prose text for meaning-
conveyance, The Fund for Animals’ banner shows that image and text work together, 
synergistically, reinforcing and inflecting each other.  In the introduction to their collection 
Eloquent Images, Mary Hocks and Michelle Kendrick argue that this is a fundamental feature of 
multimodal works, writing that: 
to attempt to characterize new media as a new battleground 
between word and image is to misunderstand radically the dynamic 
interplay that already exists and has always existed between visual 
and verbal texts and to overlook insights concerning that interplay 
that new media theories and practices can foster.  (1, emphasis in 
original) 
 
Interplay is the operative concept for Hocks and Kendrick, an interpretive focus that also 
animated my class discussion of the anti-fur banner.  For Cheryl Ball, interplay is the native 
mode of argumentation in multimodal works.  As she writes, “the formation of argument in new 
media texts, then, becomes not a linear construction linking one sentence-meaning to a 
consecutive other.  It is, instead, a juxtaposition of modal elements from which readers infer 
meaning” (“Show, Not Tell” 405).  The modal elements in Figure 6 are the result of 
juxtaposition, but the close relation between the elements reduces the shock of the encounter, 
thus naturalizing the assemblage, and masking its artificialness and artifice.  Not all works in the 
distributed mode, however, share this feature, choosing instead to foreground the modal and 
narrative disparity among elements.  Diana George notes that the potential for experimentation 
and discovery in the realms of multimodal composition and juxtaposition are endless.  As she 
reminds us, “our students have a much richer imagination for what we might accomplish with the 
visual than our journals have yet to address” (“From Analysis to Design” 12).  If argumentation 
can operate not merely as the linear presentation of persuasive data, but also as the juxtaposition 
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 of disparate – and sometimes seemingly unrelated – modal elements, then the ability to compose 
multimodal argumentation is limited only by our imagination and our technologies. 
 Gunther Kress sees multimodal argumentation and interpretation as calling for a “new 
theory of semiosis [that] will need to acknowledge and account for the process of synaesthesia, 
the transduction of meaning from one semiotic mode to another semiotic mode, an activity 
constantly performed by the brain” (“Design” 159).  Kress’ conception both of multimodality 
and of cognitive processing stems from an apparent unwillingness to abandon text as the 
privileged mode of meaning-making.  For Kress, any mode that conveys meaning is operating as 
text, and so must be cognitively processed as if it were not of its own mode, but as if it were text.  
Thus, interpreting images for their semiotic content is akin to the traditional actions of 
synaesthesia such as smelling the color teal or hearing a prickly sensation.  The call for 
multimodal interpretation and pedagogy is actually far more significant than Kress envisions, as 
it assumes from the outset that text is not the only – or the best – way to communicate meaning.  
Our students are surrounded by multimodal works and objects; it is time we addressed this fact 
of life in our composition courses.60
 
4.2.3. Assignment Sequence, Part I: Multimodal Argument 
 
The first major assignment in my multimodal composition courses is one that requires students to 
compose an argument using prose text and at least one other mode.  Most students choose to 
incorporate many modes in their arguments, but some choose to focus on only a few.  By this 
                                                 
60   One prosaic and ubiquitous multimodal element our students are especially proficient with is the emoticon.  An 
arrangement of punctuation marks that developed from the pre-graphics days of early personal computing, emoticons 
are means of indicating mood by the approximation of smiley-faces using nothing more than standard keyboard 
symbols.  As with multimodal argumentation in general, emoticons are limited only by the ingenuity of the sender and 
the interpretation skills and neck flexibility of the receiver.  Sample emoticons include   smiley face :-)    winking face ;-)   
frowning face  :-(  smiley face with big curly hair  @:-)  and goofy face with tongue sticking out   :-p. 
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 point in the semester, we will have examined a number of multimodal arguments, analyzing their 
composition and effectiveness, and exploring the relationships between their use of 
multimodality and the media in which each is presented.  Figure 7 shows one example of a 
complex multimodal argument using only prose text, an op-ed column by humorist and Seinfeld-
creator Larry David that appeared in the New York Times.  David’s screed against the political 
influence of the so-called “undecideds” in the 2004 election was accompanied by a graphic that 
ran alongside the text, listing a wide array of dichotomized choices, thus reiterating the 
incomprehensibility of the undecided position.  The utterly pedestrian nature of most of the pairs 
of choices suggests the sheer number of choices we make every day, choices we feel very 
comfortable making.  The unwillingness of the undecideds to choose a candidate to support is 
thus cast in the light of a bizarre, and highly suspicious, act of willfulness rather than the lack of 
will many may assume the undecideds possess. 
 One of my students, whom I will call “Brian Powell,” decided to argue that Batman was a 
better superhero than Superman.  After much revision, he narrowed and shifted his focus to the 
societal reaction to, and embrace of, each hero, arguing that the anti-hero Batman more 
accurately reflects the current American psyche.   Powell’s early versions included quite a few 
images of each hero, but for a later draft he chose to focus instead on his prose and its 
presentation.  Powell decided to recast his argument as a top-secret government dossier, a 
decision I found intriguing.  Figure 8 shows the introduction to Powell’s argument. 
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 Los Angeles —David, Larry.  "Are You Undecided? Or 
Not?"  New York Times National Edition 16 September 2004, 
A33. 
 
I'd like to address this to the Undecideds: I'm on to you. You may be 
fooling everyone else with your little "undecided" act, but you're not 
fooling me. You know perfectly well whom you're voting for. The only 
reason you say you're undecided is that it's a cheap ploy to get attention. 
How do I know? Because I'm the most indecisive person in the world. I set 
the template, baby, and you're not passing the smell test. 
 
You want to see real undecided? Go out to dinner with me sometime. I'll 
show you undecided. I look at the menu for 20 minutes, ask everybody 
what they're ordering, and then, finally, after I copy someone, wind up 
dashing into the kitchen to tell the waiter I've changed my mind. 
 
Do a little shoe shopping with me. I guarantee you won't be able to stand it. 
The black ones. No, the brown ones. No, the black ones. Several of my 
relationships have ended in shoe stores, with women slipping out, 
unnoticed, never to be seen again. I even got thrown out of a poker game 
once because I sat there, paralyzed, unable to decide whether or not to fold. 
It wasn't a pretty sight, but at least it was genuine, not a bluff, like you 
people. 
 
Oh, I've observed you in action. I've sat next to you at dinner parties and 
watched while everyone talked themselves silly, trying to get you on board. 
But you wouldn't budge, would you? You almost seemed to take some 
pleasure from it, just like my 8-year-old when she makes me beg her to 
take her medicine, you rascals. 
 
The other night I saw a whole gaggle of you on TV in a focus group. You 
really liked chatting with professional pollster Frank Luntz, didn't you? He 
seemed very interested in what you had to say. Afterward, I could imagine 
all of you piling into a bus and heading for Denny's to discuss your exciting 
evening with Frank. I could see all of you staying friends even after the 
election. Maybe go on some trips together. Perhaps a wine tour of Tuscany. 
On bicycles! Oh, the life of the Undecided. Too bad they can't hold these 
presidential elections more often. Ah, well, you'll just have to make do. 
 
The truth is, Undecideds, you're getting on our nerves. We Decideds hate 
all the attention you're getting and that you're jerking us around. Anyone 
who can't make up his or her mind at this point in the campaign should 
forget about the election entirely, buy a pint of ice cream and get into bed. 
 
We'd love to tell you to take a hike, but we're afraid to alienate you. If we 
really had any brains, we wouldn't spend another second on you, but on the 
people who can truly make a difference: the "unlikely" voters. And there 
are millions more of them than there are of you. Those people aren't after 
attention, they're just incredibly lazy. The only way they'll register to vote 
is if someone shows up at their door with a form. And then the only way 
they'll actually vote is if you carry them to the booth. 
 
Not only are they lazy, they're also indifferent. They just don't believe that 
voting can have an effect on their lives. Well, it just so happens that right 
after I voted for the first time, I landed myself a big fat job in Hollywood, a 
biopsy came back benign and I met my future wife as soon as I walked out 
                                                                                       of the voting booth. Coincidence? You decide. 
 
Figure 7: An op-ed column with multimodal accompanying graphic. 
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Figure 8: Prose-only multimodality. 
 
Powell’s font choice, Courant, creates an official, and highly technological, feeling for his 
argument, in keeping with his narrative conceit.  Throughout, he also uses a grey type color 
instead of the traditional black.  This choice makes the blood-red “confidential” stamp stand out 
even more than it would normally, but beyond that it creates an odd, tentative mood, as if the 
grey message were fading from the page.  Fans of the television and film series Mission 
Impossible will note the resemblance to the self-destructing nature of the tape recorded mission 
assignments in that series.  Though Powell’s prose is not as controlled as either he or I would 
like in this draft, it represents a radical rethinking of his earlier positions, presentation, and 
approach to his audience.  In the present version, his audience is no longer the essentially passive 
audience of most arguments, but becomes imaginary agents whose task it is to read the briefing 
dossier and solve the mystery of the surprisingly popular allegiance to Batman.  Powell presents 
his reader with his own conclusions, and yet manages to present sufficient evidence in support of 
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 Superman’s popularity to maintain the necessary fiction of a real contest for the hearts and minds 
of the public.  Had the semester continued, I have no doubt Powell would have been able to 
refine its prose and thus revise his multimodal argument into a case study of contemporary 
culture and the superhero mythos. 
 Other students created PowerPoint presentations, Web pages, and even, in one case, a 
computer game, bringing a far wider range of multimodal elements into their arguments.  
However, the fundamental issue here is not the number or type of multimodal elements used in 
the argument, but rather the presence of any multimodal elements, the compositional activities 
needed to create the argument, and the interpretive skills needed to make sense of it.  George 
Landow attributes an increased critical attention to the particularities of multimodality in 
composition to the spatialized network of lexias in hypertext.  Regardless of whether we agree 
completely with this, his conclusions that “writing has become visual as well as alphanumeric” 
and that “writing requires visual as well as alphanumeric writing” are well justified by the 
complexity of even minimally multimodal works such as Powell’s  (“Hypertext as Collage-
Writing” 163, emphasis added).  The New London Group comes to the same conclusion about 
the incipient visuality inherent in prose, but approaches the issue from the history of desktop 
publishing.  The mass production of personal computers capable of manipulating text and 
graphics in even rudimentary ways gave rise to a practice known as desktop publishing – the idea 
being that sophisticated publishing could be performed far from the printing presses and on the 
user’s desktop.  Today’s word processing programs are far more powerful than the software that 
popularized the term desktop publishing, demonstrating that the power to manipulate the 
appearance of text on a page is an increasingly important one.  As the New London Group 
writes: 
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 Desktop publishing puts a new premium on Visual Design and 
spreads responsibility for the visual much more broadly than was 
the case when writing and page layout were separate trades.  So, a 
school project can and should properly be evaluated on the basis of 
Visual as well as Linguistic Design, and their Multimodal 
relationships.  (“A Pedagogy of Multiliteracies” 29) 
 
Such evaluation is usually obviated by the mandatory use of standardized fonts and the academic 
preference for prose over other multimodal elements, but multimodality continues to creep into 
even the most traditional assignments.  Mark Taylor and Esa Saarinen’s Imagologies, the 
philosophical and graphical descendant of Marshal McLuhan’s work with visual designer 
Quentin Fiore, for instance, argues that “the word is never simply a word but is always also an 
image” (Styles 3).  With the click of a mouse, the modern composer may change the appearance 
of her prose, and thus change the way it may be received and interpreted by her readers. 
 
4.3. POWERPOINT PHLUFF VS. PERSUASIVE PRESENTATION POTENTIAL? 
 
The teacher’s complaint, “I assigned an essay but the student turned in a web page – how do I 
grade this thing?” is becoming increasingly common as students take the initiative in multimodal 
composition, even in non-multimodal or digital courses.  The challenge for the instructor is to 
develop a rubric that can evaluate fairly the aesthetic choices and moves made by students, and a 
critical awareness capable of seeing these choices and moves in the first place.  Further 
complicating matters, the “desktop publishing” phenomenon (now simply understood as “word 
processing”), has had a tremendous impact on our awareness of the potential for multimodality 
and the style and format of prose on page or screen.  Thus, even traditional prose-only 
assignments may exhibit critical and significant multimodal elements.  No program pushes the 
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 potential tension between form and content to the extreme like Microsoft’s PowerPoint 
application.  Through its aggressive suggestion of slide templates, “auto content,” and ease of 
incorporating multimodal elements, PowerPoint presents its users with a frequently irresistible 
opportunity to run wild with formatting, leaving content and analysis poorly served.  As an 
increasing number of grade schools are assigning PowerPoint presentations to their students, and 
as PowerPoint is now the de facto mode of presentation and communication in the business 
world, PowerPoint is a compositional tool and environment we must address in our curricula.  
This section describes an approach to PowerPoint in my composition classes that attempts to 
instill in my students an awareness of the tensions, opportunities, and dangers present in 
PowerPoint. 
 
4.3.1. Assignment Sequence, Part II: PowerPoint Presentation 
 
The multimodal argument is an important first move in the assignment sequence.  It asks 
students to think analytically and creatively about their argument and their audience.  It also asks 
them to think analytically and creatively about the technology at their disposal, and how best, 
and most effectively, to use that technology to maximize the argument’s persuasiveness for a 
given audience.  Students who choose to compose their argument on their blog, for instance, are 
writing for a wider audience than students using a word processor or PowerPoint.  All of these 
issues are discussed in class and during writing workshops of drafts of student arguments, and 
the number and richness of options available to the students have produced challenging and often 
productive class discussions. 
 The next major assignment in the sequence asks students to engage in metacritical 
thinking and writing as they return to their multimodal arguments from the earlier assignment 
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 and both document their construction and analyze their argumentative strategies and 
effectiveness.  The students presented their meta-analysis in PowerPoint.61  To help the students 
gain data to evaluate the effectiveness of their various strategies and the implementation of those 
strategies, the students exchanged multimodal arguments and peer-reviewed each other’s work.  
The students then used these comments, as well as the comments I provided them on their 
multimodal arguments, to help them assess the effectiveness of their arguments.  PowerPoint 
presentations, by their very nature as presentations, require a presenter who will deliver an oral 
report to accompany the slides.  For this assignment, the students were asked to type (in MS 
Word) all of the comments they would make while delivering their oral presentation to a group.  
They then turned in these prepared remarks with their slideshows. 
 The multimodal argument focused the students’ attention on the interaction between 
modes, an interaction that is frequently ignored in PowerPoint slide-making.  The earlier 
assignment provided my students with practice in integrating multiple modes to achieve certain 
goals, a skill they would need in this assignment to avoid the pitfalls and traps of poor and 
uninteresting slide and presentation design so common to PowerPoint.  Grounding our 
exploration and use of PowerPoint was a long essay by noted visual rhetorician and analytical 
designer Edward R. Tufte, The Cognitive Style of PowerPoint.  In it, Tufte argues that 
PowerPoint “has a distinctive, definite, well-enforced, and widely practiced cognitive style that 
is contrary to serious thinking” (26).  Tufte provides details of what he sees as the particular 
features of this cognitive style, including: 
                                                 
61   As an exercise in modeling, I present this assignment to my class in both written and PowerPoint slide format.  
When first explaining it, though, I present from the slides, which are projected for the entire class to see.  The slides 
exhibit every failing I could manage to cram onto the screen, and my presentation is scarcely better.  We discuss my 
dismal performance, which then becomes an object lesson in what not to do, and sets the stage for the students’ reading of 
Edward R. Tufte’s The Cognitive Style of PowerPoint. 
236 
 foreshortening of evidence and thought, low spatial resolution, a 
deeply hierarchical single-path structure as the model for 
organizing every type of content, breaking up narrative and data 
into slides and minimal fragments, rapid temporal sequencing of 
this information rather than focused spatial analysis, conspicuous 
decoration and Phluff, a preoccupation with format not content, an 
attitude of commercialism that turns everything into a sales pitch.  
(4) 
 
Given all this – and Tufte’s arguments are extremely persuasive – it would seem almost cruel to 
require students to compose and present a complex analysis using this software, and yet that is 
the assignment.  As I stress to the students, they should keep in mind what Tufte says: all of the 
fancy formatting in the world cannot substitute for intelligent analysis.  I exhort them to try to 
make their formatting useful and relevant to what they are presenting.  In other words, do not try 
to use flashy (phluffy) formatting to hide shoddy substance; instead, let the formatting reflect and 
emphasize a brilliant analysis.  Tufte seems to argue that this is impossible, even though in the 
Postscript he acknowledges that sometimes intelligent PowerPoint presentations do manage to 
occur (27).  As I write in the assignment, “Pay close attention to the examples [Tufte] provides – 
they’re almost all negative examples (i.e., what not to do).  Avoid them.  This assignment, 
essentially, is a challenge to you to prove one of the world’s foremost experts in visual design 
and rhetoric wrong.  See what you can do.” 
 The assignment is not entirely heartless, however, as it concludes with a concession that 
“It may be, as Tufte says, that PowerPoint makes intelligent discourse impossible.”  Later in the 
semester, I write, “you will have the opportunity to turn in your dissection of your own 
PowerPoint presentation.  For that project, you will be examining what PowerPoint allows you to 
accomplish, and what it prevents you from accomplishing.  Thus, even the most abject failure 
may result in a brilliant analysis of the medium for this later assignment.”  The spirit of challenge 
that I make explicit in this assignment has been surprisingly well received by my students, 
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 perhaps because of the snide and condescending tone used throughout Tufte’s essay; students 
want to prove him wrong.  At one point, for instance, Tufte juxtaposes the PowerPoint style 
sheet guidelines presented by the Harvard School of Public Health’s Instructional Computing 
Facility with a page from one of the “Dick and Jane” books.62  As Tufte notes in his discussion, 
Harvard’s templates “emulate the format of reading primers for 6-year olds” (19).  My students – 
many of whom in the past few years have self-identified as “visual learners” – usually seem 
eager for the chance to best the expert. 
 The PowerPoint presentation is an explanation, an analysis, and a revision of the earlier 
multimodal argument, all at the same time.  One of my students, whom I shall call “Bonnie 
Alderson,” argued that the line of dessert-scented and -flavored cosmetics sold by pop singer 
Jessica Simpson, “Dessert Beauty,” are fundamentally contradictory and psychologically 
unhealthy for women.  In her PowerPoint presentation, Alderson decided to let the multitude of 
photographs at the Web page for the cosmetics become active parts of her argument, rather than 
using them merely as illustrations.  Figure 9 shows one early slide from Alderson’s presentation. 
In this slide, Alderson’s prose attempts to limn the numerous contradictions represented 
by Simpson’s makeup line.  The slide’s title comes from the Web page itself, and, as Alderson 
argues, flies in the face of contemporary female beauty ideals.  Meanwhile, the image of 
Simpson next to the prose sends a host of signals to the viewer and potential Dessert Beauty 
customer, not the least of which is that though Simpson might be licking the cupcake’s icing, she 
is most definitely not eating the cupcake.  The tension identified by Alderson in her prose, 
between wanting to eat the sweets and wanting to look sexy – while, presumably, wearing 
makeup that reminds both the wearer and those around her of the very thing she cannot have 
                                                 
62   It should be noted that Tufte is Professor Emeritus at Yale University.  This bit of biography seems to go some 
distance toward explaining why so many of Tufte’s examples come from Harvard University. 
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 “because she thinks she looks fat, while making her look sexy at the same time” – is palpable, 
and perfectly mirrored in the image.  By changing her strategy for using photographs in her 
argument, Alderson is able to analyze what she viewed as a failure of her earlier multimodal 
argument, revise it, and present the revision as part of her analysis, all while strengthening her 
original point. 
 
Figure 9: A multimodal PowerPoint slide. 
 
Another student, whom I shall call “Greg Eades,” took a very different approach, 
deciding to emphasize and reconfigure the role of the audience in his presentation.  Knowing that 
his presentation would only be seen by myself, Eades took Tufte’s critique of the presenter-
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 centeredness of PowerPoint to heart and crafted an audience-centered slideshow.  Figure 10 
shows a pivotal slide in Eades’ presentation. 
Eades begins his presentation with a series of slides documenting his compositional 
process for constructing his multimodal argument.  This particular slide, a tribute to Sergio 
Leone’s classic film of the same name, is his transitional slide into his analysis of the content of 
that argument.  Each of the three underlined descriptors in the slide is actually a hyperlink to a 
different set of slides: one set analyzing what Eades felt went well in his argument, one 
analyzing what did not work as well as he would have liked, and one set (the “ugly” set) 
containing photographs of Eades’ roommate, with the caption “A little humor here and there 
never hurt anyone.” 
 
Figure 10: A multi-linear PowerPoint slideshow. 
 
  Eades’ use of multilinear navigation – a feature not well supported by PowerPoint – 
subverts the traditional medium of the software as a tool for presentation and turns it into a 
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 medium for reading and enacting.  Diana George’s conclusion, mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
that “our students have a much richer imagination for what we might accomplish with the visual 
than our journals have yet to address” (“From Analysis to Design” 12), is amply demonstrated by 
Eades’ simple and unorthodox approach to his presentation. 
The freedom, flexibility, and encouragement to think outside the box is a crucial component 
of my multimodal assignments.  It is not enough to incorporate multimodality into composition 
assignments.  Instead, we must seriously consider the environment in which the multimodal 
elements are being composed.  I would expect the same from a non-technological visual 
assignment.  Common assignments, such as collages analyzing and/or depicting crucial elements 
or scenes from essays or narratives, frequently use the students’ own actions of gathering 
materials as an entré to discussing the mass media and its depictions.  Rarely, though, do 
composition classes discuss the multitude of images available online, for instance, or the 
psychological and sociological assumptions guiding the user interface for Microsoft’s ubiquitous 
Word program, or the templates obnoxiously thrust upon users of PowerPoint.  The assignments 
I have discussed in this chapter are neither visionary nor revolutionary, but they effectively 
encourage students to develop an awareness of technology not merely as a tool, but also as an 
environment.  Once they begin to see the relationships between themselves and this 
technological ecosystem, those relationships begin to change.  If we are truly committed to 
digital literacy, we must begin to theorize and teach our students the skills to become aware of 
the technological spaces in which they compose. 
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 4.3.2. Aesthetics and Evaluation 
  
Cheryl Ball, commenting on multimodal and digital strategies of argumentation, notes that “New 
media texts, which are experimental if only because audiences are not used to recognizing their 
meaning-making strategies, typically move freely between theory and practice through their 
interactive and animated designs” (“Show, Not Tell” 409).  Ball’s statement points to two 
important considerations: meaning-making strategies in digital and multimodal works can, and 
often do, differ significantly from those employed by traditional academic discourse; and digital 
and multimodal works frequently use structure, tone, voice, modality, and materiality as methods 
of argumentation, quite possibly apart from, or in contradiction to, whatever explicit message 
may be conveyed by the work.  How, then, do we evaluate the academic success of students’ 
multimodal works? 
When I graded Greg Eades’ PowerPoint presentation, for instance, I was amused by his use 
of multilinearity.  It was unexpected and quite creative, and had very little to do with his analysis 
of his multimodal argument.  The same categories, in other words, could easily have been 
presented in a linear format in a traditional essay.  Eades’ subversion of the PowerPoint genre, 
rather, was an analysis – and a rejection – of the traditions surrounding PowerPoint, an indication 
of his awareness of the platform in which he was composing his presentation.  This might seem 
to be above and beyond the scope of the assignment, which asked that he analyze not the present 
medium, but rather the medium he had chosen for his multimodal argument.  However, his 
multimodal argument had been composed in PowerPoint as well, and had been soundly criticized 
by his peer reviewer and myself for its heavy-handed approach to his audience.  He concluded, 
for instance, “Now its time for you to agree.  Take your time, and let everything sink in.  The 
homework help, the bond you will have with your new friends, the parties, and the girls.  Joining 
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 a fraternity is the right decision to make, and you will not regret doing so.”  It is, undeniably, a 
forceful conclusion to an argument.  And yet, it remains largely unpersuasive because of its 
dictatorial and condescending tone.  Eades’ later presentation rejected the strategy of ordering his 
audience to believe as he did, and instead worked diligently to make his audience feel not 
patronized, but empowered.  During the semester in which Eades composed his argument and 
presentation, I did not require that a Composer’s Note be included with each of the major 
assignments, as I do now.  Had I not asked Eades why he included the multilinear slides in his 
presentation, I might never have recognized the rhetorical strategies at work in the presentation, 
and thus my evaluation might have missed a rather substantial element of his work. 
 Even more challenging, a student whom I shall call “Rob Andrews” used timing effects 
and animation to convert his PowerPoint presentation into the functional equivalent of a fully-
automated film, complete with theme music.  His analysis of his multimodal argument was 
perfectly adequate, but in revising and remounting his argument (which originally had been 
presented in MS Word), he managed to enhance the audience’s feeling that his topic was of 
urgent and dire importance.  Additionally, Andrews converted his “works cited” page into what 
appeared to be motion picture credits, complete with text crawling up the black screen and 
closing credit music.  As the citations end and the music draws to a close, leaving only a wistful 
hornpipe reiterating the melody, Andrews fades in “Digital Discourse – 2004,” the name and 
year of the class.  The brief message fades to black as the hornpipe ends its melody, in a 
sequence whose affective power simply must be seen and heard to be understood.  As cinema, it 
is both trite and common in the extreme.  As bibliography, though, Andrews displays an 
innovative understanding of the symbolic value and potential for even the most ordinary and 
forgettable of essay conventions. 
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 Johndan Johnson-Eilola, in his essay “The Database and the Essay,” argues for the ability 
of digital platforms such as blogs to operate as “symbolic-analytic forms of writing,” because 
bloggers can collect provocative or odd materials from the Internet and write their own analyses 
or glosses on whatever material they have found and posted (215).  In this way, bloggers show 
an interesting blend of aesthetic/symbolic and analytical skill in their online postings, and blog 
posts can be seen as something akin to the box art of Joseph Cornell or Dale Copeland, shown in 
Figure 11.   
 
Figure 11: Fern Hill, by Dale Copeland. 
 
Working toward a similar goal, Geoffrey Sirc uses Cornell’s box art as a model for 
composition, seeking “the possibility of student as passionate designer, with heart and soul as 
compositional factors that need as much attention as hand, eye, or brain” (“Box Logic” 115).  
Box logic, Sirc’s name for his multimodal pedagogy of collage, is Sirc’s methodology for 
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 “aestheticizing the scene of composition” (116).  I agree that the writing process needs to be 
considered as an aesthetic, affective, and immersive experience, but as I discuss later, the 
implications for Sirc’s “box” pedagogy are substantial. 
My own preference is to incorporate multimodality not to make the composed object 
itself overtly aesthetic, but to allow students to experience an explicitly creative and imaginative 
process of composition.  For too many students, composition is an essentially analytical exercise, 
devoid of the spark of imaginative inspiration.  In part, this is the predictable result of years of 
grade-school training in the five-paragraph essay.  The five-paragraph essay is traditionally 
comprised of an introductory paragraph, three paragraphs of supporting examples, and a 
concluding paragraph.  The overall structure of the five-paragraph essay is not at fault – there is 
nothing inherently wrong with the introduction-body-conclusion format, of course – it is, rather 
the potential for the strictness of the genre to paralyze free thought and experimentation, and to 
inculcate a single mode of written academic communication.  It should go without saying that 
not every claim can, or should, be argued with three supporting examples, each of which is able 
to be fully explained in a single paragraph.  The five-paragraph essay serves the admirable 
purpose of teaching beginning writers the importance of structure, and providing them with a 
fail-safe guideline within which to develop the skills of written communication.  However, if we 
value experimentation and risk-taking in our students’ writing, and if we make these values 
explicit in our classes, then we must find ways to help our students reconceptualize what writing 
is, what it does, and what writers think and do.  By requiring students to analyze the many ways 
that objects, words, images, and the constellation of these things can denote and connote, and the 
ways they can be used to form arguments, I attempt to help my students to reconnect their own 
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 composing practices with their rich imaginations and even richer experiences with visual and 
auditory modality.  
This, of course, puts tremendous pressure on the teacher of composition, who not only 
must master the myriad skills and abilities of alphabetic writing, but also must become a visual 
art critic and connoisseur.  Gunther Kress argues that this is not a development that is limited to 
blogs and explicitly multimodal discourse, but that “When in the past image appeared on the 
page it did so subject to the logic of writing, the relation of image to writing which we still know 
as ‘illustration.’  When writing now appears on the screen, it does so subject to the logic of the 
image” (Literacy 9-10).  Kress’ assessment does not ease the burden on the compositionist, as it 
suggests that even in monomodal and traditional writing environments, the visual and the 
aesthetic still intrude.   
 Kress collaborated with Theo van Leeuwen on a book that may aid teachers of 
composition as they work to become fluent in multimodality, Reading Images: The Grammar of 
Visual Design.  The book addresses the relationship between the denotative design of the visual 
and the content so denotated, but in a highly dispassionate way.  For instance, when discussing 
an image from an Australian primary school social studies textbook, they write: 
in figure 2.1 the relation between the Aborigines and the fire 
constitutes a second, minor transactional process, subordinated to 
the “major” process which is constituted by the relation between 
the British and the Aborigines; and [. . .] participants such as the 
British or the landscape can themselves be read as analytical 
structures, with a Carrier (e.g., the landscape) and Possessive 
Attributes (e.g. rocks and trees).  Which of these structures are 
major and which are minor is, in visuals, determined by the 
relative size and relative conspicuousness of the elements.  (112-
113) 
 
Kress and van Leeuwen acknowledge that “In writing a book such as this, one sometimes feels 
that one is applying a cold, clinical approach to semiotic practices which are, in reality, strongly 
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 colored by affective factors” (Reading 265).  The difficulty in managing all of these discursive 
registers at the same time – the structural, the relational, and the affective – points to a major 
challenge facing multimodal discourse.  If our theorists struggle with the challenge, are we 
justified in asking our students to attempt what may be a Sisyphean task? 
 Once the writer ceases to discuss the formal elements of the image and begins to discuss 
its affective and aesthetic connotations, the thorny question arises: whose aesthetic sense should 
guide the analysis?  When we use images and symbols drawn largely from popular culture to 
comprise our shared library of examples, and when we valorize the immediacy and impact of 
works from the mass media, are we encouraging students to replicate the frequently shallow and 
sensationalist discourse of the flash image and sound bite?  The alternative must lie, as Scott 
DeWitt argues, in analysis.  As I have discussed in previous chapters, the narrative and symbolic 
works with which our students – as well as we ourselves – are surrounded require careful, 
analytic attention, and our commitment to literacy requires teaching these analytical skills to our 
students.  As DeWitt argues, “If the sound bite or other aspects of fragmented postmodernism 
form the texts of our students’ worlds, then we need to offer purposeful, alternative writing 
instruction that teaches them to make connects between sound bites, thus creating more complex 
texts” (Writing Inventions 22).  This project of bringing analysis to bear on the often unexamined 
mediated messages and modes of discourse in contemporary life must include aesthetics.  
Heavily-animated PowerPoint slides, complete with sound effects, as so many are, cannot be 
reduced simply to their prose content – the aesthetic (and the anti-aesthetic seen in many such 
slides) must also be interpreted, and their affective properties explored. 
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4.4. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: REFLECTIONS IN/ON PROSE 
 
At the head of this chapter I have a brief but pithy maxim from Brenda Laurel’s seminal book, 
Computers as Theater: “Think of the computer, not as a tool, but as a medium” (126).  When 
Laurel’s book came out, this injunction was desperately needed in the field of digital textuality.  
Now, however, and especially in the context of composition pedagogy, we must think of the 
computer as a medium, a tool, and a topic.  John Trimbur notes that “writing is a visible 
language produced and circulated in material forms” (“Delivering” 188).  The materiality of 
writing is foregrounded by the seemingly immaterial state of writing in digital environments.  
Because digital compositions have no necessary physical state, they may take any form and 
include any content or medium supported by the composer’s technology.  The materiality of the 
digital environment, as well, has a role to play in interpretation.  A message received in e-mail 
will be composed differently and approached differently – and rightly so in both cases – than if it 
had been composed in PowerPoint, or as a text message on a cellular phone, or in a word 
processor, or as a Web page or blog. 
 Anne Frances Wysocki poses the materiality and environmental context of digital 
communication as a fundamental question to be researched and incorporated into our 
pedagogies.  She writes: 
I want to consider how any material we use for communication is 
not a blank carrier for our meanings, is not a blank that contributes 
nothing to how readers understand.  Instead, I believe that we have 
a time of opening here, a time to be alert to how these choices of 
material very much articulate into the other structures that shape 
writing and our lives – and that being alert to these choices can 
help us shape changes we might want.  (“Opening” 10) 
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As I have argued previously, works in the distributed mode do not need to be digital to be fully 
distributed, but it helps.  Similarly, all of the hermeneutical and compositional pedagogies 
explored here can be successfully carried out using non-digital works and non-digital 
technologies of composition, but having the computers and the digital works helps to make 
features like the immensely rich possibilities for multimodal and dialogic expression visible and 
teachable.  It is not enough, however, simply to use technology as an illustration.  That approach 
treats technology as a medium and as a tool.  Instead, as Wysocki and Johndan-Eilola posit, we 
need to ask “What are we likely to carry with us when we ask that our relationship with all 
technologies should be like that which we have with the technology of printed words?” 
(“Blinded by the Letter” 349).  We need to ask this question as researchers, and we need to ask it 
in the classroom, making the computer and its power to operate as an environment for the 
consumption as well as the production of works, a topic for inquiry. 
 
4.4.1. Assignment Sequence, Part III: Prose Reflection 
 
The final assignment in this brief sequence asks students to return to their previous work, the 
multimodal argument and the PowerPoint presentation, and to document the construction, and 
analyze the argumentative strategies and effectiveness, of each.  For the reflection, however, 
multimodality was forbidden – the reflection was to be composed using only prose text, with a 
standardized font, font size, font color, and margins.  The goals of the reflection assignment are 
four-fold: the assignment is first a call to revisit earlier work and to revise it in light of new 
knowledge, skills, and technological capabilities; second, the reflection asks students to perform 
an analysis of PowerPoint as recent users of the program; third, students are asked to evaluate the 
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 capabilities and limitations of the word processor; and fourth, the reflection assignment asks 
students to engage in a very complex comparative analysis of a single, self-selected and 
composed message across modes and media.   
 Below, I have included the final section of a prose reflection written by a student whom I 
shall call “Margo Lewis.”  Lewis’ reflection began with a careful description of her processes of 
composing both her multimodal argument and her PowerPoint presentation.  The section in which 
I am interested for the purposes of this chapter focuses on PowerPoint and what Lewis perceives 
as its shortcomings. 
 I am not extremely fond of PowerPoint. My dislike stems 
from a combination of being forced to do far too many 
presentations in high school and how ponderous putting a 
presentation together is. To make a presentation “interesting” 
requires locating images, animations, sounds, etc. to capture the 
audience’s attention and then somehow attempting to keep it after 
the novelty of the images and animations has worn off. I think the 
program can be a useful visual aide on occasion, but simply 
conveying ideas and information in prose is far easier and clearer 
than the forced summarization of PowerPoint. 
 Edward Tufte’s essay on PowerPoint’s cognitive style is 
more aimed towards how useful the program is in a business 
atmosphere. For an analysis tool on a not-very-long persuasive 
paper, it’s actually not terrible, except for the tediousness of 
organizing and decorating slides to give them the semblance of 
importance or interestingness. [. . . .] 
 This experience also reminded me of the fact that 
PowerPoint is more of a prompt for the presenter than anything at 
all for the audience, proving correct Tufte’s statement “. . 
.PowerPoint is entirely presenter-oriented, and not content-
oriented, not audience-oriented” (The Cognitive Style of 
PowerPoint, p.4). The audience learns nothing from slides that are 
sparse or from ones crammed with words and information. They 
are disinterested or left to draw their own conclusions, which may 
be entirely incorrect. Again, PowerPoint is like the presenter’s 
assistant director of a play, prompting the individual when “lines” 
are forgotten. This raises the question of why we should even 
bother with PowerPoint when it’s known that the presentation isn’t 
meant for the entertainment of the audience. Besides, a presenter 
could simply mark his notes with highlights. None of the material 
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 in my presentation couldn’t be reproduced in printouts that would 
clarify all my points and eliminate all the extraneous “Phluff.” The 
presentation is more informative when accompanied by the prose 
“talk-through” part of the assignment, so why not cut the 
presentation entirely? All the information on the slides could be 
inserted quite effortlessly into the prose. Although the materials in 
this case were low-resolution, PowerPoint still prevented me from 
being perfectly crystal-clear about my points and all the relevant 
data. 
 Being an avid reader and writer, I am a huge fan of word 
processing and absolutely believe that it has fewer limitations than 
PowerPoint. Ideas are not restricted in any way; they may be 
outlined and then expanded to their full potential and beyond. The 
product of word processing requires thought and comprehension, 
and provides greater clarity of analyses. Of course, where charts 
and graphs are utterly necessary, word processing can’t measure up 
if its multimodal capabilities are ignored or absent. However, word 
processing is a way to convey gads of information clearly and as 
pithily or wordily as the writer wishes. The reader has something 
more to connect to and doesn’t have to rely completely on a 
presenter or speaker to get the data across. This is especially 
important for people who are more visual than auditory learners. A 
presenter’s words are not going to remain in their heads, and they 
will more likely retain the incomplete data scattered on a slide, and 
if they choose to relay those inaccurate nuggets to someone else, 
severe problems could result, such as in Tufte’s example of the 
Columbia PP presentation. I believe word processing is definitely 
the way to go. After all, Gutenberg’s printing press isn’t the most 
important invention ever for no reason. 
 
As I read it, this section of Lewis’ reflection addresses three major issues: the tedium of trying to 
maintain the illusion of “importance or interestingness” using PowerPoint; the program’s lack of 
consideration for its audience; and the advantage enjoyed by prose text and word processors over 
PowerPoint.  These points all reiterate arguments made by Tufte in The Cognitive Style of 
PowerPoint, but begin to move in more personal and yet still well-grounded directions. 
 Lewis’ first set of claims, that composing for PowerPoint is “ponderous,” and that the 
strain of creating “interesting” slides – which, here, is defined as including “images, animations, 
sounds, etc.” – is necessary “to capture the audience’s attention and then somehow attempting to 
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 keep it after the novelty of the images and animations has worn off,” both point to a larger 
critique of discourse in the PowerPoint environment.  Lewis’ claims are valid and easily 
supported by even the most cursory glance at the PowerPoint program itself – even students who 
have not previously used the software report how “easy” it is, how “simple” the templates made 
assembling their slideshows – but Lewis does not address this.  Instead, she seems to be more 
interested in the dynamic between the presenter and her audience, a dynamic in which neither 
party is portrayed favorably.  If audiences demand, as Lewis writes, “the semblance of 
importance or interestingness” in their presentations, then they value appearance more highly 
than content, flash more highly than analysis.  Of course, the presenter so willing to 
accommodate this need for superficiality can hardly be excused or forgiven.  Lewis’s second 
major critique is of the fundamental bias toward the presenter in PowerPoint.  Not only is the 
software designed to create slides which are usually capable of nothing more than promptings for 
the presenter, but should the presenter attempt to communicate data or analysis through her 
slides, she finds that the resolution possible in the program ensures that “the audience learns 
nothing from slides that are sparse or from ones crammed with words and information.”63  This 
leads Lewis to ask, rhetorically, “why not cut the presentation entirely” and replace the 
slideshow with an oral report accompanied by “handouts.”  Lewis follows Tufte’s preference for 
written text over slides, but in her justification of prose she makes some very interesting 
observations.  First, in arguing for the greater complexity possible in prose text, she notes the 
utility of outlining, a pre-writing strategy most of my students seem to have dismissed as 
hopelessly twentieth-century.  She also takes a swipe at the prose reflection assignment itself, 
                                                 
63   “Resolution” is a term advanced by Tufte in The Cognitive Style of PowerPoint to describe the amount of information per 
slide which may be visually recognized and understood by audiences.  Tufte argues that PowerPoint has an extremely 
low resolution, resulting in what is known as the “6 by 6” rule, which limits the amount of data per slide to not more 
than six lines of text, each of which may contain not more than six words (Cognitive Style 4, 19).  By comparison, this 
footnote alone contains ninety words. 
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 criticizing the assignment for hobbling the word processor by ignoring its “multimodal 
capabilities.”  And finally, Lewis makes an uncommon claim that reading prose text will favor 
“visual” learners.  I have been continually surprised by the diffusion and circulation of the 
concept of the visual learner, as it has been repeated often in my classes.  Usually, however, my 
students claim to be visual learners, and thus more interested in images than in words.  Lewis, 
here, reminds her readers that prose text is always a visual medium. 
 These points suggest an interest in the larger modes and practice of discourse in and 
around PowerPoint, an interest I encouraged for later revision.  As the draft illustrates, these 
ideas are only barely mentioned, and lack critical development and organization.  However, it is 
heartening to see these moves being made, to see the gesture to the larger context, and to see a 
student attempting to connect the context and the particular object of the analysis to her own 
writing practices.   
 
4.4.2. Rhetorical Awareness and Rhetorical Control 
 
In the second chapter, I introduced David Kaufer’s theory of rhetoric as world-creation.  As 
Kaufer writes, rhetoric is “the application of language to bring about a world, a cast of 
characters, and a contest to the listener’s here and now” (“From Tekhne to Technique” 269).  
This was central to my approach to interpretation, as the enactor’s requirement before, during, 
and after interpretation is the conformation of the world of the work, the imaginative 
(re)construction of the rhetorical acts of the composer.  From the vantage point of the 
composition classroom, this is not merely central, it is the sine qua non of composition.  The 
composition of worlds for enactors to conform is the work of the composer, regardless of 
whether she is student, professor, or professional composer. 
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 Preferring a more environmental model, John Duffy, like David Kaufer, divorces rhetoric 
from “the classical arts of persuasion or the verbal ornamentation of elite discourse.”   Instead, 
Duffy writes:  
rheroric as I mean it here refers to the use of symbols by 
institutions or individuals to structure thought and shape 
conceptions of the world.  This means that we may think of 
rhetorics in the plural rather than imagining a single, coherent, and 
all-unifying rhetoric.  [. . .  .] Rhetorics provide the frameworks in 
which individual acts of reading and writing take place.  (“Letters 
from the Fair City” 226-227, emphasis in original) 
 
Duffy’s contribution – looking at both the individual’s rhetorical acts and the environment in 
which the individual is allowed to or constrained from performing those acts – is especially 
necessary when considering the technologies of composition.  It is the traditional work of the 
composition class to instill in students an awareness of language, and of their own uses of 
language, thus making possible the conscious, polished performance of rhetorical skill in writing.  
Many professors of composition also work to instill in their students an awareness of the 
students’ surroundings – whether through an environmental, political, social, or issue-based 
focus.  Few, however, consider the environment of the computer and the Internet, an 
environment that may affect student composition as much as, or more than, any of these other 
factors. 
 The student portfolio is a space in which the individual acts of world-creation generated 
by a student are combined into something larger and more complex – a galaxy of worlds, so to 
speak.  The student blogs that I assign serve as portfolios in two important ways.  First, the blogs 
provide an always accessible compilation of the student’s writing.  Many of the assignments are 
never posted to the blog, but the weekly blogging requirement ensures that each blog will have a 
wide variety of writing by the students, sometimes on course-related topics and sometimes on 
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 more individual interests.  I refrain from grading individual blog posts – it would violate the role 
of the blog as a writer’s notebook and make the blog an even less safe space than it otherwise 
might be.  Instead, at the end of the semester the students reexamine their previous posts and 
select five posts that they think are their best, most interesting, and most representative of 
themselves, their interests, and their writing.  Thus, the blog serves as a de facto portfolio and 
later as an intentioned and crafted portfolio.  When the students turn in their blog post portfolio, 
they also turn in a brief Composer’s Note, putting the selected posts into a relevant context.  The 
Composer’s Note is intended to serve as an introduction to the student’s selected posts, allowing 
the reader to make sense of them.  In this case, even though the blog posts remain public and 
available, the reader of the collected portfolio is just me.   I advise students that they may want to 
explain what connects these posts, what they find most interesting about them, or what they are 
surprised to see in them.  I also advise students that they may revise their blog posts before they 
submit them as their portfolio.  Bloggers in general revise their content frequently, usually – but 
not always – noting such changes.  It is in the student’s interest, I suggest, to review carefully his 
or her blog posts and revise them as needed.  In a particularly broad hint, I note that should a 
student find that a post needs to be completely re-written, it would be best to compose a new post 
in which the student links to the earlier post.  A post like this (a “wow, what was I thinking?” 
post), I confide, can be extremely interesting, as it shows an evolving perspective.  Whether the 
students compose any new posts for their portfolios, however, is up to them. 
 Second, the blog portfolio is an exercise in revision, and thus a test of the students’ 
awareness of, and skill with, their rhetorical prowess.  It is also an opportunity to reflect on the 
environment of the blog as a communicative medium.  The Composer’s Note, in particular, is a 
space in which the student can bring these two awarenesses into productive harmony.  Had Beth 
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 Roberts, for instance, included her post “Physics Will Make You Tired” in her portfolio, I would 
have been interested to see what changes, if any, she made to her original post.  Roberts 
indicated that she would return to the post at a later date to include the name of the lecturer – an 
action she did not perform.  As blogs and blog posts are almost infinitely customizable and 
revisable, her rationale for her writerly actions, whether she chose to add the lecturer’s name or 
not, would be more important than her actual action.  After all, the post is intelligible without the 
name, and the verbal placeholder Roberts uses powerfully conveys the mutability of online 
writing.  Interestingly, refraining from making the change indicates the potential for change, 
while making the change effaces that potential.  The Composer’s Note for the blog portfolio 
requires students to analyze the rhetorical moves they make, and to situate those moves within 
the environment in which they were composed.  The Composer’s Note also allows students to 
make explicit their own processes of reading – substantive changes in analysis illustrate 
analytical reading, and changes to the tone, style, and delivery of the posts indicate writerly and 
imaginative reading. 
 The three assignments in the sequence I have described in this chapter also strive to foster 
in students an awareness of their own rhetorical acts of world creation, as well as the already-
constructed worlds in which they are being asked to operate.  Much earlier in this chapter, I cited 
Kathleen Blake Yancey’s article, “Made Not Only in Words,” which notes the wide array of 
technologies of communication that our students use, many on a daily basis.  In the three 
assignments of this sequence, I explicitly challenge my students to operate in three very different 
technological and discursive environments – multimodality, PowerPoint, and prose text on a 
page.  Each assignment requires my students to engage in code-switching, a skill and concept 
that arose from research in the field of discourse studies.  Briefly, code-switching is the cognitive 
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 and performative activity of changing one’s practice of discourse, usually in response to a 
change in social context.  As noted discourse theorist James Paul Gee writes: 
All of us control many different social languages and switch 
among them in different contexts.  In that sense, no one is 
monolingual.  But, also, all of us fail to have mastery of some 
social languages that use the grammatical resources of our “native 
language,” and, thus, in that sense, we are not (any of us) “native 
speakers” of the full gamut of social languages which compose 
“our” language. (Introduction 87) 
 
Code-switching is, I believe, the dominant and unheralded skill needed to be compositionally 
literate in the twenty-first century.  The spectrum of environments and applications for 
composing, each of which gives rise to its own generic practices and traditions, requires that we 
master many different ways of communicating through writing.  Instant Messenger (IM), for 
instance, is one of the most popular computer applications among our students.  IM allows 
students to type short messages to other computer users, like e-mail, but without any time lag.  
The instantaneous nature of IM, coupled with its short message lengths, makes it more like 
conversation than e-mail, which is more akin to postal letters, and hence, monologic.  Like IM, 
short message service (SMS) offers the ability to send short text messages via cell phones.  IM 
and SMS, then, as rapid, conversational tools, have an entire lexicon and grammar associated 
with them, conventions which facilitate the instant-ness of both technologies.  A sample, and 
hopelessly uncool, IM/SMS message might read: “hA, wotz ^?  Im n class nw, bt cnt W8 2 MEt 
^ w U.  Did U c d shO?  OMG LOL.”  This message, in standard English, reads, “Hey, what's 
up?  I'm in class now, but can't wait to meet up with you.  Did you see the show?  Oh my God, 
I’m laughing out loud.”  In IM/SMS, vowels are frequently dropped, numbers replace letters or 
even words, and typographic characters are used to indicate words and concepts like “up” and 
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 “down.”  I have had students turn in formal essays with IM/SMS lingo in place of words, and not 
realize the substitutions.   
Regardless of whether we address issues of digital communication, we ask our students to 
learn a new discourse in our composition courses.  As David Bartholomae notes in “Inventing 
the University,” “the student has to learn to speak our language, to speak as we do, to try on the 
particular ways of knowing, selecting, evaluating, reporting, concluding, and arguing that define 
the discourse of our community” (589).  We ask our students to code-switch from their daily 
discourses to our academic mode, but if we have no understanding or awareness of the many 
discourses our students already practice and at which they have become proficient – let alone of 
the various discourses in which we are asking them to participate, such as PowerPoint and word 
processors capable of rich multimodality – what are their chances for success, and what burdens 
have we unfairly placed upon them? 
 
4.5. COMPOSITION AND TECHNOLOGY: CONSTRAINTS, IMPLICATIONS, AND 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR DIGITAL DISCOURSE 
 
In the introduction to this chapter, I mentioned the NCTE and CCCC’s calls for including 
multimodality and digital media in the composition classroom and for taking seriously 
experimental research and non-traditional publication venues for tenure and promotion reviews.  
“That NCTE and CCCC feel the need to call for such changes,” I noted, “indicates that 
conditions throughout education are not yet fully conducive to such practices.”  In this 
concluding section, I will focus on those conditions, and their implications for students, teachers, 
administrators, and the university in general. 
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  As I have written, code-switching is an activity and a skill that our students already 
possess to a great extent.  If we hope for them to be able to consciously control and modulate 
their uses of, and skills with, the various discourses they are expected to practice fluently, we 
must make the moves between and among discourses an explicit, analyzable part of our 
curricula.  This is not dissimilar to the moves that many teachers of composition already make 
(and have for decades), when they assign various genres of essay to their students.  Shifting from 
the personal essay to the argumentative essay to the research paper, for instance – and especially 
when accompanied by class discussion – can foreground the cognitive processes of becoming 
aware of discourses and working to operate within their particular purviews.  Such discussion 
and such moves, however, require knowledge and expertise in the various discourses under 
discussion.  For researchers trained in the traditional forms of academic writing, switching codes 
from prose work to multimodal and computer-based work will require no small amount of effort 
and attention. 
 The traditional academic essay, however, is itself undergoing its own evolution, thanks, 
in large part, to the ubiquity of the computer.  Models of what became known as “the writing 
process,” developed from the work in the 1970s of such figures as Janet Emig, Linda Flower, 
Sondra Perl, and Nancy Sommers, no longer seem to apply.  Even at its most reductive and basic 
formulation, the pre-writing (brainstorming, outlining, free-writing, etc.), writing, and post-
writing (editing, revision, restructuring, etc.) model no longer seems to obtain.  In most process 
theories, writers engage in all three stages simultaneously, constantly planning ahead, writing, 
and revising as they work.  And yet, as many of us will acknowledge, there was pragmatic 
reasoning behind the injunction we were given in our own writing instruction to engage in pre-
writing before beginning to write.  Our students today, for the most part, have never known 
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 school or writing without computers.  They have never experienced the terror and pain of 
composing with the typewriter, for instance.  For them, writing drafts in longhand, on paper, is 
an unnecessary luxury, not a time-saving step in the generation of academic work.  If finished 
academic work is work that is typed, and if the technology for producing that finished work is 
the typewriter, then the composer had better know what it is that she intends to say, how she 
intends to say it, and her typing skills had better be good.  In such a setting, and with that 
reduced level of technology, writers on the typically rushed academic schedule would not have 
time to retype their work to incorporate the many revisions that occur between the conception of 
a writing project (the ideal work) and – it is hoped – the final version of that project. 
 The differences between writing in the age of typewriters and in the age of personal 
computers are clear and significant.  Earlier this year, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette published an 
article about the new Scholastic Aptitude Test’s essay section, including a side-bar with tips for 
writing the new SAT essay.  The tips, from officials at the College Board (the corporate authors 
and publishers of the SAT), contain such suggestions as:  
• Spend the first five minutes planning the essay. 
 
• Readers are trained not to judge essays by handwriting or 
length, but the handwriting – print or script – must be 
legible, and a single paragraph probably isn’t long enough. 
 
• Readers won’t subtract for misspellings unless they are so 
distracting they interfere with the message. (Chute “SAT’s 
Essays” A11) 
 
To students who are used to composing at the keyboard, the suggestion that they spend one-fifth 
of their total allotted time thinking instead of writing may seem ludicrous.  One of the promises 
of personal computers was that they would make editing, reorganizing, and all other manner of 
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 revision instantaneous and accessible at all times.  The ability to change a single word in the 
middle of the page, and to have that page automatically reformatted to retain its “professional” 
appearance, for instance, was a revolutionary change from the compositional environment of the 
typewriter.  Given this ability to edit on the fly, however, are our students engaging in the 
substantial editing and revision that their technology so clearly facilitates?  My own experiences 
with student writing suggest that our composition instruction has largely failed to adapt to the 
new writing processes. 
 If we can agree that our pedagogies have failed to adapt to new conditions, then we must 
acknowledge that the institutional structures of academia risk becoming extinct.  George 
Landow, one of the towering figures of digital humanities theory and research, plaintively writes 
in a recent article that “Like so many other American institutions, Brown [University] still does 
not have any way of counting hypertext and most computing work in the humanities toward 
tenure or promotion” (“Educational Innovation” 113).  Brown, as Landow reminds us, was at the 
forefront of humanities computing, and yet even this innovator remains attached to an older 
understanding of academic work.   
As David Bartholomae writes, “academic writing is the real work of the academy” 
(“Writing with Teachers” 480).  This quote is, of course, taken out of context, and yet it 
functions in two senses.  Bartholomae intends the statement to convey his conviction that the 
work of the composition course is preparation for everything else students and faculty do in 
academia.  The emphasis, in other words, is on the word “real.”  If we shift the emphasis to 
“writing,” however, we illuminate the prevailing attitude at most institutions of higher learning.  
Research which, as Cheryl Ball notes, may “typically move freely between theory and practice 
through their interactive and animated designs,” may be seen as alien to the traditional culture of 
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 the academy.  Strangely enough, this is so because “audiences are not used to recognizing their 
meaning-making strategies” (“Show, Not Tell” 409).  Traditional academic writing has always 
been aesthetic as well as analytical, with the well-turned phrase, clever word-play, or Derridean 
subversion of language conventions giving the staid and stolid essay a sheen of craft and artistry 
not always connected with the analytical merit of the piece.  But even this intrusion of the 
aesthetic is carefully modulated and contained.  When the academic work itself is formally 
indistinguishable from the artistic work it purports to analyze, many in the academy may become 
uncomfortable.   
This work, The Digital Affect, is itself a product of this culture, a work about the 
distributed mode in reading and writing composed to resemble the traditional codex work, and 
availing itself of only the barest affordances open to it as a digital composition.  Change, in the 
form of online, peer-reviewed academic journals, is coming, but its acceptance throughout the 
structures of the academy is slow.  Such change will, in the end, require a fundamental 
rethinking of what the work of the university is, how multimodality performs that work, how 
multimodality can and should be evaluated, and what the proper academic relationship between 
prose and multimodality is.  Such questions will not be answered quickly, and will not be 
accepted quickly. 
 In Chapter 3, I showed how works in the distributed mode can crack open the black box 
that is reading, allowing us to peek inside to watch, comment upon, and teach those processes.  
Digital media, and the concept of multimodality in particular, offer some ways to slow down and 
open the composing process to examination and pedagogical intervention, but in no way do they 
provide the skeleton key to the treasure chest of composition cognition.  And yet, digital media 
are an inseparable part of contemporary composition.  We cannot ignore this.  My student, 
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 Margo Lewis, ended her prose reflection with a justification for her preference for prose over 
PowerPoint by noting that, “After all, Gutenberg’s printing press isn’t the most important 
invention ever for no reason.”  The jury is – and rightly so – still out on whether the personal 
computer, and the ability to publish materials to the Internet, rivals Gutenberg.  But for our 
students, and the mediaspheres they inhabit and in which they participate, writing is not what it 
used to be.  It is sometimes stranger, sometimes richer, and always faster than it was even twenty 
years ago. 
 Cynthia Selfe notes that “Literacies accumulate rapidly when a culture is undergoing a 
particularly dramatic or radical transition.  And during such periods of rapid change, individuals 
are often expected to learn, value, and practice both past and present forms of literacy 
simultaneously and in different spheres of their lives” (“Students” 50).  This is certainly one of 
those times.  Teachers, students, and non-academic writers all must come to terms with the new 
opportunities and limitations offered by the evolving environments of digital technology.  
Otherwise, we risk enabling the dystopian future predicted by Kathleen Blake Yancey.  As 
Yancey writes: 
If we continue to partition [technology] off as just something 
technical, or outside the parameters governing composing, or limit 
it to the screen of the course management system, or think of it in 
terms of the bells and whistles and templates of the PowerPoint 
screen, students in our classes learn only to fill up those templates 
and fill in those electronic boxes – which, in their ability to invite 
intellectual work, are the moral equivalent of the dots on a multiple 
choice test.  Students will not compose and create, making use of 
all the means of persuasion and all the possible resources thereto; 
rather, they will complete someone else’s software package; they 
will be the invention of that package. (“Made Not Only in Words” 
320) 
 
 
263 
  
 
 
5. CONCLUSION(S) 
 
Works composed in the digital mode – digital as well as quasi-digital – are saturated with 
affective strategies.  Likewise, our uses of digital media and technology frequently are heavily 
shaded by our own affective engagement with both the user interfaces and the content presented 
by digital media.  All too often, technology effects its own disappearance, becoming 
“transparent” to the user and thus fading into the natural world.  When this happens, we begin to 
lose the ability to question the communication media, by which we are surrounded, and their 
messages, with which we are saturated.  This familiarization process is now almost complete 
with the technology of the codex book.  Most of us no longer see the book as a technological 
marvel with a human-contrived structure and interface that limits some, and makes possible 
other, modes of communication.  Instead, the book is a transparent gateway to narrative or 
informative realms.  Italo Calvino’s If on a winter’s night a traveler is, as I mentioned 
previously, almost always read as a battle between reading and writing.  It is also, of course, a 
scathing critique of the technology of the modern novel and of the book publishing industry.  It is 
the technology of the book, and of the industries that produce books, that makes possible the 
forgeries and narrative sabotage of Ermes Merana and Silas Flannery. 
 The name “Ermes Merana” brings us back to the figure of Hermes, the messenger of the 
gods, Olympian trickster, and patron deity of the study and practice of textual interpretation – 
hermeneutics.  In this dissertation, I have attempted to describe a hermeneutical approach to 
digital media, one that, in other words, looks at the works themselves and also at the ways we try 
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 to make sense of them.  Classical hermeneutics encompasses only the consumption and 
interpretation of already-produced works.  This, I feel, is an oversight.  Drawing on an 
understanding of literacy that moves beyond reading to include all forms of interpretation and 
meaning-making allows me to think of composition and multimodal argumentation as fully 
literate practices, for instance.  If we want to think of writing as an opportunity to discover and 
form new knowledge, then we must include composition in the field of hermeneutics, for without 
the lived and meaningful processes of interpretation and understanding, writing becomes merely 
an exercise in recording pre-digested and already-shaped messages.  Besides, as a trickster god, 
Hermes would be offended at the suggestion that we leave composition out of his particular 
sphere of influence.  Hermes is undoubtedly well acquainted with the mischief that may come 
from writing. 
 In the Preface to The Digital Affect I mentioned that this work is only a beginning, the 
framing of a conversation (sometimes intriguing, sometimes contentious, I hope) concerning our 
understanding of and engagement with digital media.  The complexity of digital narratives and 
their inclusion in practically all facets of twenty-first century life render moot the question of a 
single next step to take in continuing research.  Instead, what I see is a web of interrelated 
inquiries, each of which, rhizome-like, links to others being investigated now by other digital 
researchers, and to some yet to be devised.   
In Harold Ramis’ 1993 film, Groundhog Day, Bill Murray plays Pittsburgh TV 
weatherman Phil Connors, who is sent to Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania, to report on the annual 
Groundhog Day festivities.  An unexpected blizzard traps Connors and his film crew in 
Punxsutawney overnight, but Connors wakes the next morning to find himself reliving the 
previous day.  Through an unexplained loop in time and space, every day is Groundhog Day, and 
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 Connors appears doomed to repeat the same day, seemingly forever.  This use (or abuse, from 
Connor’s initial perspective) of repetition is a common feature of works in the distributed mode, 
which may send enactors to the same lexia over and over again in what is termed recursion.  
Each time the enactor reaches an already-seen lexia, however, she comes to that lexia with a 
different perspective on the world of the work, and a different, greater understanding of the work 
as a whole.  In Groundhog Day, Connors uses his recursive experiences as practice time to 
seduce women, commit crimes, and eventually win the love of his TV producer, played by Andie 
McDowell.  Each time through the loop of Groundhog Day provides Connors with new insights 
and another chance to succeed at whatever task he has set for himself, until finally he finds true 
love and the recursive spell is broken.   
Literary theory has a history of making progress over the mangled corpses of those who 
came before, as if English Studies were a zero-sum game.  One of the features of digital theory 
that makes it such an intriguing field of inquiry is that the theory – along with the body of works 
it studies – is rapidly evolving.  From a hermeneutical perspective, though I do not agree with all 
of the work that has come before, even the most disputed efforts can be seen as providing insight 
into the field and its future directions.  As advances in digital media allow the production and 
distribution of ever more daring and outré works, digital theory continues to try to keep pace.  It 
promises to be a wild ride. 
 
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
(T.S. Eliot, “Little Gidding” 145) 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
SELECTED CODEX WORKS FREQUENTLY APPEARING IN DIGITAL MEDIA 
THEORY: A BRIEF BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
APOLLINAIRE, GUILLAUME  
Calligrammes  
Aarseth, Espen. Cybertext. 10+.  
Bolter, Jay David. Writing Space. 153.  
Ryan, Marie-Laure. Narrative as Virtual Reality. 216+.  
 
BORGES, JORGE LUIS  
“The Aleph”  
Landow, George. Hypertext 2.0. 37+.  
Ryan, Marie-Laure. “Introduction: From Possible Worlds.” 178+.  
Ryan, Marie-Laure. “Will New Media Produce New Narratives?” 340.  
“The Book of Sand”  
Douglas, Jane Yellowlees. The End of Books. 14+.  
Glazier, Loss Pequeño. Digital Poetics. 19-21.  
Landow, George P. “What’s a Critic to Do?” 38.  
“The Garden of Forking Paths”  
Bolter, Jay David. Writing Space. 145-148.  
Coover, Robert. “The End of Books.” 23.  
Douglas, Jane Yellowlees. The End of Books. 60+.  
Herman, David. “Toward a Transmedial Narratology.” 63.  
Landow, George P. “What’s a Critic to Do?” 38.  
Landow, George P. Hypertext 2.0. 56.  
Montfort, Nick. Twisty Little Passages. 45.  
Moulthrop, Stuart. “Rhizome and Resistance.” 213+.  
Moulthrop, Stuart and Nancy Kaplan. “They Became What They Beheld.” 228+.  
Murray, Janet H. Hamlet on the Holodeck. 30-32+.  
Ryan, Marie-Laure. Narrative as Virtual Reality. 65+.  
“The Library of Babel”  
Bolter, Jay David. Writing Space. 145-148.  
Glazier, Loss Pequeño. Digital Poetics. 47.  
“A Survey of the Work of Herbert Quain”  
Bolter, Jay David. Writing Space. 145-148.  
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 Ryan, Marie-Laure. Narrative as Virtual Reality. 204+.  
CALVINO, ITALO  
If on a winter’s night a traveler  
Aarseth, Espen. Cybertext. 7+.  
Aarseth, Espen. “Aporia and Epiphany.” 35.  
Murray, Janet H. Hamlet on the Holodeck. 38-39+.  
Rabinowitz, Peter. “Music, Genre, and Narrative Theory.” 315.  
Ryan, Marie-Laure. Narrative as Virtual Reality. 200+.  
Ryan, Marie-Laure. “Cyberage Narratology.” 124+.  
 
CHOOSE YOUR OWN ADVENTURE BOOKS  
Aarseth, Espen. Cybertext. 66+.  
Aarseth, Espen. “Quest Games as Post-Narrative Discourse.” 366.  
Bolter, Jay David. Writing Space. 148.  
Montfort, Nick. Twisty Little Passages. 71, 125, 131.  
Murray, Janet H. “Pedagogy of Cyberfiction.” 160n3.  
Ryan, Marie-Laure. Narrative as Virtual Reality. 248+.  
Ryan, Marie-Laure. “Introduction [to Cyberspace Textuality].” 7.  
Ryan, Marie-Laure. “Will New Media Produce New Narratives?” 341.  
 
FOWLES, JOHN  
The French Lieutenant’s Woman  
Douglas, Jane Yellowlees. “How Do I Stop This Thing?” 162+.  
Douglas, Jane Yellowlees. The End of Books. 24+.  
Rabinowitz, Peter. “Music, Genre, and Narrative Theory.” 315.  
Ryan, Marie-Laure. Narrative as Virtual Reality. 252+.  
Ryan, Marie-Laure. “Cyberage Narratology.” 134.  
 
GIBSON, WILLIAM  
Neuromancer  
Bolter, Jay David. Writing Space. 201.  
Joyce, Michael. Of Two Minds. 103, 118-119.  
Lahti, Martti. “As We Become Machines.” 157.  
Moulthrop, Stuart. “Rhizome and Resistance.” 299.  
Moulthrop, Stuart. “The Shadow of an Informand.” 60.  
Murray, Janet H. Hamlet on the Holodeck. 22.  
Ryan, Marie-Laure. Narrative as Virtual Reality. 52+.  
Ryan, Marie-Laure. “Cyberspace, Virtuality, and the Text.” 78+.  
Ryan, Marie-Laure. “Introduction: From Possible Worlds.” 178+.  
 
JOYCE, JAMES  
Finnegan’s Wake  
Aarseth, Espen. “Aporia and Epiphany.” 33.  
Bolter, Jay David. Writing Space. 142-145.  
Douglas, Jane Yellowlees. The End of Books 123+.  
Joyce, Michael. Of Two Minds. 137.  
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 Landow, George P. Hypertext 2.0. 182+.  
Moulthrop, Stuart. “Rhizome and Resistance.” 309+.  
Ryan, Marie-Laure. Narrative as Virtual Reality. 55+.  
Ryan, Marie-Laure. “Introduction [to Cyberspace Textuality].” 15.  
Ulysses  
Bolter, Jay David. Writing Space. 142-145.  
Douglas, Jane Yellowlees. “How Do I Stop This Thing?” 162+.  
Landow, George P. Hypertext 2.0. 182+.  
Murray, Janet H. “Pedagogy of Cyberfiction.” 140+.  
 
PAVIĆ, MILORAD  
Landscape Painted with Tea  
Aarseth, Espen. “Nonlinearity and Literary Theory.” 54.  
Aarseth, Espen. Cybertext. 10+.  
Dictionary of the Khazars  
Joyce, Michael. Of 2 Minds. 105+.  
Keep, Christopher J. “Disturbing Liveliness.” 168.  
Landow, George P. Hypertext 2.0. 188+.  
Moulthrop, Stuart. “Pushing Back.” 668.  
Murray, Janet H. Hamlet on the Holodeck. 37+.  
Murray, Janet H. “Pedagogy of Cyberfiction.” 138+.  
Ryan, Marie-Laure. Narrative as Virtual Reality. 94+.  
 
QUENEAU, RAYMOND  
“A Hundred Thousand Billion Poems” (“Cent Mille Milliads de Poèms”) 
Rpt. in The New Media Reader, eds. Waldrip-Fruin and Montfort.  
149-169.  
Aarseth, Espen. “Nonlinearity and Literary Theory.” 66-67.  
Aarseth, Espen. Cybertext. 10+.  
Landow, George P. “What’s a Critic to Do?” 34.  
Montfort, Nick. Twisty Little Passages. 70.  
Ryan, Marie-Laure. Narrative as Virtual Reality. 185+.  
Ryan, Marie-Laure. “Cyberspace, Virtuality, and the Text.” 97.  
“Yours for the Telling” (“Un Conte à Votre Façon”)  
Rpt. in The New Media Reader, eds. Waldrip-Fruin and Montfort.  
171-178.  
 
ROBBE-GRILLET, ALAIN  
In the Labyrinth  
Douglas, Jane Yellowlees. “How Do I Stop This Thing?” 161+.  
Douglas, Jane Yellowlees. The End of Books. 92+.  
Ryan, Marie-Laure. Narrative as Virtual Reality. 124+.  
 
STERNE, LAURENCE  
Tristram Shandy  
Bolter, Jay David. Writing Space. 140+.  
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 Douglas, Jane Yellowlees. The End of Books. 60+.  
Joyce, Michael. Of Two Minds. 22, 137.  
Keep, Christopher J. “Disturbing Liveliness.” 168.  
Landow, George P. Hypertext 2.0. 182+.  
Murray, Janet H. Hamlet on the Holodeck. 104+.  
Murray, Janet H. “Pedagogy of Cyberfiction.” 150.  
Ryan, Marie-Laure. “Cyberage Narratology.” 123+.  
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COURSE SYLLABUS: FRESHMAN SEMINAR 0003: DIGITAL DISCOURSE 
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Freshman Studies: Digital Discourse 
FS 0003 
CRN: 29963 
Fall 2004 (05-1) 
138 Gardener Steel Building (GSCC) 
Wednesdays 6-8:30pm 
http://courseweb.pitt.edu 
Instructor: Richard Parent  
Office: CL 617V 
Office Hours: Tuesdays, 11:15am-1pm 
or by arrangement 
E-Mail: richard.parent@earthlink.net
http://www.richardparent.net/FS0003 
 
 
 
DIGITAL DISCOURSE 
 
REQUIRED TEXTBOOKS 
Castro, Elizabeth.  HTML for the World Wide Web (with XHTML & CSS), 5th ed. 
Little, Brown Handbook 
Pavic, Milorad.  Dictionary of the Khazars (either Male or Female editions) 
Rall, Ted.  To Afghanistan and Back 
Tufte, Edward.  The Cognitive Style of PowerPoint 
 Works and sites available online (consult the course schedule for details) 
 
COURSE OVERVIEW 
Mutlimodality – 
modern 
computers and 
digital technology 
allow us to 
incorporate 
multiple modes of 
representation in 
our messages. 
This means that 
we now have the 
ability to include 
prose text, 
graphics, sound 
clips, links to web 
sites or other files, 
movie clips, 
animation – and 
we can do this 
quickly, easily, 
and at practically 
no cost.   
This section of Freshman Seminar will explore the ways that digital technology has 
affected our modes of communication.  When we are online, IM (instant messenger) 
provides a more immediate connection than e-mail.  In business and educational 
settings, PowerPoint has become the new lingua franca for presenting material.  
Wherever we are, SMS text messaging (on mobile phones) allows us to send prose 
messages to anyone, anywhere.  Regardless of where we live, Internet Web logs 
(“blogs”), online newspapers, and discussion forums keep us up to 
date on the world’s events.  In these environments we are constantly 
writing messages for others and reading the messages of others – but 
this writing and reading can be very different from that done by 
previous generations.  Specifically, digital technology allows us to use 
multimodality and fragmentation and connection in our “written” 
communications in new and sometimes startling ways. 
 
Whether we consider the hyperlinked multimodal assemblage of the 
World Wide Web (individual sites and pages representing fragments of 
all of the data available on the Web, and connected to each other 
via hyperlinks), or a simple text-only file created with a word 
processing program like Microsoft Word (each letter, word, sentence, 
paragraph, and page is divisible from the others, and movable 
throughout the document or to other documents), technology now 
allows us to acknowledge the fragmentary and multimedia nature of 
information and to bring together disparate bits of data to create 
new knowledge.  
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 Fragmentation & 
Connection – 
another 
important 
affordance of 
digital technology 
is the ability to 
assemble quickly 
and easily 
collections of 
data, files, or 
sites, and just as 
quickly and easily 
to explode 
assemblages 
back into their 
constituent 
elements.   
In this class we will be engaging in what literacy researchers call “code 
switching,” that is, changing from one form of discourse to another, in 
response to context.  We will be reading and writing a variety of forms of 
discourse, including such diverse examples as blog postings and 
comments, word processors, PowerPoint presentations, and hypertext 
markup language – switching our reading and writing styles as necessary 
and appropriate.  We also will be reading and writing about the switching 
that the different forms require of us. 
 
This is a composition course and, as such, you will be required to compose 
on a weekly basis.  Each week, regardless of whether there is a major 
assignment due, you will be required to compose.  There also will be 
weekly reading requirements, to supplement our class discussions and to 
provide us with new insights into our writing.  Seminar in Composition is 
traditionally a high-work-load course, and this section will be no exception. 
 
Because this is a four-credit course, you will spend at least 10 additional hours during the 
term on out-of-class Freshman Studies activities that will complement and enrich 
coursework, while providing you with knowledge of the educational opportunities at 
the University, the cultural events on campus and off, and an understanding of what it 
means to study the liberal arts.  
 
 
WORKSHOP SCHEDULE 
Every week we will explore the compositions of our classmates, reading and 
experiencing the work your fellow students have constructed for this course.  We will 
discuss the works, focusing on the strengths we notice and providing constructive 
suggestions for improving the areas we feel are not realizing their full potential.  In this 
way, we will all learn from each others’ efforts, both as composers and as critics.  Each 
student will be required to sign up for one workshop day on the workshop signup 
schedule.  Students whose work is scheduled to be workshopped are required to submit 
their work to me no later than 5pm on the Monday of the week in which we will be 
examining the work. 
 
 
GRADING: 
Weekly blogging:   10% (starts Sept. 8) 
Afghanistan assignment:  15% (Sept. 22) 
PowerPoint presentation:  10% (Oct. 6) 
PowerPoint reflection:  15% (Oct. 27) 
HyperFiction analysis:  10% (Nov. 10) 
Khazars project:   15% (Dec. 1) 
HTML final project:   15% (Dec. 8) 
Class Participation:   10% 
    100% 
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 WEEKLY BLOGGING 
In many composition classes, the hard work and effort that students put into their work 
goes unnoticed and unappreciated by all but the few people in the students’ 
particular class.  In this section, you will be creating and posting much of your work to 
your own Blogspot blogs.  By the second week of class, you will form small groups (3-4 
students each) and create your own group blog on Blogspot.  Your blog groups will be 
based on common interests, and hopefully will allow you to interact closely with your 
classmates on specific topics and happenings. 
 
You will be required to compose at least one substantive blog post each week.  
Sometimes I will provide you with a topic to address; other times you will be free to post 
on whatever strikes your fancy.  And, because the blogosphere (the world-wide 
assortment of blogs) operates as an ad-hoc community of people sharing ideas and 
exchanging viewpoints, you will also be required each week to post comments on at 
least two blog posts by others.  You may comment on any blog post you wish, but at 
least one comment each week must be on a post by a classmate.  Additionally, you 
will be required to blog about at least two of the four Freshman Lectures this fall 
semester.  The Freshman Studies department will provide more information about these 
as the semester progresses.   
 
Each week, before class, you will be required to e-mail Jennifer Dodson, the TA for this 
section, with links to your blog posts and comments for that week. 
 
 
MULTIMODAL AFGHANISTAN ASSIGNMENT 
Ted Rall is a journalist and cartoonist who traveled to Afghanistan shortly after the U.S. 
invasion of the country following the events of September 11, 2001.  Rall recorded his 
thoughts and observations about the country, its people, and the effects of the war, in 
prose, photographs, and cartoons.  Rall’s book is an excellent example of the uses of 
multimodality to convey a wide range of impressions and to create a wide range of 
reactions in its readers.  For this assignment, you will use Rall’s book as a model and 
compose your own multimodal argument.  You also will write a short analytical piece 
examining you’re the multimodal material you chose to include in your project, your 
rationales for using them, and the effectiveness of their use.  Further details will be 
provided later in the semester. 
 
 
POWERPOINT PRESENTATION & REFLECTION 
Microsoft’s PowerPoint has become the default presentation medium for business and 
for many disciplines in the academy as well.  As such, it is incumbent upon us to explore 
the rich potential and serious drawbacks of this program.  For this assignment, students 
will initially compose a 5-10 minute presentation using PowerPoint, incorporating the 
wide range of features and media supported by the program. 
 
Later in the semester, students will compose a reflection on their experience using 
PowerPoint as a mode of communication.  This reflection will discuss the students’ 
intention motivating the PowerPoint presentation, delivering the same information in a 
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 purely prose form.  Finally, the reflection will be an opportunity for students to compare 
the effectiveness of PowerPoint and prose-only documents. 
 
 
HYPERFICTION ANALYSIS 
Throughout the semester, we will be reading and experiencing a range of online 
narratives constructed in variously fragmented ways, using a variety of representational 
modes.  These stories relate their multimodal narratives in much the same way that the 
World Wide Web relates information across countless hyperlinked sites and pages.  
Literary theorists frequently refer to these online narratives as hyperfictions.  You will be 
required to compose at least one blog entry on your thoughts about hyperfiction in 
general, and on the particular works we explore in class.  Your blog entries should be a 
space for beginning this assignment, a longer and more in-depth examination of one 
particular hyperfiction.  Further details will be provided later in the semester. 
 
 
KHAZARS PROJECT 
Milorad Pavic’s Dictionary of the Khazars is a “lexicon novel” – that is, it is a novel written 
in the form of a lexicon, which is to say that the novel takes the form of a dictionary.  In 
fact, the book is comprised of three dictionaries, each with cross-references to the 
others, all discussing various aspects of the mythical (?) ancient Khazar people and their 
practices and history (mythology?).  Since it is not a traditional narrative that unfolds 
through a clear beginning, middle, and end, but rather a system of interlinked 
dictionary entries (perhaps not unlike the WWW?), the book can be read in countless 
ways.  You may choose to read the book from start to finish.  You may choose to begin 
with one of the three dictionaries, and then read the others as you wish.  You may 
choose to skim the book and begin with an entry that interests you, allowing the cross-
references throughout the book to guide you.  Your reading path and style may 
partake of elements of all of these methods (or none) – again, the form of the novel 
leaves this particular choice completely up to you.  During the semester, we will be 
reading Dictionary three different times, each time approaching the novel in a different 
way.  Your assignment for this work will require you to engage critically with the form of 
the novel, as well as with your own reading patterns and choices.  Further details will be 
provided later in the semester. 
 
 
HTML FINAL PROJECT 
For your final project in this class, you will select an aspect of digital discourse, or a 
particular manifestation of digital discourse or technology that intrigues, disturbs, or 
otherwise piques your interest.  There are two requirements for this project – the first is 
that you compose your project in HTML (or XML, if you prefer); the second is that your 
project demonstrate clear critical thinking and inquiry into the nature and implications 
of your topic.  You will prepare a proposal for your final project that will briefly explain 
your topic and the format in which you plan to produce your final project.  This proposal 
will be due by November 3rd.  Final projects will be presented to the entire class during 
the last class meeting.  More detailed directions for this assignment will be provided as 
the semester progresses. 
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CLASS PARTICIPATION 
Attendance is mandatory.  Since composition courses focus primarily not on a textbook 
but on the work of students themselves, whose writing and reading are central to class 
discussion, this course is designed to function as a seminar – which means that your 
participation in class discussion is necessary for the success of the course.  Because of 
this, and because of the truncated meeting schedule, students who miss three or more 
classes risk failing the course.  We have a lot of material to work with in a short amount 
of time.  Be prepared for the heavy commitment that the time spent writing and 
reading for this course will require.  As you can see from the Course Calendar, we will 
be quite busy.  Come to class on time and prepared to take part in conversation about 
the materials under study.  If you cannot come to class, it is your responsibility to 
communicate directly with me, to arrange to turn in written work on time, and to find 
out about subsequent assignments.  You will be considered absent if you do not turn in 
a written assignment the day it is due.  Students who miss more than two classes should 
consider withdrawing from the course and taking it again under better circumstances.  
 
Students who feel that they are too shy to participate in class discussions must meet 
with me during my office hours to receive full credit for class participation.  If you would 
feel more comfortable sharing your comments with me than with the entire class, I am 
willing to discuss your ideas with you and then bring your comments (anonymously 
reported) to the class’ attention for further exploration.  For many of you, this may be 
your first university seminar, so if you have any questions about class participation in a 
seminar course, or about my attendance policy, I encourage you to ask me. 
 
 
FRESHMAN STUDIES GRADING 
Freshman Studies is a pass/fail 1-hour component of your Freshman Seminar course.  To 
receive a passing grade in Freshman Studies, you will need to read all of the articles 
posted to the CourseWeb page under each module and complete the following six 
assignments: 
 
1) Freshman Studies (FS) Module 3: Transition from High School to College 
 ? Photoblog or blog on roommate or blog on transition to college 
2) FS Module 4: Academic Skills and Services 
 ? Library Tour & Info on Using Electronic Resources 
3) FS Module 5: Academic Integrity 
  ? Meta-blog post on linking vs. stealing 
4) FS Module 6: The Nature & Value of a Liberal Arts Education 
  ? Current event media comparison – blog the results 
5) FS Module 7: Relationships with the Academic Community 
  ? Take a prof to lunch or Prof interview or Form a study group 
6) FS Module 8: Educational & Life Goals 
  ? Declare a major & blog your reasons for choosing that major 
 
The course calendar lists the weeks that we will be addressing each of the Freshman 
Studies modules.  On those weeks you will be required to read the materials on our 
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 CourseWeb page included in that week’s module and complete the Freshman Studies 
assignment for that module. 
 
 
 
ACADEMIC RESPONSIBILITY 
The University defines plagiarism as having occurred: “When a student presents as 
his/her own, for academic evaluation, the ideas, representations, or works of another 
person or persons without customary and proper acknowledgment of sources; When a 
student submits work of another person in a manner which represents the work to be 
his/her own; When a student knowingly permits his/her work to be submitted by another 
person without the instructor’s authorization.”  More information on the University 
policies concerning plagiarism can be found at the following URL: 
(http://clover.slavic.pitt.edu/~tales/02-1/plagiarism.html). Plagiarism will not be 
tolerated in this course. 
 
 
 
AN IMPORTANT NOTE  
If you have (or suspect that you may have) a disability for which you are or may be 
requesting an accommodation, you are encouraged to contact both myself and the 
University Office of Disability Resources and Services (DRS), 216 William Pitt Union, 412-
648-7890 or 412-383-7355 (TTY) as early as possible in the term.  The DRS Office will verify 
your disability and determine reasonable accommodation for this course. 
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 COURSE CALENDAR 
 
 
 
September 1 –  First day of class: 
    Course Syllabus 
Intro to room/computer lab 
First Digital Work: “Soothcircuit” 
 
 
 
September 8 –  Read: 
    To Afghanistan & Back pages 1-33  
HTML pages 13-24, 30-35, 117-125 
   In-Class: 
Form blog groups 
Discuss Afghanistan & HTML 
**Weekly blogging requirement begins** 
   Freshman Studies: 
Module 3: Transition from High School to College 
 
 
 
September 15 –  Read: 
    To Afghanistan & Back pages 35-110 
HTML tba 
   Due: 
FS Module 3 – College Transition (blog or photoblog) 
Workshop:  
First blog entries (photo/university/roomie blog) 
   Freshman Studies: 
    Module 4: Academic Skills and Services 
 
 
September 22 –  Read:  
The Cognitive Style of PowerPoint 
HTML tba 
   Due: 
    Multimodal Afghanistan assignment  
   Workshop: 
Multimodal Afghanistan assignment 
Freshman Studies: 
Module 7.1: Relationships with the Academic Community 
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September 29 –  Read: 
3+ News/Political blogs & 3+ News/Political sites 
HTML tba 
   Due: 
FS Unit 5 – Plagiarism (conventions re: linking vs. stealing) 
   Workshop: 
Meta-blog post on linking vs. stealing 
Freshman Studies: 
Module 5: Academic Integrity 
 
 
 
October 6 –  Read: 
Dictionary of the Khazars, 1st iteration 
   Due: 
PowerPoint presentation 
E-mail re: Khazars (reflection 1) 
   Workshop: 
PowerPoint presentations 
Freshman Studies: 
Module 7.2: Relationships with the Academic Community 
 
 
 
October 13 –  Read: 
The Case Collection 
<http://turbulence.org/Works/nature/intro.html> 
   Due: 
Blog on HyperFiction as a narrative form 
   Workshop: 
HyperFiction as a narrative form blog entries 
 
 
October 20 –  Read: 
Dictionary of the Khazars, 2nd iteration 
   Due: 
Khazars reflection 2 (blog or otherwise) 
   Workshop: 
Khazars reflection 2 (blog or otherwise) 
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October 27 –  Read: 
Scholarly Hypertext (Ashes, Sparks & Hypertext) 
HTML tba 
   Due: 
PowerPoint reflection 
   Workshop: 
PowerPoint reflections 
 
 
 
November 3 –  Read: 
HyperFiction (to be decided en masse) 
   Due: 
Media comparison blog entries 
Final Project Proposals 
   Workshop: 
Media comparison blog entries 
Freshman Studies: 
Module 6: The Nature & Value of a Liberal Arts Education 
 
 
 
November 10 – Read: 
HyperText as Knowledge Aggregator Tool (Wikipedia) 
10+ Wiki articles 
   Due: 
HyperFiction analysis 
   Workshop: 
HyperFiction analysis 
 
 
 
November 17 –  Read: 
Dictionary of the Khazars, 3rd iteration 
   Due: 
Declaration of majors blog entries 
   Workshop: 
Declaration of majors blog entries 
Freshman Studies: 
Module 8: Educational & Life Goals 
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November 24 –  THANKSGIVING HOLLIDAY (no classes) 
 
 ALL FRESHMAN STUDIES REQUIREMENTS MUST BE COMPLETED 
 
 
 
December 1 –  Read: 
    HyperMedia tba 
Due: 
Khazars project 
   Workshop: 
Khazars project 
 
 
 
December 8 – In-Class: 
    Presentations of HTML Final Project 
Due: 
HTML Final Project 
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